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Abstract 
This project develops a theory of a-legal space as a political strategy. A-legal space 
refers to the space created by initiatives which assume a quasi-legal or quasi-
institutional form without any official basis, or where they exceed their recognized 
institutional basis. Examples include peoples’ tribunals such as the World Tribunal on 
Iraq, in which the US and UK governments were tried for war crimes in Iraq; the 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy where aboriginal activists protesting for land rights erected 
tents outside the Australian Parliament and declared it an embassy; and unauthorized 
referenda such as the first Catalan independence referendum in 2009. The use of a-legal 
space is an under-studied and un-theorised tactic employed with increasing regularity 
by social movement, civil society, and sometimes, state and sub-state actors. 
The project explores several case studies from Latin America including the Bolivian 
based International Tribunal on Climate Justice; an unofficial recall referendum on 
Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992; an unauthorized ballot organized by 
the Colombian student movement in which two million people participated and led to 
the creation of Colombia’s Constituent Assembly; and Honduran President Zelaya’s 
planned non-binding poll in 2009 which led to his removal in a coup. It is argued that 
the use of a-legal space is a discursive strategy whereby actors imagine, legitimate and 
being to institutionalize a counter-hegemonic order. Specifically, a-legal initiatives have 
the potential to create ‘tipping events’ which shift the political grammar and open up 
new political possibilities. 
 
 
Key words: a-legal space; a-legal initiatives; a-legality; tipping events; political 
grammar; constitutive power; Latin America; new Latin American constitutionalism; 
radical democracy.
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Introduction 
 
Is there a space for action between the legal and the illegal? In 1992, in Venezuela, a 
marginal political party called The Radical Cause organised a referendum on the 
continued rule of President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The referendum had no official basis 
in Venezuelan law, and no binding implications. But up to 500,000 citizens are 
reported to have participated, with almost ninety percent voting that ‘No, Pérez 
should not continue governing’ (Harnecker 2007). Inspired by this event, Chilean 
theorist Marta Harnecker coined the term ‘a-legal space’: a “whole other arena” which 
“is neither legal nor illegal” (2007, p. 138). According to Harnecker (ibid.), this 
referendum helped to create the political situation in which Pérez was forced to 
resign, less than a year later: “the massive participation of the citizenry – although the 
results were not recognised – meant it was now a political fact” (2008, p.145). There 
are, she contends, countless other examples of a-legal spaces, which offer great 
potential for social movements to “raise consciousness, mobilise people and have 
them participate in a way that builds the anti-system social force” (2007, p.112). 
However, Harnecker leaves this intriguing idea undeveloped. The aim of this thesis is 
to pick up where Harnecker left off, and to develop a theory of a-legal space as a 
political strategy. 
 
I argue that there are, as Harnecker suggests, many cases around the world which can 
be characterised as a-legal spaces. These include unofficial referenda, like the 
Venezuelan referendum against Pérez, but also unofficial tribunals, commissions, 
debt audits, monitoring projects and even an embassy - amongst other forms. 
Examples include the UK’s High Pay Commission, established by campaign group 
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Compass to investigate the effects of high pay on society; peoples’ tribunals such as 
the World Tribunal on Iraq, in which the governments of the UK and the US were tried 
for war crimes in Iraq; and citizens’ debt audits such as the Ecuadorian Public Debt 
Audit Commission, which was initiated in 2007 by the Ecuadorian government and 
civil society to assess the legitimacy and legality of Ecuador’s foreign debts. These are 
activities that are not normally grouped together. However, I argue that it is helpful to 
understand them as variations of the same phenomenon. Despite the variety of 
political, historical and cultural contexts in which they have taken place, these 
activities share certain common characteristics which distinguish them from other 
forms of contentious politics. Most notably, they assume a quasi-legal or quasi-
institutional form, emulating the symbols, language and procedures of formal 
institutions of constituted power, without any formal basis or exceeding a recognised 
institutional basis. This tactic is employed with increasing regularity by social 
movements, civil society, and sometimes state and sub-state actors, yet remains 
under-researched and un-theorised. 
 
There are a number of questions which I take as the most fundamental and which 
serve to guide this research project: 
 
1. Can we sustain the notion of a-legal space as an ontologically distinct category 
of action which transcends the dichotomy between the legal and the illegal? 
2. Why do actors adopt this approach and what do they hope to achieve?  
3. By what mechanism might this tactic function to bring about social or political 
change?  
4. How do different forms of a-legal space differ and to what extent do they really 
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constitute a common tactic?  
5. When has this approach been successful and what factors may influence its 
impact? 
 
In this introductory chapter I explain the approach I have taken to investigate this 
phenomenon. I start by discussing the theoretical framework within which the 
project is situated, and then describe the particular research design and methods 
used. I discuss the specific case studies which I selected and why. I then discuss some 
of the methodological challenges faced in the course of this research, and how I 
attempted to overcome them. Finally, I provide an overview of the structure of the 
dissertation and the argument which I will develop. 
 
i. Theoretical framework 
  
Discourse theory, originally formulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), 
provides the theoretical framework within which this project is situated. There are 
several reasons why this is the appropriate framework. Firstly, within this 
framework, social reality is discursively constituted: objects, people, actions have no 
objective meaning, but are constructed in language through discourse. This is not to 
reduce everything to discourse: there is a real world, external to language, but it can 
only be conceived and represented through discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis 
2000). Politics is the struggle to define social reality. More specifically, competing 
political projects, defined as ‘hegemonic projects’, struggle to expand their discourse 
and ultimately to hegemonise the ‘field of discursivity’ (ibid.). The use of a-legal space, 
I suggest, is best conceived as a particular type of counter-hegemonic discursive 
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strategy. Unlike strikes, boycotts or occupations, organisers cannot hope for direct 
material impacts. And unlike a formal legal strategy, they cannot hope for binding 
legal implications. In fact, unlike many forms of contentious politics, these activities 
do not generally disrupt normal life at all; or at least not in the immediate future. 
Instead, they function at a discursive level, contesting the dominant construction of 
reality, and prefiguring an alternative. Moreover, as I will show in the case study 
chapters, organisers’ descriptions of what they are doing and what they are trying to 
achieve reflects the logic of hegemonic struggle. These initiatives are intended to 
advance their marginal counter-hegemonic discourse and thereby shift the range of 
political and legal possibilities available. My central thesis is that a-legal space has 
potential as a way to shift the political grammar, thereby opening up a new range of 
political possibilities in a given context. I draw on a range of conceptual tools and 
theories located within the political discourse theory tradition, to elaborate a 
conceptual framework through which to explore this idea. 
 
ii. Research design  
 
I explore the phenomenon of a-legal space through an analysis of four case studies. 
For various reasons a case study design is the most suitable approach for this 
research. Case study research is particularly well suited to new areas of enquiry, 
where the research has an exploratory purpose and the goal is to support the 
development of new theory (Yin 2009; de Vaus 2001; Eisenhardt 1989). I sought to 
explore preliminary and fundamental questions about the use of a-legal space, in the 
absence of an already existing body of literature on the phenomenon: when and why 
do these initiatives come about? How should we understand the organisers’ 
objectives? And indeed to what extent should a-legal space be considered a distinctive 
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approach or strategy? A case study design allows for an exploration of such “‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions” (Yin 2009, p. 4). Moreover, case studies suit the study of phenomena 
for which there are a large number of variables, and relatively small numbers of cases 
(de Vaus 2001). One of the interesting features of a-legal space is the diversity of 
contexts in which it has been employed; hence there are countless known and 
unknown variables, which it would be impossible and undesirable to try to isolate. 
Through an in-depth exploration of four particular instances where actors have taken 
an a-legal approach, the intention was to develop an understanding of the 
phenomenon, which could then be tested, revised and expanded upon through 
subsequent research studies. 
 
The case studies are explored through a range of qualitative research methods, in 
addition to secondary sources, where available. The first two are explored primarily 
through secondary sources, with some original analysis of documentary data 
including presidential statements, Decrees and court rulings. The other two are 
explored in-depth through mixed methods including semi-structured interviews with 
informants, archival research of newspaper coverage, and textual analysis of publicity 
materials. For several reasons, qualitative research methods were most appropriate at 
this stage of an investigation into the topic of a-legal space. The research questions I 
seek to explore are preliminary and fundamental, pertaining to the nature of this form 
of political action and, indeed, the extent to which it can be conceived as a distinct 
political strategy. I want to understand how organisers construct what they are doing 
and how they assign meaning to their actions, and I don’t want to impose 
preconceived categories and assumptions onto the research process. The project is 
situated within a discourse theoretical framework, according to which politics 
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involves the struggle to define social reality (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). If a-
legal space is conceived as a particular form of counter-hegemonic strategy, then 
central to this is understanding how organisers and other stakeholders use this form 
of action in their efforts to hegemonise the wider discursive field. This is best 
understood through in-depth interviews in which they can explain their actions in 
their own words.  
 
Future research into a-legal space could fruitfully employ quantitative methods to 
explore a range of important research questions. One might use a survey method to 
assess the demographic status, political preferences and other specifics of a-legal 
space participants (those who attend a peoples’ tribunal or vote in an unofficial 
referendum, for example). Alternatively, one might explore correlations between the 
prevalence of different forms of a-legal space and contextual factors such as regime 
type, governing party, levels of independent media, and so on. But quantitative 
research methods will build on, and cannot precede, this more preliminary 
exploration of foundational questions such as: what is a-legal space? How is it used? 
What is its value?  
 
iii. The case studies 
 
As Stake (1994, p. 243) points out, in a case study research design where cases must 
be chosen from a number of possible alternatives, “nothing is more important than 
making a proper selection of cases”. The four examples of a-legal space which were 
chosen for exploration through secondary and empirical research were carefully 
selected for their potential to contribute to a theory of a-legal space. Various specific 
features were important in their pertinence to emerging research questions and 
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hypotheses, which I outline below.  
 
All four case studies selected come from Latin America. The decision to focus on the 
use of a-legal space in Latin America is based partly on the prevalence of this 
approach in the region. A-legal initiatives can be found all over the world, but there 
has been a proliferation of this type of activity in Latin America over the last twenty 
years. Civil society-based debt audits; peoples' tribunals; and non-binding referenda 
initiated by governments, social movements and other political actors are just some 
examples of the phenomenon in this region.1 However, the motivation to focus on 
Latin America was based on more than the prevalence of the approach there. The 
appearance and increased frequency of a-legal tactics has correlated with important 
shifts in Latin American politics associated with the so-called ‘pink tide’ and I argue 
that the phenomenon can be better understood when situated in the context of these 
wider political and social transformations. Specifically, I suggest that the use of a-legal 
space in Latin America reflects the turn to a new kind of constitutionalism by left 
governments and social movements across the continent. Therefore, through 
exploring the use of a-legal space in this context the intention was to explore its 
relationship to this wider phenomenon. 
 
The first two case studies were selected mainly because of the seemingly 
extraordinary impact that they have had. Both involve unofficial, non-binding 
referenda, initiated in the context of wider struggles for a constituent assembly to re-
                                                        
1 For information on peoples' tribunals in Latin America see Saguier (2012) “Peoples' tribunals in 
Latin America”, for a discussion focused on peoples' tribunals intended to promote corporate 
accountability. The first citizens’ debt audit was initiated in Brazil in 2001, and the first 'official' 
debt audit was the Ecuadorian Public Debt Audit Commission, which had the support of President 
Correa's government. For more information and a history of debt audits in Latin America and 
elsewhere see Dearden (2011). 
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write a national constitution. However, the two cases involve very different actors 
and had very different outcomes. The first is the case of the ‘seventh ballot’ which took 
place in Colombia in 1990. In a context of profound social and political crisis, the 
Colombian student movement organised an unofficial ballot on the possibility of 
convening a constituent assembly. The students called for citizens to insert an 
additional unauthorised ballot paper into the ballot box, during the formal 
congressional and regional elections in March 1990. Despite the initiative’s informal 
status, over two million Colombians reportedly participated (Novoa García 2011; Van 
Cott 2000) and the event is generally credited with bringing about the convocation of 
Colombia’s Constituent Assembly which re-wrote their hundred-year-old 
constitution, and was a precursor to a wave of constitutional reform across Latin 
America. 
 
The second case study is Honduran President Zelaya’s proposed ‘fourth ballot box’, 
which was a non-binding poll intended to allow Hondurans to express their support 
or opposition for convening a Honduran constituent assembly. Like the seventh ballot, 
the fourth ballot box poll had dramatic (though unintended) consequences. After 
ignoring a series of legal rulings against the planned poll, President Zelaya was 
removed from power in a coup on the morning it was due to take place. Hence, as I 
discuss in more depth in chapter 3, both initiatives had a profound impact on each 
country’s political future. It is for this reason they make exciting case studies. 
Through analysing the course of events and existing scholarly analyses, in each case, I 
hope to better understand when and why this tactic might have impact. 
 
These first two cases are explored primarily through secondary sources, in addition 
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to some documentary evidence including court rulings and government statements. 
The analyses of each case prove illuminating; however, various questions are left 
unanswered and in need of further exploration. How did organisers understand what 
they were doing? What did they hope to achieve? And does this support or challenge 
the account of a-legal space so far developed? A deeper understanding of this tactic, 
and the motivations of organisers, is dependent on more in-depth empirical research. 
On this basis I decided that it was necessary to visit Latin America to carry out 
primary research into further case studies. 
 
The third case study – and the first explored through in-depth primary research – is 
the Venezuelan Radical Cause party’s referendum on the continued rule of President 
Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992, which was described by Harnecker (2007; 2008) in her 
original discussion of a-legal space. The final case study, also explored through 
primary research, is the International Tribunal on Climate Justice, an international 
peoples' tribunal based in Bolivia, organised by Bolivian civil society which held 
hearings in 2009. For this case study I was able to make use of interview data I had 
gathered two years earlier when researching the case as part of my Masters’ degree.2 
For both cases I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with key organisers 
of these initiatives, and other participants and commentators, and collated publicity 
materials and newspaper coverage, in addition to reviewing the (limited) secondary 
sources available on each case. The result is a deeper analysis of the a-legal space 
tactic, as it played out in these two initiatives. 
 
                                                        
2    I explored the idea of a-legal space and the International Tribunal on Climate Justice for my final 
year dissertation for an MA in Communication for Development. This research was the precursor 
and original motivation for this doctoral project.  
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These two cases were selected as the subjects for empirical study, out of the many 
possible alternative options in Latin America, for a number of reasons. Firstly, I 
included both a referendum and a peoples’ tribunal in the hope of exploring two 
‘most different’ forms of a-legal space. Inductive case study research, such as this, 
tends to consist of a sample of cases chosen for their diversity, in order that diversity 
and convergences in practice can be uncovered (Yin 1993). There are several 
potentially significant differences between peoples’ tribunals, citizens’ debt audits, 
informal commissions, unofficial referenda and the various other activities here 
labelled ‘a-legal space’. However, one particularly notable difference is the role played 
by new information and ‘evidence’ in different types of a-legal space. Peoples’ 
tribunals, peoples’ commissions, and citizens’ debt audits, amongst other forms, tend 
to involve the compilation and presentation of large amounts of technical information 
as a central component to their activities. This component, however, plays no role in 
other types of a-legal space such as unofficial referenda. The choice of a peoples' 
tribunal and a referendum was intended to capture the two extremes with respect to 
this characteristic.  My understanding of the two forms, upon embarking on the 
empirical research, was that peoples' tribunals develop an elaborate case to support a 
particular perspective or discourse, drawing on reams of legal, scientific, and other 
expertise. However, referenda ask for the affirmation or rejection of a specific 
proposal ('should we create a Constituent Assembly?'; 'should President Carlos 
Andrés Pérez continue governing?'), for which the case has already been made 
elsewhere. This difference is significant. If a-legal space be conceived as a hegemonic 
strategy intended to change the way a particular issue is understood and constructed 
within wider discourse, then how one understands and theorises the process of 
discursive change is central. Yet these different emphases on information provision 
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and ‘education’ could suggest quite distinct models of discursive change. Through 
analysing organiser accounts in both cases I hoped to assess the extent to which these 
initiatives indeed exemplify a common political strategy; what features peoples’ 
tribunals and popular non-binding referenda share, and how they differ.  
 
In addition to the desire to include both a referendum and a tribunal in the project, 
there were reasons for the selection of these specific cases. Despite both taking place 
in South America within a twenty-year period, the social and historical contexts of the 
two cases are very different, as are the actors who initiated them. Whilst the 
International Tribunal on Climate Justice is a contemporary initiative (the focus of the 
analysis is the 2009 hearing), the Radical Cause party’s 1992 referendum on Pérez 
took place prior to the Latin American left turn, under a neoliberal government and 
the old model of pacted democracy. And this referendum was organised, for the main 
part, by a relatively small political party (although community groups and members 
of the public helped to varying degrees in different instances – as I discuss in more 
depth in chapter 4). The International Tribunal on Climate Justice, on the other hand, 
was a collaborative effort of a coalition of NGOs, community organisations and social 
movements in some instances from across Latin America, (though headed up by one 
specific NGO). Hence the choice of these two cases allowed me to explore the use of a-
legal space in significantly different contexts and by somewhat different actors, 
thereby contributing to the analytic generalisability of my findings (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Through in-depth exploration of this type of tactic at such different 
historical conjectures, I hoped to develop an understanding of the logic of this form of 
hegemonic practice.  
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One objection to this choice of cases might be the excessive emphasis given to 
referenda. However, I was keen to include a referendum in the empirical research, 
given the limitations of secondary research, and the value of including strongly 
contrasting forms of a-legal space. The reason that the seventh ballot and the fourth 
ballot box were not selected for in-depth analysis was so that I could better test the 
theory that these cases inspired. Recent scholarship in democratic theory and 
constitutional law has championed a new kind of constitutional regime which has 
been adopted in countries across Latin America (Colón-Ríos 2012; Martínez 
Dalmau 2008). Venezuelan, Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Colombian constitutions all 
now include the provision for citizens to trigger the creation of a constituent 
assembly to re-write the national constitution. As Joel Colón-Ríos (2012, p. 103) 
puts it, this democratic development provides “an opening, a means of egress, for 
constituent power to manifest”. The Colombian seventh ballot and the Honduran 
fourth ballot box referenda were, I suggest, attempts to create such an opening 
where none exists within the formal system. They should be seen as part of a 
constitutional process which took place in these countries. Drawing on these cases, 
I suggest that this might be a helpful way to understand the use of a-legal space 
more generally. However, in initiatives which don't seek to initiate a process of 
constitution writing through a constituent assembly, this claim is more 
contentious. The suitability and the utility of this characterisation are more 
complex questions. Therefore, investigating less obviously constitution-orientated 
initiatives in more depth allows for an exploration of this idea. Finally, studying the 
Radical Cause referendum provides the opportunity to re-visit the event which was 
the original inspiration for Marta Harnecker's idea of a-legal space.  
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Of course, a study of only four instances, and only two in-depth, where actors have 
made use of a-legal space as a tool to bring about change is necessarily limited in 
what it can tell us about the phenomenon in general. This project is constrained, by 
time and resources, to a study of these few case studies. However, through this 
study I hope to develop a preliminary account of the phenomenon of a-legal space 
as a political strategy. Further research would explore other types of a-legal space, 
such as citizens' debt audits, which have become important tools of Latin American 
left governments and of civil society in Latin American and Europe. 
 
iv. Methodological challenges 
 
Whilst promising a deeper and richer account of the a-legal space tactic, empirical 
research on these initiatives entails methodological challenges not encountered with 
secondary research. I discuss now some of the particular challenges encountered in 
the two empirical studies I carried out and explain how I attempted to deal with 
them. 
 
Researching the Radical Cause party’s 1992 referendum on President Pérez involved 
various challenges.  I was investigating an event that had taken place over a single 
day, twenty years ago, initially with no contacts in the Radical Cause party or with 
anyone who had been involved, and with only a limited period to spend in Venezuela.  
This prevented various difficulties for obtaining data about the event. However, 
verifiable and reliable data was acquired. In 1997 the Radical Cause party divided, 
with the majority of members leaving to form a new party (Patria Para Todos, which 
would go on to form part of the government in 1999). Most of the individuals who 
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played key roles in the referendum against Pérez in 1992 were in the group who left 
the Radical Cause. As a result, there is no organisation with an institutional memory of 
this informal referendum or which has sought to preserve a record of the event. 
Perhaps, partly for this reason, none of the materials from the referendum such as 
voter slips, or lists of voters had been retained.3 Therefore, I was dependent on the 
accounts of organisers and other possible witnesses, supported by newspaper 
coverage, for information such as the voter turnout, levels of participation in different 
areas, numbers of voting points and other specifics. 
 
Moreover, there is reason to be cautious about relying on the accounts of interview 
participants: in some cases they may have provided an inflated or otherwise distorted 
account of the referendum. Most of the individuals interviewed who organised the 
referendum are still in professional politics, several in the Radical Cause party, and 
therefore have an incentive to inflate the impact and importance of an event in which 
they played a key role.  Aside from the motive to self-aggrandise, is the concern that 
participants might have told me what they thought I wanted to hear. Participants 
knew I had come from the other side of the world to research this single event that 
they were involved with twenty years ago: they may have felt a pressure to assure me 
it was an important event in their eyes (de Vaus 2001). 
 
One solution was to counterbalance key organisers’ accounts with other witnesses to 
generate a triangulated account. However, an additional challenge was locating 
informants from a range of different backgrounds and positions. An ideal case study 
design draws on interviews with a diverse range of stakeholders (Yin 2009), which 
                                                        
3 A couple of organisers I interviewed made efforts to find these kinds of materials, but were unable 
to locate anything useful. 
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build a three-dimensional picture of the case. I would have liked to conduct multiple 
interviews with organisers from all levels of the party hierarchy; from individuals 
who participated in this event but were not organisers nor involved with the Radical 
Cause party; members of the public who voted; and individuals who chose not to 
engage with this event, for whatever reason. In practice, whilst I had expected to 
encounter problems gaining access to key organisers, in fact this was easier than 
locating ordinary participants or lower level party activists. It was relatively easy to 
track down a couple of individuals who were well-known militants with the Radical 
Cause party in 1992, in Caracas, and who had been involved with organising the 
referendum. Through these contacts I was introduced to a group of other key 
organisers from the National Leadership of the Radical Cause party in 1992. However, 
more challenging was finding the grassroots party activists who had made the action 
happen on the ground, through running polling stations, publicising the action, and 
engaging the public. And searching for ordinary people who had voted or simply 
remembered the event was like looking for a needle in a haystack. I eventually 
interviewed one rank-and-file party activist, who helped organise the referendum in 
Caracas and one middle ranking party deputy, (in addition to the key organisers from 
the party’s National Leadership). I also interviewed two members of the public who 
participated in the referendum, an academic who had studied the event and a 
minister from the Pérez administration in 1992.  These interviews provided 
fascinating data from diverse perspectives, but it would have been ideal to interview 
multiple subjects from each of these groups. 
 
Another (to some extent related) problem was the gender balance of interview 
subjects. All informants were men, apart from one woman (a journalist who had 
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participated in the referendum). This reflects the dominance of men in the party 
leadership during this period. However, as with the dominance of party elites, it 
impacts upon the quality of the data I received. In researching the use of a-legal space 
through interviews with stakeholders, authorship is important. A-legal space is a 
response to exclusion. Actors turn to the use of a-legal space in response to formal 
institutional closure, when they perceive no opening within the formal system 
through which their discourse can be heard and can help to define the terms of 
debate. Accordingly, the project is based on a radical democratic conception of 
politics, in which the political extends beyond the institutional arena (c.f. Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985; Howarth 2004; Norval 2009). The inclusion of traditionally 
marginalised and excluded voices, as well as an “attentiveness to the possibility of 
‘deprivation of voice’” (Norval 2009, p. 308, emphasis added) are fundamental to 
political analysis within this theoretical framework. In unintentionally privileging the 
voices of party leadership and men, I may have foregone a more complex, contested 
and nuanced picture of this event and how it was experienced and constructed by 
stakeholders.4  
 
Drawing on the data I did receive, I did not notice particular differences between the 
interviews with party leadership, and middle ranking and rank-and-file level activists. 
Indeed, one interesting finding was the broadly similar discursive constructions of 
the referendum which were used by informants from the party elite and the rank-
and-file, as well as participants from outside the Radical Cause party. For example, as I 
discuss in-depth in chapter 4, the rhetorical construction of the referendum as 
                                                        
4    Indeed, this would be an important area of further research on the partriarchial privileging of 
discursive political and legal spaces, drawing on feminist critiques such as Meehan (2013), Fraser 
(2013), and Dean (2013).  
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“offering a way out of the crisis” was found in all organiser and participant accounts. 
However, this is not to claim discursive divergences would not emerge through 
analysis of a wider data set.  
 
However, another kind of difference in informant interviews was evident. This is a 
difference of style rather than content, and relates to the challenges of interviewing 
political elites. Many of the interview subjects from the National Leadership in 1992 
remain in professional politics, are well-known and in various instances now head-up 
different political parties. As already noted, they may have felt an incentive to inflate 
the significance of the action or cast events so as to support a particular political 
position. More generally, conducting qualitative interviews with politicians involves a 
unique set of challenges (Berry 2002; Harris 1991). As interview subjects they are 
unusually accustomed to being interviewed; to presenting a carefully constructed 
narrative of past events and decisions; and to saying no more than they intend to. At 
times, during my interviews with key organisers, I had the impression I was hearing a 
well-crafted narrative, which had been rehearsed many times before. This is not to 
suggest that their responses are unreliable, but is important to keep in mind. Key 
organisers told me what they wanted me to hear, and tended to avoid the revealing 
slip-ups and contradictory statements more typical in interviews with ordinary 
members of the public.  
 
An additional, different kind of problem with all interview data – organiser and non-
organiser alike – is the passage of time since the event. This initiative took place 
twenty years ago, in a year in which there were two coup attempts, regular protests, 
occupations and rioting, and the president was soon to be impeached. Expecting a 
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detailed and accurate account of the events of a single day is perhaps unrealistic. Part 
of the objective of the research was to understand why organisers adopted this 
approach, what it meant to them, and how they defined success. The problem here 
will be that twenty years of hindsight shapes their accounts. Certainly, we can know 
that how they construct this event and its meaning will not be the same today as it 
would have been at the time. 
 
To some extent these problems cannot be overcome and it is necessary to simply be 
aware of the limitations of the data, and exercise caution when drawing conclusions. 
However, I took several measures in an effort to triangulate the information I gained 
from different sources and improve the reliability, balance and depth of the emerging 
account of the Radical Cause referendum on Pérez. Through utilising the Venezuelan 
National Library newspaper archives, I was able to locate much of the newspaper 
coverage of the event, which appeared in several different national newspapers. Press 
coverage can help substantiate organiser claims regarding turn-out, levels of 
participation nationally, and other features of the event. Granted, there was no 
independent election monitor, and participation figures printed in the newspapers 
came directly from the Radical Cause party at the time, and so also require a degree of 
caution. However, from press coverage it is possible to get a sense of the impact on 
the day and the levels of public participation. For example, photographs of the 
crowded plenary room where organisers sat across the floor counting piles of ballot 
papers can be used to support organiser descriptions of 'the count'. And photographs 
of people queuing up to vote further substantiate organiser accounts (see appendix 
A).  
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Another approach I used to test and deepen the emerging picture of this event was to 
compare and contrast participant testimony in relation to different factors including 
current political affiliation; current involvement in professional politics; and 
involvement with the Radical Cause party then and now. I also used the accounts of 
interview participants whom it would seem have little or less to gain from inflating or 
otherwise distorting their experience of this event, as a counterbalance against the 
reliance on organiser accounts. For example: Roberto Rodriguez was a rank-and-file 
Radical Cause activist in 1992 and helped to organise the referendum. In his interview 
he describes his experience of the event based in the 'situation room' in Caracas. He 
recalls mass participation and the ensuing debates in the media, and talks 
passionately about his experience of the event. Rodriguez was never involved with 
politics professionally and is now a librarian at the Venezuelan National Library, 
which is where I met him. Accounts such as his are less likely to have been influenced 
by the desire to construct a narrative of personal or party glory and can be used to 
support the accounts of other organisers. Similarly, useful counterpoints are provided 
by participants who were not involved with the Radical Cause, including activist Juan 
Contreras and journalist Delia Castillo, who have nothing apparent to gain from 
inflating the significance of the party or this particular initiative. 
 
Investigating the International Tribunal on Climate Justice in Bolivia brought a 
different set of methodological issues, as well as some of the same. As a contemporary 
project, issues around the reliability of memory were far less relevant. At the time of 
the interviews, the tribunal's 'Preliminary Hearing' had taken place just a few months 
earlier and organisers were engaged in planning the next event. Their testimony is 
fresh, detailed, and provides insight into their motivations and thoughts about the 
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project whilst it is still taking place. On the other hand, this comes with different 
problems. Key organisers would be unlikely to articulate doubts or criticisms of the 
project, should they have them. As an ongoing campaign with an international target 
audience, interviews with a foreign researcher would be to some extent a promotional 
opportunity, rather than the space for critical reflection that would be ideal. 
 
Also important to consider was my role as the interviewer. As Burgess (2002) 
points out, the position of the interviewer and the relationship between the 
interviewer and interviewee will always play a role in determining the responses 
given. We were discussing an emotive and political subject, which, for interview 
subjects from indigenous communities, is understood as an immediate and 
personal existential threat. For my part, I was an outsider from the part of the 
world and the system that is seen as the problem. At various points during the 
interview process I felt that this dynamic was influencing the conversation. As one 
informant exclaimed during his interview: “my family is dying because of how your 
family lives!” (Cristian Dominguez, CSUTCB Union, 2010). It is not immediately 
obvious how this relationship will have influenced organiser accounts of the 
International Tribunal on Climate Justice, but it is important to appreciate how this 
might have shaped the qualitative data I received. 
 
With respect to my interview subjects: there was a bias towards NGO stakeholders, 
over representatives from grassroots social movements and indigenous 
movements. Of the six individuals interviewed, four were from Bolivian NGOs and 
just two were activists from indigenous and campesino social movements. As with 
the Venezuelan case study, these imbalances in the profile of interview subjects 
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matter. A consideration of authorship and voice is important to really understand 
the a-legal space tactic. As I discuss in-depth in chapter 5, the elite-led structure of 
many peoples’ tribunals is one of their more problematic features, which can 
threaten to undermine their emancipatory value. In the Bolivian context, NGOs are 
a category of elite, often staffed by highly educated, non-indigenous, middle-class, 
city-based individuals. And, moreover, often beholden to the requirements of 
Northern funders. With this in mind, one might question the emphasis on NGO 
voices within my data. The ideal research design would have included multiple 
interviews with a range of different stakeholders who had engaged with the 
climate tribunal in different capacities. However, with limitations on time and 
resources, I prioritised gathering data from the small group of NGO workers who 
were most central to the organising process in this initiative. However, I was 
careful throughout the research and analysis process to remain conscious of and 
sensitised to the limitations of my data. I discussed with organisers how they 
negotiated the structural inequalities inherent to this action and, in chapter 5, I 
critique their relative success at occupying an ‘interlocutor’ role, representing the 
interests, viewpoints and demands of marginalised and oppressed groups.  
 
As a final reflection, having highlighted the methodological challenges and inherent 
limitations to empirical research based on qualitative interviews, it is important to 
note also the unique added-value of this approach. The experience of personally 
meeting and interviewing individuals who were involved in both initiatives helped 
provide a depth of insight into these events that cannot be achieved through 
secondary sources and documentary data alone. Through witnessing organisers' 
reactions to certain questions and topics, their willingness to meet, their openness or 
27 
 
 
otherwise, as well as other anecdotal observations, I gained a richer impression of 
both initiatives and what they had meant to those involved. As one example, nearly all 
organisers of the Radical Cause referendum with whom I made contact agreed to meet 
me, usually the next day and always giving an hour or more of their time, often going 
out of their way to provide further assistance.5 Also, despite the number of years and 
however many countless actions since the event, they appeared to remember it in 
some detail. In different instances, for example, organisers were able to recall the 
rough number of voters in the Caracas region, and the states in which the event took 
place,6 in addition to details about their own experiences. 
 
As another example: I brought photocopies of newspaper coverage and publicity 
materials, which I had found in the newspaper archives at the National Library to 
most interviews, to help as a memory aid. Interview participants in most cases 
showed intense and excited interest in the materials, studying them, pointing out 
aspects and almost always asking for copies. One ex-Radical Cause leader, who now 
heads a different political party, studied the materials intently for some time, 
laughing loudly, before exclaiming 'I did this!' On many occasions, I got the 
impression that this referendum was a significant event which captured a period in 
history, for the individuals involved. 
 
 
                                                        
5 Two individuals were unavailable to meet but both were currently working for the government, one 
as ambassador to the US who was only in Caracas for a short period; the other was engaged with the 
presidential election campaign but sent her assistant to the interview instead. 
 
6  Accounts which were consistent with information given in newspaper articles from the time. 
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v. An overview of the thesis argument and structure 
 
In chapter 1 I define and analyse the concept of a-legal space as a tactic, in more 
depth. I identify the defining characteristics which distinguish this tactic from other 
kinds of contentious political action and I present a preliminary typology of a-legal 
space, where I discuss various examples of the phenomenon from around the world. 
In the final part of the chapter I consider existing theorisation of these activities. A-
legal initiatives have, for the main part, been ignored within the scholarly literature. 
This is with the exception of peoples’ tribunals, which have generated a small but 
growing body of literature, which I review in this chapter. I highlight the limitations 
to a dominant account within this literature which sees peoples’ tribunals as a kind of 
adjunct to the formal legal system, which “serve as a corrective mechanism” where 
formal structures fall short (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002, p. 5). More useful are 
accounts which consider the constitutive function of peoples’ tribunals. Drawing on 
the work of scholars such as Sally Engle Merry (1996; 1995) and Jayan Nayar (2006; 
2003; 2001) I argue that peoples’ tribunals, as with other a-legal initiatives, should be 
seen as attempts to contest the extant legal, political and cultural order and help 
promote an alternative. 
 
I build on this starting point in chapter 2 where I elaborate a theory of a-legal space 
as a political strategy. This outlines a conceptual framework through which to 
understand and explore the use of a-legal space, which I test and develop in the 
subsequent case study chapters. In the first part of the chapter I seek to define a-legal 
space from an abstract ontological perspective and in the second part I consider a-
legal space from a functional point of view. The central question for the first part is 
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whether these activities indeed constitute a distinct category of action, which 
transcends the dichotomy between legal and illegal activity, as Harnecker claims 
(2007; 2008). Harnecker’s claim can be better understood when contextualised: she 
is responding to the historical debate within the Latin America left, in which strategy 
has been conceived as a choice between ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’. The Radical Cause 
party’s unofficial and unauthorised referendum transcends this dichotomy: they do 
not accept and participate in the formal political system, but nor do they break any 
laws. Hence we can understand how their action transcends a historically contingent 
dichotomy.  But does it do anything more than this? The Radical Cause party’s 
referendum was not legal, in the sense that it was not official and legally sanctioned, 
and it was not illegal, in the sense that it was lawful; but this does not entail a 
contradiction. Official, legally sanctioned activity and illegal activity do not comprise a 
dichotomy into which all social and political practices must fit. Hence, on the basis of 
Harnecker’s account alone it is difficult to sustain the notion of an ontologically 
distinct “whole other arena… which is neither legal nor illegal” (2007, p. 138).  
 
However, the concept of a-legal space can be rescued, through drawing on a different 
theoretical account of the a-legal. In his novel theory of legal order, Hans Lindahl 
(2013) describes how strange and disruptive behaviours he denominates as ‘a-legal’ 
resist designation as legal or illegal, through questioning how a legal order draws the 
distinction between the two. Crucially, a-legality is conceived as a relational concept: 
a behaviour or situation is a-legal with respect to a particular legal order, because it 
questions the way in which the categories of legal and illegal have been organised 
within that legal order. I argue that peoples’ tribunals, unofficial referenda and other 
a-legal initiatives should be seen as a variant, or sub-category, of the broader 
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phenomenon which Lindahl denominates as a-legality. Specifically, they challenge the 
extant legal order and how it defines what is legal and what is illegal, through 
enacting an institutional process which belongs to a different legal order. This insight 
forms the basis for a definition of a-legal space, which I expand upon in subsequent 
case study chapters.   
 
Having established a theoretical basis to the notion of a-legal space as an ambiguous 
alternative category of action, I turn in section 2.2 to consider its potential utility. 
Harnecker suggests that this space has great potential as a tool to “raise 
consciousness, mobilise people and have them participate in a way that builds the 
anti-system social force” (2007, p. 112). However, she does not elaborate on the 
mechanism by which it might do this. This section is devoted to providing this 
theoretical development. Drawing on the large body of literature which has 
emphasised the constitutive power of law, I argue that a-legal space has the potential 
to create ‘tipping events’ (Hausknost 2011): rupturing events which shift the 'political 
grammar' and thereby open up new political possibilities. Peoples’ tribunals, citizens’ 
debt audits, unofficial referenda and other a-legal initiatives have significant potential 
to create these tipping events due to their interesting relationship to the oppositional 
concepts of constituted and constituent power. Whilst emulating the form, processes 
and symbols of existing institutions of constituted power, organisers commonly claim 
that they express and gain legitimacy from the ‘constituent will’. Where they are 
successful in this dual claim they arguably have a unique potential to re-constitute 
social meanings. I conclude by considering how recent research into the notion of 
‘receptivity’ and into the formation of democratic subjectivities might support this 
thesis. The conceptual framework elaborated in this chapter is intended as a way to 
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understand the status and potential of a-legal initiatives. In the following three 
chapters I test and develop this theory through exploring its applicability and 
explanatory value in relation to specific case studies. 
 
In chapter 3, I situate the use of a-legal space in the context of contemporary Latin 
American politics. I show how the use of a-legal space by social movements and 
governments in the region has correlated with significant shifts in Latin American 
politics, including the emergence of new social movements and the turn to a new kind 
of constitutionalism on the part of left governments and social movements alike. 
Exploring the use of a-legal space through this lens helps to illuminate how this tactic 
might be understood, and in turn can contribute to existing debates on new Latin 
American constitutionalism. In this chapter I also discuss the first two case studies: 
the Colombian students’ seventh ballot and Honduran president Zelaya’s fourth ballot 
box poll. Analyses of these unofficial referenda prompt several insights towards a 
general theory of a-legal space. Firstly, they are undertaken at critical moments in the 
struggle for creation of a constituent assembly: suggesting that the concept of a-legal 
space fills a gap in scholarly accounts of how constitutional change sometimes comes 
about. Secondly, their extraordinary influence on subsequent events facilitates an 
exploration of when and why the use of a-legal space has impact. I show that these 
cases support the theory of a-legal space elaborated in chapter 2, and in particular 
they underline the centrality of successfully appearing as constituted and constituent 
power in achieving impact through this strategy. 
 
These cases also prompt various other insights into the a-legal space tactic. I 
introduce the notion of two ‘axes of legality’ along which the actions of those 
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employing this tactic - and those opposing them - can be pitted. The use of a-legal 
space involves a two-dimensional struggle to define (il)legality. On the one hand, 
organisers attempt to legitimate and institutionalise what they are doing through 
actions directed at the ‘axis of institutionalisation’. On the other hand, opponents seek 
to ignore, repress, prohibit and criminalise the a-legal initiative. Attempts to prohibit 
and criminalise the initiative engage with a different axis of legality: the ‘axis of 
criminalisation or prohibition’. The two-dimensional nature of this struggle reflects 
the struggle to invoke and promote a different legal order, through legally ambiguous 
behaviour. Finally, I use the case of Zelaya’s planned fourth ballot box poll to explore 
the use of a-legal space by actors in positions of constituted power. 
 
In chapter 4, I discuss the Venezuelan Radical Cause party’s referendum on the rule of 
Carlos Andrés Pérez. The first two sections of the chapter are devoted to an account 
of the referendum as an historical event. For this case study, detailed contextual 
information is essential to understand informants’ responses, and the possible 
meanings and significance of this event for the wider Venezuelan public. Drawing on 
informant interviews, documentary evidence, and secondary sources, I describe the 
social and political context and the events of the referendum and I explore the impact 
and legacy of the action. As I show in this chapter, this a-legal referendum is best 
understood when situated in its historical context. It represented an attempt by 
organisers to capitalise on a particular historical moment. In a context of growing 
economic, social and political crises, organisers consciously constructed the 
referendum as ‘a way out of the crisis’, a construction which makes sense when we 
appreciate these multiple crises which paralysed Venezuelan politics during this 
period. Moreover, the case highlights how a-legal space, and a-legal referenda in 
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particular, can be critical at times of ‘crisis’, when there is a degree of dislocation 
within the hegemonic discourse.  
 
In section 4.3 I turn to an analysis of the organisers’ aims and objectives. I explore 
how they articulated the purpose of this referendum and its relation to their wider 
theory of change. Finally, in 4.4, I use the case as a jumping off point for a deeper 
theoretical discussion of a-legal space as a political tactic. I consider several potential 
problems with the theory of a-legal space as it has so far been developed, and attempt 
to resolve these problems drawing on the case of the Radical Cause referendum. What 
emerges is a revised account of the a-legal space tactic in which the relationship with 
and differences from Lindahl’s conception of a-legality are delineated.  
 
In chapter 5 I discuss the Bolivian International Tribunal on Climate Justice. In this 
case I omit a detailed discussion of contemporary Bolivian politics. Unlike the 
previous case study, this initiative was not directed at achieving a change in national 
politics. Its target audience was international and primarily the Global North, and as 
such, details of the social and political context in which it took place are less central to 
understanding this particular application of a-legal space. Instead, I provide a brief 
description of the events of the tribunal itself: the cases, the jury members, the 
organisers and the format of the event. I then move, in section 5.2, to a discussion of 
organiser aims and objectives, and how they describe what they were trying to 
achieve. Finally, in section 5.3, as in chapter 4, I use the case as a platform to discuss 
issues pertinent to a general theory of a-legal space. Specifically, I explore three 
possible critiques. The first concerns the differences between some forms of a-legal 
space. I consider the role of information and ‘evidence’ in the International Tribunal 
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on Climate Justice and what this tells us about the coherence of a single a-legal space 
strategy. The next two critiques question the emancipatory value of a-legal space, 
from different angles. The ‘elite-led critique’ points to the influence and centrality of 
elite groups in this form of resistance. The ‘Foucauldian critique’ wonders whether 
we can hope to contest and challenge the hegemonic order through replicating 
central symbols and procedures of this order. I consider the significance of each 
critique to the International Tribunal on Climate Justice, and the implications for a 
general theory of a-legal space. I conclude the thesis by drawing together the insights 
and conclusions of earlier chapters, and summarising the consequences for a theory 
of a-legal space as a political strategy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to a-legal space 
 
 
There are many cases around the world in which actors have attempted to occupy a 
kind of alternative legal space. Examples include unofficial referenda such as the 
Venezuelan referendum on President Carlos Andrés Pérez, but also unofficial 
tribunals, commissions, audits, and even an embassy. These are activities that are not 
normally grouped together. However, I argue that it is helpful to view them as 
variations of the same phenomenon. Because despite the variety of political, 
historical, and cultural contexts in which they have taken place these activities share 
certain common characteristics, which distinguish them from other forms of 
contentious politics. Most notably they assume a quasi-legal or quasi-institutional 
form, appropriating (to varying degrees and in varying ways) the symbols, language, 
and procedures of formal institutions of constituted power, yet without any official 
basis or at least exceeding their recognised institutional basis. In most cases, they 
emerge from civil society, organised by social movements and NGOs. However, in 
some cases they involve local or national governments. The common feature is that 
organisers make a claim to democratic legitimacy and authority not recognised in 
international or domestic law. Finally, in all cases these initiatives are framed as a 
response to institutional or democratic failure, and as exemplifying and promoting an 
alternative, better system. On this basis, I take the following three criteria as the 
defining characteristics of the initiatives which make use of a-legal space:  
 
1. Adopts a quasi-legal or quasi-institutional form, imitating the language, 
processes, and symbols of an institution of constituted power, without any 
official basis or exceeding a recognised institutional basis.  
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2. Makes a claim to democratic or legal authority, which is not recognised within 
the formal state or international legal system.  
3. Framed as a response to institutional and/or democratic failure, and as 
exemplifying and promoting an alternative, better system.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to make the case for this new conceptual category. I do this 
in several parts. In section 1.1 I discuss some of the different forms this type of 
activity has taken and highlight their common characteristics. This can be taken as a 
preliminary and not exhaustive typology of a-legal space(s). In section 1.2 I discuss 
each of the key characteristics in more depth. Despite sharing these broad 
characteristics, there are notable variations between initiatives. On this basis I 
suggest that these characteristics be taken as an ideal type definition of a-legal 
space(s). In the final section I review the existing scholarly literature on political 
actions of this kind. Only peoples’ tribunals have previously been considered as a 
modular form of action, as such the small but growing literature set on peoples’ 
tribunals provides an important starting point for theorising the broader category of 
a-legal space.  
 
1.1. A typology of a-legal space(s) 
 
The following is not an exhaustive typology of a-legal space, but these are some of the 
main forms this kind of activity tends to take. For each type of a-legal space I discuss 
some of the significant cases, and suggest how they satisfy the defining characteristics 
of a-legal space which I described above. In the following section I turn to a more in-
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depth discussion of how different forms and specific cases of a-legal space have met 
these characteristics.  
 
1.1.1. Peoples' Tribunals 
 
Peoples’ tribunals are the most researched and probably the most familiar form of a-
legal activity. Conventional peoples' tribunal history starts with Bertrand Russell's 
1967 International War Crimes Tribunal (also known as the 'Russell Tribunal') into US 
atrocities during the Vietnam War. Organised by anti-war activists, it involved an 
unofficial public trial of the US government for actions in Vietnam. The US was 
charged with breaking international law through acts of aggression, civilian 
bombardment, the use of experimental weapons, the torture and mutilation of 
prisoners and genocide. A panel of international academics, legal scholars, and well-
known intellectuals, including Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, were 
brought together to act as jury. The tribunal met for several hearings in Denmark, 
Sweden and Japan throughout 1967, hearing extensive evidence, in the form of 
reports, video footage and witness testimony, compiled by the specially established 
legal, historical and scientific commissions of the tribunal (Duffett 1968). On 
December 1st 1967 the tribunal issued a verdict of “guilty on all counts” (ibid). In 
Russell’s final address he urged the need to build resistance to the war and appealed 
for “everyone the world over to redouble his efforts to end this barbarism” (cited in 
ibid., p.654). In the less than fifty years since the Russell Tribunal, hundreds of 
peoples' tribunals around the world have copied this approach in an effort to 
challenge injustice of many forms, from the Israeli occupation of Palestine to 
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indigenous rights to neoliberal capitalism. Almost invariably, contemporary peoples' 
tribunals reference the 1967 Russell Tribunal as their inspiration and model. 
 
However, two earlier lesser known peoples' tribunals predated the Russell Tribunal 
by several decades; both took place in the 1930s and responded to cases of political 
persecution. Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002), authors of the most in-depth review 
of peoples' tribunals to date,1 credit the 1933 Commission of Inquiry into the Origins of 
the Reichstag Fire2 as the first peoples' tribunal and in their view “the most 
successful” (ibid., p. 11). The Commission held a series of hearings in London to 
investigate the fire at the German parliament building, which had been used as a 
pretext by the Nazis for the arrest and detention of thousands of Communist party 
members. Organised by European and American lawyers, the event was intended to 
raise awareness of what was taking place in Germany and to assemble and present 
evidence which they expected to be excluded from the German trial (Tigar and Mage 
2009). As with the Russell Tribunal, extensive investigatory work was carried out as 
part of this counter trial, assembling physical evidence and finding witnesses.3 The 
proceedings, described as “formal and fairly rigorous” in one account, involved 
lengthy, detailed evidence about the incident itself and the Nazi party's reaction (ibid., 
p. 30). This apparently transparent and rigorous approach, in addition to the 
                                                        
1 International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights, by 
Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002).  
2 Also known as the International Juridical Investigatory Commission on the Reichstag Fire 
(Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002).  
3 Investigatory work was funded and conducted by the World Committee for the Relief of the Victims of 
German Fascism. Particularly significant findings which were presented at the trial, and which had 
not otherwise been in the public domain, included the fact that multiple fires had been set in the 
Chamber of the Reichstag; 1500 arrest warrants for Communist and Socialist activists had already 
been read for the German police on the day before the fire; and evidence of a secret tunnel leading 
from Goering's residence to the Reichstag (Mage and Tigar 2009). For some these findings were 
taken to support the suggestion that the fire had been planned by the Nazis as a pretext to 
persecute Communist party members.  
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organisers' reputation, are cited as factors in the positive reaction to the trial in the 
international media (Tigar and Mage 2009). In September 1933 the Commission 
concluded that there was no evidence connecting the three Communist party 
members standing accused with the Reichstag fire.  Three months later the three 
were acquitted in the official German trial, on the basis of a lack of evidence. It is 
argued that the London based counter-trial, which took place immediately before the 
official trial and successfully captured the support of international media, had a 
significant influence on this outcome (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002).   
 
Four years later another 'Commission of Inquiry' was initiated, this time to challenge 
the trial of Leon Trotsky by the Soviet Union for 'revolutionary arson', as part of the 
Moscow Show Trials. The 1937 Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against 
Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Show Trials (also known as the 'Dewey Commission'), held 
sessions in New York, Paris and at Trotsky's home in Coyoacan, Mexico. Like the 
Russell Tribunal, this one was named after its famous philosopher chair, John Dewey, 
and involved months of extensive investigatory work (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 
2002). Its findings were published in a 422 page book titled Not Guilty, in which it 
concluded that the Moscow Show Trials were “frame-ups”, and Trotsky was innocent 
of all charges (Dewey and Glotzer 1937, p. 19). 
 
Despite the obvious differences, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of 1945 to 1948 are 
repeatedly cited in the literature as historical antecedents to the peoples' tribunal 
model (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002; Blaser 1992; Falk 1981; Cover 1984). 
Richard Falk argues that peoples' tribunals are “keeping Nuremberg alive” (cited in 
Blaser 1992, p. 343), whilst Jayan Nayar (2001) makes the same connection with a 
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more critical take. Reflecting on the 1967 Russell Tribunal on the Vietnam war, he 
comments:  
 
The standards by which the crimes were judged were those laid down by the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals. Renouncing the historic limitations of these standards as those of a 
'victor's justice', the Russell Tribunal sought to reinvoke the spirit of Nuremberg/Tokyo 
that the universality of human dignity serves to justify the universality of application of 
standards of (il)legality and standards of culpability. 
 
Following the Russell Tribunal on Vietnam a series of new Russell Tribunals were 
established to address repression in Latin America (1973 – 76),4 freedom of opinion 
and public sector employment in West Germany (1978 – 79), and the rights of Indians 
in the Americas (1980). More recently, the Russell Tribunal has reconvened to 
investigate the rights of psychiatry patients in 2001 and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine (2009 – 2013) (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002).  
 
In 1979 The Permanent Peoples Tribunal was established as a “direct continuation” of 
the Russell Tribunal, and has since held nearly forty sessions on cases where there is 
seen to be a “systematic violation of fundamental rights” and in particular where 
“national and international legislation fails to defend the right of the people” (Lelio 
and Lisli Basso Foundation 2014). As just one example: in 1983, following a complaint 
from the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, a session was held on the treatment 
and alleged genocide of indigenous communities in Guatemala. All Guatemalan 
governments since 1954 were found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity 
                                                        
4    From 1973 to 1976 the Russell Tribunal II held hearings on repression in Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, 
and Chile, with an emphasis on US human rights violations. The hearings, which took place in Rome 
and Brussels, delivered a verdict that crimes against humanity had been committed in all four 
countries (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002).  
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and genocide. The USA was also found guilty for its complicity and involvement in 
Guatemalan politics. Interestingly, the hearing ruled that indigenous violence was 
justified “as a necessary response to oppression” (cited in Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 
2002, p. 169). More recently, a “Mexican Chapter” of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal 
has been established, following calls for such a body by Mexican civil society. The first 
large scale case, running from 2011 to 2014 was entitled “Free Trade, violence, 
impunity and the rights of the peoples”, and included ten large scale hearings and 
many local level “pre-hearings”, with the participation of several hundred civil society 
organisations and social movements, on subjects including food sovereignty, 
environmental destruction, and violence against workers  (TPP México 2011). 
 
Another significant large scale peoples' tribunal is the Latin American Water Tribunal 
which was established in 1998 and has conducted hearings, forums and workshops in 
countries across Latin America, on issues related to water privatisation, management 
and access (Tribunal Latinoamericano del Agua 2015). Yet another large scale 
international initiative is the Courts of Women; peoples' tribunals on violence against 
women which have taken place in Asia, Africa, Central America, the Arab world and 
the USA. Organised by international NGOs El Taller and Asian Women’s Human Rights 
Council, and supported by national networks, to date more than forty hearings have 
taken place (El Taller 2015). Other efforts of global civil society have included the 
2011 series of Women’s Tribunals on Climate Justice and Gender, which took place 
across Asia, Africa and Latin America, and were organised by the Southern-led global 
civil society networks, Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) and Feminist Task 
Force (GCAP 2015). Climate justice has also been the subject of various smaller scale 
peoples' tribunal initiatives including the Bolivian based International Tribunal on 
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Climate Justice (which is discussed in detail in chapter 5) (Fundación Solón 2009a; 
Fundación Solón 2009b).  
 
As might already be apparent, peoples' tribunals are often large scale, well-funded 
international initiatives, involving broad coalitions of NGOs, civil society networks 
and other civil society actors. In many cases tribunal sessions have lasted several 
years, with dozens of separate hearings taking place around the world. However, 
there are also instances where the form has been adopted on a much smaller scale. 
One example is Precarity: A Peoples' Tribunal, a one-day event organised in 2011 by 
the Precarious Workers Brigade, who describe themselves as “a UK-based group of 
precarious workers in culture and education organised around the issue of precarity” 
(Precarious Workers Brigade 2011). The peoples' tribunal was seen as a format in 
which they could share their research on the issue of precarity and “a method of 
continuing a collective conversation... as well as holding the conditions that allow it to 
continue to account” (ibid.). Another example is the People's Tribunal Against Police 
Brutality and Misconduct, which took place on January 15th 2011, in Philadelphia, USA. 
Described as an “independent community legal proceeding”, the initiative was 
organised by the civil society network Askia Coalition Against Police Brutality. 
Organisers explained that:  
 
It is not a “mock trial.” The tribunal will gather testimony from victims of police brutality 
for submission to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the Human Rights Commission of 
the United Nations. In addition, the tribunal will serve to educate community residents 
about their legal and constitutional rights as they pertain to “stop and frisk” and mobilize 
community residents to take action at the polls during this year’s mayoral and city council 
elections (Askia Coalition Against Police Brutality 2011).  
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There have also been attempts within global civil society to systematise support for 
local peoples' tribunal initiatives such as these two. In July 2014 the International 
Conference on Human Rights and Peace in the Philippines resolved to support a Local 
Peoples' Tribunal project (Boehringer 2014). Legal scholar and Permanent Peoples 
Tribunal panelist Gill Boehringer (ibid.) has been a prominent advocate for the 
development of such a project, emphasising their importance as a tactic against the 
“onslaught” of neoliberalism:  
 
Today, “globalization” and neo-liberal policies are wreaking havoc across the world in a 
“second great transformation”. To aid in resisting this onslaught, there is a need for the 
establishment of on-going local institutions with local people taking control of the specific 
issues affecting their lives. Local people’s tribunals should be included in the movements to 
resist the depredations of international- and national- capital. The name of such institutions 
might vary e.g. local tribunals, peoples’ courts, community courts, neighbourhood aid 
committees, commissions, workers’ inquiries, people’s hearings, etc (ibid.).  
 
Despite their civil society basis these initiatives standardly take the form of an official 
tribunal, to varying degrees emulating the physical layout, procedures, language and 
symbols associated with state-based tribunals. Most peoples' tribunals include a jury 
(though sometimes called a 'panel'), witnesses, evidence and occasionally even a 
defence (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002). As Borowiak comments on the World 
Tribunal on Iraq, these initiatives are “not meant to be colourful acts of protest but 
rather to provide rigorous public assessments of the policies and effects of invasion 
and occupation” (2008, p. 161). In many cases they have led to the unearthing of vast 
amounts of evidence, which is not otherwise in the public domain, nor has been 
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received in any formal court (Duffett 1968; Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002). On the 
other hand, and at the same time, they are used as political campaigns. Hearings are 
timed for political opportunism, and the tribunal itself is almost always organised as 
just one part of a wider political movement or campaign.  
 
1.1.2. Peoples' Commissions 
 
A closely related form of a-legal space is the Peoples’ Commission. Recent examples 
include the Lewisham Peoples’ Commission of Inquiry, which formed part of the 
successful campaign against the downgrading of Lewisham Hospital in London (Save 
Lewisham Hospital 2013). Organised by a local campaign group, Save Lewisham 
Hospital Campaign, the initiative revolved around a day long public hearing timed to 
immediately precede the official judicial review hearing. A panel of judges, including 
well known human rights barrister Michael Mansfield QC, heard evidence from 
academics, GPs, hospital staff, patients, Lewisham Council, and other community 
representatives. The hearing, in a large theatre in Lewisham, was open to the public 
as well as being filmed and broadcast live online. On the day of the hearing the panel 
of judges made preliminary statements about the evidence, and in the weeks that 
followed compiled a more comprehensive formal report (Save Lewisham Hospital 
Campaign, 2013).  
 
Cases such as this one, in which a public hearing or series of hearings forms the 
centre piece to the event, share much with the peoples' tribunal model and are in 
many ways interchangeable with it.5 The basis for distinguishing between peoples' 
                                                        
5 Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Show 
Trials and Commission of Inquiry into the Origins of the Reichstag Fire, from the 1930s, could just 
45 
 
 
commissions and peoples' tribunals is a difference in presentational nuance. Peoples' 
commissions are generally presented more in terms of an investigation, rather than a 
trial. In any case, both can be understood as ideal type categories, where specific 
initiatives will share more or fewer of the specified characteristics.  
 
Other peoples’ commissions diverge further from the tribunal format however. The 
High Pay Commission is another recent UK based example, which was established to 
investigate the effects of high executive pay in the private sector in Britain (High Pay 
Commission 2011). The commission ran for one year, from November 2010 to 
November 2011, publishing several reports and a final set of recommendations for 
companies and the government. Whilst it was set up by centre-left think tank 
Compass, once appointed the commissioners which had been selected conducted a 
free investigation (Lawson 2012). The initiative was then described in publicity 
materials as an “independent body” (High Pay Commission 2011).  
 
 
1.1.3. Unofficial referenda 
 
There have been various cases of popular non-binding referenda like the Venezuelan 
referendum on President Pérez. One significant example is found in the history of the 
Catalan independence movement. In 2009 and 2010 various unofficial 'consultations' 
were carried out in Catalonia on the question of independence. The best known and 
first took place in the small town of Arenys de Munt in the province of Barcelona, 
where 2,671 citizens (forty-one percent of the electorate) voted in a non-binding 
referendum initiated by the local council (Libertat.cat 2013). Despite its small scale, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
as easily be placed in this category of a-legal space. I have categorised them as peoples' tribunals 
following Kinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002), who categorise both as early precedents of the 
peoples’ tribunal tactic. 
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the referendum, in which 92% voted in favour of independence, captured the 
attention of the national and international media. Three hundred journalists received 
formal accreditation to cover the event and several TV stations filmed it. It was 
reported in publications across the world from Venezuela’s El Universal to The New 
York Times (Castillo 200). One month later on December 13th 2009, the consultation 
was repeated in 167 other municipalities in Catalonia. 700,000 citizens were invited 
to vote, 200,000 - around 30 percent of the census - participated, with approximately 
95% voting in favour of independence (Libertat.cat, 2013).  
 
Another case is the World Referendum on Climate Change, which was debated in 
Bolivia in 2009 to 2010. Whilst never achieving wide-scale take up, discussions and 
planning for this initiative were commenced in the run up to the World Peoples’ 
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which took place in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2010 (PWCCC 2010). The Conference, attended by 
approximately 30,000 delegates, was organised by the Bolivian government after the 
failure of governments to reach a new binding climate agreement at the UN COP 
meeting in Copenhagen in 2009. As part of this event hundreds of representatives of 
social movements, NGOs and other interested individuals participated in online and 
in-person debates about the basis and logistics of a world climate referendum, which 
would “consult the peoples of the world” on climate change and the “capitalist 
economic model” (ibid.).  
 
A somewhat different example of this phenomenon was the Scotland wide non-
binding referendum via postal ballot on the repeal of Clause 28 in 2000. Clause 28 
stated that local authorities; "shall not intentionally promote homosexuality or 
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publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality" or "promote the 
teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a 
pretended family relationship" (Local Government Act 1988). In 2000 the Labour 
government made moves to repeal this regressive legislation. The non-binding poll 
was organised by the Keep the Clause campaign which sought to resist the repeal of 
clause 28. The poll was the first privately funded poll in Scotland, paid for by 
millionaire bus company owner Brian Soutar, who reportedly contributed one million 
pounds. Postal ballots were sent to every registered voter in Scotland. Over a million 
ballots were returned, representing around 32% of registered voters, with 
approximately 86% of these voting to ‘keep the Clause’ (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b). The 
Keep the Clause poll differs from most other kinds of a-legal initiatives in that it was 
principally supported by conservatives and the religious right, as opposed to liberals 
and the left. Whilst most a-legal initiatives are organised by the left and can be argued 
to be in support of disempowered groups, there is no intrinsic connection between 
this type of tactic and left wing politics. It is rather a modular form of action that can 
be used by either right or left. I revisit this issue in chapter 2.  
 
1.1.4. Citizens’ debt audits  
 
Citizens’ debt audits represent another use of a-legal space which is growing in 
popularity. The best known and arguably most significant initiative of this kind took 
place in Ecuador in 2007, when the Ecuadorian government established the Public 
Debt Audit Commission. The commission was made up of a cross section of Ecuadorian 
civil society organisations, though with government support and funding, and had a 
remit to conduct an audit of the country’s debt and how it had been accrued. When 
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they delivered their final report in 2008 the Commission claimed to have uncovered 
“illegality and illegitimacy” in Ecuador’s foreign debt records, and recommended that 
the government cease repayments (quoted in Faiola 2008).  
 
The Ecuadorian Public Debt Audit Commission can be conceived as 'a-legal' despite its 
execution by the Ecuadorian government and its official status in Ecuador, because it 
constitutes a novel democratic instrument which is not recognised at the 
international level in which it operates. The recommendations of the Commission 
have no binding legal implications, at the international level. However, despite this, in 
2008 shortly after the Public Debt Audit Commission delivered its final report, the 
Ecuadorian government followed its recommendations and defaulted on their Global 
Bonds debts, citing the commission's findings as the basis for the default (ibid.). In 
this way it can be seen to have exceeded a recognised institutional basis, based on a 
new claim to legal and democratic authority.  
 
The Ecuadorian case has inspired similar initiatives around the world. International 
Citizen Debt Audit Network (ICAN) is a network of social movements and national 
networks from eleven European and North African countries, who are implementing 
Citizen Debt Audits as a means to challenge government austerity programmes (ICAN 
2013). Through ICAN, member groups are able to exchange knowledge and 
experiences; “sharing the types of audits that are being implemented or promoted in 
each country, as well as the types of action and social mobilisation strategies that are 
taken up in each territory, with the common goal of forming a solid and united front 
against the dictatorship of debt”. Following Ecuador, Debit Audit Commissions have 
been established in Bolivia, Venezuela, Paraguay and Argentina (ICAN 2013). 
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1.1.5. Civil society based monitoring bodies 
 
Civil society based monitoring projects represent another type of a-legal space. One 
recent example is the Peoples' Environmental Scrutiny Committee, subsequently 
renamed the Peoples Environmental Scrutiny Team (PEST), which was established in 
2014 as part of a wider campaign to improve environmental management within 
Manchester City Council. Among other demands, Manchester environmental activists 
had called for the creation of an Environmental Scrutiny Committee, to accompany 
Manchester City Council's six existing scrutiny committees (on Finance, Health, 
Economy, Communities, Neighbourhoods and Young People and Children). Scrutiny 
Committees are intended to monitor the activities of the Council Executive and 
officers. They meet publicly around ten times a year (PEST 2014a). In the absence of 
an Environmental Scrutiny Committee within the council's structures, activists 
established the Peoples' Environmental Scrutiny Committee. The goals of the initiative 
include: “nurturing links between concerned citizens, and getting Manchester City 
Council to set up its own Environmental Scrutiny Committee” (PEST, 2014b). In the 
meantime, PEST runs on the one hand much like an official council based committee: 
they have monthly public meetings, publish reports on issues related to the council's 
environmental management, and organise events. PEST Members have also 
presented reports and contributed to meetings of the six official Manchester City 
Council meetings. On the other hand, and in contrast to the existing official scrutiny 
committees, the initiative is intended to play a campaigning and community capacity 
building role: keeping pressure on the Council (as a key organiser explains: “it was 
renamed People's Environmental Scrutiny Team – PEST - for obvious acronymical 
reasons” (Hudson 2014)), and providing training to participants in council 
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procedures, Freedom of Information requests, lobbying, and other relevant skills 
(PEST 2014c). Finally, there is a sense in which the initiative is intended to play the 
role of an exemplar, as it is explained: 
 
Without citizen action setting a good example, there is NO guarantee such a committee will 
come into existence. Assurances from the Council, its officers and executive members are 
really not worth very much (PEST 2014d). 
 
However, a-legal monitoring projects are not always based entirely in civil society. In 
some instances, local governments have taken an a-legal approach, when formal 
mechanisms or procedures have been exhausted or are otherwise nonviable. One 
example is the Police Monitoring Committee and Police Monitoring Unit which was set 
up by Manchester City Council in 1985, as one of several radical new initiatives 
established by the Labour Left after it took control of the council in 1984.6 As the 
Police Monitoring Unit's ex Information and Research officer, Tim Treuherz, explains, 
“the initiative was very controversial, not least because there were existing statutory 
arrangements for ensuring police accountability” (2013). The statutory authority was 
a Committee of Greater Manchester County Council, comprising councillors from each 
of the ten greater Manchester districts. However, it was felt by the City Council that 
the Committee was failing to ensure police accountability, specifically in relation to 
institutional racism, corruption and police violence (ibid.).  
 
Approximately nine city councillors were appointed as members of this alternative 
Police Monitoring Committee, and five or six full time members of staff employed at 
                                                        
6 Other new initiatives included the Equal Opportunities Unit and the Neighbourhood Services Unit, 
intended to devolve powers to the local neighbourhood level (Treuherz 2013) 
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the accompanying Police Monitoring Unit. The Unit's main activity was the publication 
of a monthly bulletin Police Watch, which was the only council monthly publication to 
be delivered to every door in Manchester along with the council magazine. Police 
Watch ran stories on police racism, corruption and malpractice - issues which 
received little or no coverage in the mainstream media. It encouraged members of the 
public to report experiences to the Unit, and advertised details of forthcoming 
Committee meetings.  
 
The Police Monitoring Unit and Committee can be considered a-legal for several 
reasons. Despite the fact that they were initiated by a local government, the bodies 
had no institutional powers to implement reforms or impose sanctions on the police. 
Their remit was limited to running campaigns on issues of concern about policing 
(Manchester City Council Police Monitoring Committee and Unit 1985). However, 
through various decisions, both are presented as something more than a campaign, 
and as having some responsibility in relation to police accountability. The Police 
Monitoring Unit could equally have been called the ‘Police Monitoring Campaign’, 
given its main activities and remit. However, the decision to form a 'unit' confers an 
additional sense of institutional authority. Working in collaboration with the newly 
formed Police Monitoring Committee these bodies constituted a challenge to the 
existing statutory authority for police accountability.  
 
Similar to the Peoples' Environmental Scrutiny Committee, the initiative was presented 
as intended to provide a space for public involvement in and influence over the 
currently inadequate monitoring process. As the first edition of Police Watch 
magazine explained;  
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In the absence of any real voice or influence in the present system it is important not to let 
discussion die down or to relegate it to grumblings over the cornflakes... Your experiences 
of how you are policed and your thoughts and ideas on how it can be improved are of 
interest to us and the Police Monitoring Committee and the Police Watch bulletin can be 
your voice (Police Monitoring Unit 1985).  
 
The initiative ran until 1988 when it was closed, partly as a result of changes in the 
political make-up of the council. In addition to various other similar police 
monitoring initiatives which were established around the country at this time it 
can be seen as contributing to a change in culture around policing, in which it 
became possible to question the police (Treuherz 2013). 
 
1.1.6. An Embassy 
 
Whilst it is the only example of its kind, the Aboriginal Tent Embassy shares the key 
characteristics of a-legal space and demonstrates yet another form this activity can 
take. This unique protest, described by one scholar as “the most symbolically 
powerful political demonstration in Australia’s history” (Schaap 2009, p. 211) and a 
“serious political threat to the government of the day” (Schaap 2008, p. 3) began on 
the eve of Australia Day, 1972, when four aboriginal activists from the town of 
Redfern, Eastern Australia, set off for the Australian parliament in Canberra. Arriving 
in the early hours of the morning they set up placards, a beach umbrella and erected a 
sign declaring it the ‘Aboriginal Embassy’ (Robinson 1994).  
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The protest was a direct response to the Prime Minister’s Australia Day speech in 
which he had refused the growing demand for aboriginal land rights (Robinson 
1994). When the local and national media arrived, the protesters issued a statement 
in which they demanded the retraction of the Australia Day speech, compensation for 
stolen lands, and stated that the Embassy would remain until these demands were 
met. In the following weeks Aboriginal people from across the country arrived to join 
the camp, along with tourists and other supporters. During the coming months, the 
lawn in front of Parliament House was occupied by “a constantly changing and 
fluctuating population of Aboriginal people from throughout Australia encamped 
under the red, black and green flag of international black unity”’ (ibid., p. 54).  
 
Whilst the organisers’ ambassadorial pretensions, according to one account, “started 
as a joke” (Paul Coe, Organiser, quoted in Cowan 2001, p. 34), within days they were 
receiving international mail at the site and holding press conferences, and in the 
months that followed they received formal state visits from Soviet Union diplomats, a 
cadre from the IRA, and a representative from the Canadian Indian Claims 
Commission (Robinson 1994).  
 
In July, seven months after it had arrived, the Tent Embassy was eventually 
dismantled by police. It was re-established and again removed by police in several 
violent demonstrations over the coming months, and was subsequently re-erected at 
various points throughout the 1970s and 80s (Muldoon and Schaap 2012). In 1992, 
on its twentieth anniversary, the Embassy protesters returned and took occupation of 
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the building of old Parliament House for a number of hours. It has maintained a 
permanent presence since this date (ibid.).7 
 
 
1.2. The defining characteristics of a-legal space(s) 
 
1.2.1. The quasi-legal, quasi-institutional form 
 
The key characteristic which distinguishes these initiatives from other types of 
protest and campaigns is the quasi-legal or quasi-institutional format. Initiatives take 
the form of an official process or institution with a basis in domestic or international 
law. This is done, as a minimum, through the name they assign themselves, whether 
‘world referendum’, ‘embassy’, ‘tribunal’, or ‘commission’. Normally this is also done 
through an adherence to the formal procedures of the institution or process they 
mimic. Peoples' tribunals are structured – to varying degrees – like a formal court 
room, with a panel of judges, a witness box, witnesses who give expert and victim 
testimony, and sometimes even the inclusion of a defence (Klinghoffer and 
Klinghoffer 2002). The various cases of non-binding civil society based referenda 
have normally involved the completion of ballot papers, which are deposited in ballot 
boxes, often to be publicly counted later.  
 
However, the extent to which these initiatives conform to the procedures of a state 
based referendum, court room, commission or other formal institution can vary. In 
                                                        
7  The Aboriginal Tent Embassy continues to maintain an active presence on social media, sharing 
news stories and campaign information in relation to Aboriginal politics. See: 
https://www.facebook.com/Aboriginal-Tent-Embassy-210730945611610/ 
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their review of peoples' tribunals, Reilly and Posluszny (2005) identify two distinct 
approaches. The first involves a close adherence to the procedures of national or 
international law and legal proceedings. These tribunals aim to “meet the most 
rigorous requirements of international legal norms with a view to building legal or 
quasi-legal precedents” (ibid., p. 1). A good example of this approach is the Women’s 
International War Crimes Tribunal in Japan, which addressed the alleged human 
rights abuses inflicted on the ‘comfort women’, approximately 200,000 Asian women 
subjected to sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II. This 
tribunal was “conducted as a derivative of” the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE; the Tokyo Trial) (Chinkin 2006, p. 16). The IMTFE had been 
established by allied forces to address Japanese war crimes, but had not considered 
the case of the comfort women. Through considering charges of sexual slavery, the 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal is described as doing “what had been left 
undone by the IMTFE” (ibid.). As one scholar has commented of this tribunal’s final 
report; 
 
When one gets to the end of the judgement's thousand or more paragraphs of detailed 
description, analysis and evaluation, there is no doubt that one has experienced some fairly 
assiduous orthodox legal analysis (Byrnes 2012, p. 11).  
 
The alternative approach - and by far the most common - is to focus less on due 
process and established protocol and more on ‘giving voice’ to testimony, in order to 
support education or other political efforts such as lobbying (Reilly and Posluszny 
2006). Peoples' tribunals of this form place less emphasis on meeting the stringent 
requirements of international legal norms. One example is the Courts of Women, an 
initiative which has held dozens of hearings in different countries, on issues such as 
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gender and climate change, poverty and war, amongst others. In stark contrast to the 
Japan based Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, these hearings have allowed 
the inclusion of poetry and music as evidence from witnesses. A central concern has 
been the creation of spaces where different voices and different forms of expression 
are made legitimate (El Taller 2015).  
 
The distinction between two broad approaches is perhaps most pronounced in 
peoples' tribunals. However, others types of a-legal space can also be loosely divided 
on these lines. The Catalan independence referenda, for example, took place in many 
instances with local council support, utilised polling cards, ballot boxes and polling 
station venues very similar to those that would be used had the referenda had a 
binding character. And votes were limited to those on the electoral register (Libertat, 
2013). Other non-binding referenda or 'consultations' have taken a more casual 
approach, involving little more than a stand on the street where passers-by can fill in 
a handmade polling card, and with little concern as to whether individuals have voted 
more than once.  
 
The High Pay Commission fits into the former category. Though established by a 
political organisation various steps were taken to appear as, and indeed genuinely 
take, the form of an independent commission. Compass head, Neal Lawson, explained 
“obviously you set up a commission because you think there is a problem but within 
that there was no predetermined view”, and indeed one of the requirements of the 
High Pay Commission's funders was that the commission be “genuinely independent” 
(2012). As such, once the Commissioners had been appointed Compass had no 
influence on the process or their findings (Ibid.). Publicity materials emphasised this 
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was an “independent inquiry”, “non-partisan” and “independent from any political 
party or organisation” (High Pay Commission 2011, p. 2). And there is evidence to 
suggest the organisation was successful in appearing as such, as one key organiser 
commented:  
 
One of the advantages for us was that people assumed that we had been set up by the 
government... we were keen to stress that we were independent, but then somehow this 
feeling that we were quite an official body almost gained ground’ (Hargreaves 2012).  
 
The Aboriginal Tent Embassy, on the other hand, is an interesting example of the 
latter, less legalistic approach. In the form of a temporary encampment, which grew 
from a beach umbrella to a messy sea of tents, it clashed with, rather than attempted 
to meet normal expectations of a sovereign nation's embassy. Indeed, it was this 
juxtaposition of different signs to which some scholars have attributed its resonance. 
The claim to be an 'embassy' contrasted with the informal, temporary and 
impoverished appearance of the camp and thereby underlined the Aboriginal 
protesters' status of dispossession (Cowan 2001). Organisers also engaged in an 
active questioning and experimenting with the a-legal form. At one stage a 'Ministry 
for Caucasian Affairs' was established, which mirrored and challenged the Australian 
state structure and the (at this time) Ministry for Environment, Aborigines and the 
Arts.8 However, the idea was subsequently dropped, deemed “too much like white 
bureaucracy” (Anderson, Aboriginal Tent Embassy founder, cited in Robinson, 1994, 
p. 52).  
                                                        
8 This was an Australian government ministry established by Prime Minister McMahon in May 1971, 
which was subsequently split into several ministries in December 1972 by the next administration. 
The ministry was said to reflect Prime Minister McMahon's limited interest in Aboriginal affairs 
(Maccallum 2009). 
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In summary, despite this variation, all peoples' tribunals, commissions, referenda and 
other a-legal initiatives, have included some components of the formal process they 
mimic, whether or not they simultaneously attempt to challenge or simply ignore 
other aspects of the form.  
 
1.2.2. The unofficial basis  
 
Who organises these kinds of activities and is this part of the definition? An 
understandable assumption would be that these are initiatives of civil society. Indeed, 
in the majority of cases they are organised by activists, NGOs, community 
organisations, social movements and other entities that do not have official power or 
authority. Moreover, it is the fact that they are acting as if they have some state 
sanctioned authority but in fact do not which makes them stand out.  
 
However, in some cases, state and sub-state actors have also initiated and/or 
participated in this form of activity. The Ecuadorian Public Debt Audit Commission, 
which was initiated and funded by the Ecuadorian government, in collaboration with 
Ecuadorian civil society, is one such example. And Honduran President Zelaya’s 
planned unofficial poll, discussed in-depth in chapter 3, is another. The various Police 
Monitoring Units which were established in the UK in the 1980s by local councils to 
challenge institutional racism, corruption and violence in the British police, can 
equally be classed as the use of a-legal space, given their quasi-institutional format 
and claims to be “working for accountability” (Police Monitoring Unit 1985), despite a 
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purely campaign based remit, and their lack of statutory powers to implement policy 
reforms or impose sanctions.9 
 
These cases suggest that a definition of a-legal activity as an activity of civil society 
would exclude some important examples of the phenomenon. However, there is a 
further reason not to limit the definition in this way. Such a definition would obscure 
important aspects of the struggle that takes place in these sites. Firstly, in most cases, 
organisers of a-legal activities seek to institutionalise what they are doing, within the 
state (whilst avoiding co-optation). Secondly, in some cases there is an ambiguity as 
to the institutional status of an activity, and it is only the result of the struggle 
between organisers and state actors, that determines whether the activity is deemed 
official and institutional, or merely a civil society based type of protest.  
 
These points are well illustrated through the Catalan Independence referenda of 
2009. Plans for the first ever referendum on Catalan independence, in the town of 
Arenys de Munt, emerged through the formal political process in local government 
when a motion to have a public ‘consultation’ was passed by the council. Whilst the 
referendum was never recognised at the national level, and the outcome always only 
to be symbolic, it can be said to have had a form of legal basis, as a kind of non-
binding local government-led consultation, grounded in the local level democratic 
process. However, following a legal challenge by the Spanish government, the Arenys 
de Munt council was ordered by a Spanish court to cancel the referendum, which the 
judge found to “clearly invade powers expressly reserved for the State” (quoted in 
                                                        
9 See Remit of the Police Monitoring Committee and Unit, (Manchester City Council 1985), for further 
information.  
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Baiget 2009). The council had claimed that this was not a council run referendum, but 
that it merely provided the venue in which the process would be carried out. The 
judge rejected this defence, finding the council to have consented to the consultation, 
and thereby exceeded their powers (ibid.). As a consequence, the referendum was 
relocated from the Council building to a private social club. It still had, however, the 
implicit and sometimes explicit support of the local government.  The town’s mayor, 
for example, called the judicial decision “bad for democracy” and declared he would 
still be participating (quoted in Baiget 2009). Of the subsequent Catalonia wide 
referenda carried out in December 2009 and in 2010, some came with the support of 
council motions and some without this institutional connection (ibid.).  
 
In fact, a struggle to achieve institutional recognition, and to integrate activities with 
formally recognised institutional procedures and bodies is characteristic of these 
initiatives. Organisers of the Radical Cause referendum in Venezuela sought to have 
the referendum recognised by the electoral commission, and attempted to use their 
political contacts to bring this about (Melo 2012). Organisers of the Bolivian-led 
World Referendum on Climate Change intended for the referendum to be carried out 
“officially” wherever possible. The referendum, it was stated; “should be developed 
by the corresponding electoral organisms, in countries supported by their 
governments” and only where this was not possible due to state opposition should it 
take place within civil society, it was argued (PWCCC 2013b). The Permanent Peoples’ 
Tribunal sends all rulings to the major international bodies and many have 
subsequently been discussed by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva (Lelio 
and Lisli Basso Foundation 2014). 
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A solution is to define these initiatives not by organisers' institutional or non-
institutional status but by their relative institutional authority, and their efforts to 
exceed this authority. What organisers of the Ecuadorian Public Debt Audit 
Commission, the Catalan Independence referendum, and other a-legal activities share 
is that they attempt to exceed the official legal authority and jurisdiction afforded 
them under existing domestic or international law. The Ecuadorian debt audit is 
established with the support of the national government, yet it is an attempt to 
challenge the international financial system in which Ecuador has limited power, and 
introduce a legal mechanism that is as yet unrecognised. Just as the Catalonian 
council of Arenys de Munt attempted to challenge the Spanish state through the 
initiation of an unrecognised mechanism, and as the Spanish judge put it “invade 
powers expressly reserved for the State” (quoted in Baiget 2009).  
 
Therefore, whilst a-legal activities are usually based in civil society, a definition of the 
concept should not be limited to this arena. Instead, the concept refers to initiatives 
where actors have attempted to assume official legal authority and jurisdiction not 
presently afforded them by domestic or international law. One interesting 
consequence of this is that the more successful the initiative, the less it appears as 'a-
legal' and the more it appears as simply 'legal'. As these cases illustrate, whether an 
activity is 'legal', in the sense that it has an officially recognised legal basis, is 
sometimes ambiguous, subjective and changeable. The utility of the a-legal category 
then is to capture this process, through which new practices emerge and are 
sometimes subsequently institutionalised.  
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1.2.3. A response to institutional or democratic failure 
 
The final defining characteristic concerns one aspect of how organisers present their 
motivations and what they hope to achieve. These initiatives are framed as a 
response to the failures of the formal legal and democratic system, and as promoting, 
exemplifying or embodying some better alternative.  
 
In most cases, the a-legal approach is taken following multiple efforts within the 
formal legal or political system. The High Pay Commission publicity materials, for 
example, detail the months of lobbying for a formal governmental commission which 
had preceded this initiative. Only when the then government failed to respond to 
these calls did organisers decide to set up their own commission, it is explained (High 
Pay Commission 2011; Lawson 2012). In this way the initiative is presented as a 
response to the government’s failure to address the issue of pay inequality, and based 
on a desire to rectify this failure. The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT) is similarly 
founded on an acknowledgement of, and desire to address, the failings of formal legal 
mechanisms. As the mission statement of the PPT describes it, their aim is to; “raise 
awareness of all those situations in which the massive violation of fundamental 
human rights receives no institutional recognition or response” (Transnational 
Institute 2008). 
 
The Catalan independence referenda can similarly be seen as a response to 
institutional failings. Following the passing of the Statute of Autonomy in 2006 there 
had been various delays in the implementation of the provisions of this statute. More 
than a third of the provisions were appealed in the Constitutional court of Spain by 
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the opposition party, the People's Party. In 2009 the case was still unresolved and 
those in support of independence had become increasingly frustrated with the 
situation and sought a way forward in the face of institutional deadlock. The Arenys 
de Munt referendum was proposed by the Popular Unity Candidates party in a 
Council motion as an alternative way forward (Nichols 2012).  
 
The Aboriginal Tent Embassy was established in direct response to the government’s 
refusal to consider the question of Aboriginal land rights. It followed months of 
lobbying efforts, public campaigns, and attempts on the part of campaigners to 
negotiate with the government on this issue (Robinson 1994). The 1972 Australia 
Day speech was the first time in which the government had responded publicly to 
these demands, and the point at which it was made clear that there would be no land 
rights of the form requested (Robinson 1994). Hence the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 
like other a-legal initiatives, was established when formal avenues for achieving 
change appeared to have been exhausted.  
 
However, the depth of the criticism levied at the formal legal or democratic system 
can vary. The High Pay Commission, for example, seeks to challenge “free market 
capitalism” (Gannon 2012) rather than capitalism itself, and hopes to promote 
government regulation of the private sector to enable this. Compass chair, Neal 
Lawson, observes that “the High Pay Commission was criticized from both the right 
and the left”, with some arguing that it had “not gone far enough”; whilst pay caps 
were recommended, the idea of tying lowest and highest salaries within a company 
was considered “too far” by commissioners (Lawson 2015). And HPC chair, Deborah 
Hargreaves comments;  
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We don’t want to undermine the system; we want to make the system work better. And I 
think that’s why we have to come up with good reasoned arguments that are based on data, 
so that people can’t just dismiss us as sort of raving lefties who want to overthrow 
capitalism (2012). 
 
Other initiatives, on the other hand, articulate a more fundamental challenge. The 
World Referendum on Climate Change and the International Tribunal on Climate 
Justice, both projects of Bolivian civil society initiated in 2009, sought to “change the 
capitalist model of overproduction” in favour of a system that “respects Mother 
Earth” (PWCCC 2010).  
 
1.2.4. A-legal space and the concepts of constituent and constituted power 
 
The defining characteristics of a-legal space reveal a close and complex relationship 
to the oppositional concepts of constituted and constituent power, which is important 
to address before continuing. First introduced in the context of the French revolution 
by Emmanuel Sieyes, the theory of constituent power distinguishes between 
‘constituted power’ - the state: its offices, institutions and procedures, and 
‘constituent power’ - ‘the people’: the force who created the state and remain the 
ultimate source of its legitimacy (Sewell 1994). Sieyes argued that it was the people 
who had the power over the structure and nature of the state. The theory became, as 
one historian calls it, “a script for the revolution” (ibid., p. 53) and provided the 
theoretical basis for the creation of the National Constituent Assembly in July 1789, 
which drew up the first written French Constitution and promulgated the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789. Constituent power remains an 
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important concept in the French constitution, as it does within liberal constitutional 
theory. The notion of an original ‘founding moment’ in which the constitution and the 
state were created by the constituent power functions as the source of legitimacy and 
authority for the constitutional order (Colón-Ríos 2012).  
 
Within traditional constitutional theory and for most legal philosophers, the concept 
of constituent power is exhausted by the notion of a past founding moment, during 
which it was once active (Wall 2015). Hence it remains an important but ultimately 
impotent concept. However, critical legal scholars and certain strands of 
constitutional theory have argued for the ongoing relevance of constituent power as a 
creative force. Popular uprisings and protest movements are often characterised as 
expressions of constituent power (c.f. Negri 1999; Ciccariello-Maher 2013), which, it 
is argued, should be central to democratic and constitutional theory (ibid.; Kalyvas 
2000; Colón-Ríos 2012; Dalmau 2008).  
 
Considered through the theoretical framework of constituent and constituted power, 
the nature of a-legal space as a form of political action is intriguing. This form of 
action has a close and somewhat paradoxical relationship to these oppositional 
concepts. On the one hand, the action involves the emulation of institutions of 
constituted power. Indeed, the concept of constituted power is critical for articulating 
the connection between peoples’ tribunals, unofficial referenda, citizens’ debt audits 
and so on. Other key descriptors such as ‘quasi-legal’ and ‘quasi-institutional’, on their 
own, fail to fully capture what is at stake. Quasi-legal is too narrow: these activities 
are not always strictly ‘legal’ in form, as they are in the case of peoples’ tribunals. 
Quasi-institutional too broad: it is not just any kind of institution that is mimicked but 
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an institution of the state. In short, a-legal initiatives mimic the form of extant 
institutions of constituted power. On the other hand, this is done without any official 
basis in the law of the state, or at least exceeding any official basis; whilst making a 
claim to democratic or legal authority not recognized within the existing system; and 
purportedly as a response to institutional failure and an attempt to re-order aspects 
of the institutional order. In short: they are an expression of constituent power.  
 
To be clear: the concept of a-legal space is not reducible to that of constituent power. 
Rather, the use of a-legal space should be understood as one contemporary 
manifestation of efforts to exercise constituent power.  What is unique about this 
particular mode for the expression of constituent power is that whilst attempting to 
change the constituted order, and indeed in order to do so, actors consciously and 
carefully mimic aspects of the constituted order. Hence their authority as the 
constituent power is, paradoxically, dependent somewhat on the authority of 
constituted power. The relationship between the oppositional concepts of constituted 
and constituent power and their complex and paradoxical relationship to a-legal 
space are themes I return to in subsequent chapters.  
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1.3. Existing theorisation of a-legal space 
 
How then should these activities be understood and theorised? What is their meaning 
for organisers and what role may they play in processes of social or political change? 
The various activities here classed as a-legal have received limited scholarly 
attention. The most researched type of a-legal space is the peoples’ tribunal, on which 
there is a small but growing literature set (see for e.g. Klinghoffer & Klinghoffer, 2002; 
Borowiak, 2008; Chinkin, 2006; Nayar, 2006; Nayar 2003; Nayar, 2001; Terrell, 2005; 
Beigbeder, 1999; Merry 1995; Byrnes 2012; Byrnes & Simm 2013; Otto 2017), of 
which Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002) provide the most in-depth study to date, in 
their book International Citizens’ Tribunals: mobilising public opinion for human rights.  
 
A recurrent account within this literature characterizes peoples’ tribunals as a kind of 
corrective safety net. According to Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002, p. 5), peoples’ 
tribunals:  
 
can . . . serve as a corrective mechanism through which public intellectuals mobilize world 
public opinion against powerful countries shielded from sanctions under international law. 
If the absence of effective and permanent legal structures is the problem, then [people’s] 
tribunals may offer an appropriate solution. 
 
The problem, they note, with existing international legal institutions such as the 
International Criminal Court is that states with UN Security Council veto power may 
avoid charges. In these cases, they suggest that people’s tribunals may offer a solution 
(ibid.). Hence these informal bodies might be viewed as like an extra layer of 
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international legal infrastructure. This position is broadly supported by Borowiak 
(2008, p. 161) who states that “citizens’ tribunals inhabit a space shaped by the 
exceptional condition of institutional failure” which have “become part of the 
repertoire of non-governmental practices promoting international accountability 
where law and official bodies fall short” (ibid., p. 186). In a similar vein, peoples’ 
tribunals have been characterized as ‘“fallback” forums’ (Terrell 2005, p. 8), and 
playing a potential “auxiliary role” where formal mechanisms fall short (Beigbeder 
1999, p. 138).  
 
However, there are problems with this analysis. Firstly, in the vast majority of cases, 
peoples’ tribunals are not followed up by similar legal action within the formal 
system. The governments of the USA and UK, for example, are yet to face charges of 
war crimes for the invasions of Vietnam and Iraq, despite both being the subject of 
large scale international peoples’ tribunals. Even the 2005 Tokyo based Women’s 
International War Crimes Tribunal, which so carefully adhered to legal process and 
explicitly sought to continue the work left undone by the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (Chinkin 2006, p. 335) cannot easily be claimed to have 
functioned as a “corrective mechanism” as Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer suggest (2002, 
p. 5). Despite meeting the most rigorous requirements of international legal norms, 
the tribunal has elicited limited formal response from the Japanese government, who 
are yet to admit legal responsibility or offer a formal apology to the ex-comfort 
women (Chinkin 2006). If people’s tribunals are to be seen as a kind of corrective 
safety net, then surely justice within the formal system must be a key measure of 
their efficacy? Yet, if they are so rarely achieve this, why do thousands of activists 
69 
 
around the world, with increasing regularity, continue to spend years organising 
these events?  
 
The second problem with this analysis is its failure to address the issue of why these 
cases could not be dealt with through the formal legal system in the first place. In 
most cases, peoples’ tribunals are established only after formal mechanisms have 
been exhausted or barriers to their use are perceived as insurmountable. Chinkin 
(2006), for example, charts the many efforts made to access justice for the comfort 
women through national and international legal and political institutions in the 
decade preceding the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal. For these 
individuals it is not an “exceptional condition of institutional failure”, as Borowiak 
suggests (2008, p. 161), but a system in which they are systematically marginalised 
and excluded from political and legal recognition.  
 
There are scholars, however, who have suggested a different way in which these 
initiatives should be understood. Drawing on analyses of the World Tribunal on Iraq 
and the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, Jayan Nayar (2001, p. 3), suggests that peoples’ 
tribunals should be understood as efforts to “reclaim law”. They are instances of 
“peoples’ law-doings”, which could contribute to the creation of an alternative 
“peoples’ legality” (ibid.). In contrast to liberal scholars who have emphasised the 
importance of an apolitical bipartisan approach (c.f. Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 
2002), Nayar depicts these initiatives as principally engaged in discursive struggle. 
The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, for example, is described as “a self-consciously 
political creation for the explicit purpose of challenging the constructions of 
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dominant law and thereby seeking to reclaim for the purposes of suffering humanity 
the voice of judgement” (2001, p. 3).  
 
At the heart of this project to construct a ‘peoples’ legality’, is the idea of “creating a 
different authority for judgement” (2006, p. 320). Nayar explains;  
 
The idea of people’s law, as an opposition to Empire’s law, is something more than an 
articulation of protest. It is not occupied with urging Empire to reform. It is not intended to 
seek an invitation to speak with the powers who seek to implement Empire’s projects. 
Rather, it is about creating a different authority for judgement and action altogether, based 
on other ‘word-worlds’ of law that are authored by peoples in action (ibid.).  
 
The suggestion is that peoples' tribunals are engaged in discursive struggle: to assert 
both the authority to pass judgement and the validity of their alternative judgement. 
Sally Engle Merry takes a similar position, when she argues that peoples’ tribunals 
can “contribute to the reconstitution of the sociocultural world in…emancipatory 
ways” (1995, p. 16). In her 1994 Presidential Address at the annual meeting of the 
Law and Society Association, Sally Engle Merry responded to Joel Handler’s (1992) 
earlier critique of the postmodern turn within law and society scholarship. Merry 
argues that Handler “looked too narrowly for ways that law contributes to social 
justice and transformative politics” (1995, p. 12). The wider lens she advocates 
includes an appreciation of the “the constitutive nature of law”, by which she means 
“the way legal processes construct social and cultural life” (ibid.). Significantly, Merry 
draws on the Peoples’ International Tribunal of Hawai’i to exemplify this point and 
demonstrate the way law constructs the social and cultural world. She argues that 
this peoples’ tribunal, in which the government of the United States was tried for the 
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invasion and occupation of Hawai’i, for resource appropriation and for the cultural 
destruction of the Hawaiian people, contributed to the redefinition of Hawaiian 
people. “Viewed as irresponsible and ‘childlike’ in the 19th century, Hawaiians in the 
1990s were increasingly recognized for their rich cultural tradition and demands for 
greater political power” and a year after the tribunal there was a “growing 
recognition of Native Hawaiian claims” (ibid., p. 24). Organisers of the Peoples’ 
International Tribunal of Hawai’i have, Merry claims, “accepted the symbolic power of 
law” and use “the appropriation and redeployment of law as a basis for imagining a 
new social order” (1995, p. 79).  
 
Building on the work of Nayar (2006; 2003; 2001) and Merry (1995), I suggest that 
peoples’ tribunals, commissions, referenda and other a-legal initiatives should be 
understood as sites in which actors attempt to advance an alternative order. They are 
not adjuncts to the existing legal or political system, but attempts to exemplify an 
alternative to it. Through prefiguring an alternative order they struggle to imagine, 
legitimise and ultimately institutionalise it. In the rest of this section I seek to show 
that this is a helpful way to understand each of the different types of activity which 
have been characterised as using a-legal space(s).  
 
I start with the peoples' tribunal format, where this argument is perhaps most 
contentious. Peoples' tribunals seek to demonstrate the suffering and injustice which 
has arisen from a prevailing state of affairs. And they seek to show how a different 
application of the law, to that so far tried within the formal legal system, can rectify 
this situation and is the correct application of the law. However, the extent to which 
their use of law diverges from hegemonic legal concepts and arguments varies. 
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Importantly, in many instances, it might well be argued that peoples' tribunals don't 
seek to contest or change the existing legal order, but rather to see it upheld. 
Instances such as the Russell Tribunals on Vietnam and Palestine have involved a 
careful adherence to internationally recognised and accepted legal norms and 
treaties. The intention has been to prove charges of war crimes and genocide, in each 
case, within the terms of universally recognised international law.  
 
For two reasons, however, I argue that exploring peoples' tribunals as a form of 
constitutional struggle is still appropriate. Firstly, whilst only some peoples' tribunals 
invoke a counter-hegemonic legal order, and others stick rigidly to accepted 
international legal norms, concepts and procedures, all peoples' tribunals hear legal 
claims which could not be heard within the formal legal system. That the United 
States faced charges of war crimes and genocide for its actions in Vietnam in 1967, for 
example, was inconceivable. Hence the Russell Tribunal can be seen as a challenge to 
the political order, if not the legal order. Or to put it another way, it challenged the de 
facto legal order, if not the de jure legal order. And it did this in part through 
highlighting the divergence between the two.  
 
An alternative response is to agree that peoples' tribunals are not always about 
contesting or re-imagining the legal order. Hundreds of peoples' tribunals have taken 
place around the world since the 1967 Russell Tribunal, and they have reflected a 
variety of motivations and different forms of legal consciousness; some more 
conservative than others. However, in some of the most significant examples of the 
phenomenon this is precisely how they have been understood by organisers. And 
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moreover, it is to this end that they have most commonly been employed in the last 
two or three decades. 
 
As a member of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal reflected, regarding the nature of the 
PPT when contrasted with the earlier Russell Tribunals: 
 
While the two Russell tribunals were simply tribunals of opinion, occasional expressions of 
a fraction of the Western intelligentsia, by conferring on the Tribunal a permanent 
character and by providing it with an instrument of reference, the Universal Declaration of 
the Rights of Peoples, the Lelio Basso Foundation aims at contributing to the creation of a 
transnational humanitarian order (Member of the PPT, anonymous, cited in Klinghoffer and 
Klinghoffer 2002, p. 165). 
 
As its founder, Leilio Basso, explained, the PPT addressed the need “to fight the 
origins of the diverse forms of oppression which are necessary to the survival of the 
capitalist system” (cited in ibid.).1 
 
The PPT Mexican chapter recently concluded its four-year investigation of “Free 
Trade, violence, impunity and the rights of the peoples”. The conclusions of the panel 
of judges reviewing the alleged deterioration in the education system are particularly 
interesting. The judges found evidence of growing inequality, violations of all kinds of 
rights, and the commercialization and privatisation of education. They concluded that 
“the government created the constitutional conditions that enabled this process to 
flourish through carefully crafted legislation, passed and implemented at all levels” 
                                                        
1  In a similar vein, legal scholar Richard Falk suggests that the PPT can “relate positively to the energy 
of decolonization” (cited in Klinghoffer & Klinghoffer, 2002, p. 165). Indeed, peoples' tribunal 
scholars Klinghoffer & Klinghoffer (2002, p. 165) have gone so far as to remark that PPT members 
“tend to accept the bullet more than the ballot as a means of exercising self-determination.” 
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(Coll 2015). Hence the ruling can be interpreted as an attempt to contest the now 
institutionalised neoliberal order in Mexico.  
 
Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002, p. 179) observe that;  
 
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed the development of tribunals focusing 
on the reputed perils of “global capitalism.” The concerns are similar to those raised by 
demonstrators in Seattle, Washington, and Prague—namely, that the combination of 
globalization and capitalism is being spread by an exploitative “system” to the detriment of 
“the people.” 
 
Hence they highlight the need to contextualise any attempt to make sense of the 
peoples' tribunal tactic. It is a tactic that has been used for over eighty years, and with 
increasing frequency, by different kinds of organisations, in many parts of the world 
and to address a diverse range of issues. As such, divergent applications are 
inevitable. Equally, however, their observation supports the argument that, since the 
1990s, one recurrent application has been in wider struggles against neoliberalism 
and the legal and political order which supports it.  
 
Contemporary peoples' tribunal organisers have often explained their use of the 
peoples' tribunal tactic as a response to injustice which is both normalised and 
institutionalised. Organisers of the recent London-based peoples' tribunal on 
'precarity', as one example, observe that:  
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People’s tribunals, like the one proposed here, can be applied in work-related situations 
where systemic injustice, normalized to the point of intractability, lies beyond the reach of 
existing labour and employment legislation and policy (Precarious Workers Brigade, 2011). 
 
Similarly, organisers of the Philadelphia based Peoples' Tribunal Against Police 
Brutality and Misconduct, explain that they:  
 
believe that a tribunal of this type is necessary due to the systemic nature of police brutality 
in Philadelphia and the U.S. The state has given police the legal license to commit acts of 
murder and brutality with impunity (Askia Coalition Against Police Brutality 2011). 
 
Peoples' tribunals have addressed a dizzying range of different issues, from the rights 
of mental health patients to foreign wars to 'precarity' and police brutality. Perhaps 
the common theme is the perception of institutionalised, systemic injustice. The 
peoples' tribunal tactic hopes to both contest the institutionalised order within which 
such injustice occurs, and exemplify an alternative.  
 
Turning to non-binding referenda: one might question the extent to which these 
initiatives really embody and enact a different legal order. Wasn't the Radical Cause 
referendum in Venezuela, for example, simply an attempt to undermine an unpopular 
president by a rival political party? An in-depth discussion of this case is reserved for 
chapter 4. However, as I hope to show in this chapter, interviews with organisers and 
participants suggest the action was about more than bringing down a particular 
president for many of those involved.  President Pérez was, in the words of one 
organiser, “a stopper, that had to be removed” (Almeida Pérez 2012). And the 
referendum was intended to challenge the existing system of pacted two-party 
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representative democracy, and the limited political agency it afforded the majority of 
citizens.  
 
In fact, despite the variety of issues addressed through non-binding popular and 
citizen-led referenda, I argue that they commonly represent an attempt to contest the 
constituted order.  The World Referendum on Climate Change, which was initiated by 
Bolivian civil society in 2010, is a good example of an initiative which sought to 
challenge the legal and political order at the international level. The proposed 
referendum questions illustrate this well, the first reading:  
 
Are you in favour of changing the capitalist model of overproduction and overconsumption 
and re-establishing harmony with the environment, recognising and respecting the rights of 
Mother Earth? (PWCCC 2010) 
 
The Scottish 'Keep the Clause' campaign's referendum against the repeal of Clause 
28 is an interesting case. In this instance the a-legal tactic was employed to resist 
changes to the constituted order, which had been initiated by government. 
However, broadly speaking the case still fits the hypothesis. Organisers, without 
institutional power, turned to the use of a-legal space, in an effort to promote a 
particular legal order which was distinct from the government's proposed legal 
changes.   
 
Debt audits have supported public education and consciousness raising efforts on the 
one hand and constituted an important legal tool on the other, as Ecuador's successful 
bonds default demonstrates. However, there is precedent for also understanding 
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these activities as about something more than this. Prominent debt campaigner and 
former director of UK NGO Jubilee Debt Campaign, Nick Dearden has discussed the 
role they may play in building a “new economic vision” (2011). Reporting from a 
recent conference on austerity in Greece, Dearden noted that the debt audit was seen 
as a tool which might help indebted European countries avoid “the three decades of 
stunted development experienced by Latin American countries”. However, he added:  
 
But the activists gathered this weekend believed that a debt audit can be the start of 
something even more fundamental, a new way of thinking about economics. As [the Greek 
MP] Sakorafa put it, an audit is the start of regaining values and vision to show ‘beyond 
speculating market games, there are more valuable concepts; there are people, there is 
history, there is culture, there is decency’ (Dearden 2011).  
 
Such comments support an interpretation of debt audits as engaged in 
constitutional struggle, in a broad sense. They are struggling to challenge the 
existing economic order, and the arrangement of financial institutions and 
procedures which support it, and to begin to articulate what an alternative might 
look like.  
 
This is a necessarily limited discussion of just some instances of the a-legal space 
tactic. However, I argue that this characterisation can be applied to a-legal 
initiatives in general. The very fact that actors resort to this non-binding extra-
institutional space suggests the issue could not be addressed to their satisfaction 
within the formal system. One way to explain this is that their demands are based 
on a normative order which is fundamentally different to that of the extant legal 
and political order.  
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As a final point: non-binding referenda, peoples' tribunals, commissions, audits, 
and other a-legal initiatives are established in quite different circumstances, take 
very different forms, and play out in different ways from one another. As such, the 
intention is not to reductively lump these initiatives together with the claim that 
they are all doing exactly the same thing. Rather, I hope to have shown that they 
can each be seen as part of the same broad phenomenon, and hence demonstrate 
different ways in which struggle over transformative constitutional change can be 
enacted. A better understanding of what features these different forms of a-legal 
space share and where the differences lie is central to understanding the tactic, 
and is discussed in more depth in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2: A conceptual framework for exploring the 
use of a-legal space  
 
In this chapter I elaborate a conceptual framework through which to understand and 
explore the use of a-legal space as a political strategy. I start with an exposition of 
Chilean theorist Marta Harnecker’s account of a-legal space, where she originally 
coined the term, inspired by the Venezuelan Radical Cause party’s referendum on 
President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992 (2007; 2008). Harnecker provides a starting 
point, but leaves various questions unanswered and the concept of a-legal space in 
need of theoretical development. In this chapter I propose how her account might be 
developed. I divide this task into two parts. In section 2.1 I consider the ontological 
status of a-legal space, and whether we can sustain the notion of a-legal space as a 
distinct legal category of action. I draw on Hans Lindahl’s (2013) different theoretical 
account of the a-legal to argue that we can. In section 2.2 I consider a-legal space from 
a functional perspective. I draw on several different theories and concepts to explain 
how this approach might be an effective political strategy.  
  
2.1 The concept of a-legal space 
 
2.1.1 Marta Harnecker's account of a-legal space 
 
Harnecker's discussion of a-legal space is short: less than two pages are devoted to it. 
However, she makes several substantive claims, which provide a starting point for 
theorising the use of a-legal space. Firstly, the Radical Cause party's cheeky 
referendum on the presidency of Pérez is held to be something more than a 
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noteworthy historical quirk. It is framed as a particular political-legal strategy, 
distinguished by its alternative legal status. “No law provided for this type of 
consultation, but neither did any law prohibit it” (2007, p. 111), suggesting that:  
 
besides the area of the legal arena and its opposite – the illegal arena – there is a whole 
other arena that… could be called the a-legal, that arena which is neither legal nor illegal 
(ibid., p. 138).  
 
This depiction of a-legal space as an alternative political-legal strategy can be best 
understood when situated in its historical context. For decades, political strategy in 
Latin America was understood as a choice between 'reform' and 'revolution'. Whilst 
revolution necessitated the armed struggle, it promised the overthrow of the 
capitalist state, taking control of the means of production, and the opportunity to 
restructure state and society. The alternative, safer and for some more feasible option 
was to participate in the existing democratic system, and seek social improvements 
“within the parameters of capitalist property relations” (Cameron 2009, p. 339), and 
existing constitutional arrangements. The a-legal approach, as characterised by 
Harnecker, does not fit into either category. No laws are broken, yet neither do 
participants accept the prevailing rules of the electoral system or formal politics more 
generally.  
 
The second claim concerns the potential utility of a-legal space. Whilst not often taken 
advantage of, these spaces hold significant potential argues Harnecker. Specifically, a-
legal spaces “can be taken advantage of with great creativity, in order to raise 
consciousness, mobilize people and have them participate in a way that builds the 
anti-system social force” (2007, p. 112). In the case of the Radical Cause referendum 
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on Pérez, it is argued that the referendum “helped to create a political situation in 
favour of the president’s resignation” (2007, p. 111). Finally, Harnecker points to the 
ubiquity of a-legal spaces, which she suggests are “countless” (ibid.). Just two other 
specific examples are cited, both organised by the Zapatista Civil Movement in Mexico 
in the 1990s. One is the National Consultation for Peace and Democracy, in which 
300,000 people participated in 1995. The public were invited to vote on various 
issues including whether the organisation should unite with others and form a 
common political front, or whether it should remain independent. The other is the 
1999 National Consultation for the Recognition of Indian Peoples and the end of the 
War of Extermination, in which close to three million individuals participated (ibid.). 
Hence all of the examples of a-legal space given by Harnecker include popular 
consultations or referenda, organised by a political movement or party, without a 
basis in the formal law of the state. She does not suggest other forms that this activity 
might take, but equally she does not limit the concept to referenda. To sum up 
Harnecker's proposal: the use of a-legal space is a tactic or strategy which avoids the 
traditional legal/illegal dichotomy; there are “countless” opportunities for action of 
this kind (2007, p. 112); and the tactic holds great potential to mobilise people, raise 
consciousness, and otherwise influence the political conditions for change.  
 
Whilst intriguing, her argument leaves various questioned unanswered and the 
concept of a-legal space in need of theoretical development. Why should this space or 
activity be useful for social movements? And by what mechanism might it bring about 
changes in popular consciousness, mobilisation and participation? I consider these 
questions pertaining to the functional value of a-legal space in the next section. Now I 
turn to consider whether the idea of a-legal space as a distinct legal category can be 
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sustained. As it stands, there is a gap in Harnecker’s account of a-legal space as an 
alternative legal category which is in need of further development.  
 
A-legal space transcends the legal/illegal dichotomy for Harnecker because as with 
the referendum “no law provided for [it]… but neither did any law prohibit it (2007, 
p. 111). The problem with this argument is that legal provision and legal prohibition 
is not a real dichotomy into which all activity must fit. The Radical Cause referendum 
is simultaneously legal in the sense that it breaks no laws, and not legal in the sense 
that it has no basis in a legally recognised, sanctified and institutionalised process. 
Similarly, most other instances of a-legal space, including peoples’ tribunals, debt 
audits or peoples’ commissions (as just some examples) are legal to the extent that 
they are lawful and not legal to the extent that they have no formal basis in the law of 
the state. However, in this they are not distinct from many other forms of contentious 
political action and social practice more generally. Another objection is that 
Harnecker does not explicitly mention the quasi-institutional form of a-legal space, 
which is strange given that this is surely the key feature which distinguishes these 
activities from other forms of protest and informal politics. Therefore, despite its 
appeal, Harnecker’s account is in need of development.  
 
2.1.2 Hans Lindahl's theory of a-legality  
 
Hans Lindahl's conceptualisation of a-legality can provide just this development. 
Lindahl presents his novel theory of legal order and its disruption through strange 
behaviours and situations which he denominates 'a-legal', in his monograph Fault 
Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-legality (2013). Lindahl's 
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account of a-legality has important commonalities with Harnecker's idea, beyond a 
(to some extent) coincidental use of the term 'a-legal'. Most significantly, he posits a 
distinct legal category of activity which in some sense transcends the legal/illegal 
binary. And, whilst there are differences between the activities Lindahl describes and 
the initiatives which are the object of this study, his theory can be used to fill a 
theoretical gap in the account of a-legal space developed by Harnecker. In the present 
section, I outline the central components to Lindahl's theory, before showing how it 
can be used in a theory of a-legal space as a political strategy.  
 
Lindahl's a-legality is best introduced through examples. Fault Lines of Globalization 
opens with an anecdote. Recalling an experience he had whilst dining in a restaurant, 
Lindahl describes a “vagrant” who came in off the street and haughtily demanded he 
be served a meal. Much to the surprise of Lindahl and his fellow diners the waiter, not 
wanting to cause a scene, decided it was better to oblige and sat the man down at a 
table. When the waiter brought out the food the man smiled and asked the waiter if 
he would like to join him. The “stunned” waiter “awkwardly declined” and quickly 
returned to the kitchen (ibid., p. 1). For Lindahl, this peculiar incident captures 
something of what is meant by situations and behaviours which are ‘a-legal’. 
“However fleetingly”, Lindahl observes, “the vagrant’s gesture disrupted the flow of 
an order that had been taken more or less for granted by those who participated in it” 
(ibid., p. 1). Through rejecting the regulatory force of the existing legal order - and its 
rules for how to behave in a restaurant - the actions of the vagrant disrupted the legal 
order, for those within it. This disruption is described as having “two faces” (ibid.). On 
the one hand, the vagrant's action prompted a new awareness of the extant legal 
order. Diners in the restaurant and the waiter alike were temporarily made aware of 
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their participation in a particular legal order – in which a restaurant is a certain kind 
of ‘ought-place’, where those with sufficient resources can eat, others serve the food, 
and others are left outside. On the other hand, the action also “intimated” the 
possibility of an alternative possible order (ibid., p. 2). Through the man’s suggestion 
that he be served regardless of funds, and his friendly dinner invitation to the waiter, 
another order was invoked, where different rules and different subject positions 
obtain. 
 
This 'a-legal' behaviour, for Lindahl, resists assimilation with legal or illegal 
categories of action. The man's behaviour breaks various rules for how one is to 
behave in the context. Yet crucially he does not behave as if he is breaking the rules, 
but rather as if regulated by some other kind of legal order. This behaviour is, 
according to Lindahl, unordered within the terms of the extant legal order and hence 
reveals to onlookers other possible ways of behaving not accounted for within this 
legal order. Had the man ordered a meal and then attempted to run off without 
paying the scenario would be less interesting and provocative. Equally so, had he 
meekly approached the kitchen and requested any food they were throwing out. 
Unlike these two alternative scenarios his behaviour does not easily fit within 
recognised categories of illegal or legal behaviour. Instead, his calm confident 
demeanour and unusual dinner invitation to the waiter contribute to a sense that 
something else is going on.  
 
In another example, Lindahl describes a political group carrying out an 
‘autoréduction’ (as it is known in French) in a French supermarket. The group fill 
their baskets with food, including expensive foie gras, then line up at each of the 
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checkouts in the supermarket. Upon being served they explain to the cashier that they 
will not be paying for the food but would like to take it to distribute amongst the 
unemployed. They request that the manager is called to authorise this, and politely 
refuse to move in the meantime, blocking any further sales from taking place. Yet 
another example discussed comes from the Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores rurais sem terra; MST). Citing as justification the 
hugely unequal distribution of land in Brazil where 1.6% of landowners control 
around half of arable land, the MST engage in land occupations and struggles through 
the courts to gain legal title for occupied lands (Lindahl 2013). Hence, common to 
Lindahl's examples is an act of rule-breaking behaviour, which is not acknowledged 
as such. Actors resist the regulatory force of the dominant legal order, and behave as 
if governed by some other legal order. And the effect of this behaviour is a disruption 
of the extant legal order, prompting a new awareness of this order and of the 
possibility for alternatives.  
 
Lindahl's account of a-legality, its relation to legal order and its capacity to disrupt a 
legal order depends on the invocation of three new conceptual categories. Any legal 
order, it is argued, has its boundaries, limits and fault lines. Whilst not normally 
encountered in theories of legal order, for Lindahl these categories are central to 
understanding the nature of legal order, indeed they are constitutive of legal order. 
Whilst 'boundaries' refer to the line between the legal and the illegal within a given 
legal order, 'limits' refer to the line between what is legally ordered and what is 
unordered. The realm of the unordered encapsulates behaviour and situations not 
defined as legal or illegal, within a given legal order. The third new category, 'fault 
lines', is more specific and refers to the line between legally ordered behaviour and 
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behaviour or situations which are not only unordered, but could not be ordered by 
this particular legal order, because they presuppose a fundamentally different 
normative order altogether.  
 
Whilst boundaries, limits and fault lines are constitutive of legal order, they are not 
always visible to those whose behaviour is governed by a given legal order. Lindahl's 
point is that much of the time we act with unconscious compliance, thinking and 
behaving in a way which is determined by the legal orders we are located within, yet 
we remain unaware of these frameworks which so structure our ways of being. In 
fact, it is only when these lines are breached that they become truly present for those 
whose behaviour they govern. Hence it takes illegal behaviour to reveal the 
boundaries of a legal order. As Lindahl puts it:  
 
illegality has a ‘positive’ significance in that it renders legal order and behaviour present in a 
specific way… Illegality reveals that legal boundaries govern behaviour and also, 
conversely, that legal boundaries depend on behaviour (ibid., p. 27).  
 
However, it takes a different kind of behaviour to reveal the limits or the fault lines of 
a legal order: not illegal behaviour but a-legal behaviour. Hence the value of a-legal 
behaviour and situations is their potential to reveal the limits and fault lines of a 
given legal order, to those within it, or in other words, to reveal its contingency.  
 
Crucially then, for Lindahl, a-legality is a relational concept. The man in the restaurant 
behaved a-legally, in the terms of the dominant legal order regulating behaviour in 
this context. Hence, particular behaviours and situations are a-legal with respect to a 
given legal order. As Lindahl explains:  
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It makes no sense to pose the question about a-legality as though there are specific kinds of 
behaviour that are a-legal as such, independently of any given legal order (ibid., p. 159). 
 
Behaviour and situations are deemed a-legal when they resist assimilation with legal 
or illegal categories of behaviour within a particular legal order, through behaving as 
if regulated by another legal order.  This account offers one way to make sense of the 
suggestion that unofficial referenda, peoples' tribunals and commissions, civil society 
debt audits and so on constitute a-legal spaces. Similar to the man in the restaurant, 
the participants in these initiatives behave as if in accordance with another legal 
order. Hence the quasi-institutional format, which is strangely unremarked upon in 
Harnecker's description of the Radical Cause referendum, is central. Through acting 
out an institutional process which is based on a different legal or political order, in 
which different norms and values prevail, organisers invoke this alternative order 
and reject the existing one. Perhaps one might question the extent to which these 
initiatives really embody and enact a different legal order. Indeed, in many ways they 
enact processes which are very similar to the existing legal and institutional order. 
The vagrant diner, the autoréduction protesters and the MST occupations are not so 
obviously similar, and more transgressive it would seem. This is an issue I will 
address in the course of the thesis.  
 
To sum up: for Harnecker, the Radical Cause referendum was interesting because it 
was not legally sanctioned, but nor did it break the law. It exemplified “a whole other 
arena… which is neither legal nor illegal” (2007, p. 138). The problem with this 
account is that legally sanctioned and institutionalised behaviour and illegal 
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behaviour is not a dichotomy into which actions must fit, and she has not 
distinguished this activity from many other forms of contentious political action. It 
seemed that something was missing from her account. In suggesting that a-legality is 
relational, involving a rejection of the extant legal order and ‘intimation’ of an 
alternative, Lindahl offers a way forward.  
  
2.1.3 Weak and strong a-legality  
 
There is further reason to draw on Lindahl's theory of a-legality to explore these 
initiatives. In distinguishing between different variants of a-legality, Lindahl offers 
one way to make sense of different approaches to the use of a-legal space, which is 
crucial to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. As discussed in chapter 1, a-
legal initiatives vary in the level of systemic critique in which they engage. Whilst the 
UK's High Pay Commission, for example, is described as “not anti-capitalist” and 
intended to “make the system work better” for business and society (Hargreaves 
2012), other initiatives articulate a more fundamental challenge and demands 
incommensurate with the existing order. Organisers of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 
for example, reject the Australian government's discourse of 'reconciliation', assert 
that sovereignty was never ceded, and demand a treaty with the Australian state 
(Schaap and Muldoon, 2012). Such demands simply cannot be incorporated within 
the existing Australian legal and political order.  Lindahl's theory of a-legality reflects 
a similar distinction. A-legality, he suggests, comes in a 'weak' and a 'strong' form, 
distinguished by whether the behaviour could be ordered by the extant legal order, or 
is something more than the “not-yet-(il)legal” (ibid., p. 174). Brazil's Landless 
Movement, the MST, is given as one example of weak a-legality. To be clear: this is not 
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a value judgement, but reflects the fact that their behaviour and demands are 
orderable within the extant order. The MST's occupations are, of course legally 
contentious and the organisation has been taken to court on countless occasions. 
Nonetheless, the existing Brazilian constitution enshrines the right to occupy unused 
land, and the MST explicitly appeal to the constitution in seeking to justify their 
actions. In contrast, the May '68 occupation of the Sorbonne and the subsequent 
wildcat strikes across France are given as one example of strong a-legality. Workers 
engaged in “radical questioning” and “sought to overthrow the state and directly take 
over the economy”, Lindahl explains (ibid., p. 169).1 Strong a-legality such as this 
“arrests legal intentionality in a more radical way: behaviour appears as (il)legal but 
has a normative point that definitively eludes both terms of this disjunction” (ibid., p. 
168 – 169).  
 
Lindahl's weak/strong categorisation of a-legality maps neatly onto the initiatives 
which are the subject of this study. This provides support for the applicability of 
Lindahl's theory. Also, however, it provides tools to better understand the use of a-
legal space as a political-legal strategy. For Lindahl, weak and strong variants of a-
legality are involved in a fundamentally different claim-making process. A full 
exposition of the weak/strong distinction, and its implications for how we 
understand the claim-making process in which these activities are engaged, depends 
on Lindahl's novel account of legal order. Lindahl promotes a “'first-person plural' 
concept of legal order” (ibid., p. 4). Law, he suggests, should be understood as a type 
of collective action taken by individuals who come together to act as a group: “legal 
                                                        
1 Whilst in contrast, the statements and actions of the unions and French Communist party exemplify 
weak a-legality, argues Lindahl; both had “vested interests in the continuation of the extant legal 
collective” (Lindahl 2013, p. 169). 
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order as played out by a 'we' in which a manifold of individuals act jointly” (ibid.). A 
full discussion of the significance, strengths and possible problems with this 
conception of legal order is beyond the scope of this study. What is important, 
however, is how this approach relates to his theory of a-legality as that which reveals 
the limits and fault lines in a legal order. In short, weak a-legality is an appeal to the 
existing legal collective to shift the limits of the legal order, whilst strong a-legality 
involves a more radical challenge. As “something more and other than the not-yet-
(il)legal” (ibid., p. 157), it involves behaviour or situations which intimate an 
incommensurate legal order, in which the normative point of the collective action is 
entirely different. Hence it is not an appeal to the existing legal collective to shift the 
boundaries of the legal order. Rather it involves an appeal to a different, not yet 
existent, legal collective orientated around different normative values.  
 
The weak/strong categorisation of a-legality suggests that a-legal initiatives might 
involve very different kinds of claims for very different audiences. It has implications 
for their likelihood of success, and indeed for what success would even look like. This 
is an issue I return to in chapter 4 and the discussion of the Radical Cause referendum 
on Pérez. For now, it is sufficient to appreciate that the framework provides tools to 
explore what specific a-legal initiatives are trying to achieve and to whom their 
demands are directed.  
 
2.1.4. Is a-legal space the best way to understand these activities?   
 
There are a couple of potential objections to the use of 'a-legal space' as a conceptual 
tool to understand peoples' tribunals, civil society referenda, debt audits and the 
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other initiatives which are the subject of this study, which it is necessary to consider. 
Firstly, might it not be better to opt for a positive description such as 'peoples' law 
initiatives' or 'social movement legal initiatives', instead of 'a-legal space' or 'a-legal 
initiatives'? These conceptual categories are more descriptive, offer greater clarity 
and are less ambiguous. And moreover, there is precedent for understanding peoples' 
tribunals in this way. Nayar (2006; 2001) has advocated the development of 'peoples' 
law', as an alternative to the existing international legal order which has largely been 
transformed into 'Empire's Law' (2006): law for which the primary purpose is to 
normalise and legitimate the structural violence of empire. Peoples' law is developed 
by the grassroots, in “communities of suffering”, and is grounded in an alternative set 
of norms, values and meanings (2006). Peoples' tribunals should be seen as 
practising and developing this alternative kind of law. Therefore, extending the idea 
of 'peoples' law-doings' to include debt audits, popular referenda, and other popular 
quasi-institutional initiatives for social change could build on the peoples' law project 
initiated by Nayar.  
 
However, for several reasons the concept of a-legal space offers greater analytical 
purchase as a tool to explore the phenomena which are the subject of this study. 
Firstly, these activities are not always based entirely in civil society or social 
movements. As highlighted in chapter 1, in some instances, state and sub-state actors 
have adopted an a-legal approach. And so to define the phenomenon by its civil 
society or social movement basis would be to exclude important examples. Secondly, 
the category of 'a-legal space' facilitates a focus on the tactic and strategy, rather than 
attempting to generalise about who employs it and to what ends. This means that 
interesting cases like the Ecuadorian Public Debt Audit Commission which are initiated 
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by states are not excluded. But also, we can avoid any assumption about the type of 
political project in which this tactic is employed. Peoples’ law has substantive criteria: 
it is in the interests of 'the people' or the common good; it enjoys popular grass-roots 
support; and it contests the tyranny of states or capital, for example. A-legal space, by 
contrast, is politically and ethically neutral and can logically be employed by all sorts 
of political projects. If it transpires that a-legal space is commonly employed by a 
particular kind of actor, in a particular kind of situation or with particular kinds of 
goals, then this is a substantive finding which contributes to our understanding of a 
phenomenon, rather than the tautological implication of the conceptual category we 
started with.  
 
In the event, it is striking that in almost all instances the use of a-legal space is 
employed to support projects on the left of the political spectrum. One unusual 
counter-example is the Scotland-based non-binding referendum on the repeal of 
Clause 28 in 2000.2 Scottish citizens were enabled to express their opposition to the 
repeal of this regressive legislation in the nationwide postal ballot, in which 32% of 
registered voters took part (BBC 2000a; BBC 2000b). Principally supported by 
conservatives and the religious right, this case stands out from other examples of the 
phenomenon. Why this might be and what was different in this instance are questions 
to be explored in more depth.  
 
A different objection might be made from a legal pluralist perspective. Legal pluralists 
challenge the equation of law with state law, and hold that there are multiple often 
incommensurate legal orders operating within any society (c.f. Merry 1988). From a 
                                                        
2 Discussed in more depth in chapter 1.  
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pluralist perspective these initiatives, one might argue, are not a-legal but simply 
legal. And moreover, the a-legal category depends on an outdated monist conception 
of law. However, I suggest that this is not the best way to understand these initiatives 
and would be to miss an important component of this strategy. Organisers seek to 
achieve change within the legal and political order which is constituted by the state. 
And these initiatives are intended to help achieve this. They mimic institutions of the 
state in order to challenge them and demonstrate another possible model. In defining 
these initiatives as a-legal rather than legal the intention is not to valorise state law, 
nor to suggest that indigenous law or other legal systems not based in the state are 
not law. It is to recognise the centrality of state law and institutions of the state to the 
a-legal space strategy.  
 
2.1.5. The limitations to Lindahl's conceptual framework for the present study  
 
Despite the similarities, there are various notable differences between the behaviours 
and situations Lindahl denominates as a-legal and the unofficial referenda, peoples' 
tribunals, commissions, and other a-legal initiatives here under investigation. Firstly, 
a-legal initiatives are less legally ambiguous; they are, in general, lawful. Lindahl’s 
examples, on the other hand, are legally provocative and contentious, and it is the 
contentious, transgressive nature of the behaviour which lies at the heart of Lindahl’s 
definition of a-legality. Secondly, a-legal initiatives are planned politically motivated 
actions, whilst Lindahl’s category is much wider encompassing all sorts of behaviours 
and situations. Finally, and perhaps as a result of the former, Lindahl's account is not 
focused on how those behaving a-legally attempt to explain what they are doing and 
persuade others to join them. Efforts to increase awareness, political consciousness, 
94 
 
 
participation and mobilisation in the wider population are a key component to the 
initiatives which are the focus of this study. In the following sections I explore these 
differences, and what they tell us about a-legal initiatives and their relationship to 
Lindahl's a-legality.  
 
2.1.6. Rule breaking 
 
Broadly speaking, peoples’ tribunals, unofficial referenda, civil society debt audits and 
other a-legal initiatives are lawful. Authorities may often try to limit and control their 
activities (imposing draconian limitations on venue choice, preventing key organisers 
obtaining foreign visas, and generally monitoring their activities)3 and in several 
cases states have pursued legal challenges through the courts.4 However, the onus has 
been on the state to construct the case that the initiative has in some way broken the 
law. In Lindahl’s examples of a-legality, on the other hand, rule-breaking behaviour is 
both obvious and of central importance. Indeed, it is only through questioning and 
challenging existing legal boundaries between the legal and illegal that the limits of a 
legal order are revealed, and the possibility for other legal orders is made apparent. 
So, in both Lindahl's a-legality and the a-legal initiatives explored in this study, agents 
behave as if in accordance with some other legal order, and thereby invoke this other 
order. However, the latter do not question the extant legal boundaries in quite the 
                                                        
3  As just two examples, the Russell Tribunal on Vietnam was denied permission to take place in 
France and other European countries. It eventually took place in Sweden but was banished to a 
remote town rather than a major city (Duffett 1968); and a Colombian organiser of the 
International Tribunal on Climate Justice in Bolivia was prevented by Colombian security services 
from leaving Colombia to attend the event (Fundación Solón 2009b).  
4  Specific examples include the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the first Catalan independence referendum 
in Arenys de Munt, Catalonia, and the Honduran President Zelaya's proposed a-legal referendum on 
convocation of a constituent assembly in 2009. In each of these cases organisers faced legal 
challenges, and court rulings found the latter two to be unconstitutional and ordered the initiatives 
to be cancelled. These cases and the issue of legality are discussed in more depth in chapter 3, sub-
section 3.3.3.: 'the struggle to define (il)legality and the two 'axes of legality''. 
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same way. On this basis I would argue that a-legal initiatives do something somewhat 
different to the scenarios described by Lindahl, whilst at the same time sharing many 
commonalities. They can be seen as a variant, or a sub-category of the broader 
phenomenon of a-legality as it is described by Lindahl.  
 
One question to consider will be how important the rule breaking component is to the 
hypothesised phenomenological and psychological effect at the heart of Lindahl's 
account. Do these actions which don't break the rules in quite the same way – which 
are on the whole lawful - hold the same disruptive potential? If not, do they still count 
as a-legality? And is this still a useful form of action? I will return to these questions in 
chapter 4 where I will discuss the nature of the a-legality in which these initiatives 
are engaged in more depth. 
 
A final consideration is that these initiatives are often accompanied by and/or 
intended to support more explicit rule and law-breaking behaviour. To name just a 
few examples: the Russell Tribunal on the Vietnam War hoped to provoke a mass 
movement of civil disobedience against the war (Duffett 1968). Organisers of the 
Radical Cause referendum, in some accounts, intended to help create the conditions 
for a coup (Almeida Pérez 2012).5 Aboriginal Tent Embassy organisers returned to 
illegally occupy the old parliament building on the twenty-year anniversary of the 
Embassy in 1992 (Schaap 2008). Perhaps part of the value of these initiatives, then, is 
in helping to legitimate these other more legally contentious actions and the wider 
project of which they are a part.  
 
                                                        
5 However, this is contested, as I discuss in more depth in chapter 4.  
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2.1.7. Activism 
 
The second key difference is that, for Lindahl, a-legal behaviour and situations are not 
limited to political activism, nor need they be motivated by a conscious intention or 
desire to disrupt the legal order. We cannot know the intentions and thinking of the 
homeless man in Lindahl’s restaurant anecdote: whether he sought to challenge the 
rules in a restaurant and wider legal order from which he is excluded, or just fancied 
his chances at a free meal. But for Lindahl’s account of a-legal behaviour this doesn’t 
matter. The behaviour is defined as a-legal because:  
 
erupting into a legal order from the domain of the unordered, …[it] transgresses the spatial, 
temporal, subjective, and material boundaries that establish whether behaviour is legal or 
illegal (Lindahl, 2013, p. 4) 
 
And in this way it:  
 
disrupted  the flow of an order that had been taken more or less for granted by those who 
participated in it... it called attention to the restaurant as part of a concrete order in which 
boundaries establish that certain persons are to behave in certain ways in certain places 
and at certain times... [and]  intimated another way of ordering who stands and who sits, 
who orders and who eats, when one is entitled to enter and leave, and so forth (ibid.).  
 
Hence, behaviour is defined as a-legal because of some external feature(s) of that 
behaviour which suggest a transgression of “the... boundaries that establish whether 
behaviour is legal or illegal” (ibid.), and the presumed effect of this on others. Other 
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examples of a-legal behaviour for Lindahl include environmentally destructive 
activity, before such behaviour was regulated. 
 
A-legal initiatives, by contrast, are politically motivated and consciously seek to 
promote their alternative legal (and social, political, cultural) order. Moreover, they 
are explicit in their invocation of another order. They don't just “intimate” another 
order, as Lindahl suggests (ibid.), but spell it out, attempting to imagine and articulate 
the details. How then should the relationship between these initiatives and Lindahl’s 
a-legality be understood? I suggest that these initiatives should be understood and 
explored as self-conscious and politically motivated instances of a-legal behaviour.  As 
suggested above, they are a sub-category of the broader phenomenon of a-legality, 
and this is one of the specific characteristics of this sub-category. The significance of 
this difference is another issue which is explored in more depth in subsequent case 
study chapters.  
 
2.1.8. Seeing a-legality 
 
Relatedly, Lindahl does not provide us with all the theoretical tools necessary to 
explore and critique these initiatives which so explicitly promote another possible 
order. Lindahl argues that a-legal behaviours and situations disrupt the extant legal 
order: “calling attention” to it and “intimating another way of ordering” (ibid., p.1–2). 
But for whom, one may ask? When the French protesters carried out the 
autoréduction, most shoppers were “irate” and few sympathetic to what the 
protesters were doing, it is noted. For some, commenting on a blog page about the 
incident, it was “SIMPLY THEFT” (anon quoted in ibid., p.36) and “pure and simple 
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theft” (anon quoted in ibid., p. 37). Indeed, Lindahl notes the strong desire we have to 
order and make sense of unusual behaviour and situations. Quoting Helmut 
Plessner’s description of how people react to ‘boundary situations’, he captures 
something of how a-legality may be experienced in extreme cases: 
 
Unanswerable situations, in which man cannot orient himself, to which he can find no 
relation, whose condition he cannot discover, which he cannot understand and 
cannot grasp: with which, therefore, he can do nothing, are … intolerable. He will try 
at any price to change them, to transform them into situations ‘answerable’ in some 
way or other, or to escape them (1970, quoted in ibid., p.37). 
 
This desire to reduce experience to familiar categories presents a challenge to those 
seeking to disrupt the legal order through a-legal behaviours. The tendency will be for 
onlookers to interpret strange rule-flouting behaviour as ‘simply illegal’ and thereby 
bypass the process of critical reflection about the extant legal order which a-legality 
promises to stimulate. Despite what Lindahl argues, the negative, dismissive 
comments of shoppers witnessing the autoréduction suggest that this is much what 
happened on that occasion too.  
 
Of course, one might make a different argument. The verbal reactions of shoppers to 
the autoréduction could belie a more ambiguous consciousness. In fact, assertions 
that the incident was “SIMPLY THEFT” carry the implicit suggestion it might be seen 
as something else or more: a defensive dismissal of some other unspoken suggestion. 
(It would be unnecessary and peculiar to describe a house burglary as 'simply theft'!) 
However, whilst these shoppers might have been aware of some alternative 
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construction of the event, they are avowedly denying it and rigidly resisting engaging 
with it.  
 
As highlighted, a-legal referenda, tribunals and other initiatives which are the subject 
of this study do something somewhat different to Lindahl's a-legal scenarios and 
behaviours. They can be seen as a sub-category or variant of Lindahl's a-legality. In 
most cases, (though importantly not all)6, these initiatives are further from “the pole 
of illegality” (Lindahl 2013, p. 159), and as such are less likely to be dismissed as 
'pure criminality!' or similar. The analogous risk here, however, is that onlookers and 
the wider public dismiss the project as 'not real', 'pretend', 'not really law' or 
equivalent. As Byrnes (2012, p.4) illustrates, this indeed characterises a common 
response to peoples' tribunals:  
 
often seen as a curiosity that shows commendable imagination and energy on the part of 
organisers but as lacking legitimacy and any practical relevance to the real world of law, 
rights and politics. A quaint subject for academic study perhaps, but little more. 
 
The disruptive potential of these initiatives is lost if they are dismissed on either 
count: as ‘pure criminality!’ on the one hand, or ‘not really law’, ‘lacking legitimacy’, 
‘pretend’ or ‘a joke’ on the other hand. Therefore, part of the challenge for those 
initiatives which explicitly seek to embody and promote an alternative kind of order 
is in persuading onlookers to engage with what they are doing. They must persuade 
participants and onlookers to 'see' the a-legality: to see the behaviour as more than 
simply illegal or conversely not legitimate or serious exercises, and to engage with the 
                                                        
6 Instances where the use of a-legal space(s) has been constructed as illegal by the State or other 
opponents are discussed in chapter 3.  
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discursive disruption this brings. Lindahl touches upon this point when he describes 
the autoréduction organisers' efforts to “interpellate” the other shoppers, “engaging 
them in a discussion about the point of their action” (ibid., p. 35), but this is not 
developed. Understanding a-legal initiatives requires exploring the way in which they 
attempt to persuade (or 'interpellate') participants, onlookers and wider audiences. 
And a theory of a-legal space as a political strategy requires an account of why, when 
and how people might be persuaded to engage with what these initiatives are doing. 
Therefore, in section 2.2 I move beyond both Harnecker and Lindahl and attempt to 
theorise this process and strategy. Firstly, however, I consider one aspect of this 
strategy hitherto left to one side: the spatial dimension.  
 
2.1.9. The spatial dimension: 'A-legal space' or 'a-legal initiatives'? 
 
Until now I have referred to 'a-legal initiatives' and 'a-legal space' somewhat 
interchangeably. In Harnecker's account the phenomenon is understood in terms of 
‘space’. Lindahl, on the other hand, has a different unit of analysis, instead referring to 
a-legal 'behaviours' and 'situations'. Hence there is a need for clarification. Here I 
argue that there are good empirical and theoretical reasons to retain the spatial 
dimension to the concept. Firstly, the empirical reason: organisers of these initiatives 
often describe what they are doing in terms of space. I give just some examples, to 
illustrate this trend. Peoples' tribunal organisers and scholars alike often emphasise 
the intention to create spaces in which the voices of victims of injustice can be heard. 
The Courts of Women have held more than forty peoples' tribunals, in Asia, Africa, 
Central America, the Arab World and the USA, on violence against women. They 
explain their motivation in the following way:  
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The Courts of Women are an attempt to define a new space for women, to define a new 
politics. They are public hearings in which the voices of the women are listened to – as 
victims, survivors, resistors… The Courts of Women are a new political space: the ‘Court’ is 
used in a symbolic way. In the Courts, the voices of the victims/survivors are listened to. 
Women bring their personal testimonies of violence to the Court. They are ‘sacred’ spaces 
where women, speaking in a language of suffering, name the crimes, seeking redress, even 
reparation (El Taller 2015). 
 
The Precarious Workers Brigade, a London-based activist group who organised a 
peoples' tribunal on 'precarity' in 2011, articulate a similar position:  
 
While some of the aspects of precarity are covered by existing law and are therefore illegal, 
the vast majority are not. Therefore, the condition of precarity seems to lend itself to the 
form of a people’s tribunal that can provide a public space where voices of the implicated 
can be witnessed, for example, by listening to the stories of precarious workers in their own 
words, gestures, sounds and images (Precarious Workers Brigade, 2011). 
 
Peoples' tribunal scholar, Jayan Nayar (2001 presents a similar perspective in his 
reflections on the 1967 Russell Tribunal on the Vietnam War:  
 
The Russell Tribunal was created to provide that space for voices of suffering, a space 
denied by theatres of dominant legality. Throughout its proceedings, it was challenged as to 
its 'legitimacy' and its 'objectivity'. Throughout, it had to create a space for truths of 
suffering, to assert its historic mission to voice the truth, to force judgement, to prevent the 
crime of silence.  
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Referenda too have sometimes been framed in terms of the creation or 
reclamation of public space. The Seventh Ballot was an a-legal referendum on the 
convocation of a constituent assembly in Colombia in which several million people 
participated (discussed in-depth in chapter 3). As one key organiser explains:  
 
It was also an exercise to recuperate public space that was being increasingly occupied by 
violence, organised crime, and special interests. This could only be done from different 
trenches to those of traditional politics (Carrillo 2010). 
 
Perhaps least surprisingly, analyses of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy which occupied a 
physical space outside of the Australian Parliament House for six months in 1972 
(and at sporadic periods since) have similarly focused on the Embassy's reclamation, 
subversion and creation of public space. As Cowan (2001, p.35) observed, the 
Embassy is “a practical and potent 'occupation' of Australian space: physical, social 
and political.” And as Muldoon and Schaap (2012, p. 540) agree: “the Embassy... 
constitutes an alternative public space to that authorized by the state. It brings into 
being a subaltern counterpublic.” 
  
There is also theoretical support for conceiving of these initiatives in terms of the 
space(s) they use or create. Within various academic disciplines over the past decade 
the study of 'social space' has become a major subject of enquiry (Hetherington 
2010). As Hetherington (ibid.) points out, most of this new theorising has explored 
how space is used to resist the dominant social order. A plethora of new, old and 
resurrected concepts have been used to theorise how actors resist and challenge the 
dominant social order through creation of a separate space within which different 
cultural and behavioural codes prevail. Within cultural studies and cultural 
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geography, for example, many studies have drawn on the Foucauldian concept of 
heterotopia (see for e.g. Teyssot, 1994; Connor, 1989; Soja, 1995; Delaney, 1992; 
Lyon, 1994; Bennett, 1995; Genocchio, 1995; Hetherington, 1993; 1997). This 
somewhat ambiguous concept was understood by Foucault to refer to radically 
different sites in which normal behaviours are suspended, and which are destined to 
compensate and purify other spaces. The concept has been applied to psychiatric 
hospitals, retirement homes and prisons (by Foucault himself (1967)); Further 
Education colleges (Blair 2009); and to the UK-based protest camp Climate Camp 
(Saunders and Price 2009), to name just a few examples. 
 
Similar debates in sociology and cultural geography have drawn on the 
anthropological notion of liminality, used to describe rites of passage rituals and a 
middle point where an individual is understood to have left one life stage and is yet to 
be initiated into the next (van Gennep 1960; Turner, 1969). Within liminal space “the 
normative structure of society is temporarily suspended or overturned”, notes 
Hetherington (2010, p. 32). According to anthropologist Turner (1969) these rituals, 
which are an important part of life in small-scale societies, function to help a society 
both understand and renew itself.7 The Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) is yet 
another conceptual category of this kind. Coined by anarchist writer Hakim Bey, the 
TAZ is described as “a guerilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of 
imagination) and then dissolves itself to reform elsewhere/ else-when” (1996, p.101) 
and has been used to describe the revolutionary Communes of Paris, Lyons and 
Marseilles; American countercultural communes of the 1960s; and social events such 
as festivals and dinner parties. Other key and closely related concepts used to 
                                                        
7 ‘Liminoid space’ is the term given to analogous rituals when taking place in large-scale societies, 
where their significance is less (Hetherington 2010).  
104 
 
 
articulate the broad phenomenon of an alternative kind of space include margins, 
paradoxical space (Hetherington 2010) and Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of 
representational space. 
 
The various different concepts employed within the broader sociology of space 
literature are not synonymous. Temporary Autonomous Zones, heterotopia, margins, 
liminal spaces and so on, have emerged in different disciplinary contexts to address 
somewhat different questions, and hence vary in focus and nuance. However, there 
are several significant common themes. Firstly, they are primarily conceived in terms 
of resistance to and divergence from the dominant social order. Within these spaces it 
is possible to incubate different behaviours which constitute a challenge to the 
dominant social order. And these spaces, even if they exist only temporarily, have an 
impact on the dominant social order. Therefore, there is a strong theoretical 
precedent for exploring resistance to the dominant social, legal or political order 
through the use or creation of an alternative kind of space.  
 
The arguments of Kevin Hetherington (1997) in what remains the most theoretically 
developed account of heterotopia to date are particularly significant for a theory of a-
legal space(s). Hetherington suggests that a key weakness in accounts of alternative 
space – from heterotopia to representational space – is the misconception that such 
spaces are characterised by a suspension of rules. Scholars have focused on their 
potential to avoid and subvert dominant ways of thinking and behaving, often 
resulting in a somewhat romanticised conception of these spaces as orderless. In fact, 
they are equally subject to processes of ordering, just a different form of ordering. 
Secondly, he stresses that ordering is an active process, not a static phenomenon. 
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Hence it is something to which we all contribute. The value of heterotopic space is in 
enabling subjects to participate in an alternative form of ordering. Finally, these 
spaces are not disconnected from the wider social context but closely connected, and 
hence have an impact on the wider context. Hetherington argues that heterotopic 
spaces have been essential to wider-scale discursive and social change. He develops 
this theory through reference to the Palais Royale in eighteenth-century Paris which, 
he argues, played a crucial role in the emergence of new ideas and ways of thinking 
which preceded and enabled the French revolution. Hetherington's (1997) 
arguments, supported by the wider literature on the use of space as a form of 
resistance, suggest the value of maintaining a spatial dimension to the concept of a-
legality. Having made the case for retaining the concept of a-legal space as an 
ontologically distinct category of action, I turn now to consider its functional value.  
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2.2. The use of a-legal space as a discursive strategy 
 
The use of this kind of space must be understood as a type of discursive strategy. It 
has no direct legal or material consequences. No one is imprisoned, fined or otherwise 
sanctioned, following a peoples' tribunal. Venezuela's President Carlos Andrés Pérez 
would not have to step down, no matter the outcome of the Radical Cause 
referendum. Catalonia faced the same legal and political obstacles to secession, 
following the spate of non-binding independence referenda which took place across 
the region in 2009. And unlike with many other protest tactics, normal life continues 
uninterrupted: no roads are blockaded, city centres occupied, or businesses shut 
down. As a form of dissent, peoples' tribunals, popular non-binding referenda, debt 
audits, and other forms of a-legal space function at a purely discursive level. Hence 
this kind of tactic must be understood as an attempt to bring about a discursive 
change which will in some way advance a broader project. The following sections are 
an attempt to theorise this discursive strategy.  
 
I take the theory of political grammar as elaborated by Daniel Hausknost (2011) and 
Aletta Norval (2006) as the theoretical framework through which to understand 
processes of discursive change. This framework has several strengths as a tool to 
explore the use of a-legal space. Most importantly, it provides a model for the 
relationship between discourse and agency, and an account of how discursive change 
happens. Hence in the first section I outline the key components to the theory of 
political grammar and its utility to explore discursive change through the use of a-
legal space.  
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Next I consider the defining characteristics of this tactic – the adoption of a quasi-
institutional form, without any formal basis, or exceeding an institutional basis - and 
their significance from a discursive perspective. Drawing on the large body of 
literature which has emphasised the hegemonic effects of law, I argue that these 
activities emulate the legal form in an attempt to confer the same authority, 
legitimacy and hegemonic influence associated with the law. However, this is only 
one of the two ways they attempt to claim legitimacy. Whilst on the one hand 
appealing to the authority of constituted power, these initiatives also appeal to the 
authority of constituent power. Within the literature which emphasises law's 
hegemonic power, commonly known as 'the constitutive approach to law', there is 
support for an argument that both constituted power and constituent power have 
hegemonic effects. Whilst discursive change is the product of many different factors 
and sources, it seems that within certain kinds of societies expressions of both 
constituted and constituent power are particularly influential in the production of 
meaning. This is significant because, I argue, these activities can be seen as an attempt 
to harness the meaning-making potential associated with constituted and constituent 
power.  In the final sections I consider two other related ways in which these 
initiatives may work as a tool for discursive change: through the creation of 
democratic subjectivities and the fostering of 'receptivity'.  
 
2.2.1. Political grammar  
 
Harnecker makes bold claims about the potential for a-legal spaces to be used to raise 
consciousness, participation and otherwise influence the “political situation” (2007, p. 
11). What is missing from her discussion is an account of how and why such effects 
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should be expected. As a starting point for addressing these questions, what is 
required is a theory of the construction and transformation of social meaning. Daniel 
Hausknost’s (2011) theory of political grammar change is one effort at such a theory, 
which is potentially interesting from the perspective of a-legal initiatives. Intending to 
address a gap in the literature, where radical scholars have neglected the “‘mechanics’ 
of change and agency within the dominant liberal democratic order” (2011, p. 21),1 
Hausknost develops an account of how possibilities for change are delimited and 
shaped within a liberal democratic order (or indeed any political system) based on 
the notion of political grammar.  
 
Hausknost builds on the earlier work of Norval (2006), in which she applies the 
Wittgensteinian concept of 'grammar' to the political realm. As Norval explains, “for 
Wittgenstein, grammar sets the bounds of sense” (Norval 2006, p. 231); it structures 
the way we perceive and understand the world, and enables us to communicate 
meaningfully with those who share our grammar. Political grammar, therefore, sets 
the bounds of sense within our political world. Hence, as an analytical construct it can 
help explain how and why we make sense of the world in the way we do. Hausknost 
develops the idea of political grammar through elaboration of a theoretical model for 
how precisely it 'sets the bounds of sense'. Political grammar is understood as that 
which “organises and stratifies the 'political imaginary'” within a society (ibid., 
p.101). Ideas, statements, and demands are organised into categories of relative 
intelligibility and possibility, as a function of a society's political grammar. Any 
specific political statement, idea, or demand, understood here as an 'element' is 
                                                        
1  Scholars from Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004), to Holloway (2002; 2010), to Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) have, he alleges, failed to theorise the precise process by which change happens (Hausknost 
2011). 
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located somewhere along a continuum from 'possible', to 'semi-possible', to 
'intelligible but impossible', to simply 'unintelligible'.  
 
The theory of political grammar is, of course, not original in attempting to theorise 
the invisible structures which shape and delimit social meaning. In several ways the 
theory has much in common with discourse theory. However, as Hausknost explains, 
political grammar is not intended to replace or challenge discourse theory. Rather, it 
is intended to account for why certain kinds of discourses flourish whilst others 
flounder in a given context. Hence, it can be seen as an additional theoretical layer, 
which can augment a discourse theoretical framework.  
 
The utility of this framework for a study of a-legal space lies in its detailed account of 
how discursive change happens, and how it explains the source of discursive change.  
According to this account, a society's political grammar changes as a result of 'tipping 
events'. The notion of 'tipping events' was proposed by Robert Wood (2006) to 
describe the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with Big Tobacco, in which 
tobacco firms agreed to pay 206 billion dollars to US states to cover Medicaid 
expenses for tobacco-related illnesses. The MSA was a significant win for 
campaigners, “symbolised a profound shift in the battle with Big Tobacco” and is said 
to have opened the door to federal and state-level regulation (ibid., p. 420). To this 
extent it can be understood as a 'focusing event': an already familiar concept in the 
policy studies literature which describes events which are “important drivers of 
major policy change” (ibid., p.419). However, as Wood pointed out, the MSA had 
important differences with the events normally characterised as focusing events; and 
this is what makes it interesting from the perspective of discursive change. Typically 
110 
 
“large-scale, dramatic event(s)” (ibid.) such as natural disasters or a terrorist attack, 
focusing events work to catapult a little known issue onto the public agenda and 
thereby act as a catalyst for policy change. The MSA does not fit this bill. By the late 
1990s the dangers of tobacco were well known to the public, and campaigners had 
tried to challenge the industry through political and legal channels since decades 
earlier. Hence the event did not significantly impact on public awareness or education 
levels, nor draw media attention to a little-known issue. Yet it served to shift the 
policy terrain and influence policy actions in the months and years that followed, 
much like a focusing event. For Wood (2006) the MSA exemplifies the need for 
clarification in policy studies literature, and for identification of 'tipping events' as 
different kinds of focusing event.  
 
In Hausknost's (2011) account of political grammar change, tipping events serve to 
shift the discursive terrain, 'unblocking' elements which are impossible or only semi-
possible, whilst closing off other elements. The turn to events to account for 
grammatical change is necessary, given the nature of grammar. Political grammar 
describes the way in which experience is ordered and made sense of. As a system for 
ordering reality and assigning meaning it cannot be falsified.2 Hence “it is only 
through the power of events, occurrences outside the bounds of grammar”, that 
grammar can be changed (ibid., p. 17). Certain events play this role, somehow forcing 
a grammatical “mutation”, so that “the 'bounds of sense' are shifted” (ibid.).  
 
There are a couple of reasons that this is the right framework through which to 
explore the use of a-legal space: firstly, the detailed and explicit account of how 
                                                        
2 Hence, Hausknost acknowledges political grammar can be conceived as both the process for 
ordering reality and the product of this process (2011).  
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change happens; secondly, the pivotal role attributed to 'tipping events' to account for 
ruptural change. In most cases, the use of a-legal space revolves around a key event or 
series of events. Whilst some initiatives such as large scale peoples’ tribunals may go 
on for several years, in general they are not intended as permanent ongoing 
campaigns, and they are centred on key events. Secondly, in many and potentially all 
cases, the change these initiatives seek to bring about is necessarily of a ruptural 
nature. They are based upon and hope to advance a fundamentally different 
conception of reality. There is no incremental route from the hegemonic order to the 
alternative order that is proposed, because the two are incommensurate, so the 
change must be of a ruptural nature. Hence a theory which allows for and models the 
potential for change through rupturing events is more useful than one in which 
change is understood as gradual. This is not to suggest that ruptural and incremental 
processes aren't both part of a more complex picture of discursive transformation. 
They might be, but it is the potential for change through rupturing events which is of 
interest here.  
 
Various questions remain outstanding, with significant implications for the a-legal 
space strategy. Do tipping events take place at the micro-level, for example within 
certain communities or sub-cultures? Or does the theory apply only to national or 
macro-level discursive change? A-legal initiatives in many cases, though not all, 
operate at a local level, receiving limited national or international media coverage, 
and directly involving only several hundred participants. If the phenomenon applies 
to the micro-level, or even if not, can such events ever be engineered? A-legal 
initiatives could be understood as trying to do this. Can we use the theoretical 
concepts and arguments within Hausknost’s theory of political grammar change to 
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help assess these initiatives’ potential as tools to disrupt the hegemonic order? These 
questions will be explored in the investigations of specific case studies which follow 
in chapters 3 to 5.  
 
2.2.2. The hegemonic function of constituted power 
 
If these initiatives are understood as attempts to contrive 'tipping events', even if only 
on a micro-level, it is necessary to think through how they might do this. Part of how 
they do this, I suggest, is through appearing as an expression of constituted power. A 
large body of literature has emphasised the constitutive effects of law; arguably these 
effects can be attributed to constituted power more generally. Moreover, events 
associated with constituted power such as referenda and court cases have been a 
recurring theme in the small literature set devoted to the phenomenon of tipping 
events. Drawing on these two bodies of research, I suggest that there is a structural 
connection between events which are associated with constituted power and tipping 
events, which a-legal space holds the potential to exploit.   
 
The relationship between law and social meaning is the subject of a large, diverse, 
and wide-ranging body of literature. Scholars since Durkheim have explored the way 
in which a society's laws are a product and reflection of its culture and in turn how 
law contributes to the emergence, transformation, and continuity of cultural norms. A 
central theme within this literature concerns the hegemonic or 'constitutive' nature 
of law. Laws, specific legal rulings, institutions, procedures, and legal discourse more 
generally are held to have a particularly powerful role in the construction, 
preservation and transformation of hegemony. Studies have highlighted the role of 
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law in the construction of identity, and how legal definitions shape cultural 
definitions of race, gender, sexual orientation or class, amongst other subjectivities.3 
As Saguy and Stuart (2008) observe, this research shows how categories of identity 
can gain legitimacy once they are institutionalised in law, and sometimes indeed only 
once they are institutionalised in law. Other research has looked at the role of law in 
the construction of collective memory, and how the law influences which events are 
forgotten and which are remembered (see for e.g. Markovits 2001). 
 
Particularly important within this wider body of literature is scholarship referred to 
alternately as 'legal consciousness' work and the 'constitutive approach to law'. This 
approach emerged in the USA in the 1980s, fuelled by dissatisfaction with the then 
dominant instrumentalist conception of law. The instrumentalist approach 
emphasised the potential of law as an instrument to achieve social change through 
legislation on racial equality, wealth redistribution, and access to education, among 
other areas. It was at its peak during the sixties and seventies, at a time of landmark 
rulings on integration and racial equality such as Brown v Board of Education, when 
the US Supreme Court declared state laws establishing racially segregated public 
schools to be unconstitutional (Mautner 2010). However, by the 1980s some scholars 
sought a deeper conceptualisation of law and its role in the construction and 
transformation of social life. Influenced by the cultural studies movement in Britain in 
the 1960s and 70s and drawing on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, the 
constitutive approach understands social reality as contingent and constructed. 
Scholars sought to explore how societal narratives about the law worked to sustain 
                                                        
3  See for example; Sohoni (2007); Golub(2005); Pascoe (1996) on race; Witt (2000) on gender; 
Canaday (2003) on sexual orientation, Steinberg (2003) on class.  
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(or undermine) dominant power structures. As Susan Silbey (2005, p.335), one of the 
founders of this approach, put it; “the study of legal consciousness developed in law 
and society research as an explicit effort to explore the submerged iceberg, to trace 
this hegemonic power of law”. 
 
The ‘submerged iceberg’ refers to the then little-understood phenomenon of legal 
hegemony: the power of law to sustain support for its ideology and values, even in 
spite of the inequality and suffering it so often produces. As Silbey put it (ibid., p.323): 
“Why do people acquiesce to a legal system that, despite its promises of equal 
treatment, systematically reproduces inequality?” (2005, p.323). There have been 
various attempts to explain the hegemonic power of law. In their classic text, The 
Common Place of Law, Ewick and Silbey (1998) attributed law's continued hegemony 
to the co-existence of contradictory forms of legal consciousness, which together 
leave it invulnerable to attack:  
 
At any moment, the law is both a reified transcendent realm, and yet a game . . . Challenges 
to legality for being only a game, or a gimmick, can be repulsed by invoking legality’s 
transcendent reified character. Similarly, dismissals of law for being irrelevant to daily life 
can be answered by invoking its game-like purposes. Through these forms of consciousness 
(and the opposition between them), legality can be an uncontested and unrecognized 
power that sustains everyday life (ibid., p. 231).  
 
In a different kind of explanation, Carol Smart (1989; 1990; 1995) has drawn on 
Foucault’s analysis of scientific discourse, suggesting that law functions in much the 
same way. With its own method, language, testing ground and system of results, 
“claims to scientificity and hence truth... position(s) law on a hierarchy of 
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knowledges” (1995, p. 72) It is, she notes, a feature of modernity that discourses 
which can make claims to ‘truth’ in this way, “rather than belief, superstition, opinion 
and so on”, are considered “high up in the hierarchy of knowledges” (ibid.). Another 
account points to the significance of law's instrumental material effects, as support 
for its hegemonic status. As Bourdieu observed, “the law is the quintessential form of 
'active' discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects” (1987, p. 839). 
Unlike other ways of interpreting, explaining and ordering reality, legal discourse is 
supported by force. It has material instrumental effects as well as constitutive, and 
the former serve to enhance the latter.  
 
Of significance for the present study is the suggestion that law occupies a uniquely 
influential position in the construction of hegemony. My suggestion is that through 
imitating legal symbols, language and procedures, a-legal initiatives attempt, and 
have the potential, to harness these hegemonic effects. One objection will be that 
these initiatives are not always strictly ‘legal’ in form. Indeed, unofficial referenda, the 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy, or local-level monitoring projects like the UK’s Police 
Monitoring Unit, do not make use of legal discourse like peoples’ tribunals do. 
However, what they do share is an imitation of institutions of constituted power. So 
they do not always imitate legal institutions, in a narrow sense, but they imitate 
institutions which are defined by their basis in the law of the state. Arguably, 
institutions of the state enjoy at least some of the hegemonic power that the 
constitutive theory of law attributes to law. And a-legal initiatives have the potential 
to harness this power.  
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This literature suggests that events, statements, and discourses which are associated 
with constituted power should be explored for their potential to create tipping 
events. Turning now to the tipping event literature, there is further support for this 
claim. Significantly, two of the three cases of tipping events, which have been 
discussed in this new literature set, take the form of an expression of constituted 
power.4 As described above, Wood (2006) argues that the Master Settlement 
Agreement - the US Supreme Court ruling against Big Tobacco - functioned as a 
tipping event in public discourse and policy around smoking. Indeed, this influential 
legal ruling was what motivated his development of the concept. In his contribution 
to the literature, Hausknost (2011) also cites an expression of constituted power. He 
describes the case of an unexpected referendum result in Austria to illustrate the 
tipping event phenomenon. The mere fact that both scholars focus on events which 
are associated with constituted power is noteworthy and grounds for exploration.  
 
Moreover, Hausknost’s (2011) depiction of the referendum result as a tipping event 
offers further insight into the possible connection between tipping events and 
constituted power. This alleged tipping event and Hausknost’s analysis are 
significant, and so merit recounting in some detail. It is explained that in the Austrian 
context, until the late 1970s, the idea of banning nuclear power was inconceivable. 
However, in 1978 when faced with the decision to commission a new nuclear power 
station the government decided to call a referendum on the issue. Importantly, the 
government was pro-nuclear, as were much of the opposition party, the trade unions, 
and the majority of the Austrian public. The government was confident that the 
                                                        
4 The exception is the publication of Rachel Carson's book 'Silent Spring', which was published in 
1962 and documented the environmental effects of pesticide use. Wood (2006) suggests Silent 
Spring functioned as a tipping event much like the MSA with big tobacco.  
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proposal would be approved by the public, and the decision to hold a referendum was 
a political one: it was felt that a referendum would garner political capital for the 
government. However, as the referendum date approached, the pro-nuclear lead 
reduced. Fearing a no vote, the pro-nuclear Austrian chancellor announced he might 
resign should this be the outcome. However, it is argued by Müller (1998 cited in 
ibid.) that this had the unintended consequence of pushing a number of pro-nuclear 
opposition supporters to vote 'no' for party political reasons. The final results of the 
referendum were a rejection of nuclear power by 50.47% to 49.53%. Just a couple of 
thousand votes had tipped the outcome and Hausknost suggests that this was largely 
the result of the Chancellor’s failed tactical move. However, what is interesting is how 
this “haphazard result nevertheless started to inscribe itself deeply into the political 
grammar of the country” (Hausknost 2011, p.123). The electorate “did not seem to 
regret the decision”, he notes. A year later only 42% were in favour of a new 
referendum and by 2008, 80% of Austrians were opposed to nuclear energy. In short: 
the anti-nuclear camp had won the hegemonic struggle and it had “become common-
sense in Austria to be anti-nuclear” (ibid.).  
 
Significantly, this discursive turn was not already on its way, nor could it have been 
predicted prior to the 1978 referendum. According to Hausknost (2011), the 
referendum result itself had a causal impact. He explains:  
 
The rupture itself was inflicted by the unlikely outcome of the referendum that constituted 
the tipping event. The authority of the referendum as a democratic instrument seemed to 
have eradicated the ‘impossible’ aspect of the element and the electorate seemed to have 
accepted its own decision as the new ‘normality’ – hence, the rupture triggered a mutation 
of grammar (ibid., p.124) 
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The referendum result, it seems, had a force of its own regardless of the strength or 
the limitations of the anti-nuclear discourse which it propelled into the domain of 
common sense. The common depiction of expressions of constituted power as tipping 
events by both Wood (2006) and Hausknost (2011), combined with Hausknost’s 
revealing analysis of the process, suggest a structural connection between tipping 
events and constituted power. Hausknost does not make this suggestion and in fact is 
keen to stress the variety in potential tipping events: 
 
The ‘events’ that make a semi-possible element create a rupture in grammar can be of very 
different kinds and provide ample space for contingency. In the case of the Austrian 
discourse on nuclear energy one might say that a careless move of the Austrian chancellor 
has changed the political grammar on this issue once and for all (ibid., p.122) 
 
This, however, seems to miss a trick. Whilst the Austrian chancellor's misjudged 
move was part of the story, setting other events in motion, it was not what ruptured 
the political grammar. It was the referendum result itself which did this. As 
Hausknost (ibid., p.124) puts it, it was “the authority of the referendum as a 
democratic instrument” which had the power to shift the political grammar in this 
instance.  
  
Potentially, the authority associated with democratic institutions of constituted 
power underlies a potential to result in wide-scale change in societies’ political 
grammars. Building on this we can better understand the potential for a-legal space 
as a tool to bring about discursive change, through creating tipping events. Moreover, 
as I will show in the following section, this is only one of the two ways in which a-
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legal initiatives claim a democratic authority which has the potential to underlie 
tipping events.  
 
2.2.3. The hegemonic function of constituent power 
 
However, there are certain instances which cannot be accounted for within the 
constitutive theory of law’s existing framework. Calavita (2001) has shown that on 
some occasions, law not only lacks its assumed hegemonic effect: “it backfires as a 
hegemonic force” (ibid., p.106) and “contribute(s) to the deconstruction of the 
sociocultural meanings it embraces” (ibid., p.108). Her argument draws on an 
unpopular Italian appeal court ruling, and the events which followed it. In 1999, 
Italy's highest court of appeal, the Corte di Cassazione, overturned a rape conviction 
on the basis that the victim had been wearing blue jeans and as the Justices explained 
“it is impossible to take off jeans... without the active cooperation of the person 
wearing them” (quoted in Calavita 2001, p. 89). The ruling provoked outrage within 
civil society, the political establishment, the media, and the general public. Described 
by one journalist as “an authentic political earthquake” (de Florio quoted in Calavita 
2001, p.93), the story was front page news in nearly all newspapers for several days; 
politicians from all parties came out against the ruling; the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives decried it as “shameful” and a “disgrace” (quoted in Calavita, 2001, 
p.94); the Prime Minister expressed “solidarity” with those who were outraged 
(ibid.); and various mass protests were organised across Italy.  
 
The event presents a problem for the constitutive theory of law. According to the 
constitutive literature, law can “cement prevailing understandings, or anticipate 
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emerging ones” (ibid.). In either case it is 'constitutive': it creates and develops 
ideology. Whilst the literature recognises that some laws and legal rulings are less 
culturally impactful than others, this event suggests something hitherto not 
considered. The Cassazione ruling, argues Calavita (ibid., p. 91) had a “de-
constitutive” effect:  
 
By referencing an ideological worldview - relating to assumptions about gender, consent, 
and rape - that has been largely superseded (at least by an important segment of the 
dominant culture), the Corte di Cassazione has actually hastened the demise of that 
ideology. Far from shoring up the legitimacy of its ideological vision, this legal decision has 
exposed it to ridicule - an emblem of the foolishness of the normative order of yesteryear 
(ibid., p. 106).  
 
Calavita's argument, then, is that the appeal court's ruling was so at odds with the 
dominant discourses within Italian society that it actually functioned to hasten the 
demise of the sexist patriarchal ideology on which it was based. Importantly, she sees 
reason to believe that this is not an anomalous case, but rather, such “de-constitutive 
moments” are not uncommon.5 Another example proposed is the 1992 Rodney King 
case in which four white police officers in Los Angeles were acquitted of assaulting an 
unarmed black man, despite the video-tape evidence of officers beating King. The 
ruling triggered weeks of rioting across LA and was “a lightning rod for debates about 
the pernicious efforts [sic] of racism more generally” (ibid., p.110). Whilst Calavita 
does not discuss other cases it is not difficult to think of more examples. In the UK 
context, one might be the controversial Poll Tax legislation which became law in 
                                                        
5  She explains: “There is reason to believe, given the decentralized and "disordered" (Therborn 
1980:77) nature of ideology and the quotidian, that they are not uncommon - at least not so 
uncommon as to make them theoretically uninteresting or insignificant” (Calavita 2001, p. 109). 
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1990. The Poll Tax legislation triggered demonstrations and rioting across Britain, 
including one of the biggest demonstrations in Britain's history, and is often depicted 
as a key factor in the downfall of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who resigned less 
than a year later (King and Crewe 2013; Graham 2010; Alderman and Carter 1991).  
 
Calavita’s aim is not to undermine the constitutive theory of law: she is a proponent 
of the approach herself. Instead she stresses the need for a complexified account of 
law's constitutive power, which recognises its sometimes de-constitutive potential. I 
want to argue, firstly, that there is a missing link in Calavita's account of law's ‘de-
constitutive power’ (2001.). And that secondly, when considered in this light, it offers 
an important contribution to a conceptual framework for exploring the use of a-legal 
space. The missing link in Calavita's account is the presence of a popular backlash 
against the legal ruling. In each of the cases she draws on, it is not the controversial 
legal ruling itself which accounts for the subsequent discursive change, but rather the 
mass of protests, riots, and/or public criticism. No doubt countless other rape case 
verdicts in Italy, prior to and since the Corte di Cassazione ruling, have reflected the 
same dated misogynist ideology. However, for whatever complex combination of 
factors these cases have not generated the same public outcry as the 1999 “blue 
jeans” ruling. These rulings would not be seen as de-constitutive moments, but 
evidence of a certain ideology's continued influence. It is therefore the public 
backlash, not the ruling itself, which creates the de-constitutive moment. 
 
One option is to bring in the concepts of constituent and constituted power to help 
make sense of Calavita's account of the de-constitutive power of law. The protests and 
wider public backlash triggered by the Italian appeal court ruling as well as by the 
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Rodney King case can well be framed as expressions of constituent power. By 
contrast, legal rulings are an expression of constituted power.  As was argued above, 
actions, statements, and institutions of constituted power might be said to have the 
same hegemonic influence as proponents of the constitutive approach attributed to 
law. Perhaps what Calavita (2001) has shown is that on some occasions the successful 
expression of constituent power has the same impact on cultural meanings and 
discourse as an expression of constituted power.  
 
Calavita's (2001) contribution to the constitutive theory of law literature, and what it 
might mean, is of quite some significance to a study of a-legal space. The oppositional 
concepts of constituted and constituent power are central to an account of this 
strategy for social change. The quasi-legal form is what distinguishes these activities 
from other forms of protest and resistance. Yet, as has been argued, they are not 
always quasi-legal in the narrow sense, but rather quasi-institutional: they imitate 
institutions of constituted power. Thus, on the one hand, they appear as simulations 
of the institutions of constituted power, yet at the same time they can well be 
conceived as expressions of constituent power. They contest aspects of the 
constituted order and the normative order on which it rests, and attempt to produce 
new legal norms, and (to varying degrees) appeal to a new “ethical community” 
(Schaap and Muldoon 2012).6 Also, as I will show in the following chapter, in those 
rare instances where the use of a-legal space is attributed significant impact,7 
successfully establishing an association with both constituted power and constituent 
power has been a notable feature.  
                                                        
6  As Schaap and Muldoon comment: “Constituent power does not only produce legal norms but also 
ethical community” (2012, p. 538) 
7  'Rare' not because they are ineffective, but because of the difficulty in attributing cause and effect 
with this kind of action. 
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2.2.4. The formation of democratic subjectivities through a-legal space 
 
I have proposed one way we might understand the potential of these initiatives to 
bring about change. Drawing on Hausknost's (2011) account of political grammar 
change, I have suggested that through generating an association with both 
constituted and constituent power they create potentially ruptural events with the 
possibility to shift the “bounds of sense” (Wittgenstein 2010). I turn now to a 
different account of the processes by which political grammars change, which allows 
for a closer exploration of the individual subjective experience of a-legality.  
 
Asking how it is that “democratic norms and values come to grip subject-citizens” and 
hence “how it is that we become democrats”, Norval (2006, p.230) explores the 
formation of democratic subjectivity and its connection to political grammar change. 
The question of how citizens come to identify as democrats - as actors in a democracy 
with agency - has been largely neglected within democratic theory (ibid.). Even 
within deliberative democratic theory in which preference transformation is central, 
there is “scant attention” given to the process of political subjectivity change (ibid., p. 
239).8 Norval seeks to address this gap in the literature. Drawing on several 
additional concepts taken from the later Wittgenstein, she theorises the process by 
which political grammar changes, through the formation of democratic subjectivities.  
 
                                                        
8   Within the deliberative democracy canon this absence, she suggests, might be a result of the 
excessive focus on process and procedures which will facilitate consensus, at the expense of an 
interest in individual subjectivities and subject construction. Poststructuralist accounts, by contrast, 
are concerned with the process of subject and subjectivity construction, yet there has been limited 
consideration of what may be special about democratic subjectivities, with “the construction of 
democratic subject positions (is) often relegated to the domain of mere contextual political 
articulation” (2006, p.230).  
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Coming from the perspective of poststructuralist radical democratic theory, Norval is 
interested in the articulation and formation of identities.9 And in accordance with this 
framework, she rejects the notion of a rational agent, whose beliefs, actions and 
preferences are the product of a rational and objective assessment of the facts. 
Rather, individuals' beliefs, preferences and actions are the product of their 
identification with different discourses. Here, then, the focus is on the processes by 
which agents come to identify with a democratic discourse and the democratic 
subjectivities it enables. Central to this process, she argues, are key experiential 
moments. By way of illustration she describes her experience of the first democratic 
elections in South Africa, in 1994. As citizens queued for hours waiting their turn to 
vote, she suggests they underwent a formative experience which prompted the 
assumption of a new identity as democrats:  
 
Both black and white, living and working in what were the highly unequal conditions of the 
"white" suburbs, engaged in conversation and shared an experience of enormous 
significance - as equal participants. This participation signalled the public assumption of 
democratic subjectivity. Many decades of resistance practices, both in grassroots politics 
and in union activities laid the groundwork for this. However, this day contributed 
something new and important... Occupying the position of democratic subject brought a 
forceful new sense of subjectivity as equals into play, one that depended upon a public 
enactment at a particular point in time. Crucial to this enactment was a bodily participation, 
quite beyond the mere fact of the invisible ink marking being stamped on every voter's 
hand (2006, p. 230). 
 
                                                        
9  For radical democrats, democratic practice is not about “defending the rights of pre-constituted 
identities, but rather in constituting those identities themselves in a precarious and always 
vulnerable field” (Mouffe 2000, p.148).  
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The claim, therefore, is twofold. Firstly, that democratic subjectivities are assumed 
through experience (rather than new information or logical argument). Secondly, that 
at least one component to the formation of democratic subjectivities is not gradual: a 
shift occurs in particular key moments. It is this shift which is theorised. Drawing on 
the Wittgensteinian concepts of 'aspect-seeing' and 'aspect-change' or 'aspect-
dawning', Norval argues that voters in South Africa's first democratic elections 
underwent an aspect-change, as they assumed a new identity as democrats.    
 
Wittgenstein's notion of 'aspect-seeing' refers to the “the way in which we 'see' 
pictures and people” (ibid., p.234), in other words, the aspect that is focused on and 
used to make sense of a picture.10 Aspect-seeing is made up of two distinct processes; 
continuous aspect-perception and aspect-change or aspect-dawning. Continuous 
aspect-perception refers to the way in which an object is perceived when it is 
immediate and spontaneous, without ambiguity or searching for words. The corollary 
in politics, Norval observes, is a hegemonic situation where there is one way in which 
the world is understood, and no sense of an alternative. Aspect-change or dawning, 
on the other hand, describes the process by which we come to see something in a 
different way. For Wittgenstein, the process is analogous to the experience of viewing 
a 'rabbit-duck picture': the simple illustrations which appear equally as a rabbit or a 
duck depending on the way one looks at it. The experience of an aspect-change is 
much like suddenly seeing the rabbit-duck as a duck after we had thought it was a 
rabbit. Norval argues that this is how the process of democratic subjectivity 
formation should be understood: as a sudden shift in perception, through which the 
                                                        
10 This idea is much like the concept of ‘frames’, as discussed by Snow & Benford (1988), and Mark 
Steinberg’s (1999) more critical take on frames – dialogic thinking. 
126 
 
existing conceptual elements are rearranged. Importantly, external reality remains 
the same but it is perceived in a suddenly different way.  
 
Now, whilst Wittgenstein does not distinguish between the concepts of aspect-change 
and aspect-dawning, and they are often taken as synonymous, Norval argues that 
there is a difference in emphasis in his use of the terms. Aspect-dawning she suggests 
refers to seeing a completely new aspect whilst aspect-change involves the 
reactivation of an aspect that has been seen before. In the context of democratic 
subjectivity formation, aspect-dawning refers to the process by which individuals 
first identify as democrats. Whilst aspect-change captures the process by which this 
identification is renewed at later points in life. The key point is that both processes 
involve a rearrangement of elements rather than the addition of new information. 
New connections are drawn or reignited, out of information that was already 
available. The first elections in South Africa constituted an aspect-dawning, “in the full 
sense of the term. As against expectations right up until the election itself, the political 
grammar of apartheid was replaced by identification as democrats” (2006, p.248). 
 
Now, Norval's conceptualisation of this process might appear too sudden. Discourses 
about democracy and the vote were central to the anti-apartheid struggle (Howarth 
2000), so these concepts were not new to most South Africans. Her argument, 
however, is that the experience of this day contributed something new to the popular 
consciousness. Discourses of democracy had existed in the public sphere for years, 
and this was essential, but the bodily experience of participation was integral to the 
active assumption of democratic subjectivity. Participation in the first democratic 
elections in a country is of course an extra-ordinary experience, and likely an 
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exceptionally affecting one. Norval's argues, however, that the example is indicative 
of the way in which individuals in any society become democrats and renew an 
identity as democrats: through key moments in which an experience triggers an 
aspect-change or dawning.  
 
The connection with political grammar perhaps needs clarification. Political grammar 
is conceived as a structural framework which shapes and delimits the way we 
perceive the world. In other words, it determines the aspects which are seen. Hence, 
an aspect-change or aspect-dawning reflects and corresponds to a change in political 
grammar. The assumption of democratic subjectivity, then, is one way in which 
political grammar changes.11 Hausknost provided an account of political grammar 
change through 'tipping events' which was helpful for understanding the process at 
the level of whole societies or smaller communities. Norval, on the other hand, 
provides a way to look at the same process but from the perspective of the individual 
or collective subjective experience of political grammar change. This is helpful, given 
the need to explore the subjective experience of a-legal space and what factors might 
inhibit or enable the 'seeing of a-legality'.  
 
So is there reason to think the experience of a-legal space(s) could have the potential 
to prompt an aspect-change? Is there potential for these initiatives to provide the 
                                                        
11  One area for further reflection is how exactly political grammar and democratic subjectivity 
formation influence and delimit the other. If political grammar refers to “those horizons delimiting 
what is possible in any given context” (Norval 2006, p.231), whilst democratic subjectivity refers to 
our sense of agency as democrats, it is clear that the two are intimately connected but they are not 
one and the same. Indeed, the political grammar will likely shape the nature of democratic 
subjectivities available, defining what it should and can mean to have democratic agency. In a liberal 
representative democratic system, for example, democratic agency is largely conceived in terms of 
the ability to vote in free elections, free speech, the right to protest etc. In a different kind of 
democratic system, where a different kind of political grammar shapes societal consciousness, 
democratic agency may be conceived as much more than voting. And equally, certain forms of 
democratic consciousness will widen those horizons shaping what is deemed possible. 
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conditions necessary for such a shift in how individuals perceive the world and their 
role within it? Drawing on Norval's (2006) account of this process, key questions to 
direct at specific cases will include the nature of the experience for organisers, 
participants, audience members and other onlookers. Arguably, however, these 
spaces often create opportunities for democratic engagement with the potential to 
trigger such an effect. This is indeed somewhat how Boehringer (2014, p.3-4) has 
seen the potential value in Local Peoples' Tribunals:  
 
By convening LPTs [Local Peoples’ Tribunals] and dealing with their own issues, local 
communities can begin the process of transformation of consciousness and culture so 
necessary for the process of self-emancipation… LPTs provide opportunities for people at 
the local level to take the lead in normative actions defending their communities and their 
environment, and in opposing those institutions of the state and corporations which 
threaten their lives and welfare, their right to be fully human... In the process of taking 
these matters into their own hands, people involved in such autonomous actions, unbridled 
by state institutions could have a transformative experience. 
 
He adds that these initiatives provide an opportunity to “develop our capacity to 
act with and for each other” and “break the ideological and experiential chains 
which bind us mentally, psychologically, culturally” (ibid., p.4). He is speaking 
specifically about local peoples' tribunals, which afford greater opportunity for 
popular participation than some forms of a-legal space, including for example most 
large- scale international peoples' tribunals in which the role for the wider public 
is as largely passive audience members. However, nonetheless, his argument 
suggests the value of exploring the experience of a-legal space for participants, 
organisers, and the wider public alike, and for assessing the transformative 
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potential of this experience, and specifically its potential to facilitate the formation 
of new democratic subjectivities. I return to this idea in the case study chapters.  
 
2.2.5. Fostering receptivity 
 
In this final section I explore one further area of literature which is helpful for 
theorising the use and potential of a-legal space(s). Specifically, this literature is 
helpful for addressing the question of what factors might inhibit or enable the 'seeing 
of a-legality'. The notion of 'receptivity' has in recent years caught the attention of 
scholars broadly located within the radical democracy paradigm (Kompridis 2011a; 
Kompridis 2011b; Kompridis 2011c; Beausoleil 2014).12 Whilst there is no single 
conceptualisation of receptivity within this literature (Kompridis 2011a), what these 
studies share is a concern with peoples' willingness and aptitude to listen and 
respond to new voices and claims. As Emily Beausoleil (2014, p.19) puts it, helpfully, 
“with so much work on the issue of voice”, this is “the inverse question of how people 
come to listen”.  
 
Receptivity is not a traditional concern for political theory. As Kompridis (2011a) 
notes, for most political theorists this is an “ethical” issue, “whose introduction into 
politics would surely have a depoliticizing effect” (2011b, p. 203). Depoliticizing, one 
presumes, because it is associated with individual personality traits, such as being 
attentive or a good listener. However, recent scholarship suggests we understand it 
differently, and as more than a reflection of individuals' concerns to be nice. Public 
                                                        
12 Key contributions to this literature include Nikolas Kompridis' Critique and Disclosure: Critical 
Theory between Past and Future (2011a) and a “Special Issue” of the Journal Ethics and Global 
Politics, entitled “A Politics of Receptivity” (2011), in which a series of articles suggest receptivity 
should be “at the very centre of a transformed democratic politics” (Kompridis 2011b, p.203).  
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receptivity to difference in general and the kinds of discourses to which they are 
more or less receptive is an important factor in discursive struggle and crucially, it is 
argued, a product, in part, of the social, political and economic context. In other 
words, this literature suggests a structural account of receptivity to augment the 
more familiar agential one.  
 
This research is important for an account of a-legal space(s) because it suggests, 
firstly, that receptivity is a phenomenon that can and should be studied. Hence it 
provides a framework through which to approach the problem which was identified 
in the previous chapter:  potential public resistance to engaging with these initiatives. 
Secondly, research in this area suggests that receptivity is a phenomenon that can be 
actively fostered (or inhibited). Scholars have sought to show that public receptivity 
to new ideas and ways of being can indeed be influenced and actively fostered, 
through particular kinds of interventions. Drawing on recent research in 
neuroscience and into the notion of 'affect', Beausoleil (2014, p. 21), for example, 
explores how “the conditions of listening in politics... might be effectively harnessed 
to produce receptivity and responsiveness”. She advocates the use of “performative 
practices” such as theatre and dance, with their use of “affective and embodied 
strategies to garner attention”.  More specifically, she argues that “the forms of 
encounter most effective in cultivating receptivity and revisability are those that 
move us via affective intensity within pointedly mediated contexts”(ibid., p.22, 
emphasis in original). Beausoleil argues that it is through this “balance of strategies” 
that performative practices “work to cultivate receptivity and dissemble those limits 
to thought, action and relation that preclude more complex ways of seeing” (ibid.).  
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Arguably the transformative potential of certain performative practices applies 
similarly to the experience of a-legal space(s), at least in some instances. Peoples' 
tribunals and commissions often include detailed accounts of personal traumas and 
specific injustices, including witness testimony and graphic evidence. For audience 
members and participants alike this may be emotionally affecting. The account of 
organisers of the London based Peoples' Tribunal on Precarity, supports the 
suggestion that participation can be an emotionally affecting experience:   
 
We did not anticipate the strength of the emotional aspects of the tribunal – the anger, 
relief, anxiety, fear. It can be difficult to talk about such issues and even more difficult to 
listen. It is particularly empowering to speak and listen collectively (Precarious Workers 
Brigade 2011). 
 
These initiatives are also mediated, in a way that many other forms of protest are not: 
there are visible organisers, who structure and lead the event, and participants often 
play the role of audience members. Beausoleil (2014) emphasises the importance of 
mediation, which can create a degree of distance helpful to create space for 
reflectivity.  
 
Additionally, there is room to explore how the combination of spatial and legal 
components in these initiatives might actively foster receptivity. In most instances, 
initiatives occupy a particular physical space for a temporary period of time, within 
which organisers and other participants engage in a physically immersive and 
participatory experience. As discussed in the previous chapter, participants go 
through the motions of acting out a democratic or legal event, which reflects the kind 
of system they believe should be institutionalised. Participants in a referendum fill 
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out a ballot paper and post it in the ballot box, and others help run the polling 
stations; participants in a tribunal stand in the witness box, sit on the jury or listen in 
the audience. To varying degrees, organisers, participants and (sometimes) other 
members of the public are physically implicated in these initiatives.  
 
What is interesting to consider is how the combination of these performative and 
embodied components, in addition to the quasi-legal, quasi-institutional format might 
create the conditions for receptivity to difference. Ben Seel's (1997) account of the 
Pollok Free State offers interesting anecdotal support for such a hypothesis. In 1994, 
the Pollok protest camp against the building of the new M77 motorway near Glasgow 
declared itself a 'free state', issuing passports to local residents and releasing a 
'declaration of independence'. For Seel (ibid., p.109) the camp is an example of 
“counter-hegemonic resistance via the Temporary Autonomous Zone”:  organisers 
sought not only to resist the new motorway, but to “facilitate(ing) learning about the 
hegemonic political economy, consumer culture and liberal polity in order to help 
build a radical green movement” (ibid., p.108). His research shows that while the 
specific campaign to resist the new M77 motorway was unsuccessful, the experience 
of the camp radicalised participants, including both core group members and visitors 
from the wider community, who became increasingly involved in a wider resistance 
movement. The pertinent question for the present study, then, is to what extent the 
particular combination of performative, embodied and quasi-legal components 
impacted on the experience for organisers, participants and other visitors. Of course, 
this is difficult to measure, given that the process of radicalisation described by Seel 
might equally be a result of prolonged social movement engagement. However, there 
is some evidence to suggest that the use of a-legal space fostered a different kind of 
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receptivity, even with unlikely audiences. Jake, one of the core group members 
describes his experience at the camp:  
 
That’s the whole concept of the Pollok Free State – people make their own decisions about 
the way they want to live their lives; to a certain extent it’s worked. It’s been a bit of a 
gimmick, like declaring independence and giving out passports and stuff like that, but it’s 
very much a definite space here... everybody has observed that, even the police. We’ve had 
the police out here telling us what to do and we’ve jokingly said, ‘you can’t tell us what to 
do, it’s a Free State, it’s a separate country’. But it’s not a Free State so much as a 
geographical location, but a state of mind and it’s very interesting to see how people 
observe that. Even people who have got the physical violent power know not to. That’s 
weird, I mean it’s good (Jake quoted in Seel, 1997, p.5). 
 
Jake's comments suggest the experience of a-legal space may, on occasion, foster 
greater receptivity to new ideas and wider discourses, from audiences who might 
normally be unsympathetic. Beausoleil's (2014, p.21) discussion of how to “harness... 
the conditions for listening” helps provide some guidance as to what communicative 
and experiential elements to look out for within specific initiatives.  
 
Coming from a different theoretical perspective, Campbell, Cornish and Gibbs (2010) 
have sought to address a gap in the social psychology literature, exploring how social 
movements create environments in which the demands of the poor and marginalised 
are heard. They coin the term 'receptive social environments' to describe contexts in 
which “the rich are willing to take these voices seriously” (ibid., p. 962). Interestingly, 
they cite the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement, and in particular its efforts to 
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“emphasise its legal correctness” and constitutionality (ibid., p.14) as a successful 
example of creating a receptive social environment.  
 
2.3. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to outline a conceptual framework through which to 
understand and explore the use of a-legal space as a political strategy. Harnecker 
(2007; 2008) provides a starting point, but leaves various gaps in an account of this 
phenomenon which I have sought to fill in. Through understanding a-legal initiatives 
as a sub-category of the strange and disruptive behaviour that Hans Lindahl (2013) 
denominates as ‘a-legal’ we can sustain the idea of an ontologically distinct legal 
category of action. Such initiatives are strategic, self-conscious and politically-
motivated examples of a-legal behaviour, where actors explicitly seek to disrupt the 
legal order and ‘intimate’ an alternative. They resist assimilation with the legal or the 
illegal, in the terms of the extant legal order, because they question and reject aspects 
this order.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I considered the mechanism by which this strategy 
might function to bring about political or social change. Drawing on Hausknost’s 
(2011) account of political grammar change through tipping events, I explored the 
potential of a-legal space as a tool to consciously contrive these ruptural events which 
shift the political grammar and open up new political possibilities. I suggested that 
there is a structural connection between events which are associated with either 
constituted or constituent power and tipping events. Potentially, the democratic 
authority associated with referenda, court rulings, elections, but also (though less 
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commonly) wide-scale rioting or mass protests, has the potential to underlie the 
creation of tipping events. A-legal initiatives are distinguished by their association 
with both constituted power and constituent power, and in this way they have at least 
the potential to contrive tipping events. Finally, I have considered the role of these 
spaces in the creation of new democratic subjectivities, and in fostering receptivity to 
different ways of thinking. The embodied and performative features of a-legal spaces 
suggest their potential in both areas. This combination of concepts and theories is 
intended as a preliminary conceptual framework which will be tested and developed 
in the subsequent case study chapters.  
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Chapter 3: The use of a-legal space in Latin America 
 
The last two and a half decades have seen quite spectacular social and political 
transformations across Latin America. These have included the explosion of new 
social movements and the election of left and centre-left governments in countries 
across the region, and the turn to a new kind of constitutionalism on the part of 
governments and social movements alike. In this chapter, I situate the phenomenon of 
a-legal space as a strategy in the context of contemporary Latin America. Whilst a-
legal initiatives can be identified around the world, there has been a particular 
preponderance of these tactics in Latin America over the last twenty-five years, and I 
argue that this both reflects and is a part of these wider social and political 
transformations. Looking at the use of a-legal space in this context can help us 
understand the phenomenon better. In turn, looking at the use of a-legal space can 
contribute to broader debates in contemporary Latin American politics.  
 
In section 3.1, I provide an overview of the recent developments in Latin American 
politics, and explain their relationship to the a-legal space phenomenon. In section 
3.2, I turn to a discussion of the first two case studies. These are two a-legal referenda 
which were attempted in Honduras and Colombia, both in the context of struggles to 
convene a constituent assembly to re-write the national constitution. These cases 
suggest that the concept of a-legal space can fill a gap in scholarly accounts of how 
constitutional change sometimes comes about. Facing the closure of the formal 
system, in both instances actors have turned to the use of a-legal space in an attempt 
to create an opening for constitutional change. In section 3.3, I make the bigger claim 
that other instances of a-legal space, such as citizens’ debt audits, peoples’ tribunals 
137 
 
and other unofficial referenda should be understood much like the Colombian and 
Honduran referenda: they are attempts to change the constituted order through 
creating a space for the manifestation of constituent power. These case studies are 
also useful for exploring other aspects to the nature of a-legal space as a tactic, which I 
discuss here. Finally, in section 3.4, I show how understanding a-legal spaces as part 
of the constitutional process can contribute to existing literature on new Latin 
American constitutionalism.  
 
3.1. Recent developments in Latin American politics 
 
Significant social, political and economic transformations have marked the last two 
and a half decades in Latin America. Several interrelated developments are of 
particular significance. These include the emergence of powerful new social 
movements as influential actors in many Latin American countries; the election of left 
and centre-left governments across the continent, partly (and to varying degrees) as a 
result of these new social movements' collective action and support; and the turn to a 
new kind of constitutionalism by left governments in power. I discuss each of these 
developments, and their significance for a study of a-legal space, in turn.  
 
3.1.1. New Social Movements in Latin America 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, across Latin America, right-wing and social 
democratic governments alike adopted neoliberal macro-economic policies based on 
the 'Washington Consensus', under pressure from the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gwynne and Key 2000; Harris 2000). The reduction of state 
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spending and privatisation of state industries in many instances led to dramatic 
increases in unemployment and poverty levels, which was compounded by a 
reduction in poverty alleviation and other state programmes (Harris 2000).1 The 
emergence of new collective movements and action in this period is often understood 
as a response to the social and economic effects of neoliberalism (Silva 2009; 
Dinerstein and Ferrero 2012; Prevost, Vanden and Campos 2012; Ciccariello-Maher 
2013; Green 2003; Prashad and Ballvé 2006).  
 
Latin America has a long history of popular resistance from which the explosion of 
social movements in the 1990s can be traced. However, these new movements also 
shared several characteristics which mark a break with the past and have led to their 
classification by scholars as 'new social movements'. Firstly, unlike earlier workers' 
movements and unions of the twentieth century they are not connected to 
established political parties and have generally kept their distance from these actors. 
Secondly, instead of the armed tactics common in earlier decades they have adopted 
an ever-widening repertoire of non-violent direct action, including road blockades 
and closures, and occupations of land, buildings and public spaces, as well as 
marches.2 Thirdly, they are comprised of previously marginalised groups such as 
indigenous people and peasants, women, Afro-descendants, as well as the 
traditionally mobilised urban working class. Like the new social movements which 
preceded them in the Global North, they have articulated new claims which were 
ignored by political parties and traditional labour movements, such as indigenous and 
                                                        
1    In Argentina, for example, unemployment increased from six percent in 1991 to 18.5 percent in 
1995 (Dinerstein and Ferrero 2012).  
 
2 Road blockades for example have been employed to great effect by the Argentinian Piqueteros 
movement and indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. In Bolivia and Ecuador the strategy 
of blocking every road into and out of a capital city, forcing the city to a grinding halt, has twice been 
connected with resignation of governments (Prevost, Vanden, and Campos 2012). 
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peasant rights, women's rights, gay and lesbian rights and environmental concerns, in 
addition to more familiar demands for employment and land. Also new, and of central 
importance to their increased influence, has been the formation of broad coalitions, 
made up of different groups not previously aligned, such as the Bolivian indigenous 
and peasant coalition movements (Prevost, Vanden and Campos 2012). 
 
Another less tangible shift might be conceived as a change in paradigm for how 
movements think about social change. As Prevost, Vanden, and Campos (2012, p.6) 
observe: 
 
For decades the concept of social change was linked to armed revolution in Latin America 
and a commitment to construct socialism with the Cuban experience as a guide... The 
language and tactics of contemporary movements have gone in a different direction.  
 
This is reflected in the turn away from the traditional political parties, as well as from 
armed tactics aimed at a revolution through force. Equally it is reflected in how 
movements articulate their goals. As Prevost, Vanden and Campos (ibid.) highlight, 
movements have moved from an “explicit commitment to radical socialism”, to “broad 
themes of social and economic justice”: “emblematic of the approach is the 
commonly-heard declaration 'another world is possible'”. Movements have sought to 
build alternatives to capitalism, not captured in the socialist model of Cuba or 
elsewhere, but rather embodied by concepts such as 'buen vivir' ('living well') which 
encompasses the indigenous values and practice of living in harmony with nature 
(Escobar 2010). 
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One facet to this new paradigm is “a shift from pure opposition to neoliberalism to the 
creation of new forms of social and political interaction” (Dinerstein and Ferrero 
2012). This is reflected in the practice of horizontal decision-making and 
participatory democracy, which has characterised movements across the continent. 
In some instances, movements have filled the gap left by the end of state provision of 
social services. The Unemployed Workers Organisations of Argentina, for example, 
have established projects to meet community needs in areas including housing, 
education, and health care, amongst others. Leveraging state funds through a 
strategic use of protest and road closures, they have been able to pay registered 
'unemployed workers' to work on the community projects (Dinerstein 2010). 
However, despite their dependence on state funds, these organisations have (to 
varying degrees) maintained a radical autonomy from the state. Work is defined as “a 
true human attribute that must be used for the production of useful goods and 
services for the community rather than profit making” (Union of Unemployed 
Workers cited in Dinerstein 2010, p. 361); in other words, they have developed and 
maintained a counter-hegemonic definition of work. 
 
Autonomous practice, exemplified in the Unemployed Workers Organisations of 
Argentina, as well as the Zapatistas of Mexico, but present to varying degrees in 
movements throughout the continent, has also been a defining feature of new 
movements which have emerged since the 1990s (Dinerstein and Deneulin 2012; 
Dinerstein 2014). Indeed, some have argued for the invocation of a new conceptual 
category: 'hope movements' (Dinerstein and Deneulin 2012; Dinerstein 2014). The 
familiar category of 'social movement', it is argued, fails to fully capture the new 
kind of collective action in which these organisations are involved, as they attempt 
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to “explore alternative relations and sociabilities beyond them” (Dinerstein and 
Deneulin 2012; Dinerstein 2014, p. 1).  
 
What is significant for the present study is that this transformation of the informal 
political sphere in Latin America has correlated, broadly speaking, with the 
appearance and increased usage of a-legal spaces. The explosion of new social 
movements (and hope movements), characterised by their pursuit of 'another 
world' and their efforts to explore and prefigure aspects of this other world, makes 
fertile ground for a study of a-legal space. The use of a-legal space should be seen 
as movements' attempts to imagine and articulate the laws and institutional 
structures which might support these “alternative relations and sociabilities 
beyond them” (ibid.).  
 
3.1.2. The New Left in power and new Latin American Constitutionalism 
 
Alongside these changes at the level of grass-roots politics and civil society, have 
come equally dramatic developments in formal politics. Starting with the election of 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, a wave of progressive left and centre-left 
governments have taken power across the region. The so-called 'pink tide' or 'left 
turn' has included the election of left governments in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Guatemala since the start of the 
2000s.3 In 2005, it was reported that three-quarters of South America's population of 
                                                        
3 Socialist candidate Ricardo Lagos was elected in Chile in 2000, followed by his successor Michelle 
Bachelet in 2006; Brazil's Luiz Inácio Da Silva ('Lula') of the Workers' Party in 2002; and socialist 
Tabaré Vásquez of Uruguay in 2002. In 2002 Lúcio Gutiérrez, was elected on a left wing platform in 
Ecuador, and subsequently replaced by centre left candidate Rafael Correa in 2006. Néstor Kirchner 
was elected in Argentina in 2003, and Cristina Kirchner in 2007. In 2005, Bolivia elected the social 
movement candidate and first indigenous president, Evo Morales. In 2008, Fernando Lugo was 
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350 million people are now ruled by “left-leaning presidents”, all of whom had been 
elected since 1998 (Painter 2008). As one might expect, Latin America's 'left turn' has 
generated much scholarly debate, both positive and alarmed. Various strongly 
contested attempts have been made to categorise the contemporary Latin American 
left in power, and distinguish between different models of government. In most 
analyses, however, the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are placed in a 
common category (Ellner 2012).4 These governments share various characteristics in 
terms of policies, discourse and strategy, which it is generally argued distinguish 
them from other governments in the region, and both socialist and social-democratic 
governments of the past (ibid.). Key common characteristics include anti-neoliberal 
government rhetoric; significant investment in social programmes and redistribution; 
nationalisation of key industries; and the use of charismatic leadership styles, to 
name a few (Ellner 2012; Ellner 2013). A fuller discussion of the New Left 
governments in power is beyond the scope of the present discussion, however, one 
                                                                                                                                                                        
elected president of Paraguay on a left-wing platform and became the first president from outside 
of the traditional oligarchy. In Central America, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front was elected in 2006; centre left Alvaro Colom was elected in Guatemala, breaking fifteen years 
of right wing governance; and Mauricio Funes of the Faribuno Martí National Liberation Front was 
elected in El Salvador in 2009, ending twenty years of right- wing governments (Prevost, Vanden 
and Campos 2012). 
4 One particularly influential framework suggests that “there is not one Latin American left today; 
there are two”, distinguishing between the 'bad' populist left of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, and 
the 'good' social democratic left exemplified in countries such as Chile, Uruguay and Brazil 
(Castañeda 2006, p. 29). Subsequent scholarship which has adopted the good left/ bad left 
framework has sometimes differed in its interpretation of the 'good' left, but the 'bad' left is 
consistently understood to refer to the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Proponents 
of this framework point to the centralisation of power, 'undemocratic' constitutional changes, and 
'populist' leadership styles in the so-called bad left. In contrast, others have championed the 
governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador as a “new left” with a promise of “21st Century 
Socialism” (Harnecker 2010, p. 35 - 50); others, similarly, have celebrated the experiments in 
popular control and participatory democracy within the so-called bad left (Smilde and Hellinger 
2011). Its continued influence notwithstanding, the good left/ bad left framework has been widely 
criticised for its reductive nature and normative bias (Cameron and Sharpe 2010; Ciccariello-Maher 
2013; French 2009; Buxton 2010). Critics argue that differences in left governments' policies are 
best understood through reference to cultural, political and historical variation. And, moreover, 
Castañeda's (2006) framework serves a disciplinary function, intended to discipline left 
governments in the interests of Washington (Cameron and Sharpe 2010; French 2009). Despite 
these fierce disagreements, the so-called 'bad left' countries of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are 
commonly placed in the same category by analysts of all political persuasions (Ellner 2012).  
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aspect is of particular significance. Central to the governmental strategy of Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador has been an embrace of a new kind of constitutionalism 
grounded in the 'constituent power' of the people, centred on the creation of a 
constituent assembly to re-write the constitution and the institutionalisation of 
mechanisms for direct and participatory democracy.  
 
Promises to 're-found' the nation through a new constitution were central to the 
electoral campaigns of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael 
Correa in Ecuador and, according to some, key to their electoral success (Collins 
2008).5 The phenomenon reflects a broader mood for constitutional change across 
Latin America, where in a 'fourth wave of constitutional reform' almost every country 
has re-written or significantly altered their constitution since the 1990s (Van Cott 
2000; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011). In instances where constitutional change has been 
averted, a new constitution has become a central objective of resistance movements 
(Mendoza 2012).6 However, the new constitutions of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, 
and the process by which these constitutions were adopted, have several significant 
features which distinguish them from other countries in the region, and other periods 
of constitutional reform. In each case, new constitutions have been written by a 
constituent assembly: a special body, separate from the normal organs of the state, 
formed with the special purpose of developing a new constitution. These constituent 
                                                        
5 Describing Correa's presidential campaign, Collins (2008) notes “The clarion call of his campaign 
was to throw the old, corrupt political elite out and remake the whole system...This message 
resonated with a public hungry for change, and he won an impressive 56.7 per cent of the popular 
vote...” 
6 This is the case in the examples of Honduras and Chile. Writing about the Honduran resistance 
movement which has emerged since the coup against President Zelaya in 2009, Honduran scholar 
Breny Mendoza (2012) observes; “To date, writing a new constitution is the sole strategy and is 
what defines or constructs the political philosophy of the movement”. (The Honduran case is 
discussed in more detail in the following section). Similarly, in Chile, one of only two Latin American 
countries to still use the constitution enacted under the period of authoritarian rule, a significant 
movement for the creation of a constituent assembly to develop a new constitution has developed 
(Otramirada 2014). 
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assemblies have been created following approval in a national referendum; assembly 
members have been elected and included representatives of social movements and 
civil society groups, as well as politicians. The contents of the new constitutions have 
been developed and deliberated by the Constituent Assembly over an extended 
period and subsequently presented to the public for ratification in national referenda. 
Substantive commonalities in the three constitutions include an emphasis on popular 
democratic participation, realised through the institutionalisation of participatory 
democracy within the structures of the state. Indeed, a move from representative 
democracy to a more integrated democratic model is made explicit within all three 
constitutions.7 Other commonalities include greater state control of the economy, 
enhanced human and social rights (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011) and recognition of and 
some basis in indigenous cosmology (particularly within the Bolivian and Ecuadorian 
constitutions).  
 
For some theorists, this approach diverges from the traditional constitutional model 
in important ways so as to as to amount to a new form of constitutionalism, described 
variously as 'new Latin American constitutionalism' (Viciano Pastor and Martinez 
Dalmau 2010; Fernández 2009); 'new Andean constitutionalism' (Fernández 2009; 
Wall, forthcoming); and 'transformative neo-constitutionalism' (de Sousa Santos 
                                                        
7 The Bolivian Constitution states that the country has adopted a “participatory democratic, 
representative and communal form of government” (Constitution of Bolivia 2009, Chapter 3, Article 
11). Similarly, the Venezulean Constitution asserts: “The government of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be democratic, 
participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable 
mandates (Constitution of Venezuela, Title I, Article 6, cited in 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/constitution/title/1). And the Ecuadorian State is “organized as a 
republic and is governed using a decentralized approach. Sovereignty lies with the people, whose 
will is the basis of all authority, and it is exercised through public bodies using direct participatory 
forms of government as provided for by the Constitution” (Constitution of Ecuador 2008, Chapter 1, 
Article 1, available at: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html). 
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2010; Ávila Santamaría 2011).8 9 New Latin American constitutionalism has been the 
focus of a large and growing body of scholarly literature. There are two types of 
response to the phenomenon which are significant to the present study. The first 
explores its significance as a development in left political strategy. The second 
explores its significance from the perspective of democratic and constitutional theory. 
I consider each in turn. 
 
This constitutional turn on the part of left governments in Latin America is 
considered “somewhat surprising” by some commentators (Cameron and Sharpe 
2010, p.119). The approach is contrasted with the dominant strategy of the Latin 
American left since the 1960s in which actors sought to gain control of the state 
through extra-legal violent means. However, by the 1990s it had long been clear that 
the armed struggle had failed. New Latin American constitutionalism is framed as a 
response to the quandary in which the left found itself, and as an alternative to the 
reform/revolution dichotomy, which characterised earlier thinking. Whereas 
reformists sought to achieve social advances within the limitations of liberal 
representative democracy and capitalism, new Latin American constitutionalism is 
framed as an attempt to transcend these limits from inside the existing legal and 
democratic order.  
                                                        
8 For consistency, I will use the term 'new Latin American constitutionalism' to refer to the form of 
constitutionalism adopted in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  
9 The constitutional model adopted in these countries is sometimes also referred to as 'neo-
constitutionalism' (e.g. Mendoza 2012). However, others have argued convincingly that the 
approach developed in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador should be distinguished from the broader 
category of neo-constitutionalism. For Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) and Ramiro Ávila 
Santamaría (2011), what is taking place in these countries involves a step beyond the neo-
constitutionalist project. It is like neo-constitutionalism but with additional 'transformative' 
components. As Ávila Santamaría (2011, p. 16) explains: “Neo-constitutionalism brings together the 
most innovative elements of contemporary constitutionalism that have been developing in Europe 
since the middle of the 20th Century and that mark an important distinction with judicial positivism 
and formalism. ‘Transformative’ intends to demonstrate the advances of our own Andean 
constitutionalism that are totally novel to the contemporary frame.” 
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This is done through an appeal to the democratic component within constitutional 
theory: 'constituent power'. Whilst central, the function of constituent power within 
contemporary liberal constitutions has been relegated to a symbolic one. The 
constituent power is held to have been active at some past 'founding moment', in 
which the constitution and state were founded. But after this point, the constituted 
power replaces the constituent power; the constituent power's role is over apart from 
serving as a source of legitimacy for the ongoing constitutional regime (Colón-Ríos 
2012). In new Latin American constitutionalism, the concept of constituent power has 
been resurrected, with the intention of enabling radical structural change through 
democratic politics. Appealing to the ultimate authority of constituent power - 'the 
people' - governments have been able to legitimate the creation of constituent 
assemblies, approved in referenda; these have the power to completely restructure 
the state, through the dissolution and creation of institutions and foundational laws. 
Cameron (2009, p.340) illustrates the framing of this strategy as an alternative to the 
reform/revolution dichotomy, in his description of its emergence in the Venezuelan 
context:  
 
Languishing in jail after his failed 1992 coup attempt, Hugo Chávez contemplated taking his 
struggle for power onto enemy territory, and to seek office by means of election. But, for 
Chávez, this could not mean submitting to Venezuela’s moribund democratic system. So he 
struck on the idea of constituent power as a form of revolutionary power and, in an 
extended interview, he explained the distinction: ‘In France in 1789 constituent power 
exploded. This is the power to constitute a people against what is constituted, that simple ... 
But this transformative power, as against the established, constituted power, has to be very 
great.’ 
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So, whilst other currents in radical thought have eschewed the pursuit of state power 
altogether, attempting to “change the world without taking power” (Holloway 2002), 
new Latin American constitutionalism represents an alternative way forward. As 
Cameron (2009, p.340) puts it: it is a “strategy of taking power through changing the 
constitution”. This interpretation of new Latin American constitutionalism is 
significant for the present study because it is much how Harnecker (2007) has 
depicted the potential of a-legal space. For Harnecker, the use of a-legal space is a 
political-legal strategy which transcends the reform/ revolution dichotomy of the 
past and in this way avoids the limitations of both the legal route, of formal 
parliamentary politics, and the illegal route, of armed revolution. The difference of 
course is that the initiatives which make use of a-legal space lack, by definition, the 
formal power to make laws; I return to this point in the next sub-section.  
 
The other significant response in the literature comes from the perspective of 
constitutional and democratic theory. For some, new Latin American 
constitutionalism amounts to more than a clever strategy for those seeking 
transformative change: it holds the key to a democratic constitutional theory. In 
the revised constitutional theory he calls ‘weak constitutionalism’, Joel Colón-Ríos 
(2012, p.152) highlights the democratic deficit within traditional liberal 
constitutionalism, in which:  
 
after a constitution is in place, constitutionalism's main function (that of limiting political 
power) runs counter to the idea of creating opportunities for ordinary citizens to make 
episodic appearances and engage in important constitutional transformations. 
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Colón-Ríos advocates a constitutional model which provides mechanisms within 
the constitution which can “provide an opening, a means of egress, for constituent 
power to manifest from time to time” (ibid., p.103). Through institutionalising 
spaces for the manifestation of constituent power, we can allow for “episodes in 
which the citizenry exercises it democratic right to (re)create the constitutional 
regime under which it lives” (ibid., p.152). The paradigm example of such a 
mechanism, argues Colón-Ríos (2012), is the ‘constituent assembly from below’ 
and the real-world examples of this type of constitutionalism in action are the new 
constitutional regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Of course, in most 
contemporary constitutional regimes there is no 'opening' or 'means of egress' 
within the constituted order, for the expression of constituent power. A-legal 
activities are, as I will argue in subsequent sections, an attempt to create one.  
 
 
 
3.2. The use of a-legal spaces in struggles for a constituent assembly 
 
The use of a-legal space has been an important tactic for actors pushing for a 
constituent assembly to write a new national constitution, on at least two occasions. 
In both Colombia and Honduras the tactic was employed at critical moments in the 
countries' struggles for constitutional change, albeit by very different agents, and 
with a very different outcome.  
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3.2.1. The Colombian 'seventh ballot' 
 
In 1991 Colombia became the first in a series of Latin American countries to convene 
a constituent assembly, following approval in a national referendum, with the remit 
of writing a new national constitution. The move is credited with initiating the wave 
of constitutional reform which took place across the continent over the following 
decade and creating a precedent for the new Latin American constitutionalism which 
characterised left governments' policies in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador (Gómez 
Leyton 2009). Unlike in these countries, however, the impetus for a constituent 
assembly was not the transformative programme of a new left wing government. A 
student movement, centred around a group of law students at the University of 
Rosario in Bogotá, is largely credited with leading the campaign for a constituent 
assembly and carrying out the actions which made this possible.10 
 
The proposal for a new constitution first emerged in Colombia in the early 1980s in a 
context of intense political crisis and following decades of escalating violence 
between paramilitaries, guerrillas, the military, and the drug cartels (Fox, Gallón-
Giraldo and Stetson 2010; Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y La Paz 2011).11 
The idea gained support within various sectors, for whom it was seen as a route to 
peace, human rights protections and political stability (García 2011). In 1987 
representatives of key trade unions, NGOs and some political leaders formed the 
                                                        
10  For a detailed discussion of the student movement for a constituent assembly in Colombia see 
Torres Forero’s (2006) De las aulas a las urnas: La Universidad del Rosario, la Séptima Papeleta y la 
Constituyente de 1991. 
11  Between 1984 and the creation of the Constituent Assembly in 1991, 120 judges and magistrates, 
the justice minister and the attorney general were murdered by the drug cartels, for investigating 
drug cartel violence (Van Cott 2000). As Van Cott (2000, p.48) argues: "The purpose of these attacks 
was to paralyze the justice system and to intimidate the public and public officials into outlawing 
the extradition of Colombian nationals (Buenahora 1995: 33 - 34; Bushnell 1993: 264; Kline 1999: 
46 0 47)". 
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National Commission for a constituent assembly (Fox, Gallón-Giraldo and Stetson 
2010; Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y La Paz 2011). Major newspapers 
came out in support of the constituent assembly process (Torres Forero 2006). 
Various unsuccessful attempts were made during this period by successive 
governments to reform the constitution, and thereby address the mounting sense of 
institutional crisis.12 In 1988, significantly, liberal President Virgilio Barco proposed a 
referendum to reform the constitution's amendment process and allow for a future 
referendum on the convocation of a constituent assembly. Barco's proposal – as with 
previous efforts at reform – was overturned by the Colombian Supreme Court, who 
argued that such a referendum was unconstitutional. As with most liberal 
constitutions, the Colombian Constitution of 1886 had no provision for the 
convocation of a constituent assembly to enact reform. All reform was to take place 
through the constitution's amendment procedure, and to be enacted by Congress.  
 
The turning point in the Colombian struggle for a constituent assembly came through 
the student movement. The assassination of Liberal party presidential candidate, 
Senator Gálan, in 1989, was the catalyst for the emergence of a mass student 
movement in favour of constitutional reform. Gálan, who had been popular amongst 
the young, “embodied popular aspirations for democratic reform” (Van Cott 2000, p. 
53). His death served to galvanise and energise the movement for a constitutional 
assembly. The students employed a varied tactical repertoire over the coming 
months, including a mass march,13 petitions, and public meetings. Central, however, 
                                                        
12  Constitutional reforms were attempted by the governments of Liberal presidents López Michelsen, 
Turbay Ayala and Virgilio Barco, in 1977, 78 and 88 respectively, and Conservative president 
Betancur in 1984 – 85. In all cases proposals for reform were overturned by the Colombian 
Supreme Court. 
13 On August 25th 1989 the 'March of Silence' took place through the centre of Bogotá. An estimated 
25,000 protesters, mainly students, marched in complete silence, in protest at the assassination of 
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were various efforts at demonstrating the level of popular support for a constituent 
assembly, without, as one account explains, “the necessary infrastructure to carry out 
a mass referendum” (Torres Forero 2006, p. 41). In late 1989 their 'Plebiscite for a 
plebiscite' capitalised on media support by taking out a subsidised advert in the 
highest circulation national newspaper14 in the form of a petition, calling on the 
president to hold a plebiscite on various issues, including the creation of a constituent 
assembly. Readers were asked to complete the petition and return it to the student 
group, who would then deliver the petitions en masse to the president. As one 
account of the event explains, the idea was that “many signatures, thousands and 
thousands, would configure an actual plebiscite” (ibid.). 
 
The plebiscite for a plebiscite was the students' first attempt to simulate a form of 
referendum in the absence of the necessary infrastructure to carry out a mass 
referendum. Their next attempt took advantage of the state's infrastructure, and is 
generally depicted as the turning point in their campaign and the root of the 1991 
Colombian Constitution. In early 1990 it was proposed that an un-authorised 
additional ballot paper be included in the forthcoming elections for Congress and 
other public posts in March 1990. The 'seventh ballot' ('séptima papeleta'), as the 
initiative became known, would accompany the six official ballots, and enable citizens 
to vote on the convocation of a constituent assembly.15 The plan was to exploit the 
existing electoral process. At this time, paper ballot papers were produced by 
candidates' campaign teams. Voters selected the ballot paper with the name of their 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Senator Gálan and other deaths through violence, and in favour of constitutional change (Fundación 
Séptima Papeleta 1989).  
14 The newspaper – 'el Tiempo' – paid for fifty percent of the advert cost out of “patriotic duty” (cited 
in Torres Forero 2006, p. 43).  
15 The idea of the Seventh Ballot is credited to Professor Fernando Carillo, a lawyer and economist 
based at the University of the Andes at the time, who was involved with the student movement for a 
constituent assembly (Torres Forero, 2006).  
152 
 
preferred candidate, which they inserted into an envelope which was then deposited 
into the ballot box. Citizens in support of a constituent assembly, it was planned, 
could insert the additional unauthorised seventh ballot along with their other ballot 
papers.  
 
Initial discussions for the seventh ballot initiative centred on the potential legality, as 
well as the logistics, of such an action.  Would the ballot papers be counted? Counted, 
but perhaps recorded only as void? Would this unauthorised ballot paper invalidate a 
voter's other ballots? Accordingly, representatives from the student movement had a 
series of meetings with experts in electoral law and officials from the electoral 
commission. Significantly, it was established that votes for an unknown person in an 
election did indeed have to be counted, and retained in a separate container 
according to the existing electoral code. On this basis it was decided that the text of 
the seventh ballot paper would commence: “I vote for Colombia”, in order to meet this 
criterion and be counted (Torres Forero 2006). Various options were then explored 
for how the unauthorised ballot papers would be introduced to the polling booths 
(ibid.). Eventually, the ballots were printed in both the major national newspapers, 
which had come out in support of the initiative; voters were invited to cut them out 
and bring them secretly to the polling station (Fox, Gallón-Giraldo and Stetson 
2010).16 In addition, representatives from the student movement organised 
                                                        
16  There were various different versions of the Seventh ballot in circulation, the full text of one read:  
 I vote for Colombia. Yes to a Constituent Assembly whose membership directly represent the people of 
Colombia with the objective of reforming the National Constitution. In exercise of the sovereignty 
recognised in Article 2 of the National Constitution, the electoral power will count this vote.  
 Original text: “Voto por Colombia. Sí a una Asamblea Constituyente cuya integración represente 
directamente al pueblo colombiano con el fin de reformar la Constitución Nacional. En ejercicio de la 
soberanía reconocida en el artículo 2° de la Constitución Nacional, el poder electoral escrutará este 
voto” (cited in Novoa García, 2011) 
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themselves to be present at as many polling stations as possible to ensure that the 
seventh ballots were indeed counted (Torres Forero 2006). 
 
Figures for participation in the seventh ballot vary significantly, but all sources place 
the number in the millions.17 In addition to the ballots cut out of the newspapers, 
hundreds of thousands of homemade versions were also counted (Van Cott 2000). 
Following the massive levels of support in the seventh ballot the then President 
Virgilio Barco issued a Decree under state-of-emergency powers, enabling a formal 
and binding consultation to take place on the possibility of a constituent assembly, 
during the forthcoming presidential elections in May 1990. More than 88% of the 
electorate who participated voted in favour of the proposal (Colón-Ríos 2012; Fox, 
Gallón-Giraldo and Stetson 2010), and so the following December elections took place 
for the membership of the constituent assembly. Members included representatives 
of social movements and ex-guerrilla groups as well as the main political parties 
(ibid.).  
 
The 1991 Colombian Constitution and the constituent assembly process by which it 
was adopted is looked to as a precedent for the progressive constitutions of 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, both for its substantive emphasis on deepening 
democracy through participation as well as its constituent assembly origins. And as 
Colón-Ríos (2012, p.94) notes, the adopted constitution “has been widely celebrated” 
and includes many civil, social and economic rights, and mechanisms for upholding 
them, to the extent that:  
 
                                                        
17 2 million (Novoa García 2011; Van Cott 2000), 5 million (Fox, Gallón-Giraldo and Stetson, 2010), 13 
million (Torres Forero 2006). 
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[the constitution] has become a fundamental tool for the left, giving place to the curious 
situation that the left tends to defend the established constitutional regime from the 
opposition, and the right to challenge it from government (ibid., p.101). 
 
 
In his description of the event, Fernando Carrillo, the university professor who is 
credited with originally proposing the idea of the seventh ballot, claims that they had 
“created a supra-constitutional political fact, without precedent” (Carrillo 2010). 
Indeed, statements and decisions of the president, the Supreme Court, as well as the 
press, could be interpreted to support this claim. The national newspaper El 
Espectador described the episode as a “shake- up in the political structures” (cited in 
Novoa García 2011). President Barco used the seventh ballot as his explicit 
justification for a Presidential Decree that a referendum on the convocation of a 
constituent assembly take place during the May elections (Van Cott 2000). The 
constitutionality of the Presidential Decree was subject to review by the Supreme 
Court who, in contrast to earlier rulings on constitutional reform throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, upheld the president's decision. They argued that if the people 
decide to reform the constitution then they must not be prevented from doing so, and 
they cited the seventh ballot as evidence of the Colombian peoples' will (Fox, Gallón-
Giraldo and Stetson 2010).  
 
The Supreme Court's appeal to the theory of constituent power is not without 
precedent in Latin American jurisprudence. Indeed, as Colón-Riós (2011) shows, it is 
common for Latin American courts to make detailed reference to the theory of 
constituent power and appeal to a notion of constituent power as having ultimate 
authority over existing constitutional structures. What is interesting in this case is 
how the seventh ballot was interpreted by the court as evidence of the constituent 
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will, where earlier demonstrations, petitions and other forms of protest for 
constitutional change apparently were not. The event functioned as justification for 
the Supreme Court and the president to act in a different way than before. This 
enabled, or forced (depending on how one assesses the will of each) an action that 
went beyond existing constitutional procedures and norms, in calling a national 
consultation on the convocation of a constituent assembly. 
 
3.2.2. The Honduran 'fourth ballot box' 
 
In June 2009 President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was removed from office in a civil-
military coup, initiated by members of his own party in alliance with the army and 
Honduran business elite, and with the support of Congress (Cunha Filho, Coelho and 
Flores 2013; Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). Tensions between the President and 
other members of his party and Congress had been growing for some time.18 
However, it is generally agreed that the immediate trigger for the coup was the 
president's decision to proceed with a non-binding 'national poll' on whether there 
should be a referendum on the convocation of a constituent assembly to write a new 
constitution (Cunha Filho, Coelho and Flores 2013; Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010; 
Benjamin, 2009; Thale, 2009). 
 
Manuel Zelaya commenced his presidency of Honduras in January 2006. He was 
elected for the Liberal party, one of Honduras' two hegemonic political parties, both 
located on the right of the political spectrum. He had run a right-of-centre campaign, 
                                                        
18 Particularly significant was the government's decision to increase the the minimum wage by 60% 
by presidential decree (following failed negotiations with business) in January 2009, which 
prompted outrage in the business sector and a Supreme Court review (Cunha Filho, Coelho and 
Flores, 2013).  
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largely ideologically indistinguishable from that of the other front runner, (Porfirio 
‘Pepe’ Lobo, for the National party) (Cunha Filho, Coelho and Flores 2013). Son of a 
traditional landowning family, Zelaya came from the Honduran elite and in his 
campaign and at the outset of his presidency he drew on his network of contacts, 
utilising the traditional system of patronage which characterised Honduran politics 
(ibid.). He was not expected to change Honduran politics in any significant way (ibid.; 
Klesner 2006).  
 
However, over the next couple of years Zelaya came to exemplify a process known as 
'policy-switching'. This term is normally applied to the many examples of Latin 
American governments who have been elected on progressive left platforms, 
promising redistribution and poverty alleviation programmes, only to adopt 
neoliberal structural adjustment policies upon entering government. However, the 
government of Zelaya has been studied as a unique example of a right-to-left policy 
switch (Cunha Filho, Coelho and Flores, 2013). Key symbolic and material decisions 
which exemplify the switch include Honduras' participation in the 28th anniversary of 
the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in July 2007; joining Petrocaribe, the 
Venezuelan regional energy agreement in December 2007; and, most controversially, 
joining the ALBA bloc, the regional alliance of left-wing countries, led by Venezuela, 
and established as an alternative to the US-backed Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (Masud 2013).  
 
Perhaps influenced by his ALBA partners, in November 2008 Zelaya proposed the 
convocation of a constituent assembly to re-write the national constitution. Just prior 
to Zelaya's inauguration, the Citizens' Participation Law was passed, with the stated 
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objective of deepening Honduran democracy and citizens' participation. However, 
implementation of the law took place through the traditional political structures and 
therefore failed to transcend the old patronage networks and enable real citizen 
influence (Cunha Filho, Coelho & Flores, 2013). A constituent assembly, it was 
suggested, could “transform the country's participatory structures and 
institutionalise mechanisms of direct democracy” (ibid.). 
 
The initial plan was to draft a bill ordering a binding referendum on the convocation 
of a Constituent Assembly, to take place alongside the November 2009 general 
elections. However, by this stage Zelaya no longer had sufficient support in Congress 
to ensure a legislative majority. As an alternative, on March 23rd 2009 Zelaya issued a 
statement calling for a 'broad popular consultation' to take place by Presidential 
Decree in June, on whether there should be a referendum on the formation of a 
Constituent Assembly (Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). In a turn reminiscent of the 
Colombian case, the non-binding consultation was dubbed the 'fourth ballot box' ('la 
cuarta urna'), as the proposal was for a fourth ballot, on the convocation of a 
constituent assembly, to accompany the planned presidential, congressional and 
mayoral elections which were to take place in November.   
 
However, the Decree was overturned by the Attorney General who ruled it 
unconstitutional.  Undeterred, Zelaya issued a second Decree two months later on 
May 26th 2009, this time announcing a 'national poll' to take place on June 28th and 
conducted by the National Statistics Institute, to ascertain support for a future 
binding referendum on a constituent assembly. The shift from 'popular consultation' 
to 'national poll' was so that the exercise could be presented within the legal 
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framework of the existing Citizens' Participation Law, and avoid contradicting the 
Constitution, according to which only Congress can approve national referenda. In 
other ways it was essentially the same proposal (Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). 
However, it was then ruled that the new proposal for a national poll was covered by 
the earlier ruling by the Court of Contentious Administration, who placed an 
injunction and ordered the army to confiscate electoral materials for the poll. This 
ruling was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court who ruled the poll illegal 
(Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). 
 
Both the National party and Zelaya's own Liberal party came out against the fourth 
ballot box referendum. One group, (including members of the Liberal party), accused 
Zelaya of intending to use the referendum to remain in power.19 In a further effort to 
stop the poll, on June 23rd – just four days before it was scheduled to take place – 
Congress passed a law preventing any kind of referendum or plebiscite to take place 
180 days before or after the November general elections (ibid.).  
 
On Wednesday June 24th Zelaya ordered the army to distribute the ballots for the poll 
to the polling stations and provide logistical and security support for the event, as is 
standardly the role of the army during Honduran elections. However, the Commander 
of the Armed Forces, General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, refused, citing the Supreme 
Court ruling and arguing that he could not break the law. Zelaya dismissed the 
Commander, leading to the resignations of the Defence Minister and the heads of the 
                                                        
19 An allegation which has stuck despite the fact that, as Colón-Ríos (2012) points out, Zelaya's 
presidential term would have concluded before any new constitution could come into force. Of 
course, it is possible that Zelaya had hopes to return to power at a later date and hoped to influence 
the constituent assembly process in some way, so as to facilitate this. But this would be a far less 
direct process than is implied in much of the national and international media coverage and even 
some scholarly accounts of the episode (e.g. Taylor-Robinson and Ura 2012; Cassell 2009).  
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army, navy and air force, in protest (CNN 2009). Thursday June 25th the Supreme 
Court ruled that the dismissal of the Commander of the Armed Forces was 
unconstitutional, and issued an order for his reinstatement, (which, as Cunha Filho, 
Coelho and Flores (2013) point out, exceeded the Supreme Court’s own constitutional 
powers). The National Congress convened an emergency session, and the president of 
the Congress, Roberto Micheletti, announced the assembly's “unconditional support 
for the armed forces for respecting the constitution” (cited in CNN 2009). The 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal equally declared that the poll was illegal, and a 
spokesperson announced their support for the military's action (ibid.).  
 
On the same day, Zelaya accompanied by several hundred supporters led a protest to 
the military base where supporters reportedly collected the thousands of ballot 
papers out of storage, whilst singing the national anthem (CNN, 2009). In a statement 
Zelaya is reported to have announced:  
 
Sunday's referendum will not be stopped...We have the right to vote and the right to 
organize. The military should rectify their position in favour of the people and ignore the 
extortion of the elite (Zelaya cited in CNN 2009) 
 
The poll had been declared illegal by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal, the National Congress, and the armed forces had shown their support for 
this ruling. On Friday June 26th, two days before the poll, Zelaya contested the alleged 
illegality of the poll. He argued that the poll was justified within the Citizens 
Participations Law, according to which citizens “can ask the powers of the state to be 
consulted” (Zelaya cited in CNN 2009). Moreover, he added:  
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The poll has no binding character. That is, its results – yes or no – do not obligate the state 
to do anything. It’s a public opinion poll. It’s a poll that does not create new rights, does not 
create a new law (ibid.) 
 
The same day, a secret judicial order for the President's arrest was issued by the 
Supreme Court, for alleged crimes against the form of government, treason, abuse of 
authority and usurpation of functions (Cassell 2009). At dawn on June 28th, the 
morning of the scheduled poll, Zelaya was kidnapped by the army and flown out of 
the country. Later that day, Congress confirmed his resignation and the head of 
Congress, Roberto Micheletti, was named his successor in an interim government 
(Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010).  
 
Various factors contributed to the failure of Zelaya's plan to use the fourth ballot box 
as a tool to enable fundamental constitutional change. As described, he lacked 
support within the organs of the state. The Supreme Court, National Congress, 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the army formed a united block against his plans. 
Equally, he lacked support within his own party. However, he also lacked strong 
connections or support within Honduran civil society and social movements. Cunha 
Filho, Coelho and Flores (2013) note that he was widely distrusted amongst the main 
social movement leaders, and wide-scale mobilization in support of Zelaya did not 
happen until after the coup had been carried out. Moreover, Honduran civil society 
and social movements are less influential than in other areas in the region. Despite 
the emergence of new civil society organisations in the early 2000s (which it is 
suggested was important to help enable Zelaya's leftward switch), civil society and 
social movements remain “diffuse and relatively weak... lacking the capacity to make 
161 
 
any legitimate challenge to the status quo” (ibid., p.536).20 In this context, without 
active support from either the constituted or constituent powers, Zelaya's challenge 
to the established order resulted in his removal.  
 
Despite the weak social movement support for Zelaya whilst still in power, following 
the coup mass demonstrations and protests in support of his return took place every 
day for over six months (Mendoza 2012). As one analyst observed:  
 
the eruption of the resistance movement of the people of Honduras into the political field 
did raise some eyebrows and question marks. The scenes of fearless impoverished people, 
women and men alike of all ages and races, confronting tanks and soldiers for almost 200 
days in a row and still doing it today came as a surprise not only to political analysts but to 
Hondurans themselves (ibid.).  
 
A coalition of civil society organisations has since formed the National Front of 
Popular Resistance, which is the main umbrella organisation for the resistance 
movement in Honduras. The central demand, and strategy for social change, is the 
creation of a constituent assembly (Mendoza 2012).21 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
20 For a fuller discussion of this point see Castellanos (2006). Honduras: Gobernabilidad democrática y 
sistema político. Nueva Sociedad, Special Issue. 
21 See Appendix F for an account of the profound cultural and social significance of the National Front 
of Popular Resistance and the struggle for a constituent assembly by well-known Honduran 
playwright, Rafael Murillo Selva.  
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3.3. Implications for a theory of a-legal space  
 
In this section I explore the implications of these cases for a broader theory of a-legal 
space as a political strategy. I make various arguments. Firstly, these cases are 
indicative, I suggest, of how the use of a-legal space should be conceived: as part of a 
wider constitutional struggle, and more specifically as attempts to create an opening 
for the manifestation of constituent power. Other lessons concern the centrality of 
struggles to define (il)legality and (il)legitimacy when this tactic is employed; the 
potential for achieving impact through a-legal space; the location of a-legal space and 
the use of a-legal space by actors with constituted power.  
 
3.3.1 Creating ‘an opening, a means of egress, for constituent power to manifest’ 
 
It is striking that a-legal referenda have played such a critical role in the struggle for a 
constituent assembly in both Colombia and Honduras. This suggests that the concept 
of a-legal space can fill a gap in scholarly accounts of how constitutional change 
sometimes comes about. This space was used, I suggest, with the intention to force an 
opening in the constituted order, in the absence of institutionalised mechanisms. 
Moreover, understanding the role played by a-legal referenda in these particular 
struggles for constitutional change is indicative of how all a-legal initiatives might be 
conceived. I elaborate on these claims in turn.  
 
In his account of 'weak constitutionalism', Colón-Ríos (2012, p.103) emphasises the 
importance that “an opening, a means of egress, for constituent power to manifest” be 
built into the constitutional order. Such a mechanism can provide the possibility for 
ordinary citizens to bring about fundamental constitutional change. The seventh 
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ballot and the fourth ballot box can be understood as attempts to create such an 
opening, in the absence of an institutionalised mechanism. In both instances actors 
turned to the use of a-legal space in response to the closure of the formal system. The 
seventh ballot followed repeated attempts by successive governments to reform the 
constitution throughout the 1970s and 1980s in response to growing civil society 
pressure. As with most liberal constitutions, the only recognised mechanism for 
constitutional change in the Colombian constitution of 1886 was the restrictive 
amendment procedure, (and reform was to be enacted by Congress and not the 
executive). Meanwhile, popular demand for fundamental constitutional change grew. 
As Novoa García (2011) illustrates, the devastating violence and organised crime 
which continued with impunity had become connected in the public consciousness 
with a failure of the existing institutional framework and order:  
 
From the second half of the 80s, narco-terrorism and other forms of organised violence led 
the country to a genuine institutional crisis which could not be managed through the 
instruments of the constitution of 86... In these conditions, what was at risk was 
institutionality itself – impotent to stop the wave of violence (Novoa García 2011).22 
 
It was in this context: social unrest; popular support for change; and the apparent 
closure of the formal system, that the Colombian student group turned to the idea of 
an unofficial ballot. Likewise, whilst initiated by the president, the Honduran fourth 
ballot box poll can also be viewed as a response to closure of the formal system. As in 
Colombia prior to 1991, in Honduras only Congress has the authority to amend the 
constitution; there is no provision for the creation of a constituent assembly and the 
                                                        
22 Novoa García is Director of the Centre of Constitutional Studies (PLURAL). He was president of the 
Special Legislative Commission created by the Colombian Constituent Assembly which deliberated 
between July and December 1991 (Novoa García 2011).  
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president is prohibited from calling a national referendum. Zelaya had intended to 
draft a bill calling for his extra-ordinary referendum, but by 2009 he no longer had 
sufficient legislative support in Congress (Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). Hence, 
when it appeared that there was no way forward through the formal channels, Zelaya 
turned to the use of a-legal space.  
 
The difference, of course, is that these initiatives do not make law. Unlike Colón-Ríos’ 
(2012, p. 3) vision of an “opening, a means of egress, for constituent power to 
manifest”, these a-legal referenda had no binding legal consequences. So how can 
they be seen to have created an opening for constitutional change? Whilst lacking any 
formal legal implications, these referenda promised to create a space for the 
emergence of a new factor: constituent power. Through allowing for a public 
manifestation of the ‘constituent will’ they promised to shift the political and legal 
debate and thereby create an opening for subsequent constitutional change. And, as I 
will show in the next sub-section, in the case of the seventh ballot this strategy was 
successful.  
 
Moreover, this is much how other instances of a-legal activity including other non-
binding referenda, civil society debt audits, and peoples’ tribunals amongst other 
forms, could be understood. At a general level, they reflect the broader turn to a new 
constitutionalism within the Latin American left and the corresponding shift in legal 
consciousness. More specifically, they can be understood as attempts to create an 
opening for the manifestation of constituent power as a route to change the 
constituted order. Like the seventh ballot and the fourth ballot box, they are initiated 
in the face of institutional closure: when formal legal and political channels have been 
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exhausted. And like these initiatives, they create a space in which political demands 
can be constructed as the ‘constituent will’. Where they are successful in this 
construction, they can function to shift the range of political and legal possibilities 
available.  
 
This characterisation of the non-binding referenda, peoples' tribunals, citizens’ debt 
audits, and other a-legal initiatives which have emerged across Latin America in 
increasing frequency throughout the past two decades is useful. Importantly, it 
enables us to build on the work of constitutional law scholars such as Colón-Ríos 
(2012) who have emphasised the merits of new Latin American constitutionalism. In 
most countries of the world there is of course no constitutional provision for the 
emergence of constituent power to fundamentally transform the constitutional order. 
Also, outside Latin America's ALBA block, most governments are unsympathetic to 
such an idea. So where does this leave those fighting for fundamental constitutional 
change? Exploring the use of a-legal space contributes to an understanding of what 
strategies have been employed by actors seeking constitutional transformation, in the 
absence of institutional mechanisms through which to do so.  
 
Now, one objection to this interpretation will be that peoples’ tribunals and 
referenda, and audits and commissions are quite different types of activities. Indeed, 
these initiatives are used in quite different circumstances to address different issues, 
and play out in different ways. However, my intention is not to suggest that they are 
all the same, but that they can all be understood as the reflection of a common 
approach and strategy. This is where actors attempt to shift the possibilities for 
political and legal change through creating a space for the manifestation of 
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constituent power. How this plays out in different forms of a-legal space will be one 
question to explore in subsequent chapters. What might be involved in creating a 
space for the manifestation of constituent power can, I suggest, be understood quite 
broadly. Some a-legal initiatives place much emphasis on facilitating the direct 
engagement and interaction of participants in a particular action. Others focus on 
creating the theoretical bedrock for a counter-hegemonic discourse, for example 
peoples’ tribunals or debt audits which focus on collation of mountains of complex, 
technical data, which will stand up to rigorous legal analysis.23  Both are consistent 
with a depiction of creating a space for the manifestation of constituent power, as I 
will seek to show in the subsequent case study chapters.  
 
3.3.2. Impact  
 
Both the Colombian seventh ballot and the Honduran fourth ballot box referenda 
would appear to have had an outstanding impact. Unlike many a-legal initiatives - 
which reach relatively small audiences and take place on the margins of the political 
mainstream – these initiatives captured the interest of the country, and are connected 
with dramatic events that came in their wake. Gaining an understanding of if, how 
and why these initiatives were effective may offer important insights into the 
potential of the a-legal space tactic in general. So in this sub-section I explore these 
questions. I start out by considering the evidence of impact in each case, with a 
particular focus on the Colombian seventh ballot. As the fourth ballot box was 
eventually prevented from taking place, any discussion of its potential impact is 
necessarily constrained. However, I also consider what the implications of this case 
                                                        
23 Hence creating a space for the manifestation of constituent power might be seen as analogous to the 
development of a counter-hegemonic block. This is indeed the claim made by Kalyvas (2000) in his 
account of ‘hegemonic sovereignty’.  
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might be for a general theory of a-legal space. I then look at how scholars have 
explained the (apparent) impact of the seventh ballot. Whilst offering some insights, 
these accounts leave various questions unanswered. I suggest instead that the impact 
of the seventh ballot, and the fourth ballot box, can be well explained through the 
theory of a-legal space which was developed in chapter 2. I illustrate the applicability 
of this theory through a discussion of the cases, and conclude by a discussion of the 
consequences for a general theory of a-legal space.  
 
There is significant evidence to suggest that the seventh ballot was a powerful event, 
which played a part in altering the course of history. As a starting point: millions of 
Colombians participated in the seventh ballot, secretly inserting the unauthorised 
additional ballot paper into the ballot box.24 Following the event, President Barco 
opened the way for convocation of a constituent assembly to re-write the 
constitution, and the Supreme Court upheld his decision. And the seventh ballot was 
used to justify both of these extra-ordinary acts. Two months after the seventh ballot, 
President Barco issued the crucial Decree 927 in which he ordered that:  
 
Whilst the disturbance of public disorder continues and the country remains in a State of 
Siege, the electoral organisation will proceed to adopt all measures to count the votes that 
are submitted on the date of the presidential elections in 1990, around the possibility of 
forming a Constituent Assembly (Republic of Colombia, 1990). 
 
                                                        
24 Different sources suggest different levels of participation in the seventh ballot, but all put the 
number in the millions: 2 million (Novoa García 2011; Van Cott, 2000), 5 million (Fox, Gallón-
Giraldo and Stetson, 2010), 13 million (Torres Forero 2006). 
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The legal argument presented in support of Decree 927 makes several claims to 
legitimate this extra-ordinary presidential action. These include the escalating 
violence which had contributed to a situation of “permanent public disorder” 
(ibid.) and the inadequacy of existing institutional structures to overcome this 
situation. In addition, in a fascinating move, Barco explicitly cites the seventh ballot, 
noting:  
 
That on March 11th 1990 a considerable number of citizens, on their own initiative, facing 
the imminent need to allow institutional strengthening... demonstrated their will that the 
Political Constitution be reformed promptly by a Constituent Assembly… (Decree 927, 
1990). 
 
Moreover, it is argued that “to frustrate this popular movement in favour of 
institutional change” would be to weaken the existing institutional structures (ibid.). 
The Decree concludes:  
 
That for all the above, the National Government, interpreting the will of Colombians and 
complying with its constitutional obligation to preserve public order and search for all the 
means necessary to achieve the re-establishment of this, must proceed to enact a norm of 
legal character that enables the National Civil Registry to count the votes that are produced 
in relation to the possibility to call a Constituent Assembly, by popular initiative (ibid.).  
 
The somewhat strange formulation of the Decree, in which emphasis is placed on 
counting “votes that are produced” rather than calling a referendum, can be 
explained by the fact that the president was constitutionally unable to call a 
referendum or plebiscite on any issue. In order to limit presidential power, the 
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Constitution prevented the initiation of a referendum by the president. Instead, 
Barco draws on the seventh ballot as evidence of “the will of Colombians” and 
depicts Decree 927 as a matter of “interpreting” this will (ibid., emphasis added). 
Whilst in practice the Decree amounted to ordering a plebiscite or referendum on 
the convocation of a constituent assembly, it denies that the president is initiating 
this exercise. Instead it is “by popular initiative” that votes on a constituent 
assembly have been and will be cast, and the government’s role is limited “to 
enact(ing) a norm of legal character that enables the National Civil Registry to 
count the votes” (ibid.). In other words, Barco argues that he is not initiating a 
referendum process: he is deferring to the authority of the people. And it is the 
seventh ballot that enables him to make this argument. In contrast to earlier rulings 
on constitutional reform, the Supreme Court accepted Barco's arguments and 
upheld the Decree. In their ruling, much like Barco, the judges explained that the 
seventh ballot was evidence of the “Colombian will” (Colombian Supreme Court 
1990).  
 
In Honduras, President Zelaya's planned non-binding poll on the creation of a 
constituent assembly had equally dramatic, though unintended consequences. 
Most accounts depict the fourth ballot box poll as the trigger for the 2009 coup 
which removed Zelaya from power (Cunha Filho, Coelho and Flores 2013; Llanos 
and Marsteintredet 2010; Benjamin, 2009; Thale, 2009). Moreover, the efforts of 
Congress and other sectors of the establishment to try to prevent the fourth ballot 
box taking place suggest that this poll was something more than a pretext for the 
coup. The various public declarations of the poll's illegality from the Army, the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the two dominant political 
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parties (including Zelaya's own), and the desperate last-minute preventative bill 
drafted by Congress four days before the poll was to take place,25 all attest to the 
perceived significance of the fourth ballot box poll. We cannot know the level of 
participation that this initiative would have engaged. However, the massive 
resistance movement which has sprung up since the coup, orientated around the 
singular demand for a constituent assembly (Mendoza, 2012) suggests the poll 
would have had popular support.  
 
So, why did these non-binding referenda prompt such dramatic reactions? Why was 
the fourth ballot box perceived as so serious a threat? And how did the seventh ballot 
elicit this response from the president and the courts, when previous petitions, 
marches, and governmental efforts had failed to do so?  More generally, what features 
of these initiatives might account for the powerful reaction they provoked and the 
chain of events which followed them?  
 
Scholarly accounts of the seventh ballot offer some important insights, but leave 
various questions unanswered and ultimately provide an unsatisfactory account of 
how and why the event might have functioned to bring about significant 
constitutional change. Accounts of the seventh ballot and the constitutional process it 
triggered often focus on the level of participation in this event. Scholars describe how 
mass popular participation 'led to' the president's decision to initiate a formal 
consultation on a constituent assembly. Fox, Gallón-Giraldo, and Stetson (2010, p.470, 
emphasis added), for example, note:  
 
                                                        
25 The bill prohibited any kind of plebiscite or referendum from taking place within 180 days of a 
national election (Cunha Filho, Coelho and Flores 2013; Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). 
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The overwhelming number of affirmative votes - five million - cast in the séptima papeleta 
[the seventh ballot] led the then-president Virgilio Barco to issue a Decree, under state-of-
emergency powers, to pose the issue formally in the presidential election on May 27 1990.  
 
As Jorge Enrique   (2011, my translation, emphasis added) similarly explains:  
 
The informal count of these ballots... revealed more than two million votes in favour of the 
proposal to call a National Constituent Assembly, which led the government of Virgilio Barco 
to recognize the de facto situation created by the people themselves.  
 
And Colón-Ríos (2012, p. 92) argues that:  
 
Although not legally binding, the expression in favour of the Constituent Assembly was so 
strong that President Virgilio Barco issued a Decree ordering that, during the presidential 
elections of May 1990, voters would be formally asked whether they wished to convene a 
Constitutional Assembly…26 
 
These accounts suggest a relatively straightforward connection between popular 
support for a particular policy or government action, and the enactment of this 
policy or action. The problem with these accounts is that the relationship between 
                                                        
26  Later in this text, Colón-Ríos in fact expands on the role of the seventh ballot, suggesting it 
functioned to 'activate' the exercise of constituent power. In his account a distinction is made 
between the activation and the exercise of constituent power. The exercise of constituent power is 
understood as the institutional process through which the 'constituent will' is transformed into law, 
whilst the activation of constituent power refers to those actions or events which make such a 
process possible. Hence a more elaborate account of the seventh ballot's function is provided. 
However, when we ask how it worked to activate constituent power, there is much the same logic at 
work. Actors seeking transformation of the constitutional regime, it is explained: “attempt to create 
the climate necessary (e.g. convince other citizens that an important constitutional transformation 
is desirable) for an exercise of constituent power to take place and a new constitutional regime to 
be produced” (ibid., p.175). Hence the activation of constituent power is understood as involving 
the creation of the necessary “climate” (ibid.) for change, which is understood in terms of 
widespread popular support for the proposed change.  
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public opinion and government action is, at best, more complicated than is 
suggested here. Popular support for constitutional change in many instances has 
not and does not result in the proposed change taking place. In Colombia, there 
was ample evidence of widespread popular support for constitutional change in 
the years preceding the seventh ballot initiative. In 1987, for example, the National 
Commission for a Constituent Assembly was formed by key trade unions, NGOs 
and politicians (Fox, Gallón-Giraldo and Stetson, 2010; Instituto de Estudios para el 
Desarrollo y La Paz 2011). The students' mass March of Silence,27 and the various 
mass petitions carried out in 1989 (Torres Forero 2006), demonstrated significant 
support for a constituent assembly amongst ordinary citizens. If the seventh ballot 
is understood as no more than a demonstration of public opinion, it is difficult to 
explain why it prompted a reaction that these earlier efforts did not. Of course, this 
event might simply have been the straw that broke the camel's back: the build-up 
of pressure for constitutional change from civil society, public opinion, and the 
media is charted in most accounts of the period (Torres Forero 2006; Novoa García 
2011; Fox, Gallón-Giraldo and Stetson, 2010). Hence, the response to the seventh 
ballot might be better explained through its timing than anything intrinsic to the 
action itself. However, whilst timing is no doubt part of any explanation, it is 
important to consider whether there was indeed something particular about this 
form of action which generated effects which other actions could not.  
 
                                                        
27 After the assassination of Liberal party presidential candidate, Senator Galán, students organised a 
mass march through Bogotá in protest at escalating violence and calling for constitutional reform. 
Approximately 25,000 protestors participated. The distinctive feature was that the march was 
carried out in complete silence. The March of Silence, as it was known, marked the start of a new 
more active phase in the student movement for constitutional change (FundaciónSéptima Papeleta, 
1989).  
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There is another explanation offered in the accounts of the seventh ballot which is 
potentially helpful here. Donna Van Cott (2000, p.58) reflects: 
 
The ANC [National Constituent Assembly] would not have taken place without the 
favourable decisions of the Supreme Court on the legality of Decrees 927 and 1926.28 At the 
time, several commentators used the arguments of Rousseau and Condorcet with respect to 
the primary constitutive power of the people, which, they argued, was prior to any written 
constitution or law and, thus, could not inhabit the constitutive power of future generations 
(Buenahora 1991:149; Angarita Serrano 1994; 36). What gave force to these theoretical 
arguments was the unique fact that in the Colombian case, through the seventh ballot, the 
'autonomous and sovereign people' was not just a theoretical construct but a tangible 
political actor (Van Cott, 2000).  
 
Van Cott suggests that the seventh ballot assumed a meaning as the material 
incarnation of constituent power. The suggestion is intriguing, and provides a step 
forward. It improves on accounts which emphasise the level of participation, because 
it suggests why this event might have elicited a reaction that other mass protest 
events did not. Which is that, for whatever combination of reasons, the mass 
participation in this event assumed a somewhat different meaning as the ambiguous 
but more powerful notion of the 'constituent will'. As Colón-Ríos (2011) has 
highlighted, in contrast to much of the world, it is not unusual for courts in Latin 
America to appeal to the notion of constituent power, as an authority and force which 
survives “alongside and above” the constitution (Schmitt cited in ibid., p.365). This is 
what happened in the Colombian Supreme Court ruling on President Barco's Decree 
927. What is particularly interesting however, is how the seventh ballot functioned to 
                                                        
28 Decree 1926 was a subsequent Decree issued in August 1990, which implemented the accord that 
was reached between political parties regarding the make-up of the constituent assembly, following 
the results of the formal consultation (Méndez Morales 1990).  
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operationalise the abstract theoretical argument and in this way permit the decision 
to open Colombia's constitutional order up for transformative change.  
 
However, various questions remain. Why was this event interpreted as the 
'constituent will' where earlier protests were not? What factors or combination of 
factors helped create this meaning? What does an expression of the 'constituent will' 
even mean, when clearly some citizens opposed reform whilst others supported it?  
And what is the relationship between its status as the constituent will and the 
government and Supreme Court's decisions? Van Cott (2000) does not explain how 
the seventh ballot earned its title as an expression of the constituent will. Neither does 
she, nor do other scholars, explain precisely how this led to the decisions which were 
made by the president and the courts. If any substantive lessons are to be drawn from 
this case about the potential impact of a-legal space more generally, we would need to 
answer these questions.  
 
Drawing on the theory of a-legal space developed in chapter 2 can, I suggest, help to 
answer these questions and fill in some of the gaps in existing accounts of the seventh 
ballot and its apparently extraordinary impact. In chapter 2 I suggested that the use 
of a-legal space be explored as a way to shift the political grammar (Norval 2006; 
Hausknost 2011). More specifically, through gaining an association with both 
constituted and constituent power, a-legal initiatives have the potential to create 
tipping events which shift the grammatical structures which delimit political 
possibilities. There is reason to believe that the seventh ballot was particularly 
successful in establishing an association with both constituted and constituent power. 
Firstly, the initiative not only adopted the form of an official institutional process; 
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through audaciously using the existing elections it took place literally within and 
through the formal electoral process. In this way it maximised the potential to 
capture the hegemonic authority of constituted power. And secondly, as the 
statements of President Barco and the Supreme Court, as well as subsequent 
scholarly analyses make clear, it was widely accepted as an expression of constituent 
power.29 Indeed, the extra-ordinary actions of both the president and the Supreme 
Court can be well explained through the notion of political grammar change. After the 
seventh ballot had taken place, it appears as if the political and legal barriers to 
convocation of constituent assembly had changed. And both felt able to take actions 
that were previously untenable.  
 
These events make sense when we see the seventh ballot as a tipping event which 
shifted the political grammar, opening up new political possibilities, and closing off 
others. In this case, a formal consultation of the population regarding the creation of a 
constituent assembly had become possible and indeed, in the eyes of the Supreme 
Court, necessary, as they add:  
 
                                                        
29  I am here equating ‘expression of constituent will’ with ‘expression of constituent power’. This is in 
line with some theories of constituent power and not with others. In some accounts, popular 
uprisings and mass protests are interpreted as expressions of constituent power (e.g Negri 1999). 
In these accounts, what is understood by 'expression of constituent will' and by 'expression of 
constituent power' is interchangeable. Other scholars have understood the latter more specifically 
as the process by which the constituent will is turned into law (Colón-Ríos 2012; Dalmau and Pastor 
2010), and thereby denoting an institutional process, such as a constituent assembly. The 
‘expression’ or ‘exercise’ of constituent power is distinguished from activities which ‘activate’ the 
constituent power; the seventh ballot is an example of the latter (Colón-Ríos 2012). I suggest that 
there is a value in retaining the notion of constituent power as something which can also operate 
outside of the state. Though, like Ciccariello-Maher (2013, p.127), would seek to avoid “fetishizing” 
this idea of constituent power from below, as Negri (1999) does. In this study I am interested 
specifically in the hegemonic power associated with expressions of the ‘constituent will’. Hence the 
power gained through successfully appearing as an expression of the constituent will. This idea is 
similar to Kalyvas’s (2000, p. 343) account of ‘hegemonic sovereignty’, in which he interprets 
Schmitt’s theory of constituent power and Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as “two distinct variations 
on a single theme”. The difference here is that I am interested in the hegemonic power gained once 
a proposition, action or social movement is accepted as expressing ‘the constituent will’. So, 
constituent will and hegemony are closely related and interconnected but not one and the same.  
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To not open the way to register this will, would mean the disregard of the political event 
called the "seventh ballot", which spontaneously occurred last March 11th, as well as the 
public expressions of political parties and presidential candidates (Colombian Supreme 
Court 1990).  
 
Turning for a moment to the Honduran case: this theory is similarly useful. The 
perceived threat posed by the fourth ballot box referendum for traditional political 
elites can also be explained through this theory of a-legal space. Like the seventh 
ballot, Zelaya's poll promised to be a particularly powerful utilisation of a-legal space. 
Originating from the presidential office, it would be hard to dismiss this initiative as 
legally irrelevant, despite its non-binding status. Furthermore, its association with the 
government conferred an authority on the event, an authority normally associated 
with constituted power, despite the fact that this consultation was not legally 
recognised. Equally, one can assume that opponents feared the level of participation 
that Zelaya's national poll would generate, which might then assume the feeling of a 
mandate. The lengths taken by the Honduran political establishment to avoid this poll 
taking place, and the urgency with which they were taken, suggest there was a sense 
it would somehow change things. The theory of political grammar change through the 
use of a-legal space explains how it might have done this.  
 
Consequences for a theory of a-legal space 
 
The aim of this discussion has been to better understand what happened in the cases 
of the seventh ballot and the fourth ballot box, why they had such apparently 
extraordinary impacts, and to consider the implications for a broader theory of a-
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legal space. A number of observations can be made. Firstly: the theory of a-legal space 
as a discursive strategy to shift the political grammar can be neatly applied to these 
cases and has strong explanatory power. This supports the credibility of this theory 
as an account of the a-legal space phenomenon. Secondly, it seems that successfully 
emulating constituted power whilst also appearing as an expression of the 
constituent will is, as the theory would suggest, related to impact. The potential of a-
legal initiatives to bring about discursive change is – according to this theory - related 
to their ability to harness the hegemonic influence of both constituted and constituent 
power. The Colombian and Honduran cases support what is the logical conclusion of 
this claim: a-legal initiatives have impact where they do both well.  
 
But what factors are important in gaining acceptance as ‘the constituent will’? Earlier 
protests did not gain the same accolade as the seventh ballot did, despite mass 
participation. Interestingly, it seems that the quasi-legal, quasi-institutional format 
contributed to its acceptance as a demonstration of the ‘constituent will’, since this is 
the feature which distinguished the action from earlier protests. In other words, 
gaining acceptance as the constituent will is, paradoxically, in some way related to 
assuming the form of or successfully appropriating the appearance of constituted 
power. That constituent power creates constituted power is contained in their 
definition. But the case of the seventh ballot which was widely accepted as embodying 
the constituent will, at least in part it would seem because of its quasi-institutional, 
quasi-legal format, suggests the opposite is also true. It suggests that for an act to be 
recognised as an expression of constituent power it can help if it borrows aspects and 
symbols of the existing constituted order. Perhaps it helps that there are familiar 
already recognised legal forms, mixed in with the new proposal.  
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In the Colombian case, potentially, merging the a-legal referendum with a formal 
election was effective in helping it capture the hegemonic influence and heightened 
authority of constituted power. Hence other a-legal initiatives may want to explore 
how this innovative approach might be replicated in other contexts. In the Honduran 
case, the initiation of the a-legal referendum by the president helped it gain 
association with constituted power. Perhaps, then, a-legal initiatives organised by 
governments, or other institutional actors, have greater potential impact.  
 
A final observation concerns the relationship between constituent power and change. 
In contemporary and scholarly accounts of the seventh ballot alike, there is an 
equivocation between depictions of the event as 'an expression of the constituent 
will' and the suggestion that it created a new political reality or 'political fact'. Baez 
Vera (2011), for example, describes the “de-facto situation created by the people 
themselves”. Similarly, the Supreme Court explains that when the people vote on the 
possibility of calling a constituent assembly following Barco's decree it “will 
constitute a political fact that translates into a real mandate of equal nature” 
(Colombian Supreme Court 1990). And Fernando Carrillo (2009), the university 
professor credited with originally proposing the seventh ballot, explains that they had 
“created a supra-constitutional political fact”. The idea that an expression of the 
constituent will equates to a new 'political fact' is frequently implied in the literature 
but not elaborated on. The theory of political grammar change as a result of the 
exercise of constituent power helps to elaborate on the connection between the two. 
 
 
179 
 
3.3.3. The struggle to define (il)legality and the two 'axes of legality' 
 
An examination of the events leading up to and following the fourth ballot box 
referendum in Honduras and the seventh ballot in Colombia helps illuminate how the 
a-legal space tactic plays out in practice. One prominent feature of both episodes was 
a struggle to define the (il)legality, and relatedly, (il)legitimacy of what was taking 
place. In each case this struggle is two-dimensional, involving two different disputes 
along what might be seen as two 'axes of legality'. Moreover, similar dual struggles 
can be spotted in other instances where actors have made use of a-legal space. This is 
indicative, I will argue, of what is going on when actors attempt to use a-legal space(s) 
to create change. Of the Honduran and Colombian cases, this dual struggle to define 
(il)legality is most pronounced in Zelaya's fourth ballot box case, which I turn to first.  
 
From the outset Zelaya faced legal challenges. His initial proposal for a ‘broad popular 
consultation’ on the possibility of creating a constituent assembly was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Attorney General. The revised proposal, two months later, 
was for a ‘national poll’ was essentially the same proposal bar the name change, but a 
'national poll' could be presented within the legal framework of the existing Citizens' 
Participation Law, which recognised the right of citizens to be consulted on 
government policy (Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). However, the Honduran courts 
were unconvinced. The Court of Contentious Administration ruled that the 'national 
poll' was covered by the earlier ruling against a 'popular consultation', a decision 
which was then upheld by the Supreme Court who ruled the poll illegal (ibid.). For 
good measure, the National Congress passed an additional law, just four days before 
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the fourth ballot box poll was to take place, preventing any form of plebiscite or 
referendum from taking place within 180 days of general elections.  
 
In the face of these multiple legal challenges Zelaya pursued an interesting dual 
strategy to defend the planned poll. On the one hand he sought to downplay the 
significance of the poll, emphasising its non-binding status. Speaking to the media, 
just days before the event he explained:  
 
The poll has no binding character. That is, its results – yes or no – does not obligate the 
state to do anything. It’s a public opinion poll. It’s a poll that does not create new rights, 
does not create a new law (Zelaya cited in CNN 2009) 
 
Hence its non-binding, non-legal status was used as a defence against its alleged 
illegality. At the same time, and somewhat at odds with the first line of defence, 
Zelaya appealed to the ultimate authority and constituent power of the people in his 
statements and actions in defence of the fourth ballot box in the days leading up to the 
action. On the day that the Supreme Court returned its negative decision, Zelaya led a 
protest to the military base where ballot papers for the poll had been stored but 
which the military were now refusing to distribute. Whilst reportedly singing the 
national anthem, several hundred supporters retrieved the boxes of ballot papers, 
and at the entrance to the military base Zelaya announced to the crowd and the press:   
 
Sunday's referendum will not be stopped...We have the right to vote and the right to 
organize. The military should rectify their position in favour of the people and ignore the 
extortion of the elite (Zelaya cited in CNN 2009) 
 
181 
 
The different tactics employed here to establish the (il)legality of the planned poll 
reflect the struggles for ground along two connected but distinct 'axes of legality'. On 
the one hand, Zelaya's opponents sought to establish the poll as illegal and 
unconstitutional, and to criminalise anyone who would administer the exercise, 
whilst Zelaya sought to refute these charges and demonstrate that the poll would not 
break any laws, this was done through emphasising its non-legal, non-binding status. 
On the other hand, he sought simultaneously to demonstrate that the initiative indeed 
had a form of legality in the sense of an institutional basis (in the Citizens' 
Participation Law) whilst also asserting a more fundamental claim to legality based 
on the democratic authority of the people. So a struggle to resist criminalisation (one 
axis of legality) was accompanied by another struggle for institutionalisation (the 
other axis of legality). Significantly, tactics in one struggle did not necessarily help in 
the other. For example, Zelaya's attempts to downplay the significance of the poll, 
emphasising its non-binding, non-legal status, may have helped him contest charges 
of illegality and unconstitutionality. But they are quite at odds with his defiant 
assertion that the people have “the right to vote and the right to organise” (ibid.), and 
arguably undermined his appeal to the democratic authority of the people as grounds 
for institutionalising this exercise. It is for this reason that it is helpful to see the 
struggle to establish legality as two-dimensional.  
 
A similar struggle to establish (il)legality is evident in the Colombian seventh ballot. 
Most prominent in this case, however, was activity aimed at gaining ground on the 
axis of institutionalisation. Prior to the event the student organisers established that 
according to the electoral code, votes for an unknown candidate did indeed have to be 
counted and retained, and kept apart from the votes for registered candidates. On this 
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basis the text on the seventh ballot commenced “I vote for Colombia” (Torres Forero 
2006). This can be read as an attempt by organisers to utilise a legal loop hole to 
achieve a form (albeit ambiguous) of legal recognition. The votes for 'Colombia' 
would officially have no legal consequences. However, if they were counted and 
recorded through the institutional apparatus of the state, and classified as 'votes for 
an unknown person' – a category recognised within the existing electoral code – 
arguably, the seventh ballot might have established its status as something other and 
different to a civil society based protest. The electoral organisation, for their part, can 
be seen to have resisted these efforts towards institutionalisation. Claiming lack of 
time and organisational capacity, the organisation refused to count the votes 
submitted as part of the seventh ballot (Torres Forero 2006). However, as was 
highlighted by the fourth ballot box case, attempts to institutionalise an a-legal 
initiative can involve two kinds of approaches. A technocratic appeal to existing 
codes, regulations and other legal structures, can take place alongside a different kind 
of appeal based on the ultimate authority of the people. As is evident in the 
subsequent statements and actions of the president and the Supreme Court, the latter 
approach was successful in the case of the seventh ballot. Citing the authority of the 
seventh ballot as a reflection of the constituent will, both took the necessary steps to 
allow a binding consultation on the possibility of a constituent assembly to take place 
through the institutional apparatus of the state.  
 
Activity directed at the prohibition or criminalisation of the seventh ballot, which is to 
say activity located on the other axis of legality, is less prominent. The legal case 
against President Barco's decree was presented to the Supreme Court by citizens 
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opposed to the ruling, and is recorded in the court's final judgement.30 What is 
striking, given the centrality of the seventh ballot to Barco's decree, is the complete 
omission of references to the event by those opposing the Decree. Instead, arguments 
focus on the unconstitutionality of the proposed binding consultation, on the basis 
that it would violate various constitutional norms.31 The strategy of those who 
opposed the creation of a constituent assembly was, it would appear, to ignore the 
seventh ballot rather than attempt to criminalise it.  
 
The Honduran and Colombian case studies suggest that a struggle to define 
(il)legality is central to this tactic, and that this struggle is two-dimensional, taking 
place on two interconnected but distinct axes, towards institutionalisation on the one 
hand, and criminalisation or prohibition on the other. This is an interesting insight. 
But to what extent does it apply to the wider phenomenon of a-legal space as a tactic? 
A brief exploration of other cases is helpful here to test this claim. I suggest that 
similar two-dimensional struggles to define (il)legality can be spotted in other 
instances of a-legal space(s). To help illustrate this I provide a brief overview of two 
cases where both dimensions to this struggle are particularly evident. These include 
the first Catalan independence referendum, which took place in 2009 in the small 
town of Arenys de Munt in Catalonia and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy (both of which 
were discussed in chapter 1).  
 
                                                        
30 The existing constitution provided the right for citizens to petition the Court for and against the 
ruling (Constitution of Colombia 1886, article 214). 
31 Including article 171, which dictated the kinds of decisions which could be subject to a vote; article 
218, which stipulated the appropriate mechanism for constitutional reform; and article 13 of the 
Plebiscite of 1957, which prohibited the use of the referendum mechanism (Constitution of 
Colombia 1886).  
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The Arenys de Munt referendum on Catalan independence shares a number of 
parallels with Zelaya's fourth ballot box. This non-binding referendum was, like the 
fourth ballot box, initiated by an institutional actor. The proposal to hold a public 
“consultation” on Catalan independence was made by Popular Unity Candidates party 
in Arenys de Munt, and subsequently passed in a council motion (Govan 2009). The 
consultation was non-binding, and was to be a purely symbolic exercise. However, 
arguably it held an ambiguous legal status as a consequence of its institutional origins 
in local government. This was the perspective of the Spanish government, who 
challenged the council's planned consultation through the courts. Interestingly, in 
their defence the council took much the same approach as Zelaya in Honduras, in an 
effort to resist charges of illegality and unconstitutionality. The council argued that it 
was not a council run referendum, and that the council was merely providing the 
venue in which the event would take place (Baiget 2009). Hence, like Zelaya they 
emphasised the non-legal, unofficial status in an effort to refute charges of illegality. 
However, the Spanish court was unconvinced. The judge argued that the exercise 
would “clearly invade powers expressly reserved for the State”, and ordered the 
council to cancel the referendum (quoted in ibid.). The organisers were forced to 
relocate the event from the council building to a private social club. In the face of this 
set back, the local council can be seen to engage with the other axis of legality, with 
the town mayor announcing that the decision was “bad for democracy” and that he 
would still take part (quoted in ibid.).  
 
Another good example, in which activity directed at both axes of legality is evident, is 
the Aboriginal Tent Embassy.32 This initiative had a contested and changing legal 
                                                        
32 In 1972 aboriginal activists set up a camp on the lawn outside Parliament House, in protest at the 
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status throughout the period of its encampment on the lawn of the Australian 
Parliament in 1972. When the Embassy was originally erected the government was 
unable to order police to remove it as a result of a legal loop hole. Camping on Crown 
land without a permit was prohibited, but Aboriginal people were exempt from this 
law (Schaap and Muldoon 2012; Schaap 2008). The Australian government was 
forced to adapt a 1932 Trespass ordinance in order to legally remove the Embassy, a 
process which took the government six months during which time the Tent Embassy 
remained legally on the lawns of Parliament House. When the new ordinance was 
finally drafted in July of 1972 the police moved in and the Tent Embassy was violently 
dismantled. However, the Tent Embassy organisers challenged the legality of the new 
ordinance (Robinson 1994). And just two months later a court found that the 
government had failed to follow the correct legal process in drafting the new 
ordinance which “was not notified in accordance with the provisions of the Act” 
(Blackburn quoted in ibid.). Whilst the judge stopped short of ordering that the Tent 
Embassy be reinstated, the legality of its removal was put into question. The Embassy 
organisers wasted no time, and the following day they returned to Parliament house 
and re-erected the tents (Robinson 1994). Hence, the official legal status of the Tent 
Embassy changed in accordance with the legal and political battle between the 
government and the Embassy organisers. This reflects the struggle to define 
(il)legality on one axis. Meanwhile, however, organisers engaged in a parallel process 
directed at gaining official recognition and institutionalisation. As one organiser 
admits, the decision to call their protest an 'embassy' “started off as a joke” (Paul Coe, 
Tent Embassy organiser, quoted in Cowan, 2001). However, within days they were 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Prime Minister’s refusal to recognise their claim to land rights. The protesters set up a sign 
declaring the camp the ‘Aboriginal Tent Embassy’. The Tent Embassy remained there for a number 
of months, during which time hundreds of aboriginal and non-aboriginal supporters passed 
through and the Embassy was the subject of significant national and international news coverage. 
See chapter 1, section 1.1.6, for a fuller discussion of the case.  
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receiving international mail and held a series of press conferences, in some instances 
involving the leader of the opposition Labour party. It would appear that the space 
which was created assumed a kind of formality, which arguably was quite distinct 
from a typical protest or occupation. In the following months the Embassy received 
formal state visits from Soviet Union diplomats, a cadre from the IRA, and a 
representative from the Canadian Indian Claims Commission (Robinson 1994). In this 
way, whilst not formally recognised by other states, the Tent Embassy might be said 
to have begun in a small way to fulfil some of the functions of an Embassy.  
 
The Colombian and Honduran a-legal referenda, the Catalan independence 
referendum and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy represent just a fraction of the countless 
times in which actors have taken the a-legal approach. However, I hope to have 
provided sufficient evidence to support the claim that a struggle to establish 
(il)legality is a central feature of how this tactic plays out. And that this struggle is 
two-dimensional: involving attempts to establish legality in two different ways, or 
along two 'axes'. Organisers seek to resist criminalisation or prohibition, at the same 
time as they seek to institutionalise what they are doing; and the two are not always 
complementary.  
 
Consequences for a theory of a-legal space 
 
So, what is the significance of this observation and how does it contribute to an 
account of a-legal space? It is helpful here to revisit some aspects of the theory of a-
legal space so far developed. The theory has drawn on the different but 
complementary accounts of a-legality of Harnecker (2007) and Lindahl (2013). For 
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Harnecker (ibid.), the a-legal is the realm between the legal and the illegal, distinctive 
because no law provides for it but neither does any law prohibit it. The problem with 
this account is that behaviours can be lawful, whilst not legally sanctioned and 
institutionalised. This does not define what is distinctive about the phenomenon. 
Lindahl (2013) offers a way forward by suggesting that a-legality is a relational 
concept: a behaviour or situation is not a-legal per se, but with respect to a particular 
legal order. It resists categorisation as legal or illegal because the behaviour appears 
as if governed by another legal order. Combining the two accounts, I suggested that a-
legal initiatives question and contest the extant legal or political order, and exemplify 
and promote an alternative. And they do this through prefiguring an institutional 
structure or process of this alternative, not yet actualised other order. Following this 
theory of a-legal space, we should see a-legal initiatives such as these referenda in 
Colombia and Honduras as attempting to construct reality: they are a type of 
hegemonic struggle. The two-dimensional struggle to define (il)legality reflects the 
struggle to define reality. When organisers make efforts to institutionalise what they 
are doing they are acting on the offensive. When they are forced to deny charges of 
illegality from the courts or other critics they are back on the defensive, operating 
within the terms of the extant legal order.  
 
Observing the two-dimensional struggle to define (il)legality is helpful because it 
draws out the nature, and highlights the complexity, of the legal, political and 
discursive struggle in which organisers are engaged, when they attempt to use this 
tactic. Organisers must resist criminalisation and prohibition, at the same time as 
they try to institutionalise what they are doing. And efforts to achieve one do not 
always support the other. Attempts to resist prohibition often involve emphasising 
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the unofficial, non-legal status of the initiative, which can undermine the parallel 
objective to institutionalise what is taking place. Likewise, it would seem that the 
more successful organisers are at institutionalising the different way of doing things, 
the more of a threat they become, and hence the more opponents seek to illegalise 
what they are doing.  
 
An additional reflection which is prompted by this discussion is that a-legal space is 
no one’s end goal. For organisers, the objective is the transformation of the legal 
and/or political, democratic order: the institutionalisation of the a-legal exercise. For 
opponents, the objective is to resist the disruption brought through the a-legal 
exercise and for normality to be restored. A-legal initiatives are a tool which, where 
successful, can create a space in which a different ordering of reality is available, 
alongside the normal ordering. In this space another order can be envisioned from 
within the existing legal and political order. This is not the end goal, but a necessary 
stage in a process of transforming the existing order. This also highlights the transient 
nature of a-legal space. It does not exist de facto but must be actively created. And the 
outcome of struggles along the two axes of legality determines whether it is created 
and maintained, transformed into law, or conversely, extinguished.  
 
As a final point, it is worth noting that the criminalisation/prohibition axis is more 
prominent where institutional actors have made use of a-legal space. In the Catalan 
referendum and the fourth ballot box organisers faced formal legal challenges and 
were issued court orders to cancel the event on the grounds that they had exceeded 
their constitutional powers. This perhaps reflects the heightened threat posed by 
institutionally based a-legal initiatives.  
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3.3.5. The location of a-legal space 
 
The seventh ballot is interesting from a spatial perspective. The Colombian student 
group, like most actors who turn to the use of a-legal space(s), had no formal 
authority or jurisdiction to call a referendum. But through their creative, audacious 
use of the congressional elections, they created a space for their referendum within 
the formal electoral process. In this way the seventh ballot stands out from other 
cases of civil society-led non-binding referenda. Whilst it is standard for a-legal 
referenda to emulate the procedures of an official referendum in an effort to confer 
authority on the event, the seventh ballot went even further in taking place literally 
within and through an official election.  
 
A-legal initiatives have often been framed as an extension of existing institutions or 
official processes.33 However, in most cases, they take place in a different 
geographical and temporal location. As has been argued, these initiatives create a 
space in which social reality and the law are ordered in a somewhat different way. 
Participants, organisers and onlookers are provided an opportunity to think and 
behave in a different way, as if in accordance with a different set of rules. What the 
seventh ballot referendum shows is that a-legal space need not be geographically or 
temporally apart. Literally at the same time as citizens performed their participation 
in the existing democratic system - through voting in the Congressional, Mayoral and 
Senate elections – they were enabled to exceed their role as citizens in a 
representative democratic system and participate in this other unauthorised ballot. 
                                                        
33 As one example, the Tokyo based Women's International War Crimes Tribunal which addressed the 
human rights abuses of women subjected to sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World 
War II was framed as “a derivative of” the post war Tokyo Trial, and intended to continue the work 
of this official trial (Chinkin 2006, p. 16). 
 
190 
 
The particular subjective experience, amongst other effects, of the blurring of legal 
and a-legal spaces is one issue worth considering. More generally the case contributes 
to an account of a-legal spaces and the kinds of sites where they may be created.  
 
3.3.6. The use of a-legal space by constituted power 
 
In other parts of the world, the a-legal tactic has sometimes also been employed by 
actors within constituted power.  For example, the first (non-binding) Catalan 
independence referendum in 2009 was initiated by a local council in Catalalonia 
(Baiget 2009) and the UK's Police Monitoring Unit was an initiative of Manchester City 
council. However, in the vast majority of cases, outside of Latin America this tactic is 
employed by actors without formal power, within civil society. In contrast, President 
Zelaya's attempted fourth ballot box referendum, the Ecuadorian Government’s Public 
Debt Audit Commission, and the Bolivian Government's support for a World 
Referendum on Climate Change, are examples of the tactic's relatively frequent 
application by constituted power in Latin America. Therefore, the fourth ballot box 
initiative is an important case to explore and hopefully better understand a broader 
phenomenon: the use of a-legal space(s) by state-based actors in Latin America. Key 
questions include: when do governments turn to this type of space? What are the 
distinguishing features of government initiated a-legal space(s)? What factors 
influence the success of this tactic when employed by governments, or other 
institutional actors? I consider what the case of the fourth ballot box can tell us about 
each.  
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On the basis of Zelaya's fourth ballot box, it would seem that governments adopt this 
tactic in much the same context as non-state actors. President Zelaya was forced to 
take an a-legal approach - with his 'national poll' - despite his position as president 
because he faced opposition within Congress, the Supreme Court and other centres of 
constituted power. As Llanos and Marsteintredet (2010) point out, Zelaya had 
initially intended to draft a bill which would force a referendum on the convocation of 
a constituent assembly. Yet his diminished support in Congress meant he could not 
count on a legislative majority. As an alternative, Zelaya announced the 'broad 
popular consultation' on a constituent assembly, and later the 'national poll', to take 
place by presidential decree. The approach enabled him to bypass Congress and 
create an exercise which, though non-binding, would appear much like and be 
experienced much like a referendum. Hence the exercise can be seen as an attempt to 
create an opening for constitutional change, where routes through the formal 
channels were closed off. Just as social movements, NGOs and other civil society 
groups pushing for radical change can find formal political or legal channels closed 
off, so too can actors based within constituted power. And in such scenarios the use of 
a-legal space(s) can offer one way forward.  
 
This argument, that governments (or other institutional actors) turn to the use of a-
legal space in an attempt to create an opening for legal or constitutional change, 
where routes through the formal channels are closed, can be extended to other cases 
in Latin America. The Ecuadorian Government’s Public Debt Audit Commission carried 
out an audit of Ecuador's foreign debt, much of which was accrued during the period 
of authoritarian rule. It was initiated in the absence of formal legal mechanisms 
through which Ecuador could contest the legality and legitimacy of its foreign debts. 
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Hence, just like with the fourth ballot box poll, in the absence or closure of formal 
channels, the government turned to this new and as yet unrecognised mechanism, in 
an attempt to shift the political situation and the existing constituted order at the 
international level.  
 
One distinguishing feature of a-legal space(s) initiated by governments or other 
institutional actors has already been touched upon. These initiatives, it would seem 
(admittedly, on the basis of only a limited sample) are more commonly subject to 
legal challenges. The institutional response to a-legal referenda, peoples' tribunals or 
other initiatives organised by civil society is usually to ignore them. Where an a-legal 
initiative is initiated by a government or council, this is less so the case: perhaps 
because it is more difficult to ignore them. As was suggested in the previous sub-
section, activity directed at the axis of criminalisation/prohibition is more prominent 
than in a-legal spaces which are entirely extra-institutional. There are no doubt other 
interesting features which distinguish this important sub-section of a-legal activity. 
An analysis of more initiatives of this form would be needed to explore this fully.  
 
What about the success of these initiatives? What factors influence the successful use 
of a-legal space by institutional actors? The failed fourth ballot box initiative is 
instructive here also. Some accounts suggest that Zelaya might have been successfully 
returned to power had the popular resistance against the coup happened sooner, and 
been better organised (Cunha Filho, Coelho and Flores 2013). Zelaya lacked strong 
connections or support amongst the main Honduran social movements, whilst in 
power (ibid.). Even in the last days before the coup, when the very public legal and 
political battle over the fourth ballot box had reached its peak, there were limited 
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public displays of support from civil society (ibid.). This made it easier for opponents 
to depict the fourth ballot box as little more than a power grab by Zelaya, seeking to 
use a constituent assembly to remove limitations on term limits. And meant there was 
limited resistance to the coup until after it had taken place. Hence, it seems that 
whilst initiated by actors within constituted power, these initiatives depend heavily 
on the role of constituent power to be successful.  
 
This is interesting to consider in relation to wider debates on contemporary Latin 
American politics. Firstly, the case highlights the heterogeneous nature of constituted 
power. That there is an inherent tension between social movements and the state; 
constituent and constituted power, is recognised in most analyses of contemporary 
Latin American politics (Lander and Maya 2007; Schiller 2011). Negotiation of this 
tension, in such a way that the new ideas and values of social movements can be 
institutionalised, and spaces created for their ongoing contribution to governance, yet 
without eliminating their autonomy, ability to critique and dissent, is often 
considered the central challenge for new governments in power in the region (ibid.). 
However, instances where actors within constituted power have made use of a-legal 
space highlight the centrality of struggles between different sections of constituted 
power, for example between a new left-wing executive branch of government, and 
other centres of power within the state. This also highlights the centrality of struggles 
between constituted power at the national and international levels. Moreover, 
instances where Latin American governments have turned to the use of a-legal spaces 
offer one way to explore how states and social movements have worked together (or 
failed to do so, as with the fourth ballot box case) to transform the constituted order 
at the national level, or at the international level.  
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3.4. The significance of a-legal space for research into new Latin 
American constitutionalism 
 
In this section I show how understanding a-legal space as part of a broader 
constitutional process and struggle promises to enrich existing debates on processes 
of constitutional change in contemporary Latin America. There are two ways in which 
it does this. Firstly, in these spaces actors explore radical institutional reforms, away 
from the pressures and constraints which delimit political possibilities within formal 
politics. Therefore, a focus on what takes place in these spaces could contribute to our 
understanding of the potential and the limitations of new constitutionalism as a 
strategy for transformative change. Secondly, a focus on these initiatives promises to 
help expand the conceptual framework through which scholars assess these 
processes. Generally, scholarly assessments of real world constituent assembly 
processes, and the criteria advocated as important to enable the expression of 
constituent power, are shaped by the participatory democratic framework. As 
Dinerstein and Ferrero (2012) have highlighted, this framework fails to capture all 
activities which are important to democracy. A focus on the use of a-legal spaces, in 
addition to what happens within formal constituent assemblies, necessitates a 
broader conceptual framework which will contribute to this gap in the literature. I 
expand on each argument in turn.  
 
3.4.1. The potential and the limitations of new Latin American 
constitutionalism 
 
A central debate within contemporary radical scholarship on Latin America concerns 
the potential and the limitations of the constitutional strategy as a route to 
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substantive and transformative change. I will briefly summarise the debate, before 
considering the contribution of a-legal space to this literature. Critics suggest that 
hope placed in new constitutions to 're-found' the nation and thereby transform 
society and the state is misguided. Two main arguments are made: firstly, that too 
much hope is invested in what is “primarily a legal document”, whilst existing social 
and economic relations remain unchanged (Mendoza 2012). As Mendoza (ibid.) puts 
it: “you can't decree social change”. Secondly, the argument is that the constitutional 
form does not provide a blank slate to 're-found' nations, but tends towards the 
recreation of past oppressive structures and patterns. Pointing to the historical use of 
law and constitutionalism to support colonialism, capitalism and social exclusion, 
Mendoza (ibid.) wonders: “can the masters' tools dismantle the masters' house 
(Lorde, 1984)?”34 In the Honduran context in particular, she notes, the (current) 
constitution and law have been central tools in the legitimation of the 2009 coup. 
 
In contrast, proponents of this approach argue that it is indeed a route to meaningful 
change. Walsh (2012), for example, asserts that:  
 
for those of us involved in Latin America in the present processes of socio-political 
transformation, the role of State, constitutions and law in helping to push social justice and 
build a radically distinct society cannot be denied.    
 
Whilst it is agreed (by some) that 'you can't decree social change', this is to 
misunderstand the constitutionalist strategy in Latin America today. As Walsh (2012) 
explains:  
                                                        
34 As Mendoza (2012) points out, even constitutions which were written as part of an emancipatory 
process have been used to inscribe new and old forms of social exclusion, such as the US 
constitution which excluded blacks and women.  
196 
 
 
a Constituent Assembly... does not just write a new Charter but, in the process, contributes 
to and is part of the developing consciousness and transformation.  Here the Constitution is 
not just a product; it is a medium and tool for change (Walsh, 2012).  
 
Hence, it is argued that the creation of new national constitutions is valuable as much 
for the collective process it enables as for the legal document which is created. 
Moreover, it is possible to transcend the colonial, neoliberal and oppressive 
constitutional structures of the past and constitute a radically different constitutional 
order. Contrasting the Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly process of 2008 with the 
earlier Ecuadorian Assembly process of 1997 to 1998, and the Colombian Constituent 
Assembly process of 1990, Walsh (2012) distinguishes between different phases in 
the Latin American constitutional project. These earlier episodes, she agrees, indeed 
failed to re-structure the state so as to move beyond “the multicultural logic of 
transnational global capitalism” (ibid.). 
 
The Colombian constitutional process of 1990 and the Ecuadorian Assembly of the 
late 1990s, sometimes referred to as 'multicultural constitutionalism', put much 
emphasis on the inclusion of traditionally excluded groups, such as indigenous and 
afro-descendant peoples, within the constituent assembly process. However, this 
nominal inclusion was not accompanied by any real commitment to engage with new 
demands or different ways of thinking: “such politics and reforms did not take 
seriously social movement demands, nor did they portend to push structural change” 
(ibid.). In this way, the inclusion of new groups in a constituent assembly process: 
“instead of altering, strengthened the structures and systems of power” (ibid.). 
However, in “deep contrast” argues Walsh (ibid.), the 2008 Ecuadorian Constituent 
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Assembly process and Constitution reflect a different phenomenon. The aim here has 
been “not to simply 'include' that which historically has been subjugated, denied and 
negated, but instead to 'think with' these subjects, knowledges, and cosmic or life-
visions” (Walsh 2012). Radically different and counter-hegemonic concepts such as 
the Pachamama35 and 'buen vivir'36 are identified as the “philosophical and 
orientating force of the new social project”, notes Walsh. In addition, the 
constitutional recognition of the Rights of Nature and of ancestral knowledge as also 
'scientific', are examples of advances which involve a fundamental shift from the old 
constitutional order. Hence, in contrast to the pessimistic projections of Mendoza 
(2012), it is argued that constitutionalism can indeed be re-claimed and used as a tool 
for the radical transformation of the social world.  
 
However, despite the appeal of this argument and Walsh's persuasive defence of 
Ecuador's ambitious constitutional project, there is good reason to question the real 
achievements of new constitutionalism in Latin America. As both Walsh (2012) and 
Mendoza (2012) acknowledge, in both Bolivia and Ecuador laudable new 
constitutional visions have in many ways not reflected the lived reality. In both 
countries, governments have systematically violated new constitutional rights and 
principles. In Ecuador, as just one example, several months after the ratification of the 
constitution in 2008, the government's new Mining Law granted companies freedom 
to prospect without community permission and without community consultation 
until after concessions have been granted. This directly violated the rights to 
                                                        
35 'Mother Earth' in Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous languages.  
36 The Spanish term ‘buen vivir’ or 'vivir bien' emerged in in the late twentieth century to refer to a 
concept central to Andean indigenous cultures and philosophies. The original indigenous language 
terms ('sumaq qamaña' in Aymara and 'sumak kawsay' in Quechua) have no direct translation, but 
have been variously interpreted as 'plentiful life', 'to know how to live', 'the good life', 'the sweet 
life', 'living well', 'harmonious life', and 'sublime life' (Systemic Alternatives 2015).  
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community consultation and community participation in decision making.37 The law 
also criminalised attempts to disrupt mining activities, in addition to posing a threat 
to the Rights of Nature (Walsh 2012). In Bolivia, a similar Mining Law was passed by 
the Morales administration, which is equally considered to undermine Human and 
Mother Earth rights (Peralta 2014).38 The ongoing TIPNIS conflict is perhaps the best 
exemplification of the broader phenomenon. In 2011 the government announced 
plans for a motorway to be built through the 1.2 million hectare indigenous territory 
and national park, TIPNIS (Parque Nacional y Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional 
Isiboro Secure ). The new road would connect the Amazonian region in the south with 
the Andes in the north and, so Morales argued, was essential for 'development' of the 
region, and Bolivian economic prosperity more generally. The majority of the 
indigenous communities based within the TIPNIS strongly opposed the road, fearing 
it would lead to destruction of the forest and aid the incursion of illegal loggers into 
the region.39 The government had failed to seek the “free, prior, and informed 
consent” of indigenous residents prior to signing the contract for construction of the 
highway, violating the Constitutional Right to Previous Consultation (Achtenberg 
2011). In September 2011 the indigenous march against the TIPNIS highway was 
brutally repressed by the police, resulting in 45 protesters injured and the death of a 
baby (Achtenberg 2011; Thornton 2013). The conflict resulted in the division of the 
Pact of Unity, the coalition of Bolivia's five main social movements which formed in 
2005 and was instrumental in bringing the MAS government to power. The two 
                                                        
37 Stipulated in articles 57.7 and 395.3 of the Constitution, respectively 
38 The Mining Law is described by Mama Nilda Rojas, leader of CONAMAQ, one of the country’s main 
indigenous social movements as: “a murderous and terrible law which puts human rights below the 
rights of miners” (cited in Peralta 2014).  
39 Fears which were well founded, according to a study conducted by Bolivia's Nature Foundation, 
which suggested the park would be reduced by 64% within 18 years.  
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indigenous social movements have left the Pact and come out against the MAS 
government (Peralta 2014).  
 
For some, the TIPNIS conflict exemplifies the 'neo-extractivist' economic model of the 
Morales administration (Webber 2015; Gudynas 2012; Walsh 2012). As Webber 
(2015, p. 320) reflects:  
 
Similar to the period normally described as ‘neoliberal’, massive multinational corporations 
are deeply implicated in the extension of extraction at the heart of this primary-commodity-
led growth everywhere in the region. Those cases in which centre-left regimes have entered 
into joint contracts between state-owned enterprises and multinationals, and negotiated 
relatively higher royalties and taxes on these extractive activities, are no exception.  
 
Within this model, states maintain their legitimacy through “modest redistribution”, 
for example through cash-transfer schemes to the very poor, but “without touching 
the underlying class structure of society” (ibid.).40 As Webber (2015, p.320) adds:  
 
Indeed, the very reproduction of these political economies depends upon states prioritising 
the maintenance and security of private property rights and juridical environments in 
which multinationals can profit. 
 
Whilst Webber's appraisal of the MAS government's social achievements (which 
include massive reductions in extreme poverty and child malnutrition, amongst 
others41) seems somewhat dismissive, his broader point is persuasive in light of the 
                                                        
40  Eduardo Gudynas has coined the term 'compensatory states' to capture this dynamic (2012) 
41 Public spending increased by 750 percent between 2005 and 2014; chronic child malnutrition in 
under threes reduced from 41.7 percent in 1989 to 18.5 percent in 2012; and extreme poverty 
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TIPNIS conflict and the Ecuadorian Mining Law.42 Hence it seems that the 
governments of Bolivia and Ecuador follow a political and economic logic in some 
ways completely at odds with their idealistic constitutions. Walsh (2012) agrees, 
noting that in both countries, “the State, despite its 'progressive' stature, defies the 
Constitution and denigrates its process and goals”.  
 
The lived realities in Bolivia and Ecuador provide empirical support for both 
arguments against the potential of new Latin American constitutionalism. The 
promulgation of laws such as Ecuadorian and Bolivian Mining Laws illustrates how an 
extractivist logic, apparently so at odds with these countries’ constitutions, has 
continued to shape and find support in the law. Equally, the repeated violation of 
constitutional rights by the governments of both countries, including the right to 
previous consultation; the rights of Nature; and the right to protest, amongst others, 
supports Mendoza's objection that “you can't decree social change” (2012). It is clear 
that the prevailing economic model, based on environmentally and socially 
devastating extractive industries, has continued unabated, often in patent violation of 
the new constitution.  
 
The use of a-legal space is a potentially crucial strategy in this context. And a 
scholarly sensitivity to this type of activity will enable a deeper debate on the 
potential and the limitations of the new constitutionalist strategy. A-legal spaces such 
as citizens' debt audits, peoples' tribunals on corporate power or climate justice, or 
referenda on the rights of mother earth, are just some examples where citizens have 
                                                                                                                                                                        
reduced from 38.2 percent in 2005 to 21.6 percent in 2012 (Singham 2014).   
42 A more sympathetic account describes the model as 'social extractivism' (Fabricant and Gustafson 
2015). 
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attempted to rethink institutions and laws which will mark a break with the past. Also 
the a-legal status creates a space free from the pressures inherent in any state-based 
process, where alternative ways of thinking have greater potential to develop and 
thrive. Through an examination of the discourses and concrete proposals which 
emerge from these spaces it will be easier to assess the inherent limitations – or lack 
thereof – to the constitutional and legal form. It will be possible to assess whether 
setbacks within the constitutional projects of Bolivia and Ecuador should be 
attributed to the intense pressures on states from capital and other powerful groups, 
or something more insidious, inherent to the use of law and the constitutional form in 
these contexts.  
 
Advocates of left governments' constitutional strategy, such as Walsh (2012), have 
suggested that the “constitution is not just a product; it is a medium and tool for 
change”, which contributes to “developing consciousness and transformation”. Walsh 
does not elaborate on the mechanism by which it does this but it seems that the 
creation of a public space, which endures over a period of time, with the remit to 
reflect on and debate the structure of society and the State, must be part of the 
picture. She adds: the Constitution may “give process, substance, and hope to 
transformation” (ibid.). However, events in Bolivia and Ecuador suggest the 
constitutional strategy has, so far, failed to achieve the radical changes that were 
promised. For Walsh (ibid.), the problem is rooted in the consolidation of power with 
the State, and limited real influence of communities. In both Bolivia and Ecuador, she 
argues:  
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There is not a new configuration of power or a critical revision of the models of thinking 
and exercising power... Rather there is a consolidation of power that, in essence, reifies the 
State. It is the State that has the final say; participation of social sectors and community 
consultation are tokens in this regard.43 
 
So, whilst on the one hand, the Constitution may “give process, substance, and hope to 
transformation”, on the other hand, the “government and/as State can co-opt, signify, 
and define politics, law, and even change on its own terms” (ibid.). The value of a-legal 
space(s), in such a context, can be to provide a discursive challenge to co-optation. 
Functioning as a form of subaltern counter-public (Fraser 1990), organisers and 
participants in such spaces elaborate the legal and technical details of aspects of an 
alternative legal and/or political order.  
 
In an extended essay on the contemporary politics of Latin America, Arturo 
Escobar (2010, p.1) reflected on the relative significance of political developments 
in formal and informal politics. He observed that:  
 
Whereas at the level of the states the transformations do not seem to venture beyond 
alternative forms of modernization, the discourses and strategies of some social 
movements suggest radical possibilities towards post-liberal, post-developmentalist, and 
post-capitalist social forms. 
 
A-legal space(s) are where these “radical possibilities towards post-liberal, post 
developmentalist, and post-capitalist social forms” (ibid.) are explored in an 
                                                        
43 Research into the Morales government’s adherence to the Right to Community Consultation on 
mining and other development projects supports this claim. CEJIS (2010) have documented the 
systematic violation of constitutional rights to community consultation and the procedures around 
community consultation.  
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institutional language. Organisers do not reject the state and the law as “colonial-
predator” institutions – as Mendoza (2012) appears to advocate - but attempt to re-
think both.  
 
3.4.2. An expanded conceptual framework for exploring processes of 
constitutional change in Latin America  
 
A focus on the use of a-legal spaces, as part of a wider constitutional process 
through which states are transformed, can enrich contemporary research on the 
constitutional process. The constitutional process is most commonly interpreted in 
narrower terms as involving the selection, deliberation and decision-making of the 
constituent assembly. However, much empirical research into real world 
constituent assemblies is located within a participatory democratic paradigm 
which fails to capture all factors which affect the democratic quality of the event. A 
broader lens, which considers these extra-institutional initiatives as also part of 
the constitutional process could help address this problem.  
 
The radical processes of constitutional reform which have taken place in Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Bolivia have been the subject of much scrutiny. Scholars have sought to 
assess the democratic quality of these exercises, as well as to suggest improvements 
for future constitution (re)writing episodes. Commonly, scholars have turned to the 
criteria emphasised in the participatory democratic literature as a measure of 
democratic quality. Cameron (2009, p.342), for example, argues that constitutional 
reform by the new Latin American left must be subject to “tough questions”:  
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… was the constitutional assembly truly sovereign, or was it an instrument of the executive? 
Did it limit itself to writing the constitution, or did it also pass ordinary legislation? Were 
the procedures for writing the constitution truly deliberative? Did the assembly reflect the 
plurality of the nation? 
 
Similarly, Cameron and Sharpe (2010, p.101) observe that some see “constitutional 
reform as a matter of inclusion of voices that have been silenced from time 
immemorial, and of creating a more participatory democracy”, to which there is an 
“important truth”. And in a similar vein, Colón-Ríos (2012, p.154) emphasises the 
importance of two “basic principles” in a constitutional regime. These include 
'popular participation' and 'democratic openness'. The first requires that the 
constituent assembly be as inclusive as possible and that there are as many 
opportunities as possible for wider society to engage with and feed into the 
constituent assembly process. The second principle of democratic openness 
requires that the constitution remains open to future change. But this too is 
conceived in purely participatory democratic terms: the solution is that 
constitutional mechanisms exist which enable ordinary people to institute such 
changes, (such as a mechanism for triggering a referendum on a constituent 
assembly if a certain number of signatures are collected) (ibid.).  
 
Common to these analyses is (in varying degrees) an emphasis on participation 
and inclusion, equal participation of delegates and genuine decision-making 
autonomy, the absence of executive influence, and access and transparency for 
those outside of the constituent assembly process. Scholars are seeking, it would 
seem, a setting which as far as possible approximates an 'ideal speech situation' 
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(Habermas 1970) wherein delegates can best deliberate the contents of the new 
national constitution.  
 
These criteria are, clearly, fundamental to the democratic quality of the 
constitutional process. However, they are not the only criteria to consider. From 
the radical democratic perspective, the participatory model has significant 
limitations which point to the inadequacy of this framework to critique a 
constituent assembly process.44 One central objection is to the participatory 
model's inadequate consideration of the workings of hegemony. Emphases on 
participation, inclusion, equal opportunity to contribute, and so on, within the 
participatory account suggest that such measures can achieve a level playing field. 
And the process by which delegates arrive at a final draft constitution can 
approximate a battle of ideas. The model rests on a faith in ordinary peoples' 
abilities to process complex information, engage in rational deliberation, and 
eventually, ideally, arrive at consensus, and the resultant draft constitution has 
legitimacy because of the quality of the deliberative process. Despite the appeal of 
this model, it is hard to deny that something is missing. From the radical 
democratic perspective, this account ignores the influence of hegemony on the 
process through which delegates develop a new constitution.  
 
The following imaginary scenario can help to illustrate this. In this scenario, the 
British government have agreed to establish a Constitutional Convention; as has 
                                                        
44 It is worth noting that these objections are in reality to the deliberative democratic framework on 
which accounts of participatory democracy are commonly based. Participatory democracy could be 
understood through a radical democratic framework, (for example through a focus on the creation 
of new subjectivities through engagement in participatory democratic processes). However, this 
remains a notable gap in the literature. Hence, unless stated otherwise 'participatory democracy' 
can be understood to refer to this approach in its deliberative democratic incarnation.  
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been called for by sectors of UK civil society.45 The remit of a Constitutional 
Convention, much like a Constituent Assembly, is to debate the contents of a new 
national constitution. In this scenario, the British Constitutional Convention has 
been given complete freedom and the authority to develop a codified constitution, 
which will then be put to the public in a national referendum to ratify, or 
alternatively to reject. Delegates to the Convention include representatives of civil 
society and some politicians, but the majority are ordinary members of the public, 
selected by lots. There are equal numbers of women and men, and representatives 
for each political party. They will have an extended period of time, around two 
years, to receive input from the wider population and debate the contents of the 
new constitution.46  
 
Now, according to the theory of constituent power, which is the theoretical and 
philosophical basis to the constituent assembly or constitutional convention process, 
'the people' must be able to draw up any kind of constitution they want. If it is 
decided, for example, that the stability of the earth's ecosystems must be protected 
for the safety of current and future generations, and for their intrinsic value, 
delegates of the Constitutional Convention might decide to enshrine the Rights of 
Nature in the constitution.47 Equally, the delegates might decide to facilitate tighter 
regulation of capital and create new institutions to support the development of 
alternatives to capitalist modes of production. Or they might decide to re-think the 
criminal justice system and abolish prisons. Alternatively, (or additionally), delegates 
                                                        
45 Sectors of UK civil society have recently starting calling for a constitutional convention process (c.f. 
Barnett, 2015; Hind, 2015), and proposals for one were contained in the 2015 General Election 
manifestos of the Green Party, as well as (albeit in a limited form) the Labour and Liberal Democrat 
Parties (White 2015).  
46 This is roughly the model which has been suggested by advocates of a Constitutional Convention for 
the UK, which is similar to the recent Irish Constitutional Convention (White, 2015; Hind, 2015).  
47 As the Ecuadorian people have done in their 2009 constitution.  
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can decide to limit civil liberty protections to better enable anti-terrorism activity by 
the state; or they can prioritise the free movement of capital through de-regulation. 
More generally, they can choose to radically rethink the existing components of the 
UK's un-codified constitution. Or they can take a more conservative path, and 
approach constitution-writing as an exercise in formalising the ideas and practices 
contained in the various statutes, treaties and legal rulings currently taken to 
comprise a British Constitution. As Colón-Ríos (2012, p. 2) points out, constitutions 
include substantive choices. Contrary to the claims of some traditional 
constitutionalists, which would seek to naturalise the contents of liberal 
constitutions, constitutions include provisions which “organize the structure of the 
state… establish or facilitate certain forms of economic (de)regulation, or… limit the 
duties of government towards citizens.” 
 
However, whilst the delegates of the Convention are formally free to take any path, 
some scenarios seem far more probable than others. That delegates in contemporary 
Britain will decide to enshrine the Rights of Nature, lay the foundations for a post-
capitalist state or abolish prisons seems unlikely. And if they did, the ratification of 
such a constitution by the British public seems less likely still. Within the deliberative 
account, so long as delegates have considered these proposals with access to 
adequate information, the process is democratic. There are two interconnected 
problems with this account. Firstly, competing proposals for the new British 
constitution will in some instances reflect incommensurate discourses, in which the 
world is made sense of in entirely different ways. The deliberative model cannot 
account for how delegates choose between incommensurate ideas. Secondly, the 
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deliberative model cannot account for the structural barriers to proposals for Earth 
Rights or other radical or marginal ideas getting into the new constitution.  
 
What is needed is a more sophisticated theory of how the delegates make sense of the 
world, which can recognise the invisible structures that shape political possibilities 
and how these impact on democracy. In their critique of the participatory paradigm in 
the context of Latin America, Dinerstein and Ferrero (2012) advocate a turn to radical 
democracy to better address these concerns. However, in concrete terms, for scholars 
critiquing constituent assembly processes, it is less obvious what they should do 
differently. The kinds of qualities which are important within a radical democratic 
framework are less tangible and easy to measure than those of the deliberative 
democrat. Norval (2009, p.308), for example, has advocated an “attentiveness to the 
possibility of 'deprivation of voice'” to supplement the concern for inclusion within 
deliberative accounts. But how exactly one assesses the presence or absence of this 
quality within a given constituent assembly process is not obvious.  
 
This challenge is well illustrated in Walsh's (2012) account of the Ecuadorian 
Constituent Assembly process, which she argues went beyond nominal inclusion of 
traditionally marginalised groups, to “instead... 'think with' these subjects, 
knowledges, and cosmic or life-visions”. It is claimed that “in its organization and 
practice, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Assembly worked pedagogically to engender, 
enable, and push this “thinking with”” (ibid.). Interestingly, however, in accounting 
for its success she does not go much beyond the deliberative democratic ideal: 
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The popularly-elected Assembly women and men did not represent political parties but 
social and political movements and varied social sectors and regions of the country. Most 
were new to the political arena, were of a younger generation, and were there to contribute 
to the learning, thinking, and debate entailed in the shaping and making of the Constitution. 
Organization was through thematic mesas that endeavoured to study the issues of concern 
with readings, discussions and debates, and invited presentations. Only with consensus and 
profound understanding did these mesas then propose to the plenary the articles for 
consideration (ibid.).  
 
Key criteria, it seems, were the inclusion of representatives from different social 
movements, social sectors and geographical regions; the absence of political party 
influence; a spirit of openness among delegates; and that delegates had the time 
and space to reflect deeply on the issues at hand before developing proposals. So 
whilst Walsh emphasises the importance that a constituent assembly not only 
includes but 'thinks-with' subjugated groups, the specific criteria she lists as 
important are much the same as the deliberative democrat's. It seems that 
something is missing. Walsh, who herself was closely involved with the Ecuadorian 
process,48 concludes that she “can attest to the socio-political, epistemic, and 
pedagogical significance of this practice and process” (ibid.). My intention is not to 
challenge this claim, but rather suggest that something is missing from her account 
of what enabled the epistemic and socio-political shift she describes. It seems that 
accounting for the conditions which enable the emergence of new voices, claims 
and ways of thinking is difficult and elusive.  
 
                                                        
48  As an invitee and as an “unofficial advisor” to an Afro-Ecuadorian Assembly woman (Walsh 2012). 
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The problem, I suggest, lies with the limited focus on the constituent assembly as 
encompassing the struggle for constitutional change and the process by which 
constitutional change comes about. As Illan Rua Wall (forthcoming, p.13) reflects 
in a discussion of new Latin American constitutionalism:  
 
the danger of taking constituent power [as operating only] within the state structure is that 
'participation' with the new constitutional structures is taken to be the full expression of 
constituent power... if constituent power is understood to be entirely within the system, 
when radical dissensus is expressed, it will be rejected absolutely, with the same violence 
that was meted out under the previous constitutional regime. 
 
Violent repression of indigenous protests by both the Morales and Correa 
administrations in recent years supports this claim. It is here that the value of a 
focus on a-legal space(s) can be appreciated. In most cases these initiatives emerge 
from social movements and informal political settings. And in all cases they make 
demands for institutional change which could not be addressed within the formal 
system. In this way, they reveal the invisible constraints on democratic openness, 
in a given constitutional regime. They widen the discursive space and concretely 
they provide a point of comparison, with which the formal constituent assembly 
process can be compared, in order to explore which voices and ideas might have 
been shut out.  
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3.5. Conclusions 
 
I have argued that the emergence of peoples’ tribunals, non-binding citizen-led 
referenda, unofficial commissions and debt audits, and other forms of a-legal space, 
particularly over the last two decades, reflects the embrace of constitutionalism on 
the part of civil society, social movements and left governments in Latin America. 
More specifically, these initiatives are a response to closure in the constitutional 
order, where formal legal and political channels have been exhausted. Whilst lacking 
law-making authority, a-legal initiatives create spaces in which political demands can 
be constructed as the ‘constituent will’. Where they are successful in this construction 
they can sometimes shift the range of political and legal possibilities available, as in 
the case of the Colombian students’ seventh ballot, opening up the constituted order 
to transformative change.  
 
Understanding these spaces as part of the broader constitutional process and struggle 
can contribute to theories and debates on new Latin American constitutionalism. 
Particularly, it can build on Colón-Ríos’ (2012) account of the need for ‘democratic 
openness’ as one of two basic principles within a democratic constitutional theory. As 
was highlighted through considering the possibility of a British Constitutional 
Convention, barriers to constitutional change comprise more than material or legal 
obstacles. Expanding our conception of the constitutional process to include these 
extra-institutional and semi-institutional spaces can help identify the invisible 
barriers constraining democratic openness.  
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In the subsequent two chapters I turn to a discussion of these issues in relation to the 
final two case studies: the unofficial referendum on Venezuelan President Carlos 
Andrés Perez, organised by the Radical Cause party and the International Tribunal on 
Climate Justice, organised in 2009 by Bolivian civil society.  
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Chapter 4: The Radical Cause party's referendum on 
the rule of Carlos Andrés Pérez, Venezuela, 1992 
 
In the midst of a profound social and political crisis, the Radical Cause, then a 
marginal political party with only three representatives in the Venezuelan 
parliament, announced there would be a referendum on the continued rule of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez. Up to half a million people are cited as participating, with nearly ninety 
percent voting that 'no' they did not support his continued rule (Harnecker 2007). 
This unofficial referendum was the original inspiration for Harnecker's (ibid., p. 111) 
notion of a-legal space, who argued that it “helped to create a political situation in 
favour of the president's resignation”. In this chapter I explore this case and what it 
might tell us about the broader phenomenon of a-legal space. Drawing on interviews 
with individuals who organised the referendum and participated in the event and 
other commentators from the period, in addition to documentary data including 
newspaper coverage and publicity materials, I explore what took place, and how it 
has been understood by those involved. In sections 4.1 and 4.2 I provide an account of 
the referendum as an historical event. I discuss the political and social context in 
which it took place, what happened on the day of the referendum, and its impact and 
legacy. In 4.3 I discuss the objectives of organisers and other participants. Taking a 
discourse analytical approach, I explore how organisers depict what they were 
hoping to achieve and how they expected the referendum to help their project. In 4.4 I 
consider the implications for a general theory of a-legal space as a strategy for 
political change.  
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4.1 An account of the case 
 
4.1.1. Early 1990s Venezuela: the social and political context  
 
In December 1988 Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected for his second time as president 
of Venezuela. He won with a 53% share of the vote and his party, Democratic Action 
(Acción Democrática, AD), gained a strong majority in both the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies.1 Venezuelans were said to be hoping for a return to the 
prosperous boom years of his first presidency a decade earlier, during which 
unparalleled oil revenues were funnelled into social, health and education 
programmes and a series of ambitious mega-projects for industrialisation (Bridges 
1988).2 However, during what has been described as “the most dramatic presidential 
term since the establishment of democracy in 1958” (Lalander 2010, p. 129), the 
economic situation would decline, contributing to a severe economic, social and 
political crisis, culminating in the impeachment and imprisonment of Pérez, and the 
first and only time in Venezuelan democracy in which a president has been removed 
from office before the end of his term. The unofficial referendum on the presidency of 
Pérez organised by the Radical Cause party which took place in June 1992 - less than a 
year before Pérez would be forced out of office - should be understood as a reaction 
to, and an attempt to capitalise on, the political and social crisis. There are several key 
events and wider trends which are central to an account of the context in which this 
                                                        
1    The Venezuelan political system at this time consisted of the Executive and Congress. Congress 
consisted of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.  
2    Pérez' first presidency (1974 – 1979) had coincided with a unique period in Venezuela's history.  
Government revenues quadrupled from 1972 to 1974, following the Middle East oil embargo in '73 
(Wilpert 2003). Taking office in 1974 Pérez was able to embark on his project for 'La Gran 
Venezuela' (The Great Venezuela) as it was known, in which oil revenues were channelled into a 
series of ambitious mega-projects and government social programmes, including housing projects, 
industrial parks and a subway in Caracas (The Economist 2011). In 1976 he nationalised the oil 
industry. However, with the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s Venezuela's economy was badly 
affected, with significant increases in the numbers of Venezuelans living in poverty and extreme 
poverty (Galbraith and Garza-Cantu 2001).  
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initiative took place, which I will discuss in turn, before turning to the events of the 
referendum day and its impact and legacy.  
 
4.1.2. Pérez's neoliberal 'package' and the Caracazo 
 
Two weeks after taking office in February 1989, Carlos Andrés Pérez announced a 
series of economic reforms which were to form the basis of his macroeconomic plan 
for the country. 'The package' as the reforms became known were based on the 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) neoliberal programme for indebted developing 
countries, including the termination of price controls, the discontinuation of state 
subsidies, and deregulation of the currency rate. In exchange Venezuela received a 
four and a half billion-dollar loan from the IMF (Gott 2000). The neoliberal plan came 
as a shock to voters, and even to some within the president’s own party.  In the 
election campaign he had promised a return to the social democratic policies of his 
first presidency and denounced the IMF as “a neutron bomb that killed people, but 
left buildings standing” (cited in Ali 2006).  
 
The reforms generated an immediate impact with an episode that is characterised by 
some as “the beginning of the end of Venezuela's ancien régime” (Gott 2000, p. 44, 
italics in original). The cessation of government fuel subsidies, one of the new 
reforms, took effect on February 26th 1989. The following day bus fares were 
increased by bus companies by 100% to cover the companies' additional fuel costs. 
The first protests broke out amongst groups of angry commuters in the early morning 
which quickly spread, with the aid of television coverage, to the major cities across 
the country. Protests over bus fares escalated into widespread rioting and looting 
217 
 
across the centre and subsequently the wealthy suburbs of Caracas. In response the 
government announced a state of martial law, the suspension of civil liberties, and 
brought in the National Guard, followed by the army (ibid.).  
 
The violent repression which followed was unprecedented in Venezuelan history, 
with the police and army shooting at groups of unarmed protesters and directly into 
residential buildings in working class barrios.  Whilst the official figure put the death 
toll at 276, human rights organisations have suggested the actual figure is much 
higher, with some estimates as high as three thousand deaths (Agencia Bolivariana de 
Noticias 2009). Subsequent research has shown that the majority were killed at close 
range inside their own homes (Valery 2009). Mass graves were established within the 
city, to dispose of the dead, many of whom were never identified (Agencia Bolivariana 
de Noticias 2009). This week-long episode of protests, riots, and looting, and the 
government repression which followed is known as the 'Caracazo',3 and is critical to 
understanding the political climate in early nineties Venezuela.  
 
4.1.3. February 4th 1992: attempted coup 
 
February 4th 1992, marked the next critical event of this period, with the attempt at a 
military coup led by lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez. Though unsuccessful, the 
challenge had a significant impact on the perceived legitimacy and stability of the 
Pérez government. Promised civilian support for the coup leaders did not materialise, 
in part contributing to its failure (Gott 2000).  However, various accounts suggest that 
the coup had widespread popular support (Gott 2000; Lopez Maya 1997). Chávez 
                                                        
3  A rough translation is 'Caracas big one'.  
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became a household name overnight after he was permitted a short television 
appearance in which he accepted defeat and asked troops to step down. In his (now 
infamous) remark that they had failed '...for now', he “caught the popular imagination” 
(Gott 2000, p. 68), and established the idea that another attempt to overthrow the 
government was on its way. As one ex-Radical Cause leader puts it, February 4th 
“produced a mass de-freezing of politics in Venezuela...a mass destabilization of the 
political system and a mass de-freezing of the political climate” (Urgelles 2012).  
 
Within the government itself, Pérez' position was precarious. Following the coup 
attempt he was humiliatingly unable to secure a congressional declaration of support 
for the government and rejection of the coup leaders, due to criticism from ex-
president Rafael Caldera, and Radical Cause deputy Aristbóbulo Istúriz. Only a more 
limited resolution could be passed, and Pérez was strongly criticised in speeches from 
Caldera and Istúriz, in which they held the government responsible for creating the 
conditions which had given rise to the military insurgency (Lopez Maya 1997).  
 
4.1.4. The crisis of the political system and decentralisation  
 
However, the critical situation in which the Pérez government found themselves had 
deeper roots than the Caracazo and attempted coup. The perception that the 
Venezuelan political system was 'in crisis' had been growing for over a decade. Since 
the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1958 Venezuela had been ruled by a form of 
'pacted democracy', in which power alternated between the two main parties, the 
social democratic party, Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, AD) and the Social-
Christian Party, Independent Political Electoral Organising Committee (COPEI). The 
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Pact of Punto Fijo, named after the house in which it was signed by leaders of AD, 
COPEI and a third party, the Democratic Republican Union (URD), was intended to 
ensure political stability through excluding both the far right and the far left from the 
political system. The Venezuelan Communist Party was made illegal, and power 
centralised; elections were held for the presidency and ruling party, in which the 
electorate chose between ideologically similar parties. All other regional and local 
positions were appointed by the ruling party, often including representatives from 
both parties, in accordance with their pact to establish governments of national unity 
(Galbraith and Garza-Cantu 2001).  
 
Despite the democratic deficit, however, the regime maintained a form of legitimacy 
as long as oil revenues could be used to sustain economic and social well-being in the 
population. Various scholars note how Venezuela was able during this period to both 
satisfy “demands of private capital for accumulation” whilst funding health, education 
and social development programmes (Smilde 2011, p. 3; Crisp, Levine and Rey 1995), 
resulting in massive improvements in life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy 
levels (Smilde 2011). However, with the collapse of oil prices in the early nineteen 
eighties, this social contract was over. Unemployment and informal employment 
soared, real wages declined, and inequality increased, with the poorest the worst 
affected (ibid.).  
 
Worsened by a series of corruption scandals, a widespread antipathy towards 
politicians and political parties developed, evident in high levels of voter abstention4 
                                                        
4    Voter abstention was 42% in the 1984 municipal elections, 22% in the 1988 presidential elections, 
and 55% in the municipal-gubernatorial elections of 1989, and 51% in 1992; despite the fact that 
abstention was illegal (Ellner 1993).  
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and intense “anti-party rhetoric” in civil society organisations (Ellner 1993, p. 7). The 
idea that structural reform of the state and the electoral system was needed to regain 
legitimacy took hold and in 1983 President Campíns established the Presidential 
Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE) to investigate the reforms needed. 
The key recommendation of COPRE involved the decentralisation of power; however, 
no actual reforms would be implemented for the rest of the decade, with the 
government reluctant to let go of power (López Maya 1997). The necessary push 
would come through the Caracazo, shortly after which President Pérez finally 
implemented recommendations including the direct election of state governors and 
municipal mayors, in a bid to regain public support. These reforms would be crucial 
in opening up space within the political system, and prove critical to the development 
of the Radical Cause party.  
 
4.1.5. The Radical Cause party 
 
As one ex party leader put it: “In the middle of all this, the misery and the sense of 
abandonment in the population, you have a revolutionary party, that was the Radical 
Cause” (Palavicini 2012). The Radical Cause (LCR; La Causa Radical or La Causa R as it 
was more commonly known)5 was founded in 1971 by the intellectual and ex 
guerrilla movement leader, Alfreido Maneiro, and a small group of supporters who 
split from the Venezuelan Communist Party. By the late sixties it was clear that the 
                                                        
5    The name was originally simply 'la Causa R': 'The R Cause', until in 1973 they were required by the 
Supreme Electoral Commission to assign the R a meaning. The R was assigned the meaning of 
'radical' in the sense of 'enrooted' (Sesto cited in López Maya 1997). López-Maya notes that 'radical' 
in the sense of enrooted or deep, has quite a different sense from its connotation in English with 
'extreme' or 'distant from tradition'. “La Causa R” she notes “never sought to be confused with 
extremists” (López Maya 1997, p. 146). 
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armed struggle had failed as a political strategy and leaders such as Maneiro searched 
for “a new articulation with the popular movement” (López Maya 1997, p. 123).  
 
From its inception, Radical Cause (LCR) was a non-conventional political party, closer 
in some ways to a social movement. There was no formal charter, bureaucracy or 
statutes, and it was believed that the party should be in a “permanent process of 
formation” (López-Maya 1997, p. 123). Described by Ellner as “ideologically ill-
defined” (1993, p6) and by López-Maya as guided by a “conceptual framework... 
[which] was fundamentally Marxist, though... far from orthodox” (1997, p. 127), the 
party during this period did not fit into traditional categories. The focus was on 
achieving greater power for the popular classes6 as a means to a more just society 
(Lopez Maya 1997). However, the party sought to avoid association with traditional 
left groups, and was motivated in part by the failures they perceived in the 
Venezuelan Communist Party and the traditional left (ibid.; Urgelles 2012). 
 
Maneiro's vision was to create a “movement of movements” which could connect the 
diverse popular struggles in society (Urgelles 2012). Central to this would be the 
construction of a vanguard which would consist of the Radical Cause party and the 
leadership of organically occurring mass movements, so in their early days the party 
focused on seeking out the right movements, as a prospective source for the vanguard 
(López Maya 1997).  Three key movements were consciously selected and targeted 
by the party, including a workers' movement at the large steel works in the east of the 
country, the student movement at the Central University in Caracas, and the popular 
movement in Catia, a mixed district in inner city Caracas. Their greatest success was 
                                                        
6  The 'popular classes' is the preferred term in Latin America to refer to the working or lower classes. 
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with the workers' movement where they initiated a new form of democratic 
unionism, which by the late eighties had control of over forty unions and labour 
movements across the country (López Maya 1997). Their impact within the student 
and popular movements was not so spectacular, however they established a solid 
support base which would remain loyal into the nineties.  
 
The party is best understood as a response to the political moment in which it 
emerged. The strategy of the revolutionary left in previous decades had clearly failed, 
and as López Maya notes: “Maneiro understood early on that in Venezuela it would be 
necessary to seek transformation through [...] the political system's institutional 
mechanisms” (1997 p. 128). However, they sought to advance their project without 
accepting the existing terms of electoral politics. The notion of 'radical democracy' 
was a central and constant unifying concept in Radical Cause party discourse. Though 
somewhat ambiguous, the concept was orientated around demands for greater 
popular participation and, concretely, mechanisms for direct consultation of the 
electorate, like referenda. Despite their participation – and success – in the formal 
political system, they are described by one ex-party leader as directed towards the 
creation of a “parallel power, rather than a vision of contributing to ratifying the 
existing power”. He clarifies this:  
 
Radical Cause itself is an expression of an extra-parliamentary project. Outside of a vision of 
the legal struggle, subject to the established rules of the Punto Fijo agreement (Uzcategui 
2012).  
 
To this end they experimented with a significant array of tactics. In addition to their 
activities in union politics and the student movement, the party published several 
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different newspapers, organised petitions, marches, and occupations, as well as less 
explicitly political activities such as salsa competitions and sports competitions in 
Caracas barrios, intended to “develop popular class consciousness and leadership” 
(Albornos 2012). As I will show in subsequent sections, the unofficial referendum on 
the rule of Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992 was understood as yet another strategy to 
build popular class consciousness and contribute to the creation of a 'parallel power'.  
 
4.1.6. The referendum  
 
The idea that Carlos Andrés Pérez must leave the presidency of the Republic in the short 
term has turned into a political and social clamour. Whether it is through his voluntary 
resignation, as has been requested of him by voices of national prestige, through a 
shortening of his presidential mandate as has been discussed in various political circles or 
through a referendum as the Radical Cause have been preaching – up to organising a 
'simulation'... day by day his exit becomes more necessary (SIC, Venezuelan political 
analysis magazine editorial, July 1992).7 
 
Amidst the cacophony of calls for a solution to 'the crisis' in the weeks following the 
February 4th coup attempt, Radical Cause started calling for a recall referendum on 
President Pérez. In full page national newspaper adverts the party outlined the case 
for a “Referendum so that the people decide” and a “Referendum for a different 
government” (Ultimás Noticias, 29th February 1992, p. 11; Ultimás Noticias, 11th 
March 1992, p.23). Then, as debates in Congress and in the media over 'the crisis', 
reform of the state, and President Pérez' tenure continued, and the government 
                                                        
7    The editors of SIC magazine continue: “...principally because he gives no signs of changing his 
national political focus and orientating his presidential action towards a democratic way out of the 
crisis of legitimacy that affects the heart of the system of reconciliation of elites and political 
parties” (SIC 1992).  
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resisted mounting pressure to respond, the Radical Cause announced that there would 
be a referendum on Pérez. June 11th was declared “the national day for a referendum”, 
in an announcement taken out in the national press. “Communities, guilds, 
neighbourhood associations” were invited “to join the day, and organise the 
referendum in their sector” and detailed instructions for how to participate were 
provided (Radical Cause, Ultimás Noticias, 1st June 1992, p. 9).8 On June 10th a 'public 
telegram' was published in the press, addressed to the President and the General 
Secretary of COPEI (the main opposition party), inviting them to send their own 
witnesses to the different polling stations and to the final count. 9 
 
Early in the morning of June 11th, voting points were set up across Caracas and other 
major cities, covering the main avenues, plazas, metro stations and the stopping 
points for buses from the poorer barrios on the outskirts of the city (Melo 2012). The 
locations of voting points in each region were published in the press on the day, so 
that citizens could find out where to vote (Radical Cause, Ultimás Noticias, June 11th 
1992, p. 23). Whilst most activity and public participation took place in Caracas, 
where up to eighty voting points were set up, organisers recall that the referendum 
was carried out in the fifteen other principal states, including Bolívar, Sucre, 
Anzuatagui, Miranda, Zulia, Tachira, Merida and Falcon, through utilisation of the 
party's national infrastructure (Melo 2012).  
 
A plenary room was set up in central Caracas, where the votes from each district were 
counted manually by organisers and volunteers. Open to the public, the activities 
                                                        
8    See Appendix E for full details of instructions given to those who wished to participate.  
 
9    The telegram was in fact addressed to 'Mr Carlos Andrés Pérez and Mr Eduardo Fernández [General 
Secretary of COPEI] , Miraflores Palace', omitting the title of 'president' (Melo 2012). (see appendix 
A).  
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attracted crowds of “students, housewives... anyone who was interested”, with up to 
three thousand people purportedly passing by over the course of the day (Uzcategui 
2012). At six in the evening, in front of the crowd and television news cameras, the 
General Secretary of the Radical Cause and coordinator of the referendum, Pablo 
Medina, read out the first results (Melo 2012; Rodriguez 2012). The results from 
across the country would be coming in over the next day and a half, but in the 
meantime the outcome in Caracas was clear. Of the 163, 428 votes counted, there 
were 149, 771 votes for 'No'; Carlos Andrés Pérez should not continue governing, and 
11, 253 votes that 'Yes'; he should continue, (with 1,202 null votes counted) (Ultimás 
Noticias, June 12th 1992, p. 57). As one headline read the following day: “92.32% of 
Caraqueños [people from Caracas] said No to President Pérez” (Ibid.).  
 
So who engaged with this event? Who voted and who responded to the Radical Cause 
party's call out to help organise a referendum? In other words, to what extent and in 
what ways did the event genuinely engage groups and communities beyond the 
party's activist base? Interviews with organisers and other participants reflect 
varying experiences. Instead of attempting to generalise, I draw on these accounts to 
provide snapshots of the referendum and how it played out in particular areas, for 
particular groups.  
 
23 de Enero: inner-city working class Caracas barrio 
 
Despite the public call out to neighbourhood organisations and other groups to 
establish polling stations, some accounts suggest that most of the real logistical and 
organisational work was driven by the party. As one organiser, Gregorio Pérez, 
explains: “you need the discipline of a party to pull off something like this” (2012). 
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However, groups and individuals outside the party played an important role 
supporting the event; distributing leaflets, promoting the event and encouraging 
people to vote (ibid.).  
 
Juan Contreras, activist and community organiser from el 23 de Enero (el 23) in 
Caracas, is one individual who participated in this way.10  Contreras was not a 
member of the Radical Cause party but helped with the referendum in the barrio. His 
account provides insight into how people outside of the party engaged with the event, 
in some cases:  
 
We were part of those people that they called on, that also supported the Radical Cause, that 
day we went not only to vote but to invite people and seek out people, and do the call 
out...We participated, collaborated, calling out to the people with megaphones that they 
come out to vote, and with big signs that we set up. And delivering leaflets, publicising the 
event. It was part of a whole campaign that culminated that day with the referendum 
(Interview, 2012).  
 
Participation in el 23 was high, he recalls: “I would dare to say about seventy percent 
of people [participated]”, which he attributes to widespread public anger at the 
government and the particular political culture and history of el 23:  
 
      El 23 has always been different from the other communities that there were here in Caracas, the 
other barrios. I don't know if it has to do with the form of the buildings, the mood of the people, but 
here things are different. Well, here, the people participate. Obviously not everyone. But there is a 
sector, a significant number of people that take a stand on all these things... and that express 
themselves in all these demonstrations. Here there was fighting on February 4th of 92, in the coup. 
The base for the coup was here... And that day also [referendum day], it worked like this – it was in 
the metro, it was... I don't remember if it was in the Miradora, but in various areas here in el 23, 
where people were voting, people went to express themselves (Contreras 2012). 
                                                        
10    Juan Contreras is also founder and head of the influential community organisation Coordinadora 
Simón Bolívar, based in 23 de Enero, in Caracas.  
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He describes how in el 23 the referendum offered a way for people to express their 
anger at the government, and at a culture of political repression and violence:  
 
Many people [participated]. Because, El 23 de Enero was one of the sectors most hit by the 
issue of . . . repression. By the deaths, by the political persecution, by the imprisonment of 
people. For example, in my case, every time something happened, well the police would 
come after me, and the same for many here in El 23, that have been persecuted, that have 
been imprisoned. - In the best of cases, because other comrades have ended up murdered, 
by the security services. So El 23 was like a bastion, a political boiling pot, of debates, 
confrontations, street fighting. So, well, it expressed itself in this moment [the referendum] 
also (Contreras 2012).11 
 
Catia: a large, mixed district in Caracas 
 
Some organisers, however, recount a deeper level of civil society involvement in the 
organisation of this event. José Albornos was a member of the National Leadership in 
1992 and based in Catia district in Caracas. He recalls how volunteers got together to 
organise voting points and promote the event, principally through the initiative of the 
Catia-based community organisation Procatia. “There was a sense of participation 
that was generated spontaneously”, he reflects:  
 
...The majority of people that organised the event did it with their own resources, because 
we didn't have any money. How did they do it? So the people in Procatia [a community 
organisation in Catia barrio with historic links to the Radical Cause], the director and the 
                                                        
11    It is noteworthy that in 2008, the Coordinadora Simón Bolívar (a community organisation in el 23, 
headed by Juan Contreras), ran a similar informal referendum, inspired by the Radical Cause 
referendum of 1992, this time on the presence of US military bases in Colombia. They ran voting 
points in el 23 de Enero, and online voting. Participation reached the tens of thousands, according 
to Contreras, with online votes received from around the world (Contreras 2012).  
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people themselves, they set up their box, got the ballot slips, they named those that were 
going to be the witnesses... it was a total movement (Albornos 2012). 
 
Albornos notes that it was the Radical Cause's rootedness in the community and their 
close connections with a diverse range of community organisations and social 
movements that made large scale mobilisations such as this one possible (ibid.).  
 
San Antonio: a small satellite city on the outskirts of Caracas 
 
A similar picture of grassroots engagement emerges in San Antonio, a small city on 
the outskirts of Caracas. Luis Trincado was also a member of the National Leadership 
at this time and head of the Radical Cause party in San Antonio. He describes how 
organising the referendum worked as a tool to engage new groups:  
 
In San Antonio Los Altos, where I lived, we organised through a Committee for Organisation 
of the Referendum, there more than seventy people participated... the Radical Cause of San 
Antonio was ten people. But others started to approach us, they heard our call out, and they 
started to come, as a result of the execution of the referendum (Personal communication, 
2012). 
 
Through a media outreach campaign, where they bought short radio adverts, 
appeared on radio programmes, and placed adverts in the local press, Trincado 
describes how they successfully reached out to previously inactive sectors: 
 
We gave out our telephone numbers... and the people called us and said that they wanted to 
participate, how could they help – one woman started to make sandwiches during the day, 
someone else bought water...they arrived, 'I want to participate, how can I do that?', 'Right, 
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well I'll print out the tickets', 'there's a computer at my house...', from there started an 
organisation. I'd say that the referendum was not the only factor but it helped us a lot, to 
mobilise people that were discontent with Carlos Andrés Pérez but that didn't know how to 
mobilise, how to express it (Trincado 2012). 
 
Puerto Ordaz, Guayana: industrial city in Eastern Venezuela  
 
Puerto Ordaz is a city in the industrial heartland of East Venezuela. The Venezuelan 
Magazine of Industrial and Labour Relations has a regular section which documents 
events in the labour movement, called 'documented labour chronicles', in which the 
organisation of the referendum in Puerto Ordaz is recounted. A 'Broad Pro-
Referendum Committee', comprised of representatives from neighbourhood 
organisations, universities, further education colleges, and other public figures, was 
formed, with the task of organising the referendum in Puerto Ordaz (Urquijo and 
Bonilla 1992). The Committee is described as having “two principal responsibilities”: 
“to achieve success in the national day of protest denominated 'referendum'”, and to 
ensure the participation of all sectors, because: “in this activity every citizen that is 
hurt by this country can and should participate” (Freddy Serano, Radical Cause 
National Leadership, cited in Urquijo and Bonilla 1992).  
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4.2. Impact and legacy 
 
Assessing the impact and the legacy of the Radical Cause referendum on Pérez is 
complex. This is not only because it is difficult to attribute cause and effect in such a 
chaotic political and social context. I received wildly different accounts of the event, in 
terms of its impact and significance, from different informants. What one participant 
describes as “one of the four key events of the period, along with the Caracazo and the 
two attempted coups” (Contreras 2012) has gone unrecorded in historical accounts of 
the period and is largely forgotten by those who were not directly involved with 
organising or supporting the action. In this sub-section I expand on these differences, 
and consider what it might tell us about the use of a-legal space to constitute new 
political realities. 
 
4.2.1. The referendum in public memory  
 
Firstly, to the extent that one can speak of a singular national consciousness, in no 
sense is this event a part of Venezuelan consciousness. The Radical Cause referendum 
is not referred to in popular discourse, there is almost nothing written about it in 
scholarly accounts of the period, and most people who were not involved with the 
Radical Cause party at this time have no memory or knowledge of the event.12 So what 
does the referendum's almost total absence from public memory tell us? To what 
extent should this be taken as evidence of the event's marginal impact and marginal 
perceived significance at the time? And by extension, what do these findings suggest 
                                                        
12 Indeed, a principal challenge I faced in researching this event was locating individuals who had 
voted, or had other experience and knowledge of the event but had not been involved with 
organising it. Most people I encountered, including in some instances those who had been involved 
in political activism in Caracas in the early nineties, did not remember the event.  
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about the potential and the limitations of the a-legal space strategy? For several 
reasons I would argue that the limited public recall and absence of the event from 
popular history is unsurprising. Firstly, between February 1992 and May 1993, there 
were two coup attempts, almost daily protests, strikes and occupations across 
Venezuela and the president was impeached, suspended from office and placed under 
house arrest. It seems plausible that, as Reyes (Interview, 2012) suggests: this 
referendum “was something that was passed over by the very dynamic history of the 
period”. Secondly, in 1997 the internal divisions which had characterised the Radical 
Cause party since its inception finally led to a formal split. The party divided with a 
majority, including Pablo Medina and others from the Caracas faction who had 
spearheaded the referendum, leaving to form Patria Para Todos (Homeland for All, 
PPT).  PPT would go on to support Chávez's candidacy in the 1998 presidential 
elections, and form part of the government in 1999.  The smaller group which 
remained as the Radical Cause included Andrés Valesquez (the governor of Bolivar 
State and Radical Cause presidential candidate in 1993) and others from Bolivar state, 
for whom the referendum and arguably the kind of politics this exemplified had been 
less a priority than the candidacy of Andrés Valesquez.13 With the main group of 
individuals involved now engaged in a new project, under a new banner, there was no 
organisation with the institutional memory or motivation to preserve the event. 
Information which might have been preserved such as publicity materials and voter 
records was lost.14 Furthermore, the decline of the Radical Cause meant there was no 
widespread effort to rescue and mythologise the actions and history of the party. The 
story of the phenomenal rise of the Radical Cause and the large scale mobilisations 
                                                        
13     Gregorio Pérez from the Caracas faction reports that some in Bolivar considered the referendum a 
'distraction' from the central project of promoting Andrés Valesquez (2012).  
 
14  Several organisers make this point.  
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they led at this critical juncture in Venezuelan history did not fit with the emerging 
popular left wing narrative of history.  
 
According to the thesis elaborated in previous chapters, the successful use of a-legal 
space promises to shift the political grammar. Through appearing at once as an 
expression of constituent power and constituted power, these initiatives harness the 
constitutive effects of each, and in this way create tipping events which rupture the 
political grammar, opening up space for new political possibilities. It would seem, 
however, that these effects were not realised in the case of the Radical Cause 
referendum. Whilst the limited public record and memory of this event can be 
accounted for by various contextual factors, this would also suggest that the 
organisers did not successfully reset the political grammar and shift the horizons of 
the possible. For surely if the referendum had constituted a tipping event, the event 
would generate greater public resonance now?  Media scholar, Professor Reyes, is 
helpful here.  Whilst the referendum can be said to have 'set the agenda', he argues, it 
failed to 'construct' it:  
 
It constructed an agenda in the media. For this you can find it in the media. Or rather, the 
process of agenda setting was carried out. But the process of 'Agenda Building', no. So you 
have a certain recollection in the political class... but you are not going to have neither 
recollection nor recognition in the electorate (2012). 
 
Reyes' distinction can be well conceived in terms of political grammar change, where 
'setting the agenda' equates to some transient impact on mainstream discourse, 
whilst 'constructing the agenda' equates to a deeper discursive impact, closer to the 
level of political grammar. For Reyes, the referendum failed to 'construct the agenda', 
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(or shift the political grammar) for various reasons:  
 
Because it was an idea that was unprecedented, something new. No one talked about this 
before. It was something unviable at that moment. Because the revolution of 61 was clear. 
And it was something that did not correspond with the real concerns of Venezuelans at that 
moment. The coup of November, the second coup of November 27th, completely put a lid 
on any type of consequence that it could have had, this attempt at a referendum of 92' 
(2012).  
 
4.2.2. The referendum in organiser and participant accounts 
 
However, limited public recall and knowledge of this event belie the vivid and 
significant experiences and impressions of those who organised and participated in it. 
Without exception, organisers who were interviewed describe the referendum as a 
significant success, with mass participation and important impacts. The referendum, 
it is suggested, was an important and effective tool for consciousness raising and 
mobilisation (Pérez 2012; Albornos 2012; Trincado 2012; Palavicini 2012; Uzcategui 
2012). Organisers argue that it contributed to the impeachment of Pérez and the 
subsequent rise of the Radical Cause party: there is indeed evidence to support both 
claims. 
 
In March 1993 the Attorney General charged Carlos Andrés Pérez with the 
mismanagement of state funds. On May 20th the Supreme Court ruled that there was 
sufficient evidence to proceed to trial, and the Senate stripped him of immunity and 
suspended him from office (Lalander 2010).  Radical Cause were implicated at various 
stages in this turn of events. In addition to maintaining constant political pressure for 
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the departure of Pérez throughout this period, it was Radical Cause deputies Pablo 
Medina and Aristóbulo Istúriz who in December 1992 had obtained evidence of 
corruption which they submitted to the Supreme Court. The evidence was accepted 
by the court, which led to the subsequent charges made against Pérez (Medina 2012). 
Medina claims that the referendum of June 1992 served to “support this 
constitutional action”:   
 
In the sense that the immense majority of the referendum rejected Carlos Andrés Pérez. 
Later this was a political argument: that the people in that referendum had rejected him - 
that Carlos Andrés Pérez was not working for us (2012).  
 
Indeed, there is scholarly support for the claim that the impeachment of Pérez was at 
least in part a political decision. Lalander (2010, p1) highlights the weakness of the 
legal case against Pérez15 and argues that “Corruption charges... functioned... as an 
emergency exit from the acute regime crisis” and were “a civilian coup against the 
president” (ibid., p. 140). Similarly Pérez Perdomo (1993) cites Pérez's unpopularity, 
as well as pressure on the Venezuelan institutional system to be seen to be addressing 
corruption, as explanations for the Supreme Court's decision.   
 
Thus the impeachment of Pérez was the product of political pressures, and 
according to Medina, the referendum was an important contribution to these 
political pressures. An additional, surprising, source of support for this claim can 
arguably be found in the account of Pérez' finance minister: Dr. Pedro Rosas. Rosas 
considers the impacts of the referendum to have been “very marginal”, the event 
                                                        
15    He notes: “In the 250-page decision of the court hardly any references were made to why and how 
the use of 250 million bolivars from the secret presidential security funds constituted a crime, and 
the right to defence was violated” (Lalander 2010, p. 139).  
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was “not given much importance”. He doesn't recall any actions taken to stop it: 
the government “just tried to ignore it”. However, it is noteworthy that he 
remembers the event twenty years later, and moreover recalls being informed of 
the event at the Home Secretary's weekly cabinet briefing (Rosas 2012). 
Importantly, when asked if he saw a connection between the referendum and the 
impeachment of Pérez, for example if the Radical Cause had used the event as 
'political capital', Rosas is unambiguous:  
 
Without a doubt. The conspiracy against CAP took arguments from the referendum. It was a 
small indication that 'CAP and his neoliberal government had to go' (ibid.).  
 
The other significant outcome organisers attribute in part to this referendum is the 
party's subsequent electoral success. In the December 1992 elections the Radical 
Cause won a number of new local government posts, including the Mayoralty of the 
central Caracas municipality Libertador. In the following year's presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the party made dramatic gains in Congress: from just 
three representatives in the Chamber of deputies, they won 40 of a total 198 seats, 
and 9 of 50 seats in the Senate (López Maya 1997). Andrés Valesquez, for the 
Radical Cause, officially finished fourth in the presidential race, with 21.97% of the 
vote.16 However, every organiser interviewed claimed they had in fact won, but 
were the victim of electoral fraud. A claim which has some support in scholarly 
research of the period (Buxton 2001; Lalander 2004).17  
     
                                                        
16  A less than a two percent difference with Democratic Actions's 23.23% and COPEI's 22.11% 
(Consejo Supremo Electoral, Dirección de Estadísticas cited in López-Maya, 1997) 
17  Lalander notes the alleged collaboration between the two hegemonic political parties, Acción 
Democrática and COPEI, in order to avert the Radical Cause victory, which was seen as a “dangerous 
threat... given its electoral promise to radically transform political structures” (2010, p. 141).  
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Luis Trincado, from the Radical Cause National Leadership in 1992, describes the 
referendum as facilitating a “tremendous organisational leap forward”, which enabled 
them to capture previously undirected public anger and discontent, and thereby build 
support for the party which translated into electoral success. “After the count of votes 
in San Antonio, we had a team of seventy people attending weekly meetings, coming 
everyday... like this the Radical Cause grew” (Trincado 2012). But importantly, the 
outcome in San Antonio, a small satellite city on the outskirts of Caracas, where the 
Radical Cause gained their first two councillors in December 1992, was not unique:   
 
What happened in San Antonio happened in all the districts of Caracas...organising the 
referendum, participating, forming teams, and from there a political enthusiasm to achieve 
the political objective of getting Democratic Action and COPEI out of power in Caracas 
(Ibid.).  
 
Finally, various organisers note the event's significance as precursor to the 
participatory democratic initiatives which would be institutionalised by the Chávez 
government after 1998 (Trincado 2012; Almeida Pérez 2012; Palavicini 2012). 
This is supported by scholar Professor Reyes, who notes that “for many scholars, 
this referendum attempt of the Radical Cause served as a basis for what in '97 
would be the Law of Political Participation” (2012).  
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4.2.3. Making sense of the referendum: impact, legacy and political grammar 
change 
 
A review of the scholarly literature, the accounts of ordinary Venezuelans not 
involved with the referendum and interviews with organisers and some 
participants give wildly different pictures of this event and its impact and legacy. 
Whilst the event has been largely forgotten by those not involved, organisers 
describe a meaningful and significant experience which is interesting to consider 
from the perspective of political grammar change. What is required is a more 
sophisticated and multi-layered model of political grammar. Just as the concept of 
discourse can be applied to different levels and sectors of society, from the national 
or international level to small social groups, grammatical structures will vary at the 
macro and micro level, and between particular sub-cultures. If this is the case, the 
accounts of organisers and some participants suggest the referendum may have 
functioned as a tipping event which shifted the grammatical structures delimiting 
the possible within certain communities and sub-cultures. This idea is explored in 
more depth in the subsequent sections in which I discuss organiser objectives and 
what might the implications of this case might be for a general theory of a-legal 
space as a political strategy.  
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4.3. What did organisers hope to achieve? Analysing organiser aims 
and objectives 
 
In this section I draw on interviews with organisers of the referendum, in addition to 
other participants and commentators, in order to explore what the event was 
intended to achieve, its perceived effects, and how it relates to and what it might tell 
us about organisers' broader theory of change. Fourteen in-depth interviews were 
conducted with a variety of sources: see Table 1, below, for details. I interviewed nine 
Radical Cause party members and ex-members (or 'militants' as they are known) who 
had been involved with organising the referendum. The majority (seven) had been 
members of the Radical Cause National Leadership - a group of approximately twenty 
party leaders who ran the party - and played key roles in organising this event. Of the 
other two, one was a middle-ranking party deputy and the other an ordinary rank-
and-file party activist. All had been based in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas at the 
time of the referendum.1 2 In addition to the nine organisers, I interviewed one of the 
founders of the Radical Cause party, Thailman Urgelles. Urgelles had left the party in 
the early eighties, shortly after the death of founder and party leader, Alfreido 
Maneiro. Urgelles was not involved with the referendum initiative, and hence helped 
provide a counterbalance to the accounts of organisers. Also helpful for triangulating 
the accounts of organisers were interviews with two individuals not associated with 
the Radical Cause party but who had participated in the event. Juan Contreras is an 
activist and community leader based in the Caracas barrio 23 de Enero; he is the 
                                                        
1    Except for one interview subject who was based in San Antonio: a satellite city on the outskirts of 
Caracas.  
2   This was partly a result of logistical limitations which prevented travelling to different regions of the 
country to carry out field work. However, it can be justified by the fact that Radical Cause activity at 
this time was most concentrated in two regions: Caracas and Bolivar state, in the east of the country.  
According to organiser accounts, it was in Caracas where most activity around this referendum took 
place.  
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founder and director of the influential political organisation Coordinadora Simón 
Bolívar. He participated in the referendum and helped to promote it in 23 de Enero. 
Delia Castillo is a journalist, who was employed by the government's press office 
during the period of the referendum.3 She also participated in the event, through 
voting, and helped to set up one of the voting points.  
 
A final two interview subjects allowed for a very different perspective on the event. 
Dr. Pedro Rosas was the Minister of Finance in Perez' government, in 1992. His 
comments provide some insight into how the event was perceived by the government 
and, interestingly, provide unexpected support for some of the claims of organisers. 
Prof. Reyes is an academic and scholar of media and communication theory. He has 
researched the Radical Cause referendum on Pérez in the context of research into 
'agenda building' and legitimacy. Table 1, below, provides the full details of interview 
participants, including their name, their role in the referendum, current occupation 
and current political affiliation. As the table shows, informants included supporters of 
the current administration and supporters of the opposition. This is relevant as 
current political affiliation emerged as a key variable which correlated with how the 
referendum was constructed by informants, as I discuss below. Other relevant 
contextual information includes informants’ current occupation and in particular 
whether they are still involved in professional political and whether they are in the 
Radical Cause party. The positions and statements of informants should be 
considered with these contextual factors kept in mind.  
 
                                                        
3 She could not recall whether she was working for the Government on the date of the referendum or 
had left shortly prior to this, but claimed that in any case her government job would not have 
prevented her participation.  
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Table 1: Interview subjects, Radical Cause referendum on Carlos Andrés Pérez 
Interview Subject Role in referendum Current occupation & 
political affiliation 
Interview 
Date 
Pablo Medina Coordinator of the 
referendum, General 
Secretary of the 
Radical Cause in 1992 
Identifies with the 
opposition, no political 
party (at time of 
interview). 
August 2012 
 
Luis Trincado  National leadership in 
1992, key organiser 
Radical Cause party 
national leadership, 
National Secretary of the 
Organisation. Part of the 
opposition.  
July 2012 
Rafael Uzcategui  National leadership in 
1992, key organiser 
General Secretary of Patria 
Para Todos, critical of 
government from leftist 
perspective.  
August 2012 
Carlos Melo  National leadership in 
1992, key organiser 
General Secretary of COPEI 
(at time of interview), part 
of opposition. 
July 2012 
David Palavicini  National leadership in 
1992, key organiser 
Teacher in sixth form 
college. Identifies with the 
government.  
July 2012 
Jose Albornos  National leadership in 
1992, key organiser 
General Secretary of 
Movimiento Progresista de 
Venezuela (MPV) 
(breakaway party from 
PPT), part of the 
opposition.  
August 2012 
Jose Lira  National leadership in 
1992, key organiser 
Radical Cause party 
national leadership. Part of 
the opposition.  
July 2012 
Gregorio Almeida 
Pérez  
Middle-ranking 
Radical Cause deputy 
in 1992, ‘suplente’ 
(stand-in) for Pablo 
Medina in Congress. 
Organiser of 
referendum.  
Retired philosophy 
professor. Identifies with 
the government.  
July 2012; 
August 2012 
Roberto Rodriguez  Rank and file Radical 
Cause militant in 
1992. Helped organise 
referendum.  
Librarian. Identifies with 
the government.  
August 2012 
Thailman Urgelles  One of the founders of Film director. Identifies August 2012 
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the Radical Cause 
party, left the party in 
1980s. Not involved in 
the referendum.  
with opposition.  
Juan Contreras  Participated in the 
referendum.  
Founder and head of 
influential community 
organisation Coordinadora 
Simón Bolívar. Identifies 
with the government.  
July 2012 
Delia Castillo  Participated in the 
referendum. 
Journalist. Identifies with 
the opposition. 
August 2012 
Dr. Pedro Rosas  Venezuelan Minister 
of Finance, 1992 - 
1993 
Retired. Identifies with the 
opposition. 
July 2012 (via 
email) 
Prof. Reyes  
Too young to have 
participated in the 
referendum. Reyes 
has studied the event 
in the context of 
research into 
legitimacy and 
‘agenda building’. 
Academic. Identifies with 
opposition. 
August 2012 
 
All interview participants were asked what the principal objective(s) of the 
referendum was; what they had hoped to achieve (or what they thought it was 
intended to achieve, for non-organisers); and what its impacts were. One surprising 
finding was the commonalities between accounts. Regardless of their current political 
allegiances and position, organisers and participants in the referendum each 
articulated one or all of several key interconnected themes, which I discuss in turn. 
 
4.3.1. A “measurement” ... and a “demonstration”  
 
One recurring way in which organisers described the referendum was as a way to 
measure and to demonstrate the level of dissent. As one organiser comments; “it was 
an exploration, right? To see how far the proposal of the Radical Cause had gone” 
(Almeida Pérez 2012). Similarly, Pablo Medina comments “it was a way to measure 
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public opinion, a way to know what the people were thinking, what was the mood of 
the people'” (2012). And participant, Juan Contreras, echoes; “it was also a way to 
measure the sympathy and to measure what was felt... to measure the level of 
acceptance of a correct politics, that said that we had to remove Pérez” (2012).  
However, in a jump which is common in accounts of the a-legal space tactic, claims 
that the referendum was hoped to 'measure' dissent are made interchangeably with 
claims that it would serve to 'demonstrate' it. As another organiser explained: “the 
objective was to demonstrate the size of the crisis, to demonstrate the rupture, and it 
was very effective” (Uzcategui 2012). Much like peoples’ tribunals act out the stages 
of a trial, with no doubt over the eventual outcome, the Radical Cause went through 
the motions of measuring support for Pérez, whilst simultaneously presenting the 
event as “for a different government” (Radical Cause, Ultimás Noticias, June 1st 1992, 
p. 9). 
 
Arguably, however, their claims to want to ‘measure’ the crisis should not be taken as 
disingenuous. The comments of Pablo Medina, coordinator of the event, are 
interesting. He explains:   
 
 We knew that the referendum would be a success… the 11th of June was to finally formalise 
as an approval a rejection of his methods and of him as president (2012). 
 
It seems that whilst the party were confident of the result it would produce, actually 
enacting the referendum was expected to change something.  
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4.3.2. “So that the people could express themselves”  
 
Unprompted and by way of an introduction at the start of his interview, Pablo Medina 
explained: 
  
There was a desire, in the Venezuelan population, to express their opinion and to search for 
a way out of the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez (2012).  
 
This construction, and the importance it is given, exemplifies another recurring 
theme in the accounts of organisers and participants alike: the referendum as “a tool 
to enable the people to express themselves” was presented as an objective of the 
event and one of the reasons for its success. As another key organiser comments:  
 
I think that there was a sentiment below, in the popular sectors of the population, that they 
did not have a way to express themselves... When we launched the proposal [for the 
referendum] it had acceptance. And why did it have a lot of acceptance? Because the people 
understood that it was one of the possible routes to express themselves, their point of view, 
their opinion, with respect to what was happening (Albornos 2012).  
 
In the absence of institutionalised mechanisms for the expression of discontent, it is 
suggested that this event offered an alternative. As Juan Contreras from 23 de Enero 
barrio in Caracas recalls; “It wasn't binding but we did it anyway because it was the 
way in which … the people could express themselves” (2012). Equally, however, it is 
presented as an alternative to other forms of extra-institutional politics:   
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The referendum signified the possibility that the people express themselves. That they 
overcome their fear. The people that at times don't leave their house, don't go to a protest, 
that didn't go to a march for fear that they would imprison you, for fear that they are going 
to kill you in a protest. That day the people expressed themselves (Contreras 2012). 
 
Juan Contreras is speaking from the Caracas barrio of 23 de Enero which suffered 
particularly brutal repression during the Caracazo.4 Several of the organisers and 
participants interviewed (as well as scholars of the period (e.g. Gott 2005)) refer to a 
climate of fear characterising much of the city in the years following the massacre. 
However, the period in which the referendum took place is described as marking a 
change. As Medina reflects: 
 
Venezuela started to live a different climate, another environment, different to the years 
before […] Because that date was the awakening – the people started to lose their fear 
(2012).   
 
Indeed, Lopez Maya (1999) demonstrates the sharp increase in protests in 1992, in 
contrast with earlier years. Mass participation in this referendum can be seen as an 
expression of this change, and arguably will have functioned to encourage subsequent 
protests. Moreover, as Contreras' account suggests, the event enabled a form of 
political engagement accessible to those who feared for their safety at more 
confrontational protests or marches. Walking to a voting point, filling out a ballot slip, 
                                                        
4 In one account, for example, a resident describes the presence of a tank outside their block of flats 
for a period of six days, with soldiers firing into the building at random. The resident describes 
hiding with her family in a small corridor, the one part of the flat out of shooting range of the 
window, for the duration of the six days, as bullets were sporadically shot into the flat, leaving only 
early in the morning to stock up on supplies before rushing back. This account reflects the 
experiences of many residents, and is supported by subsequent research which has shown that the 
majority of victims killed in the Caracazo were shot at close range inside their own homes (Valery 
2009). Government repression during the Caracazo was potentially particularly acute in El 23 de 
Enero, given its history as a base for radical left groups, including guerrilla groups (Contreras 2012).  
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and posting it in the home-made ballot box, would probably have felt less threatening 
than attending a march or protest. Perhaps also the novelty of the pseudo legal-
institutional form played some role in enabling a different kind of behaviour. In any 
case and regardless of whether it was a less risky and visceral an experience than 
other political actions, participation enabled a form of expression for those who 
voted.  
 
Interviews with organisers suggest that the expected subjective experience for those 
participating in the referendum and in this way 'expressing themselves', was indeed 
central to the purpose of the event. Asked about the 'added value' of the informal, 
non-binding form, organiser José Albornos comments: 
 
the people demonstrated in that referendum that it was possible to act like the state, to 
have the capacity to act, if they were organised, like the actual state on certain things... 
because the people started to realise that yes it was possible. [Q: What was possible?] ...A 
change. That a change was possible. That it was possible to do things without the need to 
have the guidance of institutions. I think that that ...well it was created and diffused, and 
well many people worked on that in that spontaneous manner, and I think that that 
honestly is going to make a difference (Interview, 2012). 
 
As such quotes demonstrate, organisers believed that the experience of participating 
– whether simply through voting, or in a more engaged capacity – had transformative 
potential. It is suggested that through organising and participating in this informal 
referendum citizens would gain a sense of their own agency and capacity to influence 
change: “without the need to have the guidance of institutions” (ibid.). Such 
comments are interesting to consider in light of Norval’s (2006) account of 
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democratic subjectivity formation.5 Organisers demonstrate their aspirations to 
foster a new kind of democratic agency in the population. And their sense that 
popular participation in this referendum could help do this finds support in Norval’s 
account of democratic subjectivity formation through key experiential moments. 
Whether the referendum could really be said to have had this impact is an issue I 
return to in section 4.4.4. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Discussed in-depth in chapter 2.  
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4.3.3. “To give a peaceful and democratic way out of the crisis” 
 
“It was a tool to give us a way out”, explains ex-Radical Cause leader, Rafael Uzcategui, 
“- a legal, constitutional, participatory democratic way out” (2012). He articulates the 
most ubiquitous claim made by organisers regarding the purpose of the referendum: 
that it was intended to 'give a way out', of 'the crisis' and the government of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez. Every organiser and participant interviewed described the referendum 
in this way at some point, and for some this was the main way in which they 
explained its purpose and significance.  
 
But what exactly can they mean? In what sense could this non-binding mock 
referendum have offered a way out of anything? A way out of what exactly? And in 
exchange for what alternative state of affairs? I suggest that in order to make sense of 
this construction it is necessary to situate the referendum in its social and political 
context, and the complex struggles for and against reform of the state taking place at 
this time. When viewed in this light, organisers' depiction of the referendum as a 'way 
out of the crisis' is revealing of a discursive strategy at the heart of this initiative. I 
elaborate on this before turning to a closer analysis of this discursive strand in 
organiser accounts of the referendum. Despite the similarities in organiser accounts 
there are important cleavages in their constructions of the referendum as a 'way out 
of the crisis', which are interesting to consider.  
 
As highlighted in section 4.1, by 1992, a decade of worsening economic crisis had 
morphed into a full-blown social and political crisis. Widespread anger at politicians, 
high voter abstention, combined with increasing social unrest, contributed to growing 
demands for reform of the political system and the state (Ellner 2013). President 
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Pérez himself was in a highly vulnerable position. Whilst supported by a certain 
sector within Democratic Action, there was fierce opposition from the traditional base 
angered by the unexpected economic programme (Trincado 2012; Joquera 2003).1 It 
is the perspective of various commentators and scholars that Carlos Andrés Pérez 
was to some extent the unwitting victim of political circumstance (Ellner 2008; 
Lalander 2010). As Lalander puts it: “CAP was certainly a scapegoat of the collapse of 
partyarchy2 and of the revenge against the political culture of corruption” (2010, p. 
143). 
  
It was in this context that the demand for 'A Way Out' ('Una Salida'), defined in 
opposition to Pérez, gained ground. In discourse theoretical terms, 'A Way Out' 
emerged as a nodal point and potential empty signifier within various different 
discourses, uniting different groups and on which a multitude of different demands 
were pegged. This discursive formation was based on the creation of a political 
frontier between the notion of a 'way out' of the crisis; all that this might mean and all 
those working towards this, and President Pérez, who functioned as the enemy 
responsible for blocking attainment of the Way Out. The Radical Cause party was just 
one of several different groups consciously promoting this discursive formation. 
Another group, and probably the most influential, were 'the Notables', as they were 
named by the press. This group of public intellectuals including novelists and 
prominent members of the clergy had arrived on the political scene when they sent 
an open letter to President Pérez, Congress and the political parties in August 1990. 
                                                        
1    Traditionally a centrist to centre-left party, with a basis in the labour movement, there had been 
surprise and anger at key decisions taken by Pérez since commencing the presidency. In addition to 
the 'package' of neoliberal reforms, key positions in the cabinet were given to  non-AD members 
connected with Venezuela's elite business school, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de 
Administracion (Joquera 2003).  
2   'Partyarchy' refers to a system of two party rule (Lalander 2010). This was the effective outcome of 
the Punto Fijo Pact which dominant political leaders signed in 1958. 
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They called on the government to implement a series of reforms designed to resolve 
the crisis including proposals for the reform of the state and the existing electoral 
system, to be replaced by democratic mechanisms for “real participation of the 
electorate” (Lalander 2010).  Amongst the proposed reforms was a recall referendum 
on President Pérez. Following this initial contribution to the debate, the Notables 
became fierce critics of Pérez (and were subsequently blamed by Pérez himself for his 
downfall (El Universal 2010)3). 
 
As one referendum organiser put it, the Radical Cause party: “...saw all this, and we 
took advantage” (Almeida Pérez 2012). As Pérez was constructed as the problem and 
his removal the solution, across a range of different discourses operating at the time, 
the Radical Cause attempted to radicalise the central (still floating) signifier 'a way 
out (of the crisis)' and to capitalise on the opportunity to attract support outside of 
their traditional base.4 This process is best captured through their interactions with 
the so-called Notables.  Despite the groups' divergent background, politics, and 
arguably, motivations, the Radical Cause publicly aligned themselves with the 
Notables' proposals. On the evening of the referendum day, when Radical Cause 
General Secretary, Pablo Medina, read out the results to a waiting crowd in central 
Caracas, he commenced by reading out the proposal of the Notables (Rodriguez 
2012). In this way the Radical Cause party's subversive action was framed as part of a 
much wider movement, and supporting and supported by these respected 
establishment figures. From the perspective of hegemonic struggle this was 
                                                        
3    They were influential in the reformulation of the Supreme Court (another one of their demands for 
reform of the state). The newly constituted Supreme Court would then go on to approve 
impeachment of Perez the following year. 
4    In Political Discourse Theory, a 'floating signifier' is a signifier whose meaning remains contested, 
as different discourses attempt to define its meaning in their own terms. If any given discourse 
successfully achieves hegemony the signifier is de-contested, and expands to enable the inscription 
of countless demands, hence it is denominated an 'empty' signifier (Howarth 2004). 
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potentially effective in two ways. On the one hand, new groups may have identified 
with the Radical Cause party through their association with the Notables, helping the 
party build support in sectors outside of their traditional base in the popular classes, 
student movement and the labour movement.5 And on the other hand, the action 
supported their efforts to capture and define the signifier 'way out of the crisis' on 
their terms, and universalise Radical Cause party discourse.  
 
The Radical Cause, during this period, should be understood as attempting to build a 
hegemonic block, which would have the strength to challenge the Pérez government 
and more fundamentally the Punto Fijo system – the system of pacted democracy 
which had prevailed since the 1950s. References to the referendum as offering a 'way 
out of the crisis' reflect a conscious discursive strategy on their part to capitalise on 
wider discursive trends and build a movement in opposition to the government, and 
the existing political system. The removal of Pérez through a referendum was 
consciously constructed as the route to transformative change and real democracy in 
the Radical Cause's communications and – as the informant responses illustrate - 
subsequently came to be seen in this way by members and supporters alike. As 
Gregorio Almeida Pérez puts it; “…[Pérez was] like a piece that had to be moved in 
order to open the path to democracy, because Carlos Andrés Pérez had turned into a.. 
shall we say, a kind of stopper” (ibid.). 
 
                                                        
5    Indeed, some organiser accounts suggest that they were successful in building connections outside 
their traditional base. Gregorio Almeida Pérez comments; “what you call the 'organised middle 
class' were very involved, they helped us a lot.” He recalls how middle class professionals 
associations and movements, principally those who had lost their savings as a result of the banking 
crisis, became involved with the Radical Cause during this period. “We even managed to have a 
movement of judges!” he recalls, demonstrating the breadth of Radical Cause links with civil society 
(2012).  
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The debate around a referendum on Pérez, therefore, encapsulates an unusual 
situation in which factions within both the right and the left proposed a referendum 
as a concrete solution to the crisis, using much the same rhetoric, and each suggesting 
it offered 'a way out'.  However, whilst the Notables hoped to create an outlet for 
popular unrest and thereby 'save democracy', Radical Cause hoped the event would 
be a catalyst for more fundamental change. They hoped the removal of Pérez as a 
result of public pressure would give force to the popular movement, opening up 
political space and creating opportunities for change previously impossible under the 
Punto Fijo regime. Therefore, below common rhetorical references to a 'way out' and 
a solution to the crisis is a struggle to define exactly what these claims actually mean 
and the kind of post-Pérez political order for which they would serve as a basis. 
 
4.3.4. Radical Cause constructions of the referendum as a “peaceful and 
democratic way out” 
 
Even within Radical Cause members' accounts there is evidence of a discursive 
struggle, where different factions attempt to define the signifier 'Way Out (of the 
crisis)' in quite different terms. Within the repeated descriptions of the referendum 
as 'offering a way out', several different discursive constructions can be identified. At 
opposite ends of the spectrum there are what I will reductively call the 'radical' way 
out and the 'conservative' way out narratives. Both narratives are constructed around 
the central claim that the referendum offered a 'peaceful and democratic way out' and 
an 'alternative' (to violence), but with quite different meanings and implications for 
how the tactic should be understood.  
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The central difference between the two narratives is how the referendum, as a tactic, 
is constructed in relation to illegal and/or violent tactics, most evident in references 
made to the possibility of a second coup attempt against the government of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez. Within the conservative narrative the referendum is presented as 
intended to avoid a second coup. Carlos Melo exemplifies this perspective and wider 
discursive formation when he claims: “The principal objective was to demonstrate 
that we could find a way out of Perez through the peaceful route.” “We have had the 
coup and we have had the referendum...” he adds, constructing the events in 
opposition to one another (2012). Within this narrative, armed struggle and the use 
of violent and un-democratic means are rejected on ideological grounds. This is 
evident mostly through the implicit value attributed to an alternative to such means. 
Melo, for example, observes: “It could have been a way out... through the route of the 
referendum, we have could come out democratic” and “[the idea of a referendum was 
important] ...because it was a peaceful way out. Political. It could be legitimate, 
democratic – it was a way out of the crisis” (2012).  
 
In contrast, within the radical way out narrative the referendum is presented as an 
alternative but additional tactic, intended to work in parallel and indeed to support 
more clandestine activity. Gregorio Almeida Pérez captures this most pointedly when 
he argues:  
 
So that was what we were saying with this referendum [the need to find a way out from 
CAP]. And above all to support a coup against Carlos Andrés Pérez (2012).  
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Pablo Medina (General Secretary in '92 and coordinator of the referendum), similarly 
demonstrates his support for this perspective, stressing that the event was not 
intended to prevent a second uprising against the government:  
 
It wasn't referring to the coup. It wasn't about that. It was about the figure and the methods 
which were used by Carlos Andrés Pérez. What's more if that was the purpose for some in 
the Radical Cause well... it was a failure! Because in December was the other coup (2012) 
 
Unsurprisingly there is a correlation between organisers' current political allegiances 
and which of these narrative strands they articulate. In general, organisers who most 
clearly articulate the radical way out narrative align themselves with the 
government.6 Whilst those who most clearly exemplify the conservative way out 
narrative are aligned with the opposition and critical of the government. Given 
President Hugo Chávez'7 involvement with these early nineties' coup attempts it is 
unsurprising that opposition politicians are critical and seek to distance themselves, 
whilst government supporters do the opposite.8   
 
There is however a third, more ambiguous, narrative strand: located somewhere 
between the radical and conservative versions. In this account the referendum is 
constructed in opposition to 'the violent route', yet without the ideological 
condemnation of violent or illegal tactics. For some articulating this position, violence 
                                                        
6   Though not always: Pablo Medina, for example, now aligns himself with the opposition and is very 
critical of the government. He was however part of the Chávez government for a number of years.  
7    Hugo Chávez was the president at the time of interviews: July to August, 2012.  
8    Of course, just as organisers' political affiliations and position have in several cases changed since 
1992, so may the ways in which they construct this event. Those articulating the conservative way 
out narrative now – or the radical version – may well have presented the event differently at the 
time.  
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is rejected but on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds. Rafael Uzcategui, 
himself a former guerrilla, comments:   
 
The left had to revise their mistake – to have initiated an armed struggle, and in one way 
contributed to their own disarray, and to the loss of their relation with the people9  (2012).  
 
Similarly, Jose Albornos comments: 
 
Venezuela was coming from this history of armed struggle, this resounding failure... the 
popular movement did not take it up, why? Because it was fear that the guerrilla movement 
produced in the people rather than anything else (2012). 
 
For others, the violent and/or illegal route is not rejected on ideological nor 
pragmatic grounds, but the solution of a referendum is presented as offering a 
preferable alternative. One participant comments:  
 
Now, the referendum is like one weapon, and like it says here [pointing to publicity 
material for the event] 'a peaceful, democratic way out before the crisis', it was a very 
important tool. For consciousness raising. Or rather, facing a violent way out, well there 
was a methodology that was the referendum. That the people express themselves. But what 
happened was that it was not taken into account (Contreras 2012)  
 
Making a similar point, Gregorio Almeida Pérez reminds us that if the same ends 
could be achieved through the existing system, this would of course be preferable:  
 
                                                        
9    Uzcategui elaborates on this point: “...It was then that Acción Democrática and COPEI received the 
biggest electoral success. Around 90% of the votes in the country” (2012) 
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Well no group in the Radical Cause wanted a violent way out…because if you lose, well at 
the very least you have to leave the country, if they don't kill you, or imprison you. Because, 
well, you are doing something totally illegal… violently against a constitutional regime 
(2012)  
 
In this narrative, therefore, the referendum is presented as an alternative, 'peaceful, 
democratic way out', which promised to help avoid a second coup: in line with the 
conservative narrative. However, unlike the conservative narrative, and much like the 
radical narrative, the referendum is not distinguished from what the coup leaders 
were trying to achieve. It is understood as part of the same process, or project, and 
“one weapon” in a wider struggle, comprised of the full range of tactics: “...open, 
closed, legal, clandestine”, all of which were important in the struggle against Pérez 
(Contreras 2012). 
 
The divergence in organiser accounts of the referendum as a way out reveal the 
complexity of the discursive struggle around transformation of the state, as well as 
how differently the a-legal strategy was understood by different organisers in this 
instance. I return to a discussion of this construction of the referendum as 'to give a 
way out' and its implications for a theory of a-legal space in section 4.4.3.  
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4.4. Implications for a theory of a-legal space  
 
The aim of this section is to develop the account of a-legal space as a strategy for 
political change which has so far been developed. In the first three sub-sections I 
consider ways in which the a-legal initiatives which are the subject of this study 
diverge from Hans Lindahl's (2013) notion of a-legality. They do so in several 
important ways. Firstly, they emulate an institutional process which is demanded, and 
which embodies aspects of another kind of order. To this extent they do more than 
“fleetingly” “intimate” another way of ordering, as Lindahl puts it (2013, p. 1). 
Secondly, these initiatives are in general lawful, in contrast to Lindahl's legally 
ambiguous and transgressive scenarios. Thirdly, arguably, the a-legal space strategy is 
inconsistent with Lindahl's central distinction between weak and strong a-legality. I 
expand on each of these in turn and, drawing on the Radical Cause referendum on 
Pérez, develop an account which allows us to explain how a-legal initiatives belong to 
the same category of behaviour as Lindahl's a-legality, whilst also recognising how 
they are different. In the fourth sub-section (4.4.4) I take the opportunity to explore 
the connection between a-legal space, democratic subjectivity formation and political 
grammar change in more depth.  
 
4.4.1. From 'intimating' to legitimating and institutionalising another order,  
through the use of a-legal space 
 
I have argued that the a-legal initiatives which are the subject of this study are a 
variant of the behaviour Lindahl (2013) denominates as a-legal. However, it is also 
clear that these initiatives also do something quite different to the scenarios Lindahl 
describes. Recounting the 'vagrant's' unusual behaviour in the restaurant, Lindahl 
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notes how “fleetingly” he disrupted the extant legal order and “intimated another way 
of ordering” (2013 p. 1, emphasis added). Peoples’ tribunals, unofficial referenda and 
other a-legal initiatives do more than fleetingly intimate another way of ordering. 
They explicitly enact an institutional process which exemplifies another order. In this 
sub-section I address this difference and what a-legal initiatives do which exceeds the 
behaviour described by Lindahl. Drawing on the Radical Cause referendum on Pérez I 
suggest that they attempt to legitimate and institutionalise, rather than merely 
intimate, an alternative order. The accounts of several different interview participants 
support this characterisation, and three specific strategies can be identified by which 
organisers attempt to legitimate and begin to institutionalise the referendum, and by 
extension another way of ordering.  
 
As has been argued, Carlos Andrés Pérez was constructed as the ‘Other’ in Radical 
Cause party discourse and in other discursive strands dominant in earlier nineties 
Venezuela. He had become synonymous with the wider political and legal order in 
which the lower classes were denied political agency, and which was thereby 
“blocking the full constitution of…[their] self-identity” (Griggs and Howarth 2000, p. 
56). The specific function of the referendum, I suggest, was related to legitimating 
their counter-hegemonic project and de-legitimating the existing order. This is 
supported by several different sources. Activist and referendum participant, Juan 
Contreras, reflects:    
 
The people had to legitimate that action of 27th, 28th of February [the Caracazo], of February 
4th [first failed coup attempt], together with that generation of young military men, that 
expressed themselves... It was in that context that this [the referendum] was organised 
(2012). 
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Hence, for Contreras at least, the significance of the referendum was to legitimate the 
Caracazo and the attempted military coups. Hence, significantly, this a-legal action is 
depicted as intended to legitimate the unambiguously illegal actions of rioting, 
looting, and insurrection. Media and communication scholar, Professor Reyes, takes 
much the same perspective:  
 
...February 4th there was the attempt at a coup by President Chávez. The Radical Cause was 
totally aligned with the president [Chávez]. It was the civil arm of the coup. And the attempt 
at a referendum was an attempt to demonstrate the lack of legitimacy of performance of 
President Pérez. It was intended to show that the government lacked legitimacy, in order to 
prepare for what was in November the second attempt at a coup, that was more civil than 
miliatary. The intention of the Radical Cause in June was to demonstrate through the media 
that the government of President Pérez lacked legitimacy of performance (Interview, 
2012).  
 
Interestingly, Pérez’ finance minister, Dr. Pedro Rosas shares this interpretation. 
When asked what he thought the organisers of the referendum wanted to achieve, he 
is in no doubt:  
 
Without a doubt, demonstrate that the government had no legitimacy, and that it had to be 
replaced by a temporary government that would promptly call new elections (2012).  
 
There is support, therefore, from diverse sources, for characterising the referendum 
as part of a broader counter-hegemonic project, and explicitly intended to legitimate 
the broader project to which it belonged and de-legitimate the extant hegemonic 
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order. Understanding how exactly it was hoped to play this function requires a closer 
analysis of the actions and statements of organisers. Here we can find an analysis of 
three inter-connected strategies intended to establish legitimacy and begin to 
institutionalise another order.  
 
Firstly, and most obviously, the referendum involved a performance of formality as is 
characteristic of the a-legal form. Organisers not only declared the event a 
‘referendum’ rather than an opinion poll or a protest, but emulated the format and 
procedures of an official state-based electoral process. Cardboard ballot boxes were 
constructed and anonymous ballot papers, which were later counted publicly and in 
the presence of members of the public who had volunteered as “witnesses” (Melo 
2012; Albornos 2012). One organiser recalls that voters had to show their 
identification card and number, which was recorded along with their name, in order 
to vote (Melo 2012). And another organiser recalls how they enlisted the support of 
international advisers, flown in from other countries such as Brazil that had 
experience of referenda. This wasn't a major feature of the event, he notes, but was 
intended to “give a better image of legality” (Almeida Pérez 2012). This quasi-legal, 
quasi-institutional approach, which is a defining feature of a-legal initiatives, can be 
understood as an attempt to claim legitimacy through adherence to recognised norms 
and procedures. It is a claim to a Weberian rational-legal authority (Weber 1958). 
 
Secondly, in addition to imitating a formal institutional process, organisers attempted 
to utilise institutional resources and openings where possible. As one example, efforts 
were made to engage the formal body in charge of election management during this 
period, the Supreme Electoral Commission (Consejo Supremo Electoral, CSE), in the 
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referendum process. The Radical Cause party initially submitted a proposal to the CSE 
to oversee the referendum. When the CSE unsurprisingly refused the Radical Cause 
continued to implicate it in the referendum process. Publicity materials for the event 
listed the contact details of the CSE, and the Radical Cause representative there. As 
one organiser explains, “we had a representative at the CSE,10 so we used the CSE to 
receive the results, we presented them to the CSE” (Uzcategui 2012). In Bolivar State, 
Radical Cause state governor, Andrés Valesquez reportedly called on all members of 
the cabinet and government support staff to participate in the referendum (Luis 
Trincado, Interview, 2012). So here, as Luis Trincado observes, “whilst it was not 
formal... there was structural support.”11 Efforts were also made to advance the 
broader campaign for a recall referendum on Pérez through the formal channels: 
agreements were made between the Radical Cause and other parties to back calls for a 
referendum in Congress (Melo 2012). Therefore, as one organiser put it, they “used 
the parliamentary route with the extra-parliamentary route, a combination of the new 
elements with the state based element” (Uzcategui 2012).  
 
In some instances, we can see that there is an ambiguity and cross-over between 
these two strategies of emulation of official processes on the one hand, and attempts 
to utilise institutional resources and mechanisms on the other hand. Organiser, José 
Albornos, elaborates on their attempts to engage the Supreme Electoral Commission:  
 
                                                        
10 The Supreme Electoral Commission (CSE) was made up of representatives from the different 
political parties. At this time there was one Radical Cause representative at the CSE: José Lira, who is 
also one of the interview subjects. 
11 This is reminiscent of the first Catalan independence referendum held in the town of Arenys de 
Munt in 2009, in which the mayor declared his support for the initiative and announced he would 
be participating. This was despite the Spanish Supreme Court ruling that the initiative was 
'unconstitutional' and must not take place within the council buildings (Castillo 2009). 
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JA: We made the formal solicitations for the referendum [to the CSE], and of course they 
didn't grant it legality. Well, they wouldn't permit it. But- 
C: But you tried to achieve a formality?  
JA: Of course – it had formality. The legal administration and formal... was done, to request 
that the CSE could be the body in charge and direct it. 
(Albornos 2012) 
 
So it seems that recognised procedures for administration of an election were 
adhered to (at least in some ways and to some extent) and formal solicitations made 
to the CSE, despite an understanding that the institutional support would “of course” 
not be granted (ibid.).  That efforts to engage the CSE were made without any 
expectation of success is evidence that they played some other function: I suggest 
they be seen as supporting and indeed part of the performance of formality.  
 
In other instances, they were able to use the institutional powers they held in 
combination with this performance of formality. One organiser describes how Radical 
Cause party deputies Pablo Medina and Aristóbulo Istúriz spoke about the 
referendum in Congress on the day of the event:  
 
They were saying that there is a referendum going on outside, the people are already 
deciding, and that the decision had to be taken into account inside [of Congress] (Rodriguez, 
2012).  
 
Then, upon exiting the Congressional building, the deputies went directly to join the 
crowds in front of the statue of Bolivar in Bolivar Plaza in central Caracas. The 
national anthem was sung, before Medina read out the first results that were in, from 
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the Caracas region (Rodriguez 2012). Recitals of the national anthem and the 
symbolically important location contributed to a performance of formality and 
officialdom, which underlies the creation of a-legal space. What is interesting in this 
instance is how the party used their access to formal legal spaces, such as 
congressional debates, to promote the event and assert its legitimacy. This can be 
understood as going a small way towards merging the legal and a-legal spaces, as was 
so successful in the Colombian students' seventh ballot initiative. And indeed there is 
some evidence of their success. Organiser Roberto Rodriguez recalls media coverage 
of the event, in the press and on television where “they even debated if it was legal or 
it wasn't legal” (2012).  
 
Alongside these two strategies was another somewhat different way in which 
organisers attempted to demonstrate the legitimacy of the referendum, and their 
wider political project. In newspaper coverage and Radical Cause party promotional 
literature, as well as organiser testimony, is evidence of a conscious effort to 
construct the referendum as an expression of 'the popular will'. The Radical Cause 
representative at the Supreme Electoral Commission, quoted in newspaper coverage 
of the event, exemplifies this framing when he asserts:  
 
It is clear that this referendum ceased to be a rehearsal, to become an expression of the 
popular will, expressed by the people that are calling out for Carlos Andrés Pérez to go (José 
Lira, quoted in Ultimás Noticias, 13th June, 1992).  
 
This framing was also adopted in some of the more sympathetic newspaper coverage 
of the event, such as one article two days after the event which declared: “The 
Popular Will is that CAP Goes” (Morillo, Ultimás Noticias, June 13th 1992). And it is 
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evident in the discourse of all organisers interviewed. As one organiser reflected:  
 
It's not legal [the referendum], but it is legitimate. It is the popular expression... [Legitimacy 
derives] from what we call the original power of the people (Trincado 2012) 
 
And as another echoed:  
 
The Supreme Electoral Commission did not validate us. Congress didn't validate us. But it 
had the force of the street. Of the population... Legitimacy came from the people that 
participated...the volume of participants. The event was given legitimacy because the 
people, at the end of the day, assumed the referendum as a way out, as a possibility. That 
gave it legitimacy (Melo 2012). 
 
And as yet another explained:  
 
So the governing party, Democratic Action, decided that that was not valid... because they 
decided that it did not have legal support. But the population, the social fact, made it legal 
(Rodriguez 2012). 
 
In this third strategy we can see how the referendum was constructed in organisers’ 
discourse and explicitly in publicity materials as an expression of the ‘popular will’. 
As I have argued, the a-legal space strategy involves a dual claim to authority, based 
on an appeal to both existing constituted norms and procedures and to constituent 
power. The latter is exemplified here in organisers’ attempts to present the 
referendum as expressing the ‘popular will’.  
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In chapter three I introduced the notion of ‘two axes of legality’. I argued that one 
feature of how the use of a-legal space plays out is a two-dimensional struggle to 
define (il)legality. Organisers attempt to institutionalise what they are doing, which is 
reflected through progress on the axis of institutionalisation, whilst the government 
or other opponents seek to prohibit or criminalise what they are doing, which is 
reflected on the axis of prohibition/criminalisation. Whilst attempting to 
institutionalise the initiative, organisers must resist government efforts to prohibit 
and criminalise them. And likewise, the government must undermine their attempts 
at institutionalisation.  
 
Understood through this framework, we can see that the referendum organisers’ 
three strategies to legitimate and begin to institutionalise the referendum are 
primarily directed at progress on the axis of institutionalisation. In fact, there is only 
limited evidence of activity directed at progressing on the axis of 
prohibition/criminalisation. On the day before the event was due to take place the 
Supreme Electoral Commission reportedly held an emergency meeting, which was 
kept secret from the Radical Cause representative at the commission, in which they 
agreed to prohibit use of the CSE offices for administration of the referendum. 
Subsequently, the CSE is quoted in the press as describing the referendum as 
“absolutely offensive”. These can be interpreted as preliminary moves towards an 
attempt to construct the referendum as unlawful. The account of Pérez' finance 
minister in 1992, Pedro Rosas, is illuminating here. He explains that:  
 
When the security organisations detected the network of leaders from the Radical Cause 
who were involved, the government took action to stop the referendum but it was too late. 
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What’s more CAP was a leader who was open to opposition, and didn't want to silence his 
critics (Pedro Rosas Bravo 2012).  
 
From Rosas' account at least it would seem that efforts to prevent the referendum 
may have been considered, but for the main part the strategy of the government was 
to “try to ignore” the event (ibid.). 
 
The three strategic approaches to legitimate and begin to institutionalize the 
referendum are what distinguish a-legal initiatives from the broader category of a-
legality, in which another legal order is merely “intimated” (Lindahl 2013, p. 1). So we 
can see perhaps another more fundamental difference between a-legal initiatives and 
the wider category of a-legality. On the basis of this case it seems that a-legal 
initiatives are distinguished by their engagement with the axis of institutionalization. 
Why this might be is one issue I consider in the following sub-section.  
 
To conclude: the Radical Cause referendum supports an interpretation of the a-legal 
space strategy as designed to legitimate and begin to institutionalise another order. 
To this extent, initiatives of this form go further than the activities described by 
Lindahl which merely “intimate” another way of ordering (2013, p.1). Three 
interconnected strategies can be spotted through an analysis of the Radical Cause 
party's actions and public communications. These include an emulation of formal 
legal symbols, language and procedures; attempts to utilise institutional openings and 
resources where possible; and an attempt to frame the referendum as an expression 
of the popular will. These constitute the organisers' strategy to legitimate and 
institutionalise what they are doing. In terms of the two 'axes of legality', these 
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activities are directed at the axis of institutionalisation. Therefore, the case suggests 
that one way in which a-legal initiatives can be distinguished from the broader 
category of a-legality is through their engagement with the axis of institutionalisation.  
 
4.4.2. The importance of “breaking the rules!” for referendum organisers: a 
different kind of boundary transgression? 
 
As was noted in chapter two, another notable difference between a-legal initiatives 
and Lindahl's (2013) notion of a-legality is the transgressive nature of the behaviours 
involved. Peoples' tribunals, citizens' debt audits, non-binding referenda and other 
forms are, on the whole, lawful. The legality of these activities is sometimes strongly 
contested, as the Honduran fourth ballot box and the first Catalan independence 
referendum well illustrate. (Indeed, as suggested in the previous chapter, it might be 
a mark of more successful a-legal initiatives that they face legal challenges). However, 
the case for their illegality must be constructed through legal work: the onus is on 
critics to show that a law has been broken. In Lindahl's examples, such as the 
autoréduction, land occupations or insurrection, the challenge to and transgression of 
extant legal boundaries is immediately apparent. Potentially, this is a problem. For 
Lindahl, the transgression or at least the contestation of extant legal boundaries is 
central. Indeed, it is the modus operandi of a-legality. As he explains:  
 
By questioning how a legal order sets the boundaries that give shape to the distinction 
between legality and illegality, a-legality challenges how a concrete legal collective draws 
the limit between legal (dis)order and the unordered (2013, p. 158).  
 
Hence the limits of a legal order - which reveal its contingency and the possibility for 
alternatives - are made visible only indirectly, through this questioning of legal 
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boundaries. The French autoréduction protesters in the supermarket, for example, 
questioned existing legal boundaries through their transgressive behaviour which 
couldn't quite be categorised as legal or illegal. Was it charity work or extortion? 
Neither seems quite right.12 Crucially, the protestors behaved in a way that you are 
not supposed to. But because the behaviour did not easily fit into recognised 
categories of illegal action, nor legal action, it functioned – according to Lindahl's 
theory, at least – to challenge and reveal the limits of the extant legal order.  
 
The problem, therefore, is this: given the centrality of legally transgressive behaviour 
for Lindahl, can the mainly lawful initiatives which are here under investigation be 
expected to have the same disruptive effects? Indeed, should they even be understood 
as doing the same thing, and belonging to the same category of behaviour? If not, the 
utility of Lindahl's theory of a-legality for understanding these initiatives, which I 
have asserted throughout this thesis, is in question. However, one theme that 
emerges in the accounts of ex-Radical Cause leaders is intriguing. In organising the 
referendum, (some) organisers indeed understood themselves to be acting outside of 
the law; and transgressing extant legal boundaries. Moreover, the predicted effects of 
“breaking the rules!” in this way were central to what they hoped to achieve 
(Palavicini 2012).  
 
All referendum organisers and participants were asked if they saw any 'added-value' 
in the event's informal status. Which is to say, did it have any additional benefits 
when compared with a scenario in which the government had agreed to initiate a 
                                                        
12 See Eolas (2009) for a discussion of whether the action constitutes extortion. As Lindahl notes, 
interestingly, the jurist author broadly argues that it does but: “is careful, however, to go no further 
than asserting that the autoréduction is ‘very probably’ extortion” (Lindahl 2013, p. 46).  
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binding recall referendum on President Carlos Andrés Pérez.13 The following 
interchange with ex-Radical Cause leader, David Palavicini, is revealing:  
 
DP: ...Well of course. Its fundamental value was that it was illegal... This was the value. That 
it was illegal.  
CH: That is was illegal? 
DP: Of course – to call on the people to break the rules! 
CH: Ah, this was fundamental?  
DP: of course. If not, how can one change the state? To change the state you have to bring 
the people with you, so that they break the status quo.  
(Interview, 2012) 
 
When I objected that the referendum was in fact not illegal, Palavicini clarified: 
“illegal, because it was not in the law” (ibid.). Hence, acting outside of the legally 
recognised provisions and procedures of the existing democratic system was 
understood as transgressive, in a similar way to actually breaking the law. When 
pressed on the significance of this rule breaking behaviour Palavicini suggests that 
part of the value is in the expected subjective experience for participants:  
 
The referendum was another instrument to - as well as propagate ideas - to capture the 
attitude of the people towards a change and to dare them to do things that whilst they are 
not legal, they are legitimate... In this order between legality and legitimacy. And that itself 
produces endorphins... It stimulates the production of adrenaline. [Which effects] the mind 
and the creativity, it stimulates the need to be organised. 
 
                                                        
13  Which was not completely outside the bounds of possibility, given his eventual fate at the hands of 
Congress and his own party. 
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Palavicini's comments are significant in light of Lindahl's theory of a-legality. The 
benefits he foresees in participants' daring to transgress the rules and decide for 
themselves, and “do things that whilst they are not legal, they are legitimate” (ibid.), 
share comparisons with Lindahl's scenarios in which actors resist classification as 
illegal through their claim to legitimacy within a different legal order. Moreover, 
Palavicini's description of the effects of such behaviour takes us beyond Lindahl's 
account, in which the mechanics of the disruptive experience of a-legality are not 
spelled out. Lindahl talks only of a 'fleeting' disruption of the extant legal order and 
the 'intimation' of an alternative. Whilst Palavicini, in explaining the effects on 
“endorphins”, “the mind”, “creativity” and “the need to be organised” (ibid.), offers the 
beginnings of a deeper theorisation of what might be going on.  
 
Other organisers, similarly, identify a value in what they see as the provocative, 
subversive nature of the event. Luis Trincado observes:  
 
The fact that it did not have legality added an element, which was an impudence, a 
cheekiness, a daringness. That's to say, the state doesn't want it but we are doing it. It was a 
challenge. A challenge to the State.  To say, you, with your institutions, are not capable of 
channelling this imminent political crisis (Interview, 2012).  
 
In a similar vein, another organiser comments, “it was one more taunt” (Almeida 
Pérez 2012). 
 
One possibility is to understand the referendum, and other a-legal initiatives, as 
disrupting the legal order through a different channel. Instead of enacting unfamiliar 
behaviours which intimate a radically different legal order, they enact an institutional 
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process which could only belong to a radically different order. So despite their 
differences in style, both approaches may invoke a radically different legal order for 
those who are receptive to such a suggestion. This interpretation allows us to explain 
how a-legal initiatives belong to the same category of behaviour as Lindahl's a-
legality, whilst also recognising how they are different.  
 
Moreover, arguably, this idea can contribute to a gap in Lindahl's theory of legal 
boundaries and how they can be transgressed. As Lindahl explains, legal boundaries 
“establish what is legally important and relevant, and what is not” (2013, p. 159): 
they “join and separate places, times, subjects, and act contents within the concrete 
unity of a legal order” (ibid., p. 4). In other words, they are how a legal order 
manifests, in a specific set of laws which order social reality. Also, however, it is 
explained that boundaries are what “give shape to the distinction between legality 
and illegality” (ibid., p. 158): they “determine what is (il)legal” (ibid.). And when a-
legal behaviours challenge boundaries they “challenge(s) the illegality/legality 
disjunction” (ibid., p. 188). It is these latter descriptions of boundaries, which imply a 
dichotomous distinction between the categories of the legal and the illegal which, 
arguably, are problematic. As was argued in chapter 2, 'legal' can be conceived in two 
ways: lawful and legally recognised and sanctioned in law. The Radical Cause 
referendum, for example, was lawful but not legally recognised or sanctioned. If, as 
Lindahl claims, legal boundaries are to be conceived as that which “establish what is 
legally important and relevant, and what is not” (2013, p. 159), then they determine 
what is legal in both senses of the term. To put it another way: a legal order does 
more than tell us what we can't do; it recognises and apportions rights and provisions 
to particular behaviours, identities and other phenomena. On this basis, legal 
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boundaries might be better conceived as comprised of two kinds of dichotomous 
distinction. On the one hand, between behaviours, identities and other phenomena 
which have a basis in law and hence enjoy certain rights and provisions, and those 
that are not. And on the other hand, between behaviours, actions and other 
phenomena which are legally prohibited, and those that are not. 
 
However, Lindahl's examples of a-legality engage primarily with the latter dichotomy. 
He describes situations in which agents behave in a strange and unfamiliar way, and 
the question is whether this should be allowed: whether they have broken the law. In 
fact, in a footnote Lindahl notes how he was criticised for his “one-sided focus on 
illegality” in earlier accounts of a-legality (2013, p. 187 – 188). He is keen to stress 
that “(il)legality can be challenged from both sides of the disjunction, and not only by 
questioning what counts as illegal” (ibid., p. 159). To illustrate the potential for a-legal 
challenges from the other side of the disjunction, “from the pole of legality” (ibid.) as 
he puts it, he cites a case of politicised dog-walking:  
 
…in the face of a decree by the Serbian government prohibiting persons from gathering 
together in public places, people took massively to the streets to ‘walk their dogs’ in the 
period leading up to the downfall of Milosevic’s regime (ibid.).  
 
I’d argue, however, that this too continues to engage the latter dichotomy: whether an 
action is legally permissible or whether it is not. The dog walkers may be closer to the 
‘pole of legality’ than the French autoréduction protesters or a political group plotting 
armed insurrection. But the question they pose concerns whether their behaviour has 
broken the law. The scenario is provocative and earns its ‘a-legal’ designation because 
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although citizens are walking their dogs it is clear that something else is going on too 
which is rather close to the legally prohibited act of gathering in public.  
 
Activity which challenges the other kind of legal dichotomy would not question 
whether a behaviour is permissable or not, but whether a behaviour should be legally 
recognised and accorded certain legal provisions and/or otherwise institutionalised. 
For example, if a polyamorous trio attempted to gain legal recognition through 
requesting a marriage license. Or, to take a recent real world example: various 
Caribbean nations have initiated a legal case against the British government, 
requesting reparations for damages caused by slavery (Pryce 2015). These scenarios 
question the position of legal boundaries within the extant order, but in a different 
way. The polyamorous trio contest the categorisation of marriage within the extant 
legal order as between two people. The Caribbean nations contest the absence of legal 
recognition and provisions for the victims of historic crimes (amongst other issues) 
within the extant order. Like Lindahl’s examples of a-legality, these scenarios are 
intriguing, provocative and thought provoking. But crucially there is no suggestion of 
law breaking, because they challenge extant legal boundaries in a different way.  
  
The Radical Cause referendum on Pérez, I suggest, belongs in this other category of a-
legal behaviour. Through enacting a revocatory referendum on the president when no 
such mechanism existed within the Venezuelan democratic system they contested the 
absence of this mechanism and the structure of the existing system more generally. 
Turning to a-legal initiatives in general: the nature of the a-legality they enact is 
complex. In many instances – particularly, for example, with peoples’ tribunals – 
explicit claims are made concerning the injustice and illegality of behaviours which 
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are normalised and institutionalised. Such claims contest legal boundaries in the way 
that Lindahl’s examples do: they demand a shift in the line delineating the illegal and 
the legally permissible. Always, however, these initiatives engage in a-legality of this 
other kind, not considered by Lindahl. Through prefiguring an institutional process 
which could only belong to a different legal order, they challenge the institutions of 
the extant order and the values and conceptual frameworks on which these 
institutions are based. Considering a-legal initiatives in this way allows us to address 
a gap in Lindahl’s account, and to appreciate the complexity of a-legal challenges to 
the legal order.  
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4.4.3 A “democratic, constitutional and legal way out of the crisis”? Possibilities 
for radical change within the extant order 
 
There is another possible objection to the a-legal space strategy, as it is has been 
outlined so far. Arguably, attempts to use a-legal space to bring about fundamental 
structural change within the legal or political order are inconsistent with how Hans 
Lindahl (2013) has understood the potential and the limitations of a-legal activity.  
More specifically, this strategy is inconsistent with Lindahl’s central distinction 
between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ a-legality, and their respective potential to transform the 
extant legal order. In this sub-section I explain why, and offer a solution to this 
problem. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Lindahl distinguishes between a-legality in its ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ dimensions. This is not a value judgement, but relates to the nature and the 
extent of the challenge which is posed by an a-legal scenario or behaviour to the 
extant legal order. The Brazilian Landless Workers Movement (MST), who occupy 
disused land where they set up schools, farms and other useful activities, are given as 
one example of a-legality in its weak form. In the context of the extant Brazilian legal 
order, this behaviour is illegal: it is in violation of private property law. However, the 
MST argue that such actions should in fact be understood as legal and, crucially, they 
do so through an appeal to the extant Brazilian Constitution, claiming: “land 
occupations are rooted in the Brazilian Constitution, which says land that remains 
unproductive should be used for a ‘larger social function’” (MST cited in Lindahl 2013, 
p. 166). This behaviour exemplifies weak a-legality in Lindahl’s typology because it 
calls for a shift in the boundaries which define (il)legality, in the terms of and through 
an appeal to the extant legal order.  
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Strong a-legality, on the other hand, presents a more fundamental challenge to the 
extant legal order. This behaviour “has a normative point that definitively eludes both 
terms of the [legal/illegal] disjunction” (ibid., p. 169). The French autoréduction 
protesters might be used to exemplify strong a-legality. In attempting to take luxury 
goods for the unemployed they behaved in a way that is not easily defined within the 
extant legal order. Neither the familiar legal category of charity work nor the illegal 
category of extortion seems quite right, because both “miss the normative point” of 
the action (ibid., p. 165). Whilst weak a-legality demands a shift in legal boundaries 
“in light of the normative point of joint action” (ibid., emphasis added), strongly a-
legal activity has an entirely different ‘normative point’ altogether. It is here that 
Lindahl’s central categories of ‘limits’ and ‘fault lines’ come into play: weak a-legality 
reveals the limits of a legal order, which are the lines between what is ordered and 
what is unordered within a given legal order. Strong a-legality reveals the fault lines: 
the lines between legally ordered behaviour and behaviours which are not only 
unordered but could not be ordered within this particular legal order, because they 
presuppose a fundamentally different way of ordering society altogether, where the 
law is directed towards a different ‘normative point’ (ibid.).  
 
This has significant consequences in Lindahl's account. Whilst weak a-legality 
presents a “provisional interference”, which can be resolved through a shift in the 
boundaries which determine (il)legality within the extant legal order (ibid., p. 164), 
strong a-legality cannot be resolved through a shift in legal boundaries. The fault lines 
of a legal order, unlike its limits, cannot be moved. Instead: “they must be overstepped, 
and in being overstepped lead over from one legal collective into another” (ibid., p. 
176, emphasis in original). In other words, the extant legal order cannot be 
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transformed to accommodate the challenge contained in strongly a-legal behaviours 
and scenarios: the formation of a new legal order is required. As Lindahl explains:  
 
What cannot be said and done in one legal order can only be said and done by taking leave 
of that legal collective and entering another. The practical possibilities intimated by the 
strong dimension of a-legality, and which interfere with the range of practical possibilities 
available to a legal collective, can only be realized as our own possibilities if one adopts 
another first-person plural perspective. To accede to the normative demand raised by the 
strong dimension of a-legality is to take a one-way ticket across a normative fault line. A 
fault line marks the end of a legal collective in the spatial and temporal senses of the term: a 
place and a time beyond which it can no longer exist (Lindahl 2013, p..). 
 
Indeed, Lindahl suggests that all strong a-legality might be understood as a type of 
secessionist movement:  
 
What goes under the name of ‘secessionist’ movements is but one instance of the strong 
dimension of a-legality, although perhaps it would be more correct to say that a-legality 
confronts every legal collective with multifarious figures of secessionist aspirations, 
whether tumultuous or halcyon, heeded or ignored (ibid., p. 181 – 182).  
 
Strongly a-legal demands cannot be addressed within the extant legal order, instead 
they require a ruptural break and the creation of a new legal order within which 
these demands make sense. The problem, then, is that many or most a-legal initiatives 
seek to do exactly what Lindahl suggests cannot be done. Organisers seek 
transformational structural changes in extant political and legal systems, and hope to 
institutionalise aspects of the alternative legal and/or political order that they 
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exemplify. With a few obvious exceptions,1 organisers do not hope to secede from but 
to transform the extant legal order. This is particularly evident in organiser accounts 
of the Radical Cause referendum on President Pérez. As highlighted in section 4.3., the 
most frequent way that organisers described the referendum was as intended “to give 
a way out of the crisis”, and in particular “a democratic, constitutional and legal way 
out”. This common discursive construction in organiser accounts belies a more 
complex and contested discursive terrain, in which organisers struggle to define the 
signifier ‘way out’ in accordance with their past and present political projects and 
allegiances. In what I call the ‘conservative’ way out narrative, the referendum as 
‘way out’ is depicted as a way to avoid further violence. Contrastingly, a ‘radical’ way 
out narrative casts the referendum as an ‘additional tool’ to support and legitimate a 
second coup. Most interesting, however, is a third more ambiguous narrative, located 
discursively somewhere between the other two. Articulated explicitly by a number of 
organisers and evident to some degree in all organiser accounts, the referendum is 
depicted as an alternative to ‘the violent route’, whilst still in pursuit of a radical and 
fundamental constitutional shift. Sharing much with Harnecker’s (2007) 
interpretation of the a-legal space tactic, this ‘middle way’ narrative of the 
referendum as ‘way out’ suggests that this referendum somehow transcended the 
legal/illegal; reform/revolution dichotomy of the past. As organiser, Luis Trincado, 
puts it:  
 
The referendum was a type of call out ['campanazo'] to wake everyone up. To say we don't 
have to wait until he finishes his mandate, we don't want him to finish. We want to break 
the constitutional democratically. With popular participation. Not with a coup. Not with 
                                                        
1   Such as the various a-legal Catalan Independence referenda, and other initiatives associated with 
independence movements.  
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measures of force. But with a mass popular movement that says to the political class: it’s 
over (2012).  
 
And as Rafael Uzcategui explains:  
 
All this [the various actions taken to promote the referendum including in the international 
media] helped us; there was a type of accumulation, of a force… an insurrectionary exercise. 
It was an insurrectionary exercise. From a non-violent route. Because we said that it was the 
popular way out, the constitutional way out, the democratic way out (2012).  
 
These accounts of an “insurrectionary exercise” (ibid.), intended to “break the 
constitutional democratically” (Trincado 2012), exemplify a construction of the 
referendum as intended to achieve radical and fundamental constitutional change, 
from within the strictures of the existing legal order. Organisers hoped to usher in a 
new legal and political order, structured to support the democratic agency of 
ordinary citizens and to remove the power of Venezuela’s traditional political class, 
without seizing power through force nor any kind of ruptural break with the existing 
legal order. The problem is that if we accept Lindahl’s framework, then strongly a-
legal challenges, which call for a realignment of the legal and political order around a 
different set of collective values, cannot be resolved within the extant legal order. 
Strongly a-legal demands will be ignored or co-opted; they cannot be met. Hence 
constructions of the referendum as a ‘way out’ reveal a fundamental problem in the 
Radical Cause party’s political strategy. Following Lindahl, it would seem that the 
party misunderstood the types of changes which are possible through this form of 
political action. More generally, we may have uncovered a limitation to the use of a-
legal space as a strategy for transformative change. 
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In what follows, I suggest that theories of political grammar change can be used to 
provide a solution to this deadlock. Norval’s (2006) model of political grammar 
change as ‘aspect-change’ provides a way to explain how what is unthinkable and 
unintelligible becomes intelligible, but in such a way that it “steers a path between 
radical rupture and continuity” (Norval 2006, p. 238). Moreover, research into the 
conditions in which political grammar change might occur supports the idea that a-
legal space can be used in this way. 
 
As a starting point, it is helpful to point out, as one reviewer has, that legal order in 
Lindahl's account is “first and foremost a symbolic order” (Geenans 2015, p. 84, 
emphasis in original).2 Building on this, I suggest that Lindahl’s conception of legal 
order lends itself particularly well to comparison with the notion of political 
grammar. As already noted in chapter 2, the concepts of political grammar and 
discourse are similar: both providing a schema through which social reality is made 
sense of. The added-value of the less established concept of political grammar is to 
help explain why certain discourses flourish and others flounder in a given social 
context (Hausknost 2011). It can be seen as a more foundational level within the 
discursive structures which prevail in a given context. Much like political grammar, in 
Lindahl’s framework, legal order functions as a foundational symbolic structure, 
which delimits the possibilities for discursive change and has greater rigidity and 
resistance to change than particular discursive formations.  
 
                                                        
2    Indeed, Lindahl is criticised by this reviewer for failing to spell out the influence of continental 
philosophy on his theory of a-legality and for the “quasi-absence of Foucault” given the resemblance 
of legal order in this account to the Foucauldian notion of 'truth-regime' (Geenans 2015, p. 84). As 
Geenans (ibid.) notes: “For Foucault, an order of truth lays down what kind of statements can be 
considered true or false, and thus makes meaningful speech possible; yet it does so by creating a 
certain blindness for the limits of the order in which one finds oneself.” 
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Drawing on Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘aspect-change’, Norval (2006) argues that 
political grammar change – the adoption of new ways of seeing and thinking – is 
analogous to the process by which a rabbit-duck optical illusion is seen suddenly as a 
duck, after it had always appeared previously to be a rabbit. An entirely different 
picture has emerged, but nothing external has changed. And importantly, the process:  
 
should not be treated as a moment of radical break, but as a rearrangement of elements 
that makes possible a new way of seeing something (Norval 2006, p. 238) 
 
I suggest that this can be used as a theoretical model for the process of legal order 
change. Following an aspect-change at the societal level, a legal order is changed. 
The specific contents of laws and constitutions of course remain unchanged, at 
least in the short term. But the way in which members of a legal collective 
understand the ‘normative point’ of their collective action: the normative point of 
the legal order, can be shifted through a collective aspect-change. Following this 
shift, there may be a new impetus to change now ‘outdated’ laws; a shift in the 
standard way in which particular kinds of laws are interpreted; and new legal 
developments are seen as legally possible.  
 
As a highly abstracted theoretical model, this provides a way to conceive of radical 
change within a given legal order without the need for a ruptural break. Moreover, 
there is evidence to suggest that the use of a-legal space can on occasion satisfy the 
conditions for a collective aspect-change. Probably the most explicit example of 
this phenomenon is provided by the Colombian seventh ballot in 1990, when the 
idea of holding a referendum on the creation of a constituent assembly to re-write 
the constitution went from legally impossible to legally necessary, in the eyes of the 
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Colombian Supreme Court, the government, and – it would seem - the wider 
Colombian public.3 Repeated attempts at constitutional reform had been made by 
both Liberal and Conservative administrations throughout the 1970s and 1980s.4 
This included President Barco’s 1988 proposal for a referendum to reform the 
constitution to allow for a future referendum on the convocation of a constituent 
assembly.  In all cases, these attempts at reform were overturned by the Colombian 
Supreme Court, deemed unconstitutional. After the Colombian student 
movement’s a-legal, seventh ballot referendum in which millions of Colombians 
participated, a shift had occurred within the extant Colombian legal order. The 
government took action which was previously explicitly ruled unconstitutional, 
organising a binding consultation on the convocation of a constituent assembly. 
The government explained it was now “complying with its constitutional 
obligation to preserve public order and search for all the means necessary to 
achieve the re-establishment of this” (Republic of Colombia 1990). And the 
Supreme Court upheld this extra-ordinary action, citing as justification the seventh 
ballot as evidence of the “Colombian will” (Colombian Supreme Court 1990).  
 
I have offered an account of a-legal activity and the effect it might have on the legal 
order which differs to that of Lindahl. However, it offers theoretical and practical 
advantages over Lindahl’s rather rigid categorisation of weak and strong a-legality, 
and their respective capacities to bring about change. Possibilities for change are 
seriously constrained within Lindahl’s framework. But for exceptional events, such 
as revolutions, coups, or secession, the ‘normative point’ of a legal order must 
                                                        
3   Discussed in-depth in chapter 3.  
4   Failed attempts at constitutional reform were made by the governments of Liberal presidents López 
Michelsen, Turbay Ayala and Virgilio Barco, in 1977, 78 and 88 respectively, and Conservative 
president Betancur in 1984 – 85. In all cases these moves were overturned by the Supreme Court.  
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remain unchanged. This is to say: the conceptual and normative framework on 
which a legal order is based cannot shift or evolve, not even incrementally. Not 
only does this present a pessimistic picture, it fails to reflect the way in which law 
evolves and changes over time.  
 
Lindahl is right to distinguish between weak and strong dimensions of a-legality.5 
Empirical research into the use of a-legal space broadly supports this typology. 
Some initiatives call for a shift in the boundaries of (il)legality, through appealing 
to the extant legal and political order. Others embody and exemplify aspects of an 
incommensurate legal order, demanding a radical re-think of what the law is for. 
Equally, Lindahl is right that weak a-legality can be more easily accommodated by 
the extant legal order. However, as I hope to have shown, strong a-legality can also 
be addressed without the end of the extant legal order. Through a shift in the 
political grammar, that which could not be said and done within a given legal order 
can become possible.  
 
 
4.4.4. Political grammar change through the formation of new democratic 
subjectivities in a-legal spaces 
 
In this final sub-section, I turn back to the Radical Cause referendum on President 
Pérez and explore what evidence we have to believe it affected the political grammar 
through prompting collective aspect change. In the previous section I argued, against 
Lindahl, for the conceptual possibility of fundamental change within a given legal 
order. The conceptual and moral framework on which a legal order is based can 
change, without a ruptural break and the need to create an entirely new legal order. 
                                                        
5    Of course, as ideal types: in reality, instances of a-legal activity will tend to involve a messier mix of 
both strong and weak a-legal demands (Lindahl 2013).  
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Contrary to what Lindahl argues, the fault lines which delineate the currently ordered 
and the unorderable can indeed be shifted: theories of political grammar change 
provide a way to understand and model this process whereby the unintelligible 
becomes intelligible. But how likely and achievable is this outcome in most instances 
where the a-legal space strategy is used? The conceptual possibility of radical change 
in the legal order does not imply this outcome is likely or common. In fact, the seventh 
ballot - which I used to illustrate the potential for political grammar change through 
the use of a-legal space – is exceptional for its apparently outstanding impact. Indeed, 
it was selected as a case study because of its unusual association with radical change. 
In most instances impact is much harder to gauge. The limited public record and 
memory of the unofficial referendum on President Pérez suggest that organisers 
failed to reset the political grammar and thereby shift the horizons of the possible 
through this event, at least at the whole societal level. However, as I argued in section 
4.2, political grammar must be conceived like discourse as complex and multi-
layered, and applicable to the micro as well as macro level. As such, it is worth 
exploring the impact of a-legal space on political grammar within the small groups 
and communities most directly involved. On this basis, in this section I explore the 
evidence that the Radical Cause referendum created the conditions for an aspect-
change for the communities and sub-cultural groups who participated.  
 
I draw on Aletta Norval’s (2006) account of aspect-change through democratic 
subjectivity formation to explore this question. Seeking to address a gap within 
democratic theory, Norval (ibid.) has sought to explain the process by which 
democratic subjectivities are formed and re-activated. She argues that central to the 
process by which we “become democrats” are key experiential moments (ibid., p. 
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230). These moments function to trigger an ‘aspect-change’ (or ‘aspect-dawning’6), 
through which subjects attain a new sense of themselves as democrats: as actors in a 
democracy with agency.  As one example, she describes the experience of 
participation in South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994:  
 
Occupying the position of democratic subject brought a forceful new sense of subjectivity as 
equals into play, one that depended upon a public enactment at a particular point in time. 
Crucial to this enactment was a bodily participation, quite beyond the mere fact of the 
invisible ink marking being stamped on every voter's hand (2006, p. 230). 
 
Whilst ideas about democracy had occupied the public sphere for years and were 
central to the anti-apartheid struggle (Howarth 2000), the experience of this day 
contributed something new to public consciousness. The bodily experience of 
participation was central to the public assumption of a new democratic subjectivity. 
Importantly, on this day, external reality remained unchanged but it was perceived in 
a suddenly different way. Citizens underwent an aspect-change – analogous to seeing 
a rabbit-duck optical illusion as a duck, after it had always previously appeared as a 
rabbit. Through this key experience, a grammatical shift occurred and citizens 
emerged as democrats.7  
 
To be clear: the formation and re-activation of democratic subjectivities is just one 
way in which political grammars can change. Or to put it another way: just one kind of 
possible aspect-change. Whilst political grammar can be understood as “those 
                                                        
6    As discussed in section 2.2, Norval distinguishes between the original moment of identification and 
subsequent moments in which democratic subjectivities are re-activated. 'Aspect-dawning' is the 
term which refers to a first moment of democratic identification, and 'aspect-change' refers to 
subsequent moments of re-identification. Importantly, though, the two are understood to involve 
the same process (Norval 2006).  
7    See section 2.2.4. for a full exposition of Norval’s account of political grammar change/aspect-
change and the formation of democratic subjectivities.  
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horizons delimiting what is possible in any given context” (Norval 2006, p. 231), 
democratic subjectivity refers to our sense of agency as democrats. Hence, the two 
are intimately connected but not one and the same. The assumption of a democratic 
subjectivity is one way in which political grammar changes. However, given the 
democratic nature of a-legal space - the centrality of democratic language and claims 
in these spaces - this is perhaps the most relevant kind of political grammar change to 
explore.  
 
As a starting point, it is clear that supporting the activation of new democratic 
subjectivities in the wider Venezuelan public was central to what organisers hoped to 
achieve. As highlighted in section 4.3 (‘organiser aims and objectives’), the 
referendum was intended to create a space for political expression which was not 
otherwise available. Moreover, the act of political self-expression was expected to 
have formative and transformative effects. As one organiser explained:  
 
the people demonstrated in that referendum that it was possible to act like the state, to 
have the capacity to act, if they were organised, like the actual state on certain 
things...because the people started to realise that yes it was possible (Albornos 2012) 
 
Norval’s (2006) account of democratic subjectivity formation and re-activation 
through key experiences lends theoretical weight to organisers’ sometimes lofty 
claims. However, organisers’ grand plans notwithstanding, did this referendum really 
constitute the kind of experience which could prompt an aspect-change? I consider 
evidence for and against in turn.  
 
One might wonder how significant an experience participation in this event will have 
been for the majority of ‘voters’. What will this action have involved for most of the 
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several hundred thousand Venezuelans who reportedly participated? Perhaps they 
passed one of the makeshift polling stations on their journey to or from work, and 
stopped and filled out a ballot slip. Perhaps they talked about the experience with 
colleagues or friends and were struck by its novelty value. For many, or most, 
however, this will likely have been the end of it. Moreover, it is important to consider 
the dramatic and chaotic political context in which the referendum took place. As 
communication and media studies scholar, Professor Reyes reflects: “this attempt at a 
referendum… was far less transcendental than the other events that happened to us 
that year” (2012). In other words, can the experience of participating in this event 
really be thought to have had the qualities – the resonance, the import, the emotional 
impact – necessary to prompt an aspect-change? When compared with Norval’s 
(2006) example of the phenomenon, in which South African citizens participated in 
the country’s first democratic elections, the idea seems strained.  
 
However, as Norval (ibid.) is careful to point out, the process of aspect-change is not 
limited to such once in a lifetime moments. Indeed, it is a central mechanism by which 
democratic subjectivities are formed and re-activated throughout a lifetime. Hence, 
all kinds of events and experiences can play a role in this process. Turning back to the 
referendum, its aspect-change potential depends on how the event was experienced 
and what it meant to participants. For many, it may have amounted to the somewhat 
limited (maybe even superficial) experience depicted above. Other accounts, 
however, are intriguing. Activist and referendum participant Juan Contreras depicts 
the Radical Cause referendum as “one of the four key events of this period”, which 
indicated that the old regime was ending. The referendum, he explains, “was when 
the people said enough!” (Interview, 2012). Hence, he frames the event as the quiet 
beginning of a popular uprising. Of course, his retrospective interpretation has 
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twenty years of hindsight shaping his memories. However, if these comments 
approximate something of his experience of this event at the time, for Contreras and 
others like him, there is good reason to consider its aspect-change potential. 
 
Also significant in Contreras’ account is his description of people who did not 
participate in political protest for fear of state repression. “On that day these 
people expressed themselves… they overcame their fear”, he explains. His 
testimony suggests the referendum created a space in which politically inactive 
citizens chose to express a long-silenced anger at the government. For such 
individuals, the formative impact of participation is possible to imagine.  
 
The involvement of another demographic group in the referendum is interesting to 
consider from the perspective of democratic subjectivity formation. In the inner-
city Caracas barrio of El 23 de Enero, Contreras describes how most community 
activists and organisers had rejected the formal political process in Venezuela until 
the early 1990s:   
 
Here in El 23, Democratic Action [one of the two hegemonic political parties at this time] 
always won. Or the right won. Despite being a bastion of the left. But it was because this left 
were 'abstencionistas' [abstained from voting] ...We didn't vote because we didn't want to 
legitimate that situation of electoral fraud. We didn't vote as a rejection, to not legitimate 
that regime of false democracy (2012).  
 
Contreras voted for the first time in his life for Aristóbulo Istúriz, the Radical Cause 
candidate for Mayor of Caracas, in December 1992, and then for Chávez in 1998 
(ibid.). It is interesting to consider the significance and meaning of participation in 
the informal referendum on Pérez for individuals like him. This referendum, it 
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would seem, constituted a new form of political engagement for the radical left 
‘abstencionistas’ of El 23. Whilst not formally recognised, and to this extent 
symbolic, the event allowed participants to simulate engagement in a democratic 
process of the state, through which they expressed their political will as citizens. 
Arguably, this action held aspect-change potential. Groups who were normally 
engaged in clandestine activity and rejected formal politics, participated as a 
somewhat different kind of democratic subject. Potentially, this performance of 
citizenship helped create the conditions in which a shift could occur, after which 
subjects could engage in a new stage of discussions about the kind of alternative 
democratic system they wanted to build.  
 
Another consideration, is the impact of this event on the democratic subjectivities of 
organisers themselves. Having explored the impact of the experience for different 
groups who responded to the Radical Cause party’s call out, it is the experiences of 
organisers themselves which are potentially most interesting to consider from this 
perspective. Rodriguez was a rank and file Radical Cause militant in 1992. In the 
following exchange he describes his experience of helping to organise the 
referendum, based in the 'situation room' in Caracas:  
 
RR: We had a room in a building in the east, with telephones, radio, authorised messengers,  
CH: ah like a press office?  
RR: No... it was a situation room. Where developments were analysed at the level of every 
district.  
(Interview, 2012) 
 
He goes on to describe the workings of the 'situation room', managed by around 
twenty or thirty activists on a rota basis, some there for two or three days without 
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sleep, “analysing developments” as they came in (ibid.). From Rodriguez' account 
emerges a picture of the event for those most involved with organisation at the 
grassroots level. His response to the suggestion that the room was a 'press office' is 
particularly interesting. It is clear that this event was more than a media stunt for 
those involved. Rodriguez and his companions enacted a process of monitoring a real 
referendum and afterwards one can imagine they felt that a real referendum had 
been pulled off. Affecting a change in their own consciousness was not a stated 
objective: organisers aimed to interpellate and mobilise the public. However, 
interestingly, this may have been a significant outcome.  
 
One might object that the preceding analysis invests too much power in the 
transformative potential of a single fleeting experience. Indeed, no matter how 
exceptional or significant an experience for particular groups, this referendum was 
just one of countless actions in which organisers engaged, and in which members of 
the public participated. However, as Norval (2006, p. 250) explains:  
 
...the dislocation [the experience prompting the aspect-change] need not take the form of a 
'great event'. More often than not, it will take the form of a multitude of different practices, 
which, when taken together, makes possible a different way of looking at things. 
 
When understood in this way, the question to ask is not did the referendum – or 
other a-legal spaces – constitute a single transcendental event which triggered the 
adoption of new democratic subjectivities. But rather, amongst the multitude of 
different practices in which organisers and participants engaged during this 
period, did it offer anything unique? Did it create a space in which a different kind 
of experience was facilitated? And was this likely to have contributed to a shift in 
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the democratic subjectivities with which subjects identified? The accounts of some 
organisers and participants provide support for this, at least for the particular 
constituencies who engaged with this event.  
 
To conclude this section: the aspect-change potential of this referendum and other a-
legal spaces will vary significantly, dependent ultimately on what engagement in the 
event entailed for participants and how they constructed the experience. In some 
instances, the referendum created a space for unusual kinds of democratic 
engagement, such as for Caracas residents normally silenced by fear of government 
repression, radical activists who rejected the formal democratic system, and 
organisers who synthesised the experience of organising a binding recall referendum 
on the president. For these groups there is reason to believe that the event 
contributed to the adoption of a new sense of democratic agency which provided “a 
different way of looking at things” (Norval 2006, p. 250). Whilst the nature and 
meaning of a-legal initiatives vary, they create a space in which publics are 
encouraged to question the hegemonic order and enact how it might be improved. 
This form holds significant potential for the formation and re-activation of democratic 
subjectivities, and the corresponding shifts in political grammar that these new 
subjectivities entail.  
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4.5. Conclusions 
 
The Radical Cause party’s referendum on President Pérez was an attempt by the party 
to capitalise on the political and social crisis and the president’s unpopularity, and 
create opportunities for change within a rigid political system. Organisers’ accounts 
of their objectives illustrate the various different ways in which this tactic was 
expected to function. It was intended to ‘demonstrate’ opposition to the government; 
create opportunities for people ‘to express themselves’; and most ambiguously: 
create a ‘way out of the crisis’. The discussion in 4.3 facilitates a deeper 
understanding of how the a-legal space tactic might be hoped to achieve such ends.  
 
I have drawn on the referendum to develop a deeper account of a-legal space as a 
political strategy. The initiatives which make use of this space share much with 
Lindahl's conception of a-legal behaviours and situations, hence I have suggested that 
they be understood as a variant of the behaviour Lindahl denominates as a-legal. 
However, as a particular variant of a broader phenomenon they have a number of 
distinguishing characteristics.  Firstly, in deliberately emulating an institutional 
process, which represents a different legal and political order, they do more than 
“fleetingly... intimate” another way of ordering (Lindahl 2013, p. 1). So it was 
necessary to delineate how this activity differs from the act of merely 'intimating' 
another order. I have suggested that they be understood as attempts to legitimate and 
begin to institutionalise another order, and I have shown how the Radical Cause 
party's referendum on Pérez supports this interpretation.  
 
The second significant way in which peoples' tribunals, citizens' debt audits, informal 
referenda and other a-legal initiatives differ from the behaviours and scenarios 
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described by Lindahl is that they are, broadly speaking, lawful. In Lindahl's examples - 
such as French anti-capitalist protesters conducting an 'autoréduction', or the 
Brazilian landless movement occupying disused lands, or the homeless vagrant 
demanding a restaurant meal - the questioning and the transgression of legal 
boundaries is immediately apparent. And indeed it is central. It is only through 
questioning the boundaries within a legal order that the limits (or the fault lines) can 
be revealed, and alternative ways of ordering become apparent. In other words, 
boundary transgression is the modus operandi of a-legality, in Lindahl's account. This 
poses a problem: if a-legal initiatives, such as the referendum and peoples' tribunals, 
don't break or even question legal rules, should they really be seen as belonging to 
the same category of behaviour as Lindahl describes? I argue that they should and use 
the Radical Cause referendum to support this claim. Interestingly, organisers 
described the importance that participants had to 'break the rules!' Acting outside of 
the legally recognised provisions and procedures of the existing system was felt to be 
legally transgressive, in a way not dissimilar to actually breaking the law. Hence these 
initiatives might be understood to disrupt the legal order through a different channel: 
they are engaged in a different kind of boundary transgression. They do not question 
what is lawful as opposed to illegal (at least not primarily), but rather what is legally 
sanctioned and institutionalised, as opposed to unrecognised. This account allows us 
to explain how these a-legal initiatives belong to Lindahl's broader category of a-
legality, whilst accounting for how they differ. It also addresses a gap in Lindahl's 
account of legal boundaries, and provides a complexified picture of a-legal challenges 
to the legal order.  
 
In the third section I considered the weak/strong a-legality split, and the limitation 
this places on the use of a-legal space as a political strategy. I suggested that theories 
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of political grammar change might be used to account for radical discursive change 
without a ruptural break. This offers a possible way forward. One way in which 
political grammars change, which is particularly pertinent to the present study, is 
through the creation of new democratic subjectivities. So in the final section I 
explored the idea that a-legal space might be useful for the emergence and formation 
of new democratic subjectivities, through looking at how informants described their 
experience of the referendum. Drawing on the accounts of referendum organisers and 
participants I argued that this experience may have played such a function, 
prompting an aspect-change and the activation of new democratic subjectivities, if 
only within particular communities and sub-cultural groups.  
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Chapter 5: The International Tribunal on Climate 
Justice, Bolivia 
 
In October, 2009, a preliminary hearing of the International Tribunal on Climate 
Justice took place in the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia. Seven cases were heard in which 
communities, civil associations and workers’ movements from across Latin America 
accused national governments, transnational corporations and international 
organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the EU of 
committing human rights violations, as a result of climate change. The organisers 
cited the 1967 Russell Tribunal, the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, and Latin American 
based peoples' tribunals on debt and water rights, as their inspiration. Acknowledging 
that they had “not been entrusted with the task by any formally constituted legal 
authority”, but had “assumed responsibility in the name of mankind and in defence of 
civilisation and Mother Earth”. Whilst not binding, it was explained, the tribunal 
sought “ethical, moral and political implications”, and to “construct the necessary 
force to implore governments and multilateral entities to assume their 
responsibilities in the framework of equity and climate justice” (Fundación Solón 
2009b, p. 27) 
 
In this chapter I draw on interviews with organisers, publicity materials and 
secondary sources to explore this event and its implications for a broader theory of a-
legal space. In section 5.1 I provide details of the event, including the cases heard and 
the organisations who initiated it. In section 5.2 I turn to a discussion of how 
organisers articulate what they were trying to achieve through this tribunal. In 
section 5.3 I use the case to test and develop the broader theory of a-legal space. I 
consider three ways in which this theory might be criticised and consider the 
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implications for the International Tribunal on Climate Justice and the use of a-legal 
space more generally.  
 
5.1 An account of the case  
 
5.1.1. Background and Context 
 
The preliminary hearing of the International Tribunal on Climate Justice (hereafter the 
'climate tribunal' or the 'tribunal') was organised to immediately precede the United 
Nations COP meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. There, the final report of the 
jury's findings was distributed at civil society and formal negotiating spaces, and 
organisers spoke at civil society events about the tribunal and its findings (Peredo 
Beltrán 2010).  
 
Over the course of that year, organisations involved with the preliminary hearing of 
the climate tribunal continued to participate in the Bolivian movement for creation of 
a binding tribunal on climate justice. At the next UN COP meeting in December 2010 
in Cancun the tribunal organisers held a meeting for global civil society to discuss the 
campaign for a binding tribunal and the outcome of the preliminary hearing held in 
October 2009. Organisers have since continued to participate in the global movement 
for a binding tribunal and the wider climate justice movement. However, the present 
study takes as its focus the events of the 2009 Preliminary hearing held in 
Cochabamba. This is in part for practical reasons: it was during this period that I had 
access to organisers. Also, however, the October 2009 hearing was the most visible of 
the tribunal's events to date, about which various publicity materials were produced.  
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5.1.2. The Tribunal Organisers and interview participants 
 
Various organisations contributed to the creation of this event. The two most 
important actors were Bolivian NGO, the Solon Foundation (Fundación Solón) and the 
Bolivian Platform on Climate Change (also referred to as 'the Platform'). The latter is 
an umbrella organisation established in 2008 with a remit to coordinate Bolivian civil 
society action on climate change. Members of the Platform include NGOs, community 
organisations, and the country's five main indigenous and peasant social movements. 
The Platform's role with the climate tribunal of 2009 was to connect the various 
groups involved. It provided the network and organisational structure to support 
organisation of the event (José 2010). Despite the Platform's centrality, however, the 
organisation responsible for carrying out most of the key organisational work was the 
Solon Foundation. This Bolivian NGO, which carries out research and campaigns, and 
organises events “directed at the anti-neoliberal struggle” (Fundación Solón 2009a), 
was the driving force behind the climate tribunal, leading its organisation and 
producing and publishing the publicity materials associated with the event. The first 
three interview participants include the director and programme officer of Solon 
Foundation, Elizabeth Peredo and Alexandra Flores, and the director of the Platform, 
Maria Teresa José. The next interview participant, Martin Vilela, was from Sustainable 
Water a Bolivian NGO which worked in collaboration with the Khapi community of La 
Paz to coordinate and present one of the seven cases at the 2009 hearing. Vilela was 
central to organising the case and was the key point of contact for the Khapi 
community in relation to the 2009 hearing (Vilela 2010). The final two interview 
participants, Walberto Baraona and Cristian Dominguez, are from the indigenous 
social movement CONAMAQ, and the rural workers’ union CSUTCB, respectively. 
Neither were directly involved in organising the 2009 hearing but are key figures in 
the Bolivian indigenous and climate justice movements, attended the 2009 hearing 
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and are involved in the wider campaign for a binding tribunal on climate justice. 
Table 2, below, lists all interview participants, their organisational affiliation and role 
in the climate tribunal. Whilst this small group does not include everyone involved 
with the 2009 hearing it does include the three individuals who were most central to 
the process. The mix of participants also allows for several different perspectives, 
including someone involved in organising one of the cases, and two individuals from 
outside the key organising team who provide some insight into the construction of 
this event within the indigenous and campesino movements in Bolivia.  
 
Table 2: Interview participants, International Tribunal on Climate Justice  
Interview Participant Organisation Role in the Tribunal 
Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán Solon Foundation (Director) Key organiser 
Alexandra Flores Solon Foundation 
(Programme Officer)  
Key organiser 
Maria Teresa José Bolivian Platform on Climate 
Change (Director) 
Key organiser 
Martin Vilela Sustainable Water 
(Communications Director) 
Coordinated one of the seven 
cases.  
Walberto Baraona National Committee of Ayllus 
and Markas of the Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ); a national 
indigenous social movement 
Attended 2009 hearing, 
active in indigenous 
movement and wider climate 
justice campaigns.   
 
 
 
  
Cristian Dominguez Unified Syndical 
Confederation of Rural 
Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB); 
rural workers’ movement.  
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5.1.3. The cases 
 
Seven cases were presented during the two-day hearing, where organisations and 
communities from across Latin America explained the impacts of climate change on 
their communities to the tribunal jury and audience. Organisers explain that these 
cases were selected for reasons of expediency: these were organisations with which 
the Solon Foundation already had established contacts, and the tribunal was 
organised in a limited time frame which did not allow for a lengthy selection process. 
However, this was not seen as a particular problem. As Alexandra Flores explains: 
“they could have been any, to some extent. Because these problems are happening 
everywhere. The cases are like symbols” (2010). What is significant, however, is the 
particular combination of problems touched upon by the cases. Only the first two 
cases focused on specific environmental impacts of climate change: melting glaciers 
and rising sea levels. The following three cases address the impacts of current policy 
solutions to climate change and the final two look at wider environmental and health 
problems caused by mining projects. Hence, the problem of climate change is 
constructed as something more than a problem of excessive levels of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere. See Appendix C for a full list of the seven cases presented at the 
Preliminary Hearing in 2009.  
 
 
 
5.1.4. The jury 
 
The eight members of the jury included representatives of international 
environmental and political campaign networks, indigenous organisations, and 
academics. They came from seven different countries, (six from Latin America and 
two from Europe), and brought expertise in a range of different areas, including debt, 
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environmental issues, government repression and indigenous politics. Despite their 
differences, however, they represent organisations which share a common discourse, 
which is equally exemplified in the organisations which presented the seven different 
cases. Central to this discourse are ideas about North/South equity, a critique of the 
economic system and indigenous-influenced philosophies based on establishing a 
balance between human activity and nature.1 
 
5.2 What did organisers hope to achieve? Analysing organiser aims 
and objectives 
 
5.2.1. Organiser objectives 
 
When asked what the tribunal was intended to achieve, organisers identify a wide 
variety of intended positive impacts. These include 'mobilizing the public so that they 
will apply pressure on their governments'2; 'contributing to a jurisprudence of climate 
justice'3; 'providing concrete evidence of the effects of climate change and how these 
are threatening human (and other kinds of) rights'4; 'giving voice to the victims of 
climate change'5; 'providing a space to denounce those that are breaking climate 
agreements'6; and 'educating and raising awareness amongst the public about the link 
between climate change and human rights violations'7. This variety is perhaps not 
surprising given the multidimensional, genre-crossing nature of peoples' tribunals, 
which as one scholar put it are “part legal proceedings, part theatre, part publicly 
                                                        
1     See Appendix B for full details of jury members and their organisational affiliations.  
2    Listed by five interview participants: Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán; Alexandra Flores; Martin Vilela; 
Cristian Dominguez; Walberto Baraona. 
3    Listed by four interview participants: Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán; Alexandra Flores; Martin Vilela; 
Maria Teresa José. 
4    Listed by three interview participants: Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán; Alexandra Flores; Martin Vilela. 
5    Listed by three interview participants: Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán; Alexandra Flores; Martin Vilela. 
6    Listed by two interview participants: Alexandra Flores; Cristian Dominguez. 
7    Listed by three interview participants: Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán; Alexandra Flores; Cristian 
Dominguez.  
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speaking ‘truth to power’” (Schuler 2010). 
 
However, whilst mentioning a number of these different effects, the three key 
organisers interviewed were clear that the tribunal had a central overarching 
principal objective. As Elizabeth Peredo explains:  
 
The main objective is to contribute towards the existence of some mechanism in society, in 
the world, that helps to sanction and control the failure on the part of developed countries 
to meet their emission reduction targets. This is the objective (2010).  
 
The creation of a binding international tribunal on climate justice, either within the 
UN system or outside of it, was described as the principal objective by the 
representatives of Solon Foundation and the Bolivian Platform on Climate Change. 
And, whilst not explicitly stated as the principal objective in the accounts of other 
interview participants, there is an implicit recognition of the central importance of 
institutional and legal change. Walberto Baraona of CONAMAQ, for example, explains 
that “the most important thing is that we reach and raise consciousness in the public, 
so that they will then pressure governments for action” (2010), just as Martin Vilela 
from NGO Sustainable Water notes: “we are trying to rescue international legal 
instruments for the defence of human rights” (2010). 
 
However, characterising the climate tribunal as narrowly directed at the attainment 
of specific legal changes captures only part of the picture.  Apparent in my interviews 
with organisers and other participants was another construction of the tribunal, 
which suggests a different component to the struggle in which they believe they are 
engaged.  
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 Cristian Dominguez, from the rural workers' union, CSUTCB, alludes to this when he 
remarks that “it is also more than just a tool” (2010). And Martin Vilela provides a 
fuller picture, when he explains:  
 
So, on the one hand it [the tribunal] must demonstrate... climate justice... but also it should 
become like an initial plan, of a model or system of economic organisation, or development 
model, that addresses and corrects the history that has generated such inequality, and such 
consumption with no regard for natural resources (2010). 
 
Within this discursive strand the climate tribunal is constructed in grand yet 
somewhat ambiguous terms, as about more than the constitution of a new 
international legal infrastructure. And more than a discrete campaign for particular 
concrete changes. As Vilela puts it, it is an “initial plan” for wider scale systemic 
change (ibid.). Much like the Radical Cause party’s referendum on Pérez, the tribunal 
is framed by organisers as one part of a broader counter-hegemonic project and as 
directed at the progression of this project. 
 
Hence a dual construction of the climate tribunal emerges in the accounts of 
organisers and participants. On the one hand, it is understood as a “tool of the 
struggle”,8 specifically intended to contribute to the construction of new international 
legal infrastructure, in the form of an international tribunal on climate change. On the 
other hand, it is understood as supporting the emergence of an alternative 
development paradigm. These parallel objectives are well captured by Dinerstein and 
Ferrero’s (2012) two-dimensional framework for understanding social movement 
                                                        
8    The tribunal is described as a “public tool” and a “tool of the struggle” by several interview 
participants: Alexandra Flores; Martin Vilela; Cristian Dominguez. 
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activity, in which they distinguish between movements’ ‘real policies’ and ‘imagined 
politics’. Where concrete demands to states and movement engagement in policy-
making reflect the ‘real policies’ dimension to movement activity, their ‘imagined 
politics’ refers to the “non-institutionalised politics that 'disagree' with the realm of 
real policies and instead articulate new experiences that resist integration into the 
logic of the state” (ibid., p. 11). This less tangible realm of movement activity is 
evident in their “values, endeavours, proposals and democratic practices” (ibid.).  
 
5.2.2. The inter-dependent, dialectical relationship of real policies and 
imagined politics in a-legal spaces 
 
How then should we make sense of the different kinds of political objectives which 
are articulated by interview participants? Which should be taken as primary and 
what is the relationship between these different kinds of objectives? The relationship 
between movements’ real policies and their imagined politics is an interesting 
phenomenon. It reflects the struggle to achieve concrete gains in the medium term, 
whilst hoping for more fundamental change in the long term, when the two might be 
in contradiction. However, what is interesting about the climate tribunal is the inter-
dependent and dialectical relationship between these two dimensions.  
 
Key organisers stress the centrality of the real policy objective of supporting the 
creation of a binding tribunal on climate justice. However, thinking through the 
requirements for such a demand to be realised reveals the equally central role to be 
played by the dimension of imagined politics. The demand for a binding international 
tribunal on climate justice is dependent on strategies to widen the discursive space in 
order to even make sense. Within dominant discourses around climate change the 
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problem – whilst it may be tragic – is simply not a matter of justice or injustice. Hence 
nor is it a matter for legal or political action. So, for their efforts in the real policy 
domain to have any purchase, organisers are dependent on some discursive work, 
which is the remit of their imagined politics.9 Moreover, whilst taking the form of a 
real policy demand - to the extent that it involves a specific concrete demand to states 
– the climate tribunal’s demand has an ambiguous status. Whilst in the real policies 
dimension movements talk in the language and grammar of the hegemonic discourse 
in order to be heard, imagined politics activities function to make a different range of 
real policy options possible. What is noteworthy about the climate tribunal is that the 
real policy demand for a binding tribunal does not involve a compromise: it does not 
reflect the world as it is constructed within dominant international climate policy 
frameworks. To this extent, the concrete demand for a binding tribunal on climate 
justice has a disruptive function, contesting hegemonic constructions of climate 
change and thereby helping to fulfil the function of imagined politics.  
 
An interdependency and ambiguity between the dimensions of real policies and 
imagined politics is, arguably, a defining feature of the a-legal space strategy. Since in 
simulating a formal legal state-sanctioned space, in order to exemplify concrete 
policies and legislation which could be enacted, and without any constraints on what 
may be said in such a space, their real policy activity has an imagined politics function 
also.  
 
 
                                                        
9   This at least was true at the time of the tribunal’s preliminary hearing in 2009. In the most recent 
COP meeting in December 2015 the discourse of climate justice was arguably more present within 
mainstream debates.  
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5.2.3. The climate tribunal's imagined politics  
 
As a final point, since this is so central to what organisers hope to achieve, it is helpful 
to outline the central components to the climate tribunal's imagined politics and the 
alternative conception of the world they hope to advance. There are several concepts 
which can be taken as central ‘nodal points’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) within their 
discourse. The first is the notion of justice, defined in terms of North-South equity. 
The particular crystallisation of this notion is in the idea that Northern industrialised 
nations owe a 'climate debt' which must be repaid to the South. This component is of 
course implicit in their creation of a tribunal which tries particular nations and 
organisations, and is explicitly articulated in the jury's recommendations' and 
concrete policy proposals. Audiences are advised to “demand of the governments of 
the industrialised Northern countries repayment of the climate and ecological debt”, 
and the establishment of an International Fund for Climate Justice, to be managed by 
the UN, is recommended (Fundación Solón 2009b, p. 32). 
 
However, climate justice is about more than legal action and reparations within this 
discourse.  Integral also is a systematic critique of the extant economic and political 
system and 'development model' which is identified as the root cause of climate 
change. Referred to at different points as “the current economic and political system” 
(ibid., p. 27), “the capitalist economic system” (ibid., p. 29), “the neoliberal system” 
(ibid., p. 14), and the “extractivist and export-based model of development” (ibid., p. 
30), there is some ambiguity as to precisely what social, political and economic 
formation is opposed. However, this signifier plays a crucial role in their wider 
discourse, as the concept to which they are united in opposition, and is “blocking the 
full constitution of [their] identity” (Griggs and Howarth 2000). The signifier of the 
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current system is constructed in opposition to the positive alternative they propose, 
which is an economic and political order founded on the indigenous concept of ‘Living 
Well’ (‘Vivir Bien’). The Spanish term Vivir Bien emerged in the late twentieth century 
to refer to a concept central to Andean indigenous cultures and philosophies. The 
original indigenous language terms ('sumaq qamaña' in Aymara and 'sumak kawsay' 
in Quechua) have no direct translation, but have been variously interpreted as 
'plentiful life', 'to know how to live', 'the good life', 'the sweet life', 'living well', 
'harmonious life', and 'sublime life' (Systemic Alternatives 2015). Crucially, in the 
Bolivian context it is defined in opposition to the notion of 'living better', understood 
to define the capitalist ethos based on ever-increasing consumption. As Elizabeth 
Peredo from the Solon Foundation explains:  
 
[It is the idea that] the only way to reduce the gap [between consumption levels and 
resources] is to end a lifestyle that is about always thinking we are going to be richer... that 
we are going to be healthier, fitter, more attractive, more everything. So this notion of 
infinite growth that is the goal of this system (2010).  
 
Central to the concept is an emphasis on living in balance with nature and 'Mother 
Earth' (Flores 2010). The concept has entered the consciousness and vocabulary of 
the Bolivian mainstream and the media partly since the presidency of Evo Morales 
(the first indigenous president), who has regularly employed the discourse of Vivir 
Bien making it a defining feature of his public image and rhetoric. Mentioned by all 
interview participants without prompting, this concept plays a vital role in their 
discourse, connecting various different elements together.  
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As a fledgling hegemonic project, there are various directions in which the discourse 
exemplified in the International Tribunal on Climate Justice may develop. Efforts to 
bring diverse groups together under the heading of Climate Justice can be understood 
as moves to establish this as the empty signifier. The related Living Well, however, 
may emerge as the signifier with greater resonance. At the 2009 hearing and in the 
associated publicity materials both concepts feature as important overlapping nodal 
points in the discourse.  
 
Organisers depict the tribunal as part of a broader counter-hegemonic project for 
'climate justice' and 'vivir bien'. At the same time, it is understood as specifically 
directed at advancing the campaign for a new international legal infrastructure which 
can address the violations of human rights by states and corporations, as a result of 
climate change. These two constructions reflect their imagined politics aims and real 
policy aims, respectively. Despite the emphasis placed on the latter in the accounts of 
key organisers, an explicit intention to “change ideas about the value of life” 
(Dominguez 2010) is also evident throughout organiser accounts. This somewhat 
grander yet less clearly defined idea is well captured by the notion of an imagined 
politics dimension to social movement activity. And organiser accounts suggest that 
this dimension is central to how the purpose and function of the tribunal was 
conceived.    
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5.3 Implications for a theory of a-legal space 
 
The International Tribunal on Climate Justice has several features which make it an 
interesting case through which to explore the a-legal space strategy more generally. 
Firstly, like other peoples’ tribunals it is an ‘information based’ form of a-legal space. 
In the introductory chapter I noted a key divergence between different forms of a-
legal space was whether they involved the compilation and presentation of large 
amounts of technical information to the public. This is central in some forms of a-legal 
space and is completely absent in others. What is missing from the account of a-legal 
space as a strategy which has been developed so far is an account of how such diverse 
tactics can be part of the same phenomenon. As I will argue below, this is potentially 
significant since information and non-information-based a-legal initiatives would 
appear to reflect divergent models of democracy and political change. Hence in this 
section I explore the climate tribunal’s discursive strategy and the function of the 
information component in this initiative.  
 
Next I turn to a consideration of the climate tribunal’s emancipatory potential. As a 
peoples’ tribunal, it is particularly vulnerable to two critiques which might be levied 
at the a-legal space strategy. The first points to the often elite-led nature of a-legal 
initiatives. Peoples’ tribunals, dependent on high profile jury members and highly 
technical legal expertise, are arguably the form of a-legal space to which this most 
applies. The second critique wonders whether we can contest the hegemonic order 
through replicating the symbols, processes and language of this same order. For 
similar reasons to the first, the critique is particularly apt in relation to the peoples’ 
tribunal form of a-legal space. I explore the significance of each critique to the case of 
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the International Tribunal on Climate Justice, before considering the implications for 
the a-legal space strategy more generally.  
 
5.3.1. Differences in a-legal space and theorising the democratic contribution 
 
Like other information-based a-legal initiatives, the International Tribunal on Climate 
Justice involved an elaborate process of evidence gathering on the part of activists 
who presented each of the seven cases at the 2009 Preliminary Hearing (Vilela 2010). 
The jury and audience members were presented with scientific data to support claims 
about rising sea levels, water shortages and flood risks caused by climate change. And 
they were presented with careful legal arguments to illustrate how specific UN 
Human Rights legislation had been violated. This component to the climate tribunal 
contrasts with other a-legal initiatives such as unofficial referenda, Free States, or the 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy, (amongst others), in which the presentation of new 
information and ‘evidence’ to the public plays little or no role.10 This difference is 
potentially significant. Arguably, it is indicative of an adherence to opposing models 
of democracy and political change, which would undermine the notion of a single a-
legal space strategy. I elaborate on this argument below.  
 
5.3.2. Theories of democracy and the transformation of public beliefs, 
consciousness and behaviour 
 
The traditional aggregative account of democracy depicts a process for the 
aggregation of individual preferences (c.f. Schumpeter 1942). However, critics point 
to the impoverished conception of human psychology and democracy in this account, 
                                                        
10  See Appendix D for a review of different forms of a-legal space and the relative importance of the 
information component.  
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in which preferences must be conceived as pre-formed and immovable. There can be 
no account of how preferences are formed in the first place, why people desire what 
they do, nor of the possibility for transforming preferences. In short, the model 
cannot capture the true complexity of human desires and behaviours. Alternative 
theories have sought a “deeper” account than the aggregation of preferences, of what 
it is for the people to rule themselves (Norval 2001, p. 587).11 A belief that individual 
preferences are not pre-formed and immovable but have the potential for 
transformation is at the heart of these accounts. However, theorisation of this process 
of preference transformation takes radically different forms.  
 
The most dominant alternative to the aggregative model emphasises the role of 
deliberation in the democratic process. Through engagement in processes of rational 
and reasoned deliberation, it is argued that individuals have the capacity to hear and 
understand opposing viewpoints and eventually, ideally, arrive at a consensus. 
Decisions arrived at through deliberation in this way have legitimacy in a way that 
un-deliberated decisions do not, because the process entails that alternative possible 
decisions have been considered and thought through. Deliberative democracy is in 
this way both a normative theory of democratic legitimacy (which is measured 
through the presence and quality of deliberation) and a prescriptive theory of how 
democratic processes and institutions should be structured (to include opportunities 
for meaningful deliberation) (c.f. Harbermas 1970). 
 
Radical democrats take a different approach. The focus is not political ‘preferences’, 
nor their transformation, since these are reflective of a more fundamental 
                                                        
11  According to the Encyclopaedia of Democracy what deliberative, participatory and radical accounts 
of democracy share is a commitment to the “radicalisation and deepening” of liberal democracy 
(Norval 2001, p. 587).  
310 
 
 
phenomenon: the construction and transformation of ‘subjectivities’.12 Within the 
radical democratic framework, agents make sense of the world and their position in it 
through discourse. Agents’ preferences are transformed when they adopt a new 
discourse and correspondingly the subjectivity(ies) this discourse enables. But agents 
do not adopt a new discourse through reasoned deliberation, since deliberation can 
take place only within and through reference to a particular discursive formation. As 
Derrida (2013) puts it: “there is no outside-text”. In any given social context, different 
discourses struggle to hegemonise the discursive field and thereby define how agents 
construct social reality. The adoption of a new discourse is a historically contingent 
event which occurs when the hegemonic discourse is ‘dislocated’, and its contingency 
becomes apparent. Dislocation occurs as a result of events or new practices which 
cannot be accounted for within the terms of the hegemonic discourse. The 2008 
financial crisis, for example, might be said to have resulted in some level of 
dislocation in the discourse of neoliberalism. When dislocation occurs, the hegemonic 
discourse is said to lose its 'grip': the thoughts and actions of social agents are no 
longer determined by the particularities of this discursive formation. And it is now, 
‘the moment of subjectivity’ (Laclau 1996), in which the subject is present and must 
assert their agency: they must make an actual decision about what to think, say or do. 
Of course, with no discursive framework through which to make sense of the decision 
it cannot be a rational one. Described as a moment of ‘radical undecidability’ (ibid.), 
the subject’s decision to think, speak or behave in a certain way is understood as an 
act of identification. The subject identifies with one of the many possible competing 
hegemonic projects, and the discourse it articulates. And through this act of 
identification, new ways of seeing and being in the world – new subjectivities – are 
created (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  
                                                        
12  Hence one might say that the ‘unit of analysis’ within radical theories of democracy is 
‘subjectivities’, rather than ‘preferences’ as it is in the deliberative canon.  
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As Iris Marion Young (2001) points out, the theory of democracy to which one 
subscribes is an indicator and a determinant of political strategy. For the deliberative 
democrat, “the best and most appropriate way to conduct political action, to influence 
and make public decisions, is through public deliberation” (ibid., p. 672). Radical 
democrats, on the other hand, advocate a different mode of political engagement. As 
Young (ibid., p. 673) observes, for critics of deliberative democracy, the emphasis on 
deliberation is “laughable”:  
 
powerful officials have no motive to sit down [and deliberate] … and even if they did agree 
to deliberate, they would have the power unfairly to steer the course of the discussion. 
 
These actors take a different approach:  
 
picketing, leafleting, guerrilla theatre, large and loud street demonstrations, sit-ins, and 
other forms of direct action, such as boycotts. Often activists make public noise outside 
when deliberation is supposedly taking place on the inside. Sometimes activists invade the 
houses of deliberation and disrupt their business by unfurling banners, throwing stink 
bombs, or running and shouting through the aisles (Young 2001, p. 673).  
 
What is interesting about the climate tribunal is the extent to which it draws on and 
can be understood within both frameworks. Central to the tribunal organisers' efforts 
to convert audiences are both deliberative and non-deliberative, disruptive 
components. Moreover, I argue that these components have an inter-dependent, 
dialectical relationship. Non-deliberative, disruptive actions are necessary to enable 
audiences to engage with the reasoned, deliberative arguments that are made. Whilst 
audience engagement with these arguments, even on a minimal level, helps bring 
312 
 
 
about a discursive shift which is best made sense of through concepts outside of the 
deliberative model. I turn now to a more in-depth examination of the deliberative 
democratic components of the climate tribunal, before considering the non-
deliberative components, best captured through a radical democratic framework.  
 
 
5.3.3. The deliberative democratic contribution of the climate tribunal 
 
The way that organisers describe the role of the tribunal and the various ways in 
which it was planned and executed closely fit the deliberative democratic model. The 
tribunal is depicted as playing an information giving and educational role – amongst 
other functions – in the accounts of most organisers. As Cristian Dominguez, from the 
rural workers' union, CSUTCB, comments: “It’s a collective education – a guide”. And 
as Martin Vilela, from NGO Sustainable Water, explains:  
 
What we have done is demonstrate, a little, the evidence of the impacts of climate change, 
and how these impacts of climate change violate human rights - the right to life, the right to 
water, food, health, self-determination, culture... and other rights such as the rights of 
women, children, adolescents (2010). 
 
Similarly, Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán from the Solon Foundation highlights their aim 
to provide evidence of anthropogenic climate change, particularly for Northern 
audiences where they perceived the consensus to be less clearly established:  
 
This was the objective that we set ourselves, to demonstrate [the effects and cause of 
climate change] ... above all in the developed countries, it is necessary to demonstrate this 
relation. For example, a short while ago I was in New York, and there was a tornado, and 
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one person died...they didn't even find out... society did not find out what was really 
happening. So it is still necessary to provide evidence (Interview, 2010).  
 
She adds that the target audiences are not “activists and environmentalists” but 
rather “the general public”, who have often not had access to the information that 
they sought to provide:  
 
Because what we do not want is to work only amongst the already convinced, because 
between ourselves, we already know... what is important is that we reach more people. And 
that more people can be convinced of the relation that exists. Or rather, make the 
connections that have to be made, in order to understand, and be able to change the 
phenomenon (2010).  
 
These comments exemplify a theme evident in all the organiser accounts: a sense that 
'the facts will speak for themselves'.  Implicit is a faith in the capacity of the general 
public, globally, to process and understand the technical information they have made 
available, and to draw the same inevitable conclusions: to “make the connections that 
have to be made” (ibid.). In these organisers’ accounts, at least, the tribunal is not 
framed as a way to craft a narrative or a public relations exercise but as a transparent 
tool for public education and awareness-raising. This account is characteristic of the 
deliberative democratic model, and the faith it places in the potential of ordinary 
people to make important and complex decisions about governance.  
 
Also evident in organisers’ accounts and central to their faith in the potential of the 
tribunal as a political tool is their belief in the public’s capacity for empathy. 
North/South inequality and the imbalance between those responsible for climate 
change and those most affected is understood as a principal barrier to effective action 
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on climate change. However, organisers have a faith in the capacity of Northern 
publics to empathise with Southern communities affected by climate change, put this 
before their own material interests, and respond collectively to the common problem.  
As Elizabeth Peredo comments: 
 
There are those that do not like the idea of the tribunal. Above all in Europe, there are those 
that say no... because in a way it is striking at their state of well-being, because when one 
does not have to pay a debt… So this is a problem. And that is a problem that we must 
overcome. I have much hope that we can because I believe that the climate crisis is 
increasingly serious... And I trust that there is a common feeling of empathy, between all, 
because in the end we are all in this together... and we will have to work together to 
respond to this problem (Interview, 2010).  
 
This faith in the general public's rational and empathic capacities suggests an affinity 
with the deliberative democratic approach, and the applicability of this model to 
make sense of the climate tribunal’s discursive strategy.  
 
There are several possible objections to this characterisation of the climate tribunal 
and peoples’ tribunals in general as deliberative democratic exercises. But each, as I 
will argue, can be readily rebuffed. Firstly, where are its actual deliberative 
components? There is no formalised space for discussion within the (most common) 
peoples’ tribunal model: information is presented and audiences listen.13 So how 
applicable is the deliberative democratic model to make sense of organiser strategy? 
As Goodin and Niemeyer (2003) have highlighted, there is more to deliberation than 
                                                        
13  Some peoples’ tribunals build in deliberative components, and create significant opportunities for 
active audience participation. This is how local peoples’ tribunals have been characterised 
(Boehringer 2014). And this is somewhat like the approach of the World Courts of Women (2012). 
However, in the standard and most commonly used model the role for audience members is largely 
a passive one. The International Tribunal on Climate Justice, broadly speaking, fits into this latter, 
more common, category.  
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dialogue. Internal reflection constitutes a central component to the deliberative 
process. Drawing on research into a citizen's jury on Australian environmental issues 
they demonstrate that jurors' attitudes in fact changed more in response to the 
'information' phase of proceedings, than during the 'discussion' phase, suggesting “a 
large degree of 'deliberation within'” (ibid., p. 627). Other deliberative scholars have 
highlighted the value of ‘hybrid’ designs in which deliberative mechanisms are 
combined with an extensive information provision phase. Lightbody (2014), for 
example, advocates the combination of deliberative fora with public hearings, as a 
means to enhance environmental sensitivity in deliberative decision making. These 
studies suggest that if publics are given access to the right technical information, and 
the space and time in which it can be processed, they will make environmentally and 
socially conscious decisions.  
 
Drawing on this research, a persuasive case can be made for theorising the climate 
tribunal as the information phase in a wider deliberative process. Through prompting 
internal reflection in audience members and promoting environmentally and social 
conscious attitudes through information provision, the event contributed to 
deliberation at the societal level. Indeed, comments of organisers in some instances 
suggest this was much how the initiative was understood by those involved:  
  
The key audience is the public. [The intention is that] ...the peoples of the world can have 
the criteria to make judgements, to make conclusions, and that sentences can be imposed 
(Dominguez 2010). 
 
Another objection to a deliberative democracy-framing concerns the probable 
makeup of the climate tribunal audience. Unlike the deliberative democratic ideal, 
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participants and audience members do not reflect a cross-section of society or those 
who have a stake in the issue. They are a self-selecting group. One might object that 
audience members likely already understood the issues and supported the 
perspective of the tribunal. If, despite organisers' intentions to the contrary, the 
climate tribunal spoke mainly to the “already convinced” (Peredo Beltrán 2010), the 
deliberative function it played is less meaningful. However, this dismissal, I would 
argue, is too quick. Even where audiences are already broadly supportive they 
comprise a degree of discursive diversity and complexity, and tribunals may play a 
deliberative function. An experience I had whilst attending a different peoples’ 
tribunal can help to illustrate this point. Whilst we stood together in a queue during 
the Peoples’ Commission on the Closure of Lewisham Hospital, which took place in 2013 
in London to address the impact of cuts and other changes to the NHS, a woman from 
the audience turned and remarked to me:  
 
It’s incredible isn’t it?! I mean I knew all this was going on, but when you hear the details 
like this… it’s so clear! It’s really shocking isn’t it? (Anon, personal communication, 2013).  
 
Despite this woman’s familiarity with and support for the Lewisham Peoples’ 
Commission, it would appear that the detailed, comprehensive and rigorous 
information which was presented during the event indeed contributed to her 
knowledge, understanding and consciousness. Whilst just one example, the instance 
suggests the heterogeneity of peoples’ tribunal audiences, in which members have 
varying levels of knowledge and conviction. And it supports the suggestion that such 
events function as the information phase in a wider deliberative process, prompting 
internal ‘deliberation within’. Whilst not formally provided for, deliberation takes 
place between audience members during and after the event, with family, friends, 
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colleagues and others.  
 
Another objection concerns the objectivity and impartiality of peoples’ tribunals. 
Information is compiled and presented in order to support a particular argument, and 
it is rare for peoples’ tribunals to include a ‘defence’ (Klinghoffer & Klinghoffer, 
2002).14 As such these events are ‘biased’ in a way that is quite distinct from 
orchestrated deliberative democracy initiatives, in which proponents of different 
policy solutions are given space and time. However, understood as just one space in a 
society-wide deliberative process, I would argue that the climate tribunal maintains a 
sufficient degree of objectivity to satisfy deliberative democratic requirements. The 
tribunal was intended to contribute to the construction of a jurisprudence of climate 
justice (Peredo Beltrán 2010; Flores 2010; Vilela 2010; José 2010), as Vilela puts it:  
 
We are working for a systematization of what could be the start of an international legal 
system that permits a defence of human rights from the impacts of climate change (2010).  
 
As such the tribunal adhered to certain procedures and evidential standards, in order 
that findings stand up to a degree of legal scrutiny (Vilela 2010).15 If deliberation is 
envisioned at the societal level, arguably it is not necessary that every particular 
deliberative space includes a range of political perspectives. Also the climate 
tribunal’s efforts to adhere to recognised legal procedures and evidential standards 
within the space that was created address other possible concerns about ‘bias’ that 
the deliberative theorist might have.  
 
                                                        
14 For Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002) this is one of the key ways in which the peoples’ tribunal 
model could be improved.  
15 This is one aspect (amongst others) which distinguishes peoples' tribunals from show trials.  
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Building on this characterisation of the climate tribunal as contributing to processes 
of deliberation at the societal level, Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2008) account of 
‘discursive representation’ is particularly useful. Representation of people and groups 
is indeed central to democracy, these scholars acknowledge, but it is not the only 
form of representation. In fact, many representative claims are better conceived as 
‘discursive representation’: representing the claims, beliefs and values of a particular 
discourse, rather than any particular group of individuals. They illustrate the concept 
with rockstar Bono’s claim to represent “a lot of people [in Africa] who have no voice 
at all” (Bono, cited in ibid., p. 481). Bono cannot sensibly be understood to represent 
millions of people, most of whom have no knowledge of his existence. But his claim is 
not entirely nonsensical. Instead he can be understood to represent a particular 
discourse about Africa, generally employed outside of Africa itself, often in the course 
of charity appeals. Dryzek and Niemeyer (ibid.) advocate the formal incorporation of 
this type of representation into international governance mechanisms, through 
construction of institutions such as a 'Chamber of Discourses'. Here representatives 
would be selected on the basis of their consistent subscription to particular 
discourses, so that representatives of each of society's main discourses could be 
brought together to deliberate policy options. Discursive representation, they argue:  
 
can help render policy making more rational, respect individual autonomy by more fully 
representing diverse aspects of the self, assist in realizing the promise of deliberative 
democracy, and make democratic theory more applicable to a world where the 
consequences of decisions are felt across national boundaries (ibid., p. 38).  
 
Following this approach, The International Tribunal on Climate justice can be 
understood to represent the marginal climate justice discourse. Further work in this 
area suggests the particular contribution this could make to international politics and 
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governance. Building on Dryzek and Niemeyer's (2008) theory, Hayley Stevenson 
(2011) highlights the crucial role to be played by civil society actors in the 
representation of marginal and radical discourses. Pointing to the Latin American 
ALBA block of countries’ claims to represent 'the peoples' during UN climate 
negotiations, she argues that this is best understood as discursive representation. 
ALBA should be seen as attempting to represent 'Green Radical' discourse, rather 
than any particular group of peoples. However, the failure of the ALBA block (bar 
Bolivia) to consistently represent this discourse at the 2010 UN COP meeting in 
Cancun demonstrates the limitations to representation of radical discourses by states. 
The pressures and constraints on states mean that they cannot well represent a 
discourse which challenges powerful interests. The ALBA case, argues Stevenson, 
“points to the potential hazards of transmitting a public discourse through a state-
based instrument, even when a state appears to share that discourse” (ibid.) 
Following this research, it would seem that the climate tribunal makes an important 
contribution to democracy through representing a radical counter-hegemonic 
discourse which state actors cannot consistently articulate.  
 
However, there are several limitations to the deliberative framework, both as a 
theory of democracy and as a way to make sense of the International Tribunal on 
Climate Justice. Critics of the deliberative model suggest that insufficient attention is 
paid to the distorting impact of structural inequalities on the potential for 
deliberation among equal participants (Young 2001). Less privileged groups face 
multiple often hidden obstacles to their active participation which put them at a 
structural disadvantage and skew the results of deliberative processes in favour of 
the interests of the privileged. Most significantly for the present case, it is alleged that 
deliberative democrats fail to address the role of hegemony and its impact on the 
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deliberative process.  As Young (2001, p. 686) comments, in a somewhat damning 
critique of this gap in deliberative theory:  
 
The theory and practice of deliberative democracy have no tools for raising the possibility 
that deliberations may be closed and distorted in this way. It lacks a theory of, shall we call 
it, ideology, as well as an account of the genealogy of discourses and their manner of 
helping to constitute the way individuals see themselves and their social world. For most 
deliberative democrats, discourse seems to be more "innocent”. 
 
This problem extends to the strand of deliberative theory most concerned with 
discourse, in which the focus is deliberation at the discursive level. Innovative 
proposals such as Dryzek and Niemeyer's (2008) 'Chamber of Discourses', certainly 
promise to improve the quality and depth of debate in international institutions 
currently dominated by variants of a neoliberal discourse. 'Green Radicalism' or 
'climate justice' are rarely articulated within existing international institutions, so 
their presence in a Chamber of Discourses, or similar, would be meaningful and 
potentially have an influence on subsequent policy proposals, in the way that radical 
social movements can sometimes widen the terms of mainstream politics and what is 
considered possible. However, Dryzek and Niemeyer appear to suggest that the 
decisions of such a Chamber gain legitimacy through the inclusive deliberative 
process. Implicit is the notion of a level playing field within which the representative 
of each discourse will battle it out, presenting their case and arguing the pros and 
cons of potential policies and legislation. This fails to appreciate the structural 
disadvantage facing radical or counter-hegemonic discourses, and the reduced 
likelihood that policies they favour will gain consensus.  
 
Within mainstream publics, particularly in the Global North, organisers of the climate 
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tribunal face a struggle to be heard and seriously engaged with, not encountered by 
proponents of more familiar and mainstream proposals for energy efficiency 
measures or green growth initiatives. No matter the rigour and transparency of the 
evidence, and the internal logic of legal and rational arguments, the climate tribunal 
faces a structural disadvantage, which the deliberative model does not adequately 
account for.  
 
5.3.4. The radical democratic contribution of the climate tribunal 
  
Radical democracy offers an alternative to the deliberative democratic conceptual 
framework, which provides theoretical tools to make sense of the structural 
disadvantage facing the climate tribunal. Moreover, looking at the climate tribunal 
through this framework reveals another dimension to the initiative which is lost 
within a deliberative framework. Logical legal arguments which appeal to audience 
capacity for rational reflection are only one way in which the climate tribunal 
functions as a communicative event with the potential to influence public 
consciousness, beliefs and behaviours. There is another non-deliberative dimension 
to this initiative, which constitutes a challenge to the discursive structures which 
render its claims invisible. In this sub-section I consider the climate tribunal from a 
radical democratic perspective, and show how this framework enables an 
appreciation of this other dimension to the climate tribunal’s communicative act. 
However, I will argue that, like the deliberative framework, this approach also fails to 
fully capture what organisers are trying to do and how they are trying to do it.  
 
Radical democratic theory suggests a fundamentally different task awaits organisers 
of the International Tribunal on Climate Justice, than is implied by a deliberative 
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democratic framework. Unlike in the deliberative democratic account, organisers 
must do more than articulate solid, rational arguments supported by evidence, if they 
are to win over hearts and minds. Radical democratic scholars interested in how 
individuals’ beliefs and behaviours change and can be changed foreground a different 
kind of political practice or communicational mode to deliberation. Broadly speaking, 
the concern is with ‘disruptive’ and ‘interruptive’ practice(s), with the potential to 
disturb the hegemonic discourse and thereby create opportunities for the emergence 
of new discursive formations. What is interesting about the climate tribunal - and 
potentially peoples’ tribunals in general - is its potential to fulfil this function in 
addition to its deliberative function. 
 
Several different theoretical concepts from within the radical democratic canon and 
the broader literature concerned with the workings of hegemony are helpful to draw 
out the climate tribunal’s non-deliberative communicative act. As a starting point, 
Lindahl’s (2013) account of a-legality suggests that certain non-conventional, legally 
ambiguous behaviours can work to question extant legal boundaries and thereby 
reveal the limits to the legal order, and hence its contingency. In the previous chapter I 
elaborated on the particular nature of the boundary transgression at stake in the a-
legal initiatives which are the subject of this study. Whilst Lindahl describes behaviour 
and situations which challenge the boundary between lawful and illegal behaviour 
within a given legal order, these initiatives do something a bit different. These 
initiatives challenge the position of the legal boundary which delineates what is 
legally sanctioned and institutionalised, and what is not. Through enacting a legal 
and/or institutional process of the state, which could only belong to a somewhat 
different legal order, a-legal initiatives question the actual institutional order. And 
they suggest the possibility of an alternative institutional order. The climate tribunal 
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can be understood in this way: through enacting a judicial process which could only 
be part of another legal order, it evokes this other order and reveals the contingency 
of the extant one.  
 
Hence, Lindahl’s (2013) theory of a-legality suggests one way in which the climate 
tribunal might have functioned in a non-deliberative way, to affect public 
consciousness. However, the precise mechanics of this process could benefit from 
further elaboration. The nature of the communicative act at stake is succinctly 
captured by the notion of ‘exemplarity’, which has been explored by proponents of 
radical democracy to help explain how new demands get onto the political agenda. 
From a radical democratic perspective, the question of how new political demands, 
new ideas and new ways of thinking emerge is both central and perplexing. As 
highlighted, politics is characterised within this account by a logic of hegemonic 
struggle: competing political projects attempt to define social reality and hegemonise 
the discursive field (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The contents of the political agenda in 
any given context reflect the victors of these past discursive struggles. So how do new 
demands, not articulated by any of the discourses which characterise the social field, 
get a look in? Drawing on Cavell’s (1990) writings on exemplarity, Norval (2012, p. 
812) employs the notion of exemplars to help explain the process by which novel 
demands are “inscribed into the current order”. Cavell (1990) explores the role of 
Nora in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House as an exemplar. When Nora shocks her family and 
friends at the end of the play by breaking convention and leaving her husband and 
children, she exemplified an almost unheard of moral and political choice and 
behaviour to the play's 19th century audiences. Nora's actions were outside of the 
acceptable behaviours and rules of the time, but more importantly she articulated a 
sense of injustice which was not then recognised as injustice. As Norval explains:  
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Through the example of Nora, Cavell captures the experience of a sense of injustice that is 
inexpressible in the terms of prevailing discourse, but where, as he puts it, misery is clearly 
unmistakable (1990, 112) (2012, p. 812).  
 
Additionally, through her unfamiliar behaviour and implicit political demand, Nora 
forged a new path: she was “an exemplar of the possibility of being and acting 
differently” (2012, p. 819, emphasis in original).  In another instance, of particular 
pertinence to the present study, Norval describes the path-breaking legal case of the 
Khulumani Support Group, a South African social movement of victims and survivors 
of Apartheid (Madlingozi 2015). In 2008, through the innovative invocation of an 18th 
century law intended to protect victims of piracy, they used the US legal system to sue 
fifty multinational corporations alleged to have aided and abetted the Apartheid 
regime, through conducting business there during the Apartheid era.16 Importantly 
for the present study, the case is depicted as valuable regardless of its ultimate 
success in the courts. Win or lose, the Khulumani case functioned as an “exemplar of 
the possibility of being and acting differently” (2010, p. 19), through its suggestion 
that multinational corporations could be held responsible for their actions, wherever 
they take place. Exemplars like this, as with Nora:  
 
Literally manifest for us another way of doing things. In this sense, they precisely do the 
work of egalitarian inscription: they open up a horizon of imagination in which other ways 
of conceiving political community could be kept alive and, importantly, could be 
(re)inscribed repeatedly (ibid., emphasis in original).  
 
                                                        
16 The case was made possible through the Alien Tort Claims Act - originally intended to help 
foreigners seek redress for piracy, but which has been used on several occasions to hold 
multinational corporations responsible for human rights abuses (Norval 2009a).  
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Like Nora and the Khulumani, the International Tribunal on Climate Justice articulates 
a sense of injustice not fully recognised within the prevailing legal and political order. 
And, just like these marginalised actors, it demands a response. As Norval (2012, p. 
819) puts it:  
 
they embody claims exceeding moral discourse, they ‘put the social order as such on notice’ 
(Cavell, 1990, p. 109), as well as manifesting for us another way of doing things.  
 
The study of exemplars helps to sharpen the account of a-legal disruptions to the legal 
order provided by Lindahl (2013). Lindahl is interested in these behaviours for their 
potential to ‘disrupt’ the legal order and ‘intimate’ an alternative (2013, p. 1). 
Understanding a-legal initiatives, and the wider category of a-legality, as attempting 
to constitute exemplars helps explain both moments: the disruption and the 
intimation of an alternative.  
 
However, the utility of the exemplar concept for a theory of a-legal space does not end 
here. The International Tribunal on Climate Justice might be seen as an exemplar in a 
way which exceeds Cavell (1990) and Norval’s (2012) use of the term. In a postscript 
to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1970, p. 
186) introduced the notion of ‘exemplars’ to help clarify one sense in which he meant 
to employ the term 'paradigm', but which had been lost in the subsequent ubiquity of 
its application. He explained that:  
 
(...) [b]ecause the term [paradigm] has assumed a life of its own ... I shall here substitute 
‘exemplars.’ By it I mean, initially, the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter 
from the start of their scientific education, whether in laboratories, on examinations, or at 
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the ends of chapters in science texts. 
 
For Kuhn exemplars are the 'concrete problem-solutions' through which we learn. 
They exceed and precede what can be explained through rules, and encapsulate a way 
of doing science. Whilst Kuhn employed exemplars to characterise a process of 
learning in the hard sciences, arguably the concept can be employed to other 
disciplines and to law in particular. The climate tribunal holds promise as an exemplar 
in the sense that Cavell (1990) and Norval (2012) use the term: it embodies a 
different way of thinking and being and articulates a claim for justice which exceeds 
existing moral discourse. Equally it functions as an exemplar in Kuhn’s sense. Climate 
injustice and new legal infrastructure, specific laws, and a form of legal reasoning are 
presented as a concrete ‘problem-solution’, for lawyers, policy makers and the general 
public. Each of the seven cases presented during the tribunal capture different aspects 
to a new application of existing international Human Rights law, which illustrate a 
solution to the problem of climate injustice. The tribunal amounts to an effort to 
exemplify a new paradigm in how we understand climate change in legal terms. In the 
previous sub-section, I explored how the climate tribunal’s use and presentation of 
information could be understood in deliberative terms. However, Kuhn’s concept of 
exemplars helps explain how the careful and elaborate presentation of information to 
audiences might have a communicative function which is better conceived in radical 
democratic terms.  
 
One problem with this account is that exemplars are limited in their ability to affect 
public consciousness. As Norval (2008, p. 74) reflects:  
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It is only once a woman responds "Go ahead" to the "Go on" that the exemplar is effective in 
the constitution of new modes of doing and of being: new modes of subjectivity and of 
acting are not only opened up but made effective (2008, p. 74).  
 
In other words, the potential of exemplars to open up new discursive worlds is 
dependent in part upon those for whom these worlds are to be opened up. Indeed, 
this limitation to the provocative and evocative potential of a-legal behaviours was 
pointed out in section 2.1. For many shoppers witnessing the French protesters’ 
autoréduction, the action was ‘simply theft!’ (Lindahl 2013). In many cases these 
strange and intriguing behaviours go unnoticed and un-remarked upon. For Norval, 
this highlights the importance for democratic theory of a focus which extends beyond 
those articulating new claims, to those within the extant order to whom these 
demands are directed. There is a need for a: “focus on acknowledgement and 
responsiveness in the face of the declaration of a dispute” (2010, p. 20). But where, 
then, does this leave agents seeking to promote new modes of thinking and acting 
such as organisers of the climate tribunal and other a-legal initiatives? If the 
effectiveness of exemplars is so dependent on a certain public disposition and 
openness, then much is beyond the control of organisers. It would seem that the 
potential for effective exemplars to be consciously contrived is significantly 
constrained.  
 
However, here lies the particular potential of a-legal space as a mode of exemplarity.  
The hegemonic effects of constituted and constituent power were explored at length 
in chapter 2. The potential to harness these effects is one feature which makes a-legal 
initiatives interesting. In terms of constituting effective exemplars, capturing the 
hegemonic influence of law, institutions of constituted power, and of the ‘constituent 
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will’, could be crucial. Where successful in their emulation of constituted power and 
claims to represent the constituent will, a-legal initiatives stand to encourage 
audiences to take the leap and engage with the exemplar presented to them.  
 
When explored through a radical democratic framework it is clear that the climate 
tribunal functions in another non-deliberative way. It exemplifies another way of 
doing things, which exceeds and precedes existing political vocabularies. In this 
manner it not only disrupts the extant order, but helps to create the availability of an 
alternative. Moreover, through harnessing the hegemonic effects of constituted and 
constituent power it elevates its own exemplar potential.  
 
However, there are also problems with the radical democratic framework, both as a 
model of political change and democracy, and as a way to make sense of the climate 
tribunal. Of particular significance to the present study is the complaint that this 
account affords only a limited conception of human agency. As outlined above, the 
radical democratic social agent is determined by the discursive structure. Their 
thoughts and actions are a product of the subject positions they occupy. Only when 
the hegemonic discourse is dislocated does the ‘subject’ emerge. As Howarth and 
Stavrakakis (2000, p. 13) explain: 
 
it is the ‘failure’ of the structure, and... of those subject positions which are part of such a 
structure, that ‘compels’ the subject to act, to assert anew its subjectivity (2000, p.13).  
 
Yet here too only a limited conception of political agency is possible, since in this 
terrain of “radical undecidability” (Laclau 1996) the decision to identify with a new 
discursive formation is essentially arbitrary. The problem then is a too sharp 
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distinction between on the one hand the subject in a hegemonic context, in which 
their thoughts and behaviours are determined by the hegemonic discursive structure. 
And on the other hand, the moment of dislocation in which the subject’s decision 
must be “radically contingent” (Laclau 2006, p. 109), and hence arbitrary. In short, 
there is no room left in between these two extremes for any meaningful conception of 
political agency. 
 
This is particularly problematic for an account of the climate tribunal for it fails to 
reflect the struggle organisers describe or the task that they have set themselves. 
Organisers believe they are involved in the pursuit and demonstration of truth, not a 
particular contingent construction of reality (as the radical democratic framework 
would suggest). Accordingly, a belief in and appeals to public rationality and empathy 
play a central role in this strategy. As illustrated, their project exceeds what the 
deliberative democratic framework can capture. They seek to promote the 
development of ‘vivir bien’ as an alternative development paradigm and ‘form of life’ 
(Wittgenstein 2010). In persuading audiences to adopt these ideas they must do more 
than outline rational, legal arguments, since what is required is a discursive shift 
beyond existing discursive frameworks. And as I have shown, through efforts to 
constitute an exemplar, they attempt to do just this. However, the decision to identify 
with the discourse of climate justice and ‘vivir bien’ is not conceived as an arbitrary or 
even contingent decision. It is the inevitable and logical decision of an informed, 
educated and politically conscious citizenry. As Cristian Dominguez explains: “the 
Water War17 has shown that the people have the power. We are giving them the tools 
to make the right decisions” (2010). For organisers of the climate tribunal, climate 
justice and ‘vivir bien’ are not another equally valid but contingent construction of 
                                                        
17 The Bolivian Water War was a series of large scale protests in the 2000s when the protest 
movement successfully reversed the government’s decision to privatise water services.  
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reality, they reflect the common good. And in their efforts to persuade audiences to 
identify with their project they do not envision an act of arbitrary identification, but 
try to appeal to their common humanity.  
 
5.3.5. The democratic contribution of the climate tribunal and understanding 
divergences between forms of a-legal space 
 
In the preceding discussion, I aimed to explore how we should understand differences 
in the a-legal space tactic. In particular, how do we explain the centrality of 
information in some kinds of a-legal spaces, whilst this component is absent from 
others? The difference might suggest that these are not the same kinds of political 
projects. Information-based initiatives, as I have shown, are more readily explained by 
the deliberative democratic model. Whilst non-information-based a-legal initiatives 
cannot be understood as deliberative democratic exercises. These actions which 
function on a purely symbolic level are, instead, captured by the radical democratic 
model of democracy. However, looking at the climate tribunal, what is interesting is 
the applicability and the utility of both theoretical frameworks, to capture different 
aspects of the communicative act taking place.  
 
So, there are two sets of questions which need answering. Firstly, how should we 
characterise the democratic contribution of the climate tribunal? Is this a deliberative 
democratic exercise, intended to educate and inform the public and thereby 
contribute to realisation of the common good? Or is it better conceived as a disruptive 
practice which can contest the hegemonic order and contribute to the emergence of a 
counter-hegemonic discourse? Secondly, what does this tell us about the coherence of 
the idea of an a-legal space strategy? Are different forms of a-legal space best 
331 
 
 
conceived through divergent models of democracy and political change? Or is there a 
way in which we can make sense of the differences in form?   
 
A persuasive case can be made for the climate tribunal’s contribution to deliberative 
democracy. Organiser accounts reflect the faith they hold in the public’s capacity for 
empathy and rationality. And through the climate tribunal they seek to educate and 
inform audiences, so that they will “make the connections that have to be made” 
(Peredo Beltrán 2010). However, the deliberative model is fatally limited in its ability 
to recognise the power inequalities which disadvantage proponents of marginal and 
counter-hegemonic discourses such as climate justice.  Actors turn to a use of a-legal 
space when formal legal and political channels are closed to them; they articulate 
claims which cannot be heard within the formal legal system. As such the deliberative 
framework is particularly inadequate to capture all that they are about. Moreover, I’ve 
shown that despite the deliberative components, the climate tribunal’s 
communicative act exceeds what can be explained through this framework. Much like 
non-information based a-legal initiatives, the climate tribunal promises to function as 
an exemplar, which disrupts the hegemonic order and invokes the possibility of an 
alternative.  
 
I suggest that information-based and non-information-based a-legal initiatives are 
indeed part of the same phenomenon and strategy, and that divergences in the form 
can be explained by the discursive context in which they are employed. More 
specifically, these divergent approaches are employed at different stages in the life 
cycle of a hegemonic project. Peoples’ tribunals, citizens’ debt audits and other 
information- based initiatives are more commonly employed, and most relevant, at 
the earlier stages in a hegemonic project, where the objective is to lay the foundations 
332 
 
 
for a new discursive project. The objective of the a-legal exercise in this context is to 
create a source of authority for the claims of the fledgling hegemonic project. This 
interpretation resonates with Jayan Nayar’s (2001; 2006) account of peoples’ 
tribunals, which are described as:  
 
something more than an articulation of protest… [they are] about creating a different 
authority for judgement and action altogether, based on other ‘word-worlds’ of law that are 
authored by peoples in action (2001, p. 3 check).  
 
Non-information-based initiatives, such as the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, unofficial 
referenda, or Free States, are utilised at a later stage in a hegemonic project. They 
reflect a discourse which is more developed, in which a longer ‘chain of equivalence’ 
connects different groups together, united by their common identification with an 
empty signifier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1990). This is not to say that these 
non-information-based a-legal initiatives don’t have a hegemony building function. 
Commentators on the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, for example, remarked upon how the 
Embassy functioned as a signifier which united Australia’s diverse aboriginal groups 
(Robinson 1994). But, unlike peoples’ tribunals, debt audits and other information-
based initiatives, they do not involve an elaborate process of developing legal 
arguments, based on technical evidence, to support a wider political project. In these 
cases, the discourse is already well formed, and the a-legal initiative functions to 
reinforce this. Here too the a-legal exercise has a legitimating function, as I argued at 
length in chapter 4, with respect to the Radical Cause party’s referendum on Pérez. 
But the structure of this legitimacy claim differs somewhat. Legitimacy claims are 
based more on levels of popular participation, rather than technical legal arguments 
supported by evidence. 
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By way of support, I would point to the high levels of media coverage that non-
information-based a-legal initiatives have often received, in contrast with their 
information-based counterparts. Whilst not always the case, unofficial referenda such 
as the first Catalan independence referendum in Arenys de Munt, Catalonia; Zelaya’s 
fourth ballot box poll, and the Colombian students’ seventh ballot, have captured the 
attention of national and international media. As did the Aboriginal Tent Embassy 
(Robinson 1994). This is suggestive of a more mature hegemonic project, in which the 
demands of organisers make sense and have resonance with large sections of the 
public. Equally, these initiatives are often dependent upon high levels of participation 
to have any value. Unlike peoples’ tribunals or debt audits, for example, without mass 
public participation an unofficial referendum has limited value.18 This is in contrast to 
peoples’ tribunals which have often received very limited media coverage 
(Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer 2002).19 Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer’s (2002, p. 184 - 
185) account of this phenomenon is interesting:  
 
Overall, international citizens’ tribunals over the last two decades of the twentieth century 
have not been highly effective, as they have been too partisan, shrill, anti-American, and 
leftist. While often raising important issues and presenting critical evidence, their credibility 
generally has not been accepted by the media or public. 
 
Putting to one side for now the question of impact, these scholars’ dismissive 
comments make sense when we understand peoples’ tribunals to be articulating a 
                                                        
18  The World Referendum on Climate Change, initiated by Bolivian civil society in 2010, is one 
example of a referendum which failed to generate wide-scale take-up. The explanation may be that 
this initiative did not exemplify a well-developed hegemonic project: ideas about climate justice in 
2010 (as now) were still marginal in most contexts. Which is to say this is an example of an a-legal 
tactic employed in the wrong context.  
19  As was commented about the World Tribunal on Iraq: “almost blanket media blackout” (Medialens 
2005).  
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counter-hegemonic discourse with limited wide-scale acceptance. Their depiction of 
peoples’ tribunals as “shrill” (ibid.) and lacking credibility suggests that these a-legal 
initiatives speak in a language that is not yet well understood.  
 
This account allows us to retain the notion of a coherent a-legal space strategy. In all 
instances these initiatives can be understood as a type of discursive strategy to 
support the development of a wider hegemonic project. Through harnessing the 
authority associated with law, constituted power, and the ‘constituent will’, these 
initiatives can be conceived in terms of the construction of tipping events, which will 
shift the range of political possibilities available. But how exactly this task is 
approached may vary, dependent on the discursive context.  
 
 
5.3.6. The elite-led critique 
 
As sites in which the voices of the marginalised and oppressed are elevated and 
afforded a new authority, it may appear that a-legal activities should be championed 
for their emancipatory potential. There is reason for caution, however. As Borowiak 
(2011, p.169) points out, civil society is: “saturated with politics and power struggles. 
It has its own regimes, its own accountability problems, and its own need for 
reflexivity.” Whilst (in most cases) a-legal activities originate in civil society, the key 
organisers are often not the marginalised and oppressed themselves. This is perhaps 
most true of the peoples' tribunal format, often instigated by international NGOs and 
academics, and based on a somewhat elitist model with juries often comprised of 
Nobel Prize winners and well known intellectuals. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
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task of successfully mimicking domestic or international legal institutions requires 
financial and social capital which is a barrier to all but elite groups. 
 
In this sub-section, therefore, I explore the relative influence and contribution of the 
social movements, rural communities, international environmental networks and 
other organisations listed as participating in the International Tribunal on Climate 
Justice. I explore which individuals and groups may have been more or less able to 
influence decisions and act in the planning and execution of the tribunal. And what, 
perhaps, does its civil society basis mask? I argue that in some ways the tribunal 
could be said to recreate the structural inequalities of the society within which it 
takes place. And that this is to some extent unavoidable and a feature of this form of 
resistance. However, organisers demonstrate sensitivity to this tension and a strong 
commitment to enabling the participation and influence of the marginalised 
communities worst hit by climate change.  
  
Several components of the climate tribunal can be seen to embody the structural 
inequalities of power which as a political action the tribunal was designed to 
challenge. Firstly: the specific cases presented to the preliminary hearing of the 
tribunal in 2009 are interesting to consider. As the tribunal seeks to emphasise, the 
impacts of climate change have disproportionately affected the poor. Accordingly, 
each of the cases presented during the tribunal highlighted the devastating impacts of 
climate change on indigenous or peasant and/or poor communities across Latin 
America.  
 
The Bolivian case is an interesting example. Entitled 'Denunciation of human rights 
abuses resulting from global warming for acts and omissions of the countries 
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included in Annex 1 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)', 
the case outlined the effects of climate change on the Khapi community, in La Paz, 
Bolivia. The Khapi are a small indigenous community of around forty-eight families, 
based at the foot of the Illimani glacier, approximately fifty kilometres from the city of 
La Paz. The community practices subsistence farming, using traditional farming 
techniques. The Illimani glacier is their only source of water and its shrinking in 
recent years due to climate change has had dramatic effects on their food security and 
way of life. They experience regular water shortages and droughts, as well as 
excessive heavy rains which destroy crops. The community can no longer produce 
sufficient food for their own subsistence. Young people increasingly relocate to the 
cities in search of work. Scientists predict that the community will be forced to 
relocate in the medium term due to water shortages. 
 
The La Paz based NGO, Sustainable Water, has worked with the Khapi community for 
a number of years and was responsible for collating the information for and 
coordinating the case for the climate tribunal. As organiser Martin Vilela explains, the 
role of Sustainable Water in the tribunal was “to bring forward” this case. Therefore, a 
picture emerges in which the lives and struggles of an indigenous rural community 
living in extreme poverty are presented as 'the case', which is coordinated by the La 
Paz-based, highly educated, largely middle class, white NGO workers, subsequently to 
be presented for judgement by a panel of judges from across the continent and world. 
A power imbalance between participating groups seems unavoidable.  
 
Organisers, however, demonstrate a strong commitment to enabling the Khapi 
community to remain central to the process. Martin Vilela of Sustainable Water 
explains:  
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I assumed a role between the work of the community and preparing the case... because, of 
course, it’s not that we went to make the case – they [the Khapi community] had to be 
involved, and through their testimony they were able to demonstrate and verify that these 
violations exist. And basically to construct the foundations [of climate justice 
jurisprudence] (2010).   
 
However, the extent to which members of the community were indeed able to 
participate in and influence construction of the case is unclear, whilst it is clear that 
the tribunal is premised on use of an exclusionary form of knowledge. As Vilela 
comments:  
 
What we have done is demonstrate a little what are the impacts of climate change and how 
these impacts threaten human rights... the right to life, the right to water, food, health, self-
determination, culture, food sovereignty, and others such as the rights of women, of children 
and adolescents.  
 
Compilation of this case evidently required a knowledge and understanding of 
existing human rights legislation, and some understanding of the requirements of 
legal evidence and legal reasoning. Whilst the Khapi community members may have 
contributed to the process, anyone without expert knowledge could have played only 
a secondary role. Arguably, the decision to present the impact of climate change on 
the lives of the Khapi community in the language of law comes at the expense of 
(most) community members' ability to lead the process.  
 
Perhaps, however, this may be recognised as one trade-off to be made, in exchange 
for the hegemonic and legitimating potential of law. One fruitful way of 
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understanding the dynamic, I suggest, is through Jayan Nayar's concept of 'activist 
legality' (2001). In his analysis of peoples' tribunals and their contribution to a 
'Peoples' Law' Nayar acknowledges that peoples' tribunals cannot be described as 
initiatives of the subaltern, and neither therefore are they a form of 'subaltern 
legality'. However, he suggests they be understood to play a kind of interlocutory role, 
between the oppressed and powerless that they seek to represent, and the dominant 
institutions of power. Peoples' tribunals thereby exemplify an 'activist legality', 
whose role is to translate the voices of the subaltern into a language which can be 
understood, and has authority, in wider contexts. Such a characterisation of the 
climate tribunal finds support in the comments of organisers, such as Alexandra 
Flores' (Solon Foundation) explanation that: “we started to look for tools in order to 
be able to make justice accessible to communities” (2010).  
 
However, there are tensions to such a dynamic, as are inherent to any interlocutory 
act. In describing their plans for the next session of the Tribunal (then planned to take 
place in 2012) Flores explains their intention to construct a jury which “will better 
attract the attention of the press, because the first hearing of the tribunal did not have 
much coverage in the press” (2010). She adds:  
 
There is this preoccupation, that we want to establish a jury... a little more... not objective, 
but with more social credibility shall we say, with more scientists, Nobel prize winners... 
(Ibid.).  
 
When compared with the Jury of the 2009 Preliminary Hearing, her comments are 
revealing of a tension at the heart of such initiatives. The 2009 jury was made up of 
representatives of significant social and indigenous movements and international 
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environmental networks. Members included indigenous leaders, from the National 
Association of Rural and Indigenous Women of Chile and the Coordinating Committee of 
Andean Indigenous Organisations; representatives from politically orientated NGOs 
including Jubilee South, Friends of the Earth and the Holland-based Transnational 
Institute; and social movements such as the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, amongst 
others. Despite the variety in their backgrounds, these jury members share a common 
counter-hegemonic discourse, and can be expected to have significant 'social 
credibility' – as Alexandra Flores puts it (ibid.) – with the range of movements and 
other actors associated with the campaign for climate justice in Bolivia, and globally. 
Yet organisers, evidently, feel a pressure to recruit a different demographic, including 
“more scientists, Nobel prize winners” (Flores 2010) to strengthen their social 
credibility of a different kind; or with a different audience. This is an inherent tension 
in the peoples' tribunal model, where organisers strive for mainstream acceptance 
and media coverage, through the use of particular kinds of elites, who almost 
standardly do not belong to the communities which are affected by the injustice 
under examination, nor have any connection with their particular historical struggles.  
 
However, in the case of the climate tribunal, organisers demonstrate an acute 
sensitivity to this tension, and describe their intentions to achieve a balance. As 
Alexandra comments, about the requirements of a jury for the climate tribunal: “They 
must be credible, but at the same time have 'feeling' with civil society” (Interview, 
2010). Expanding on the need to achieve a balance between mainstream credibility 
and civil society demands she can be interpreted as encapsulating the 'activist 
legality' strategy, its philosophical basis and inherent tensions:  
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When you talk of justice, I think that you always have to be on the side of those that have 
the greatest need, rather than those that don't shall we say... The Tribunal works in this 
sense, trying to reach this “objectivity” in quotation marks, in a jury that is a little more 
shall we say, independent, … for example scientists, well known people, academics, but at 
the same time to not lose the social side of the Tribunal, because this is what the 
organisations demand, even in Cochabamba [the alternative climate change summit], the 
indigenous people in the Climate Tribunal working group at the conference were saying 'it 
cannot be that people judge us who don't live our reality'. 
 
Within a framework of activist legality there will be varying degrees to which the 
subaltern subjects of an intervention are able to influence and hold to account the 
activist interlocutors. In addition, there will be varying degrees of crossover between 
the subaltern subjects and activist agents. Where there is evidence of limited 
accountability and limited crossover, the 'elite-led critique' of peoples' tribunals 
presents a more serious challenge. In the case of the climate tribunal, however, there 
is evidence of accountability, subject/activist crossover, and effective discursive 
representation.  
 
5.3.7. The Foucauldian Critique 
 
In 1972, for a special issue of Sartre's magazine Les Temps Modernes, Michel Foucault 
and the leader of French Maoist group Gauche Prolétarienne, debated the nature of 
'popular justice'. Both Sartre and the Gauche Prolétarienne had become enthusiastic 
supporters of peoples' tribunals, after they had initiated one in the French mining 
town of Lens two years earlier. In Lens sixteen miners had been killed in a mine 
explosion, yet despite evidence of countless safety violations the local judiciary had 
failed to press charges against the company. The Lens tribunal found the mining 
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company guilty of murder, and that it “intentionally chose output over safety, which is 
to say, the production of things over people's lives” (Sartre quoted in Wolin 2010, p. 
29). In 1972 the Gauche Prolétarienne (GP) were planning their next peoples' tribunal 
which would address allegations of police brutality. However, Foucault expressed 
deep misgivings about the peoples' tribunal tactic. He questioned whether popular 
justice - “acts of justice by the people” - can be organised in the form of a court. For 
Foucault, the court is not “the natural expression of popular justice”, but rather “its 
first deformation” (1972, p. 1 - 2). He points to the role of the court in sustaining the 
class structure, through “dragging along with it the ideology of bourgeois justice” 
(ibid., p. 27).  Moreover, he argues, efforts to reclaim the form of the court are 
destined to recreate the same oppressive structures:  
 
Can we not see the embryonic, albeit fragile form of state apparatus reappearing here? The 
possibility of class oppression? Is not the setting up of a neutral institution standing 
between the people and its enemies, capable of establishing the dividing line between the 
true and the false, the guilty and the innocent, the just and the unjust, is this not a way of 
resisting popular justice? (Ibid., pg. 2). 
 
In the wider literature addressing law and resistance, the complex and paradoxical 
impacts of legal strategies for resistance are a recurring theme (Lazarus-Black and 
Hirsch 1994). Scholars interested in the use of law as a tool for social justice 
emphasise the ambiguous nature of law’s effects in the struggles of subordinated 
peoples (ibid.; Merry 2000). As Lazarus-Black and Hirsch (1994, p. 4) explain: 
 
Law governs through paradoxical forms and practices which curb certain injustices as they 
create others… ideologies and practices in and around legal arenas reproduce hierarchies 
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even as they constitute new social groups and categories that, in turn, transform law’s 
meaning and application.  
 
For some this is to sacrifice too much. In her seminal book, Feminism and the Power of 
Law, feminist legal scholar Carol Smart (1989) argued that law is a product of, and 
works to sustain, the patriarchal system.  As such, “in accepting law’s terms in order 
to challenge law, feminism always concedes too much” (ibid., p. 5). Moreover, 
building on Foucault’s analysis of scientific discourse, Smart argues that law functions 
in much the same problematic way. Through its claim to truth and objectivity, law 
disqualifies other forms of knowledge in general, and feminism in particular. Smart 
advocated that feminists abandon legal strategies altogether and seek out ‘non-legal 
strategies’ for resistance.  
 
The arguments of Foucault (1972) and Smart (1989) encapsulate what is perhaps the 
most serious challenge to the utility of a-legal space as a political strategy. As I have 
shown in earlier chapters, actors turn to the use of a-legal space in response to the 
closure of the formal system. They make political demands which cannot be heard 
within the formal legal or parliamentary system, and the turn to a-legal space is an 
attempt to create an opening, in which they will be heard. However, if, as these 
theorists would suggest, the use of the legal and state form will inevitably recreate 
hegemonic conceptual categories and frameworks, these initiatives might do more to 
reinforce than to contest and subvert the prevailing legal and political order. In this 
sub-section I discuss the significance of this ‘Foucauldian critique’ to the use of a-legal 
space generally and the International Tribunal on Climate Justice in particular. I argue 
that whilst it indeed captures the paradoxical nature of this strategy and gives reason 
for caution, the Foucauldian critique is too totalistic.  There is more room to contest 
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the hegemonic order within a-legal spaces than in formal legal spaces, which this 
critique does not account for. 
 
Firstly, it is helpful to untangle the somewhat different claims which comprise this 
broader critique. Two distinct, though related, claims can be identified. The first 
suggests that these initiatives will reinforce legal hegemony: the power and authority 
of the law at the expense of other kinds of knowledge and practice. In the case of less 
narrowly legal initiatives, such as unofficial referenda, debt audits or the Aboriginal 
Tent Embassy, the analogous charge is that these initiatives reinforce the hegemony of 
the state and state processes more generally. In either case, the result is to undermine 
voices, practices, and knowledge which emanate from outside of the state or the 
discourse of law. This claim is hard to deny: the a-legal space strategy is based on an 
appeal to the authority and legitimacy of law and the institutions and processes of the 
state. Hence, these initiatives reify and reinforce the hegemonic status of law and the 
state, per se. The second strand to the Foucauldian critique is that through speaking 
in the language of law, and emulating institutions of the state, a-legal initiatives will 
inevitably recreate dominant categories and systems of meaning, and thereby 
reinforce hegemonic structures more generally (be it patriarchy, neoliberalism, 
colonialism, or otherwise). This second claim is the more problematic, since it 
suggests the ultimate futility of the a-legal space strategy. However, as I will seek to 
show, this argument fails to appreciate the freedom to creatively employ law and 
experiment with visions of the state, made possible within a-legal spaces.  
 
The Peoples' International Tribunal, Hawai'i, which tried the USA for the takeover of 
Hawai'i, resource appropriation and cultural destruction (Merry 1996), exemplifies 
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particularly well the plural, bottom up and counter-hegemonic law which is 
sometimes developed in these spaces. The jury’s verdict states that the tribunal 
“refuses… to define law in a formalistic or colonialist manner”, and instead is “guided 
by five mutually reinforcing conceptions of law” (cited in ibid., p. 77). These include 
indigenous Hawaiian law; UN Declarations; the US Constitution and US Law; the 1976 
Algiers Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Peoples; and “the inherent law of 
Humanity”, defined as “a higher law based on the search for justice in the relation 
among persons and peoples and their nations” and “a law establishing the conditions 
for harmony between human activity and nature” (Interim Report 2 – 4, cited in ibid., 
p. 77).  
 
Other peoples’ tribunals are founded on a similarly radical and counter-hegemonic 
conception of law. As Byrnes (2012) notes, peoples’ tribunals have at different times 
drawn on “two strands of legal authority” including nation state law and “the law of 
the peoples”: “a body of law which claims its validity from outside the Westphalian 
system in the sovereignty of peoples that exists independently of that system”. The 
principle legal instrument within this tradition is the 1976 Universal Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Peoples (the Algiers Declaration). The Algiers Declaration 
was drafted by a gathering of jurists and political leaders in 1976, initiated by Italian 
legislator Lelio Basso, who went on to found the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, with 
the objective to “more fully elaborate and legitimise the concept of peoples’ rights” 
(McCaughan 1989, p. 2). Peoples’ rights are intended to complement Human Rights, 
which are conceived in terms of the rights of the individual (ibid.). The Algiers’ 
Declaration asserts the rights of peoples to existence and political self-determination, 
and to control over their resources, economic system, culture and environment. It 
also calls for the protection of liberation movements. The Algiers declaration is not 
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‘official’ international law: it has never been sanctioned by an inter-governmental 
body (Stavenhagen 2012).20 But it has had some influence on mainstream 
international law (ibid.) and has become an important document within the peoples’ 
tribunal tradition, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal takes the Algiers’ Declaration at 
its ‘conceptual basis’ (Lelio and Lisli Basso Foundation 2014).  
 
These peoples’ tribunals have not engaged in an unselective recreation of the 
dominant legal order. As Merry (1996, p. 68) puts it, in her discussion of the Peoples’ 
International Tribunal, Hawai’i:  
 
The law they mobilize is not simply the law of the state or the United Nations but an 
appropriated notion of law that joins indigenous concepts with state and global law. Thus, 
although they talk rights, reparations, and claims--the language of law--they construct a 
new law out of the pieces of the old. Like the English spoken in Africa, the colonial law 
imposed by the West is developing its own cadences and vocabulary. It is becoming a 
vernacular law rather than transnational imperial law. 
 
The Foucualdian critique is pertinent to these initiatives. Whilst employing a 
“vernacular law” (ibid.), they may simultaneously use and re-affirm oppressive legal 
categories and arguments. But this should be examined on a case by case basis. 
Outright dismissal of the form ignores the potential for contestation of legal 
categories exemplified in pluralist initiatives such as the Peoples’ International 
Tribunal, Hawai’i.   
 
However, not all a-legal initiatives take this radical pluralist approach. As I 
highlighted in chapter 1, peoples’ tribunals and other a-legal initiatives have varied in 
                                                        
20  To this extent the Algiers Declaration itself might be understood as an a-legal space/initiative.  
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the extent to which they attempt to adhere to official legal forms and processes. In 
stark contrast to the Hawaiian tribunal, some initiatives have employed a narrow and 
conservative use of hegemonic legal tools. One example is the Women’s Court of 
Canada, a feminist judgement writing project for which a collective of feminist 
academics and lawyers re-write key rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada which 
are perceived to have denied women justice. Unlike the plural application of law in 
some peoples’ tribunals, this court’s re-written feminist judgements draw only on the 
equality clause in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Hunter 
2012).  
 
The more conservative approach exemplified in some initiatives is not, however, 
necessarily more vulnerable to the Foucauldian critique. I would argue that here too a 
closer analysis of specific cases is required. Organisers of the Women’s Court of 
Canada explained that they sought to show: “how a more developed substantive 
equality analysis could be incorporated into the interpretation and application of 
section 15 of the Charter” (ibid., p. 3 – 4). Reflecting that a successor project might be 
“bolder and more visionary”, and “try to envision a very different legal system from 
the existing one”, organisers explain their intention in this instance was to show that 
their judicial decisions were ones that could have been made by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, at the time they were made (Majury 2006). Hence the objective was to 
contest and expand dominant forms of legal reasoning, (rather than promote 
alternative legal tools or concepts). The subversive and emancipatory value of their 
efforts is not, I would argue, lost through their conservative use of existing legal tools 
however imperfect these may be. In short: the freedom of the a-legal form allows for 
discursive work that could not be done in the formal legal arena, and to which the 
Foucauldian critique fails to give due credit.  
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What approach, then, did the International Tribunal on Climate Justice take in their 
struggle to articulate and promote climate justice, through use of the a-legal form? 
Did they, like the Hawaiian tribunal, attempt to promote a counter-hegemonic law 
based on a plurality of legal traditions and philosophical frameworks? Or, did they, 
like the Women's Court of Canada, opt to operate within the confines of hegemonic 
state or international law but strive to demonstrate the potential for its progressive 
and egalitarian application? And, in either case, how does it fare in light of the 
Foucauldian critique? Viewed through this framework, the climate tribunal is an 
interesting case.  
 
On the one hand, the climate tribunal exemplifies a conservative strategy based on 
the application of hegemonic legal tools. Several organisers emphasised the 
importance that only “formally recognised” legal instruments were employed by the 
tribunal (Vilela 2010; Flores 2010). And indeed the jury's final report is centred on an 
extensive list of the specific UN treaties which are judged to have been violated by 
climate change.21 There is one reference to indigenous legal traditions in the jury’s 
final report, in ‘General Observation 5’, where it notes:  
 
Application of an extractivist and export-based development model - perpetuated by 
governments and transnational corporations – is provoking systemic and permanent 
                                                        
21  In their list, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) (ICESCR) 
and General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are together cited 
five times.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) (ICCPR) is cited four 
times. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is cited three times. Together these three 
documents constitute what is known as the International Bill of Human Rights, meaning that this 
instrument is drawn on a total of twelve times in the jury's report, and constitutes almost the whole 
first page of jury observations. The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man (1948) – a 
product of the Organization of American States, rather than the UN - is also cited in two places. But 
in both instances, it is supported by reference to UN treaties (UNDHR and the ICCPR) which are also 
deemed to have been violated (Fundación Solón 2009b).  
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conflicts with collective rights, poor use of territory, and violation of the rights of nature. 
Also with Traditional Law based on indigenous ancestral knowledge and wisdom about 
management of all that is material and spiritual, with which compliance guarantees balance 
with the Pachamama and the permanence of life (Fundación Solón 2009b, p. 30). 
 
So the violation of indigenous law receives a mention, but as a supplementary point. It 
does not constitute a jury ‘General Observation’ in its own right, let alone provide a 
basis to the jury’s findings. There is no detail provided as to which indigenous legal 
system(s) they refer, or to the contents of the indigenous laws in question. This 
omission in the context of a climate tribunal, in which some of the worst-impacted 
victims include indigenous communities, is noteworthy. Arguably this reinforces a 
dismissal of indigenous law as ‘not really law’. Equally conspicuous by their absence 
are references to the Algiers Declaration, or already existing earth rights legislation 
such as Ecuador’s Rights of Nature, ratified in their 2008 Constitution. Neither is 
there any reference to the growing movement for Mother Earth Rights, which was 
gaining momentum in Bolivia by late 2009. 
 
The climate tribunal’s conservative application of mainly hegemonic legal tools likely 
reflects a similar strategy to the Women’s Court of Canada, who sought to show how 
different legal rulings were possible and correct, within existing recognised legal 
frameworks. It was perhaps the product of a utilitarian calculation: they sought to 
challenge climate injustice through law, not promote legal pluralism, regardless of 
whether organisers themselves advocated a more pluralist conception of law. The 
aim was to show that existing uncontroversial legal norms had been violated, and 
hence function as a source of authority for those demanding state action on climate 
change.  
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However, there is evidence of something else going on in the jury’s final report. The 
use of UN Human Rights Law as a basis to the tribunal’s findings is juxtaposed with 
radical political demands which challenge the economic and political order. ‘General 
Observation 1’, at the start of the jury’s report, assumes the appearance of a key 
message and functions to frame the rest of the report. It is here that the jury defines 
the problem that is to be addressed:  
 
The capitalist economic system has generated the climate change that we are now living 
and impedes a rapid and effective response to its impacts. International agreements on 
trade, finance and investments are driving the expansion of industries with intensive use of 
fossil fuels, other natural resources, such as the expansion of agriculture and industrial 
farming (including monocrops). These activities release large quantities of carbon and 
contribute to the destruction of forests that regulate the climate (Fundación Solón 2009b, p. 
29).  
 
The release of carbon dioxide is carefully framed as a product of the capitalist 
economic system. Understood through Kuhn’s (1970) exemplar framework 
(discussed above), they have constructed the ‘problem’ part, of the “concrete 
problem-solution”. And throughout the rest of the report they illustrate how existing 
UN Human Rights law can be applied to solve this problem. Hence, alongside and 
indeed through the careful application of internationally recognised, uncontentious 
legal instruments and concepts, there is something else going on. The ‘problem-
solution’ constructed by the tribunal invokes a different legal order which, in 
Lindahl’s terms, has an entirely different “normative point” (2013, p. 73) to the extant 
neoliberal international legal order. The careful use of UN Human Rights law, at the 
expense of indigenous law, peoples’ law instruments such as the Algiers Declaration, 
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or earth rights legislation, should be understood as a strategic choice. The aim is to 
normalise their radical political analysis through drawing on the hegemonic power of 
Human Rights law. And their capacity to create an effective exemplar of this other 
legal order depends on successfully harnessing this hegemonic power.  
 
Various novel legal concepts, with significant implications, are introduced, including 
‘climate debt’, Earth Rights, and Crimes Against Nature. But they are presented as 
following logically from existing norms and concepts. The second General 
Observation, for example, notes that:  
 
considering the undeniable fact that climate change affects and will affect billions of people, 
systematically violating their Civil, Cultural, Economic, and Political Rights, we can define 
climate change as a Crime Against Humanity (Fundación Solón 2009b, p. 26).  
 
Then, presented as an additional observation which merely builds on the first, they 
continue:  
 
In the same way, for their gravity and systematicity, we consider that the crimes against the 
rights of nature constitute what can be called a 'Crime Against Nature' (ibid.).  
 
The new category of Crime Against Nature, constructed as analogous to the already 
accepted notion of Crime Against Humanity, entails a radically different conception 
of rights, and the kinds of things which can be protected through rights. But the 
implication here is that it represents a logical extension of existing legal concepts 
and categories. This is what Duncan Kennedy (2008) calls “legal ‘work’”. Kennedy 
has argued against the positivist legal theory of Hart and Kelsen, according to 
which there is an area of law which is fixed, and determinate, the ‘core’, in contrast 
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to the ‘penumbra’, in which law is indeterminate. In fact, argues Kennedy (ibid.) 
part of the work of the judge or legal scholar is to ‘work’ the legal materials and to 
define what belongs in the ‘core’ and what belongs in the ‘penumbra’. In other 
words, the act of legal interpretation is itself an ideologically motivated and 
contingent process; neither neutral nor objective. The climate tribunal jurists can 
be seen to have carefully presented significant new conceptual categories as within 
the domain of settled law. The impression created is one of logical, methodical 
exercise, instead of an appeal for a radical conceptual shift in legal frameworks.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
The International Tribunal on Climate Justice provided a space in which 
representatives of social movements, community groups, and civil society from 
across Latin America came together to articulate how aspects of the economic and 
political system – as they see it – are devastating their lives. An analysis of the groups 
and individuals who participated through presenting cases, serving on the jury, or 
organising the event reveals an emerging common discourse structured around the 
key signifiers of climate justice and ‘Living Well’, and defined in opposition to the 
extant neoliberal order. The tribunal can be understood as narrowly intended to 
advance the case for new legal infrastructure to address climate change, but this 
captures only part of the picture. Organiser accounts suggest it was also understood 
as an expression of and intended to advance their broader counter-hegemonic 
project.  
 
In section 5.3 I explored the strategy by which they attempted to promote their wider 
counter-hegemonic project and alternative ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein 2010). This 
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analysis has significant implications for a theory of a-legal space, since it relates to the 
difference between information-based and non-information-based a-legal initiatives. 
If it transpired that the climate tribunal was best understood through a deliberative 
democratic framework, we would have to question the coherence of a single a-legal 
space strategy. However, I have shown that the deliberative framework – whilst 
indeed capturing key components to what took place – is ultimately inadequate to 
make sense of the task facing organisers of the International Tribunal on Climate 
Justice. Instead, understanding the tribunal as attempting to create an exemplar can 
capture both the deliberative and non-deliberative communicative modes in which 
organisers have engaged. Complex legal arguments, supported by evidence, are better 
understood as attempts to create a ‘problem-solution’: an exemplar in the Kuhnian 
sense, rather than through a deliberative democratic lens. Different forms of a-legal 
space should indeed be understood as part of the same phenomenon and same broad 
strategy, but reflect the different stages in a hegemonic project. The construction of 
new ‘problem-solutions’ is necessary in the earlier stages of a political project. In 
contrast, initiatives such as a-legal referenda which allow for the affirmation or 
negation of a single statement (‘Should we convene a constituent assembly’; ‘Should 
Catalonia secede from Spain?’ ‘Should Carlos Andrés Pérez continue governing?’) take 
place at a later stage, and reflect an already well constructed antagonistic frontier 
(Laclau 2005).  
 
Finally, I considered two critiques of the a-legal space strategy which question its 
emancipatory potential. Critics of this approach might point, firstly, to the elite-led 
nature of these initiatives. Secondly, they might question the extent to which one can 
hope to contest and subvert the extant legal and political order, and exemplify an 
alternative, through a strategy based on replicating elements of this order. The two 
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critiques and my responses to them are ultimately connected. I argued that the 
International Tribunal on Climate Justice, like peoples’ tribunals in general, is indeed 
vulnerable to this critique. The decision to speak in the language of law comes at the 
expense of the ability of the most marginalised groups to lead the process. However, 
those leading this process, their motivations, and their desire to transform the system 
are all a part of the matter. For organisers of the climate tribunal, creating a space for 
the voices of those most affected by climate change was central. To this extent the 
tribunal exemplifies what Nayar calls ‘activist legality’ (2001): it is an interlocutory 
space which is intended to “make justice accessible to communities” (Flores 2010). 
Here we can see the relevance to the Foucauldian critique. As Nayar explains, the aim 
of activist legality is: 
 
to subvert the languages and symbols that are recognised by the dominant so that the cause 
of the subaltern within specific contexts of liberational and resistance endeavours may be 
served (2001).  
 
An analysis of the climate tribunal’s use of law reveals their careful project to 
create an exemplar of a fundamentally different legal response to climate change. 
Whilst they speak in the language of UN Human Rights law, the legal order which is 
invoked is based on the philosophy of ‘vivir bien’ (living well) and would 
institutionalise the rights of Mother Earth. In short, it has what Lindahl (2013) 
would call an entirely different ‘normative point’ to the dominant international 
legal order.  
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Conclusions 
  
Inspired by the Radical Cause party’s unofficial and unauthorised referendum on 
President Pérez, Marta Harnecker posits the existence of another kind of legal space: a 
“whole other arena” for political action, distinct from the legal and the illegal (2007, 
p.138). My interviews with the referendum organisers echo this characterisation of 
what took place. As one ex-Radical Cause leader explains: “It was an insurrectionary 
exercise, from a non-violent route” (Uzcategui 2012) and as another puts it “we 
wanted to break the constitutional, democratically” (Trincado 2012). Their comments, 
and Harnecker’s argument, can be best understood in context. The Radical Cause 
party was a response to a particular historical moment: founded by an ex-guerrilla 
leader and others who recognised the failure of the armed struggle yet sought to 
transcend the limitations of Venezuela’s ‘pacted’ democracy, in which power had 
alternated between two ideologically similar hegemonic political parties since the 
start of the modern democratic period in 1958. For Harnecker, this referendum 
offered an alternative to the reform/revolution dichotomy which had defined left 
strategy in earlier decades. But did the Radical Cause party’s referendum transcend 
something more than a historical dichotomy? The aim of this project has been to 
explore this idea, and the transferability and the utility of a-legal space as a political 
strategy. In this concluding chapter I will draw together the insights and conclusions 
of earlier chapters and consider the consequences for a theory of a-legal space. Five 
research questions were identified in the introduction as guiding this project:  
 
1. Can we sustain the notion of a-legal space as an ontologically distinct category 
of action which transcends the dichotomy between the legal and the illegal? 
2. Why do actors adopt this approach and what do they hope to achieve?  
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3. By what mechanism might this tactic function to bring about social or political 
change?  
4. When has this approach been successful and what factors may influence its 
impact? 
5. How do different forms of a-legal space differ and to what extent do they really 
constitute a common tactic?  
 
 
These questions, which I discuss in turn, provide the structure for the main part of the 
discussion. I then turn to the theoretical and practical implications of this research, 
before concluding with a discussion of the gaps in this project and avenues for future 
research. I consider the ontological status of a-legal space first, before turning to 
questions 2 to 5 which address its functional value.  
 
The ontological status of a-legal space 
 
The problem with Harnecker’s argument is that institutional politics and illegal 
insurrectionary activity is not a real dichotomy into which all action must fit. The 
Radical Cause referendum did “not fit into the above dichotomy” (Harnecker 2007, 
p.112), but in this it was no different to the new social movements which emerged 
across Latin America in the 1990s. Hence, the elusive notion of an ambiguous other 
legal space appears to be misleading.  
 
However, I have used Hans Lindahl’s (2013) theory of a-legality and legal order to 
show how the referendum and initiatives like it indeed constitute an ontologically 
distinctive legal category of action. As a starting point, I have argued that there are – 
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as Harnecker suggests – many initiatives around the world which take this form. 
These include other unofficial, unauthorised referenda but also peoples’ tribunals, 
citizens’ debt audits, citizens’ monitoring projects and other forms. Despite the 
variety of political, historical and cultural contexts in which they have taken place 
these activities share certain common characteristics, which distinguish them from 
other forms of contentious politics. Firstly, they assume a quasi-legal, quasi-
institutional form, emulating the symbols, processes and language of formal 
institutions of constituted power. Secondly, they do so without any state-sanctioned 
official basis, or - where organised by state or sub-state actors – the initiative exceeds 
any recognized basis in state law. (President Zelaya’s planned fourth ballot box poll is 
one example of the latter kind). Finally, they are framed as a response to institutional 
or democratic failure, and as embodying an alternative. Building on this empirical 
observation, I have shown how these initiatives fit into Lindahl’s (2013) category of a-
legality.  
 
For Lindahl (ibid), certain strange and non-conventional behaviours can be 
characterised as a-legal because they question and contest the way in which a legal 
order divides the legal and the illegal. These behaviours resist classification as either 
legal or illegal within a given legal order, and hence appear as a-legal, because they 
invoke another legal order through appearing as if regulated by this other order. 
Hence, the crucial contribution from Lindahl is the suggestion that a-legality is a 
relational phenomenon: behaviours or situations are a-legal with respect to a 
particular legal order because they challenge how this order draws the boundary 
between the legal and the illegal. Like the behaviours and situations Lindahl 
describes, peoples’ tribunals, unofficial referenda and other a-legal initiatives can be 
characterised as a-legal because they reject the way in which the extant legal order 
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defines the legal and the illegal. A-legal initiatives challenge a given extant legal order, 
and they behave as if in accordance with another legal and/or political order, and 
thereby invoke this other order.  
 
Of course, these initiatives are not quite the same as the behaviours and scenarios 
which typify a-legality for Lindahl. The first most significant difference is that 
Lindahl’s examples, such as land occupations and insurrection, are legally contentious 
and provocative, if not explicitly illegal, in terms of the extant order. In contrast, there 
is often no suggestion that a-legal initiatives have broken the law. They may be 
accompanied by explicitly illegal activity, or be used to justify it, but these initiatives 
are in general lawful. This is significant because in Lindahl’s account the transgression 
of legal boundaries is central. It is only through questioning and challenging extant 
legal boundaries that we can reveal the limits of a legal order. Just as one cannot speak 
directly about what lies outside the extant discursive structures, one cannot speak of 
what lies outside the extant legal order. Through questioning how a legal order draws 
the boundaries between the legal and the illegal, a-legal behaviours suggest that there 
are ways of behaving which exceed existing legal categories and thereby reveal the 
contingency of the extant order and the possibility for alternative ordering. So, if a-
legal initiatives are often unambiguously lawful, how can they hope to challenge the 
extant legal order and reveal its limits?  
 
The answer is that a-legal initiatives challenge the legal order through a different 
channel: they transgress a different kind of legal boundary. They contest not what is 
lawful but what is legally sanctioned, recognized and institutionalized. Through 
enacting an institutional process which could only belong to a different legal, political, 
or cultural order, they challenge the institutions of the extant order and the values 
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and conceptual frameworks on which these institutions are based. This account 
allows us to explain how a-legal initiatives belong to the same category of behaviour 
as Lindahl's a-legality, whilst also recognising how they are different. Hence, I have 
suggested that a-legal initiatives constitute a politically motivated and self-conscious 
variant or sub-category of the broader phenomenon of a-legality which Lindahl 
describes.  
 
A second feature which distinguishes these initiatives from the broader phenomenon 
of a-legality concerns their relationship to the alternative order which is invoked. 
Lindahl decribes a subtly evocative phenomenon whereby actors, behaving in a way 
which does not make sense within the extant legal order, serve to disrupt this legal 
order and “intimate” an alternative order (2013, p. 1). The process in which a-legal 
initiatives engage goes somewhat further than this: through carefully enacting an 
institutional process which exemplifies another order they spell out this other order. 
And as I have shown through an analysis of specific case studies, organisers attempt 
to legitimate and begin to institutionalise elements of this other order. Lindahl notes 
that the French autoréduction protesters attempted to “interpellate” shoppers, 
through engaging them in conversations about what they were doing (ibid, p. 35). For 
a-legal initiatives, efforts at interpellation are much more central. Organisers engage 
and implicate the public in the initiative, whilst trying to build links with existing 
institutional structures, so as to institutionalise what they are doing. To sum up: a-
legal initiatives should be seen as a variant or sub-category of the broader 
phenomenon of a-legality as it is characterised by Lindahl, but which have two 
distinctive features which distinguish them from the wider category of a-legality.  
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The functional value of a-legal space 
 
So why do actors adopt this approach and what do they hope to achieve? The 
scholarly literature on peoples’ tribunals – the most researched form of a-legal space - 
provides an important starting point for exploring this question. However, I criticised 
one dominant account within this literature. Liberal scholars such as Klinghoffer and 
Klinghoffer (2002, p.5) characterise peoples’ tribunals as a “corrective mechanism”, 
which can increase accountability where “powerful countries are shielded from 
sanctions under international law”. The problem with this influential account is that it 
fails to recognise the systemic critique at the heart of these initiatives. It also renders 
them in many cases without value, since on the whole peoples’ tribunals fail to trigger 
legal action within the formal system. A more useful way forward is offered by 
scholars such as Jayan Nayar (2006; 2003; 2001) and Sally Engle Merry (1996) who 
have understood peoples’ tribunals as a form of discursive struggle, and recognised 
the constitutive function they might have. As Merry (ibid, p.79) puts it: peoples 
tribunals have “accepted the symbolic power of law” and involve “the appropriation 
and redeployment of law as a basis for imagining a new social order”. Building on 
these scholars I suggest an alternative to Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer (2002). Peoples’ 
tribunals and other a-legal initiatives are the response of actors who, facing the 
closure of the formal system, attempt to exemplify an alternative. However, the 
peoples’ tribunal or other a-legal space is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The 
hope is that through creating this exemplar, they will create an opening for change 
within the formal legal system. 
 
Focusing on the use of a-legal space in Latin America has offered support for this 
interpretation. The occurrence of a-legal tactics across the continent has correlated 
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with important shifts in Latin American politics associated with the so-called ‘pink 
tide’. Specifically, the tactic is a reflection of and one part of a wider turn to a new 
kind of constitutionalism by governments and civil society across Latin America. New 
Latin American constitutionalism is characterised as a democratic form of 
constitutional regime, in which there is an “opening” in the constituted order, “for 
constituent power to manifest” (Colón-Ríos 2012, p. 103). The new Latin American 
constitutionalist regimes encompass mechanisms for the creation of a constituent 
assembly to be triggered ‘from below’, for example by the collection of signatures 
from a certain percentage of citizens. However, in the absence of formal provisions 
for an ‘opening’, actors turn to the use of a-legal space in an attempt to create one. 
The use of a-legal referenda at critical moments in the struggle for a constituent 
assembly in both Colombia and Honduras provide support for this claim, and I argue, 
for the idea that this is how all a-legal tactics should be conceived. They are attempts 
to create an ‘opening’ for a new political project, where none exists within the formal 
system. 
 
But why should organisers place hope in this tactic as a route to constitutional 
transformation? In other words: by what mechanism might this tactic function to 
bring about social or political change? In chapter 2 I developed a conceptual 
framework through which to understand the relationship between a-legal space and 
political or social change, which I tested and developed in the subsequent case study 
chapters. I argued that a-legal initiatives have the potential to create ‘tipping events’ 
(Wood 2006; Hausknost 2011): dislocatory events which function to rupture the 
political grammar and thereby shift the range of political possibilities available. This 
argument draws on the significant body of literature which emphasises the 
hegemonic function of law, within which we can find support for the claim that 
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expressions of both constituted power and constituent power have hegemonic effects. 
Building on this, I suggested that events which are understood as expressions of 
constituted power or constituent power – from court rulings to referendum results to 
wide scale rioting – have a particular potential to result in tipping events which 
reshape the political grammar. Having proposed this structural connection between 
political grammar and constituted and constituent power, the potential for a-legal 
space as a tool to bring about change becomes clearer. A defining feature of a-legal 
initiatives is their somewhat paradoxical relationship to the oppositional concepts of 
constituted and constituent power. On the one hand, they emulate the form, 
processes, and symbols of existing institutions of constituted power, evidently in an 
effort to establish legitimacy through adherence to these recognised norms. On the 
other hand, organisers claim to be an expression of the ‘constituent will’, and claim 
legitimacy on these grounds. The hypothesis is that where a-legal initiatives 
successfully gain association with both constituted and constituent power they have a 
unique potential to harness the hegemonic influence of both. In these instances, they 
promise to create tipping events which shift the political grammar, and result in a 
new range of political possibilities.  
 
In summary: I argue that there is a structural connection between political grammar, 
and events which are associated with constituted power or constituent power (at 
least in some kinds of societies). And a-legal space allows actors to exploit this 
connection to shift what is deemed possible. Support for this theory comes from the 
first case study I explored: the Colombian student movements’ seventh ballot, in 
which millions of Colombians inserted an unofficial, unauthorised additional ballot 
paper in the ballot box in support of the creation of a constituent assembly. Crucially, 
after this event both Colombian President Barco and the Colombian Supreme Court 
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took actions which were previously considered impossible, but now were possible 
and perhaps even necessary. That the seventh ballot had constituted a tipping event 
which changed the political grammar is one way to explain this course of events.  
 
The fourth research question asks when these initiatives are successful and what 
factors might influence success. Assessing impact is difficult, for several reasons 
(Goodin and Tilly 2006). However, I will start with the Colombian and Honduran 
cases since they were selected on the basis of their seemingly extraordinary impact. 
As a first point, both cases can be understood to support the theory of a-legal space 
which has been developed. If a-legal space functions as a way to shift the political 
grammar and thereby create new opportunities for change through harnessing the 
hegemonic effects of both constituted and constituent power, then initiatives will 
have impact when they do both well. The seventh ballot was particularly successful in 
establishing an association with both constituted and constituent power. Firstly, the 
initiative not only emulated the form of an official referendum of the state, but took 
place literally within and through the formal congressional and regional elections. 
Voters expressed their support for the seventh ballot and the proposed constituent 
assembly at the same time as they exercised their right to vote as citizens. Hence, the 
event successfully merged an a-legal space with an official, legal space, arguably 
enhancing its association with constituted power. At the same time, it generated mass 
participation, and the statements of the Supreme Court and President Barco clearly 
illustrate it was accepted as reflecting the constituent will. One way to account for its 
impact is its success in gaining association with constituted and constituent power.  
 
The Honduran case is more difficult to assess given it was eventually prevented from 
taking place. However, arguably any a-legal initiative led by a president will have a 
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strong association with constituted power, regardless of the initiative’s lack of official 
status or binding implications. The Honduran Congress presumably feared the event 
would generate wide scale participation, and perhaps appear as the ‘constituent will’. 
The drastic actions taken to prevent the poll taking place are testament to its 
perceived potential influence on Honduran politics.  
 
The impact of the Venezuelan Radical Cause party’s referendum is harder to gauge. 
The limited public recall and almost total absence of the event in scholarly and 
popular accounts of the period suggest that the Radical Cause did not create a tipping 
event which radically shifted Venezuelan political grammar. However, the accounts of 
organisers and participants in the event in some cases suggest a significant and 
transformative experience, after which new ways of behaving and thinking were 
possible. As participant Juan Contreras notes of people who did not normally engage 
in political activity for fear of government repression: “That day the people expressed 
themselves” (Interview, 2012). And as General Secretary of the Radical Cause, and 
coordinator of the referendum, Pablo Medina explains, “that the immense majority of 
the referendum rejected Carlos Andrés Pérez…was a political argument”, which when 
submitting evidence against Pérez on corruption charges, functioned to “support this 
constitutional action” (Interview, 2012). The Venezuelan case points to the need for a 
more nuanced account of political grammar. Like discourse, the phenomenon can be 
conceived as layered and heterogeneous within any societal context. Hence tipping 
events which shift the political grammar might be experienced by only some social 
groups rather than only at the macro, whole societal level.  
 
In chapter 5 I addressed one significant objection to the notion of an a-legal space 
political strategy. One key difference between different forms of a-legal space is in the 
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centrality of gathering and presenting new information and ‘evidence’ to the public. 
In some initiatives this forms a central component to their activities and in others this 
component is entirely absent.22 This difference is significant because, arguably, it is 
indicative of an adherence to opposing models of democracy and political change, 
which would undermine the notion of a single a-legal space strategy. Peoples’ 
tribunals and other information-based initiatives appear in many ways like a 
deliberative democratic exercise, where the objective is to inform and educate the 
public so as to enable more informed contributions to policy making from civil 
society. In contrast, non-information-based initiatives cannot be said to fulfil this 
function. Instead they are better conceived through a radical democratic framework. 
Hence perhaps these initiatives reflect fundamentally different approaches to 
working for political change?  
 
However, my analysis of the climate tribunal and the approach that was taken to 
influence public consciousness, beliefs, and behaviour, suggests otherwise. The 
Bolivian climate tribunal’s use of complex legal arguments, supported by evidence, 
can indeed be understood in deliberative democratic terms; but it might be better 
understood in a way which exceeds the deliberative democratic framework. The 
tribunal functioned as an ‘exemplar’ in a Kuhnian sense, creating a concrete ‘problem-
solution’, in which climate injustice is the problem and a particular application of UN 
Human Rights Law grounded in an anti-capitalist political analysis is the solution. On 
this basis, information and non-information-based a-legal initiatives can be 
understood within the same broad theoretical framework of radical democracy (with 
some caveats, as discussed in chapter 5). The difference in approach can be explained 
                                                        
22  See Appendix D for the relevance and centrality of information and ‘evidence’ in different forms of 
a-legal space.  
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through the discursive context in which they are employed. Information-based 
initiatives are more relevant and more useful at the earlier stages in a hegemonic 
project, where the objective is to create the foundations to a new discursive 
formation and help establish a source of authority for the project. However non-
information-based initiatives are suitable at the later stages in a hegemonic project, 
where a discourse is already well formed. Hence, returning to the question of 
assessing impact, the question for the climate tribunal and other information-based 
initiatives is perhaps different to the question posed to the first three case studies. 
Perhaps we should not ask, ‘did they create a tipping event which shifted the political 
grammar?’ But instead, how effective were they at creating an exemplar for the 
possibility of being and thinking differently, which at some later stage may be 
adopted more widely? Within this framework, the climate tribunal created a powerful 
exemplar of climate justice.  
 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
 
This project has various theoretical implications. Firstly, I hope to have made a 
convincing case for how we should understand this previously un-theorised tactic 
which is employed by civil society, social movements, and sometimes state and sub-
state actors, with increasing regularity. Secondly, the concept of a-legal space makes a 
useful contribution to contemporary debates on new Latin American 
constitutionalism. As I have shown, a-legal space has been used at critical moments in 
the struggle to convene a constituent assembly in both Colombia and Honduras, 
suggesting the concept fills a gap in scholarly accounts of how constitutional 
transformation sometimes comes about. In most countries, outside of Latin America’s 
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ALBA block, governments are not interested in adopting a new more democratic form 
of constitutional regime in which mechanisms are created for the periodic exercise of 
constituent power. A-legal space offers one way to understand how actors sometimes 
attempt to create such an opening in the formal constituted order, in the absence of 
formal mechanisms.  
 
Thirdly, the project contributes to the study of a-legality and a-legal challenges to the 
legal order which Hans Lindahl (2013) has initiated. Specifically, I hope to have shed 
some light on how those consciously seeking to challenge and transform aspects of 
the extant legal and political order make use of the a-legal category of action. Also, 
through positing another way in which legal boundaries can be transgressed, the 
project suggests a complexified account of a-legality and how it can disrupt the legal 
order. A-legality can question not only the kind of behaviours which are allowed 
(lawful), but the those which are advocated (legally recognised, sanctioned and 
institutionalised) within a given legal order. A-legality of this other kind, not 
considered by Lindahl, is not only part of the picture, it allows for a more empowered 
form of resistance. Examples of politically motivated a-legal behaviour, in Lindahl’s 
framework, which include the Brazillian Landless Movement (MST) and the French 
protestors’ conducting an autoréduction (amongst others) appear in many ways as a 
form of self-defence. Whilst they may ‘intimate’ another possible order, their primary 
function is to resist negative consequences of the extant political and legal order. A-
legal initiatives, on the other hand, have greater propositional potential, allowing 
actors to imagine and prefigure a better way of ordering society altogether. The 
French autoréduction protestors, for example, don’t ultimately seek a political and 
legal system in which the poor receive free handouts from supermarkets of luxury 
goods. They seek a society in which luxury is shared and available to all, regardless of 
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wealth, and indeed where the question of whether the poor should have foie gras 
would not arise. With the autoréduction they question and resist the existing 
capitalist legal order. But if they organised an a-legal initiative, they would imagine, 
articulate and begin to legitimate some alternative way of organising society. This is 
not to suggest that either approach is better or more useful, but an appreciation of 
both types of a-legal challenge is necessary for a full picture of how the a-legal might 
be a useful political tool.  
  
In addition to these theoretical implications I hope for the project to be of practical 
use to those who are attempting to make use of a-legal space as a strategy for political 
change. Though far from offering a step by step guide, this project provides a 
framework through which to understand how and why this tactic might be effective. 
It suggests when and for what discursive purpose different kinds of a-legal spaces are 
appropriate, and it offers some insight into how to capture the potential of this 
strategy. As just one example, organisers might explore how they can merge an a-
legal initiative with existing, official legal spaces, as was so successful in the case of 
the seventh ballot.  
  
 
Future research 
 
This project is intended as a preliminary investigation into the use of a-legal space as 
political strategy. There are several notable gaps, which present avenues for future 
research. Firstly, I have been limited by time and resources to a study of four case 
studies, only two in-depth, and only two forms of a-legal space: the tribunal and the 
referendum forms. Future research could explore how different kinds of a-legal space 
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have been used, and the extent to which these fit within the framework which has 
been developed in this thesis. Of particular value would be research into the use of 
Citizens’ Debt Audits which are being employed with increasing frequency by civil 
society groups, and sometimes governments, to challenge allegedly illegal and 
illegitimate national debts owed to foreign funders.  
 
Another gap in this project is an in-depth consideration of the other ways that a-legal 
spaces differ. The role and centrality of the information component is a key 
difference, and as I have shown, a significant one. However, there are other 
potentially important ways in which different forms of a-legal space and different 
instances of a particular form diverge. One example is the mode of participation 
available to participants and the wider public. Whilst some peoples’ tribunals allow 
audience members to play a key role in shaping the agenda, in others the audience 
plays a mainly passive role. Referenda enable and necessitate a more active (though 
not deliberative) form of participation. These differences will affect the potential for 
the formation and type of new democratic subjectivities which are created.   
 
Leading on from this, one phenomenon I would have liked to explore in more depth is 
the use of a-legal space by actors in positions of constituted power. Whilst President 
Zelaya’s planned poll failed, in other instances Latin American governments have 
used the a-legal approach to great effect. In 2008, for example, the Ecuadorian 
government defaulted on their Global Bonds debts, citing the report of the Public Debt 
Audit Commission which had found “illegality and illegitimacy” in Ecuador’s foreign 
debt records (quoted in Faiola 2008). The Public Debt Audit Commission was made up 
of Ecuadorian civil society organisations, but with the official support and funding of 
the Ecuadorian government (ibid.). The government of President Zelaya and his 
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planned fourth ballot box initiative, by contrast, had limited active civil society and 
social movement support prior to the coup. Arguably this was a contributing factor in 
Zelaya’s failure to successfully use an a-legal referendum to shift the political 
grammar in Honduras. Investigation of initiatives such as these will offer an 
interesting contribution to research into the precarious relationship between states 
and social movements in Latin America, which is so central to contemporary debates.   
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Appendix B 
 
Jury members, the International Tribunal on Climate Justice 
 
Jury member Organisational affiliations, relevant credentials 
Brid Brenna, Holland Coordinator of the Alternative Regionalisms Programme for the 
Transnational Institute (Dutch NGO/Research institute) 
Nora Cortiñas, Argentina Founder of Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, a social movement 
which campaigns for justice for Argentina’s disappeared 
people. She is also a university professor and has carried out 
many studies into the connections between the military 
dictatorship, corrupt foreign debt and economic crisis in 
Argentina. 
Beverly Keene, Argentina Coordinator of the Jubilee South International Network (Debt 
focused campaigning network).  
Tom Kucharz, Spain Member of the secretariat of Ecologistas en Acción, a Spanish 
environmental NGO and movement, and from 'Who owes who?' a 
Spanish campaign for the “abolition of foreign debt and return of 
the ecological debt” (Quien debe a Quien?, 2015). 
Alicia Muñoz, Chile President of the National Association of Rural and Indigenous 
Women and representative of the international peasants movement 
La Via Campesina. 
Ricardo Arnoldo Navarro Pineda, 
El Salvador 
Former head of Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), and co-
founder of environmental NGO Salvadorian Institute for 
Appropriate Technology. 
Miguel Palacin Quispe, Peru General Coordinator of the Coordinating Committee of Andean 
Indigenous Organisations (Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones 
Indígenas – CAOI). 
Professor Joseph Henry Vogel, 
Puerto Rico 
Economist, University of Puerto Rico and the Latin American 
Faculty of Social Sciences (FLASCO – Ecuador). The latter is an 
international organisation which was founded at the UNESCO 
conference of 1956, with a remit to develop a space for reflection 
which would drive the development of Latin American societies. 
 
(Fundación Solón 2009b) 
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Appendix C 
 
Cases presented at the International Tribunal on Climate Justice Preliminary 
Hearing, October 2009, Cochabamba, Bolivia 
 
 
Name of case Claimant Accused  Details 
“Denunciation of 
human rights 
abuses resulting 
from global 
warming for acts 
and omissions of 
the countries 
included in Annex 1 
of the UN 
Framework 
Convention on 
Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)” 
The Khapi 
community, La 
Paz, Bolivia.  
Annex 1 
countries in 
UNFCCC 
The Khapi are an indigenous 
Aymaran community of forty eight 
families, based at the foot of the 
Illimani glacier, in the La Paz 
region of Bolivia. The community 
practise subsistence farming and 
the Illimani is their only source of 
water. Jury and audience members 
heard how the rapid shrinkage of 
the Illimani glacier represents an 
existential threat to the Khapi. 
Whilst in the short term water 
levels have increased, scientists 
have warned that extreme water 
shortages are imminent. The 
community already experience 
weather extremes including 
droughts and heavy rains which 
destroy crops, and now struggle to 
provide sufficient food for their 
own subsistence. Young people are 
increasingly forced to relocate to 
the cities in search of work, and 
older members talk of their sense 
and fear that they are losing their 
culture and way of life. 
“Victims of climate 
change and the 
negligence of the 
Salvadorean State, 
in impoverished 
communities of the 
northern zone of 
Jiquilisco 
municipality” 
Association of 
United 
Communities of 
the Bajo Lempa, 
(ACUDESBAL); 
community 
organisation, El 
Salvador. 
Salvadorean 
State 
The case sought to show the 
impact of rising sea levels, as well 
as flooding and droughts, on the 
low lying communities in the 
Lower Lempa River region, in El 
Salvador (Fundación Sólon, 2009). 
Only small increases in sea level 
have already led to significant loss 
of land in this region, reducing the 
amount of farmable land on which 
the mainly impoverished 
communities have to depend on 
(Independent, 2012) 
 
“'FACE PROFAFOR', 
claim against the 
Dutch Foundation 
Forest Absorbing 
Carbon Emissions 
Acción 
Ecológica; NGO, 
Ecuador.  
The Dutch 
Foundation: 
FACE 
PROFAFOR 
PROFAFOR is an Ecuadorian 
private company established by 
the Dutch Foundation FACE, with 
the aim of establishing forest 
plantations for the capture of 
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and others” carbon dioxide. Acción Ecológica 
sought to highlight the negative 
impacts of the initiative on local 
communities and the country's 
primary ecosystem, including 
displacement of community 
activities, negative environmental 
impacts on the soil and loss of 
water retention, and overall 
increases in carbon released as a 
result of the plantation. The 
claimants sought to demonstrate - 
as was argued in their in-depth 
earlier report on the subject – that 
such impacts “make the project 
FACE PROFAFOR an absurd idea... 
that only succeeds in diverting 
financial and political resources 
from restructuring the use and 
generation of energy” (Acción 
Ecológica 2005, p. 43). 
“The climactic 
impacts caused by 
the Initiative for 
the Regional 
Integration of 
South America 
(IIRSA)” 
Bolivian NGO, 
Bridge between 
Cultures 
Foundation.  
 
The three 
members of the 
Technical 
Coordination of 
IIRSA; the 
Inter-American 
Development 
Bank, the 
Andean 
Corporation of 
Fomento and 
FONPLATA 
This case addressed the culpability 
of the three members of the 
Technical Coordination of the 
Initiative for the Regional 
Integration of South America: the 
Inter-American Development 
Bank, the Andean Corporation of 
Fomento and FONPLATA, in 
addition to other financial entities 
such as the Brazilian Development 
Bank, the European Union and 
Santander Bank (Fundación Sólon, 
2009). 
 
“Violation of 
Human Rights, 
Environmental 
Rights, Cultural 
Rights and Workers 
Rights, by the 
implementation of 
the false solution to 
climate change, the 
agrofuel – sugar 
cane ethanol, in the 
area of Valle del Río 
Cauca” * 
Sugar Cane 
Workers of 
Cauca, 
Colombia 
The Colombian 
government 
Sugar cane workers of Cauca had 
been involved in a number of large 
scale strikes in the years 
preceding the climate tribunal's 
preliminary hearing, including a 
strike of 32,000 workers in 
September 2008 
(Corteros.Blogspot, 2008). The 
sugar industry workers of the 
Cauca region in Colombia are 
employed indirectly as outsourced 
workers by the thirteen large 
ethanol plants and sugar mills, and 
do not enjoy basic labour rights 
(IPS, 2008).  Workers tend to work 
between twelve and sixteen hour 
days, with one day off per month, 
highly dangerous conditions, and 
poverty wages (ibid.). The 
following statement from the 
United Workers' Federation of 
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Colombia encapsulates the case 
against ethanol production, in this 
context:  
“Ethanol production in the 
region, as it currently 
stands, responds to a 
demand from the countries 
of the North, who need to 
solve their power shortage, 
and who could not care less 
if local oligopolies profit 
from the expansion of 
sugarcane single-crop 
agriculture at the obvious 
expense of workers, 
indigenous communities, 
farmers, consumers, the 
environment and food 
sovereignty” (United 
Workers' Federation of 
Colombia, cited in Iglesias & 
Pedraza, 2008).  
 “Children with 
excess lead in their 
blood in Cerro de 
Pasco, Peru, due to 
gases and other 
polluting elements” 
Civil Association 
Centre for 
Popular Labour 
Culture, (the 
Labour Centre), 
a non-profit 
civil 
association, 
Peru.   
Volcan Mining 
Company, SA, 
and the 
Peruvian State 
Case number six addressed a 
different dimension through 
looking at the devastating health 
impacts of mining projects.  
“DOE RUN PERU” CooperAccion; 
Non-profit 
organisation, 
Peru 
 
Doe Run Peru 
and the 
Peruvian 
government 
This case was made against the 
government of Peru and the 
company Doe Run Peru, which 
melts and refines metals, for 
pollution in the Junin Region of 
Peru 
(Fundación Solón 2009b) 
 
* It is noteworthy that the Colombian representative from the Association of Sugar 
Cane Producers, Sr. José Oney Valencia Llanos, who was due to present the Colombian 
case to the tribunal, was unable to attend the event. Sr. Valencia Llanos was detained 
by Colombian security forces upon boarding the plane to Bolivia, and prevented from 
leaving the country (Fundación Solón 2009b, p. 29).  
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Appendix D 
 
The role of information in different kinds of a-legal space 
 
Type of a-
legal space 
 
Specific cases 
The retrieval, 
compilation 
and 
presentation of 
information to 
the public is 
central to the 
project  
 
Details 
 
 
 
 
Peoples' 
Tribunals  
The Russell 
Tribunal on 
Vietnam 
✓  Accounts of the tribunal describe how 
the panellists (and the members of the 
audience) heard extensive evidence, in 
the form of reports, video footage and 
witness testimony, which had been 
compiled by the specially established 
legal, historical and scientific 
commissions of the tribunal (Duffet, 
1970). Data that ‘filled many trunks and 
file cabinets’ was collated and analysed 
by the various special commissions 
(Shoenman, quoted in Duffet, 1970, 
p.10). This included information from 
the tribunal’s various fact finding 
missions in Vietnam, including North 
Vietnam where the western media were 
refused access. (ibid.). 
Peoples' 
Commissions 
The High Pay 
Commission 
✓  The commission ran for one year, from 
November 2010 to November 2011, 
publishing several reports and a set of 
recommendations for companies and 
the government. Recommendations 
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were based on extensive interviews 
with company directors, and 
information submitted by the public. 
The commissioners were independent 
and made the recommendations on the 
basis of research compiled by the 
researchers for the commission 
(Deborah Hargreaves, The High Pay 
Commission, Interview, 2013; Neal 
Lawson, Compass, 2013) 
Lewisham 
Peoples' 
Commission of 
Inquiry into the 
closure of 
Lewisham 
Hospital 
✓  The Commission heard from 47 witnesses, 
who were questioned by barristers, in front 
of a panel of legal lawyers and an audience 
of four hundred people (SaveLewisham 
Hospital, 201323).  
Feminist 
Judgement 
Writing 
Projects 
The Canadian 
Courts of Women 
✓  Feminist legal scholars re-write judgements 
of the Canadian Supreme Court to illustrate 
the potential for a different reading of 
equality legislation.  
Civil society 
debt audits 
Public Debt Audit 
Commission, 
Ecuador 
✓  The Ecuadorian Public Debt Audit 
Commission was organised by a cross 
section of Ecuadorian civil society 
organisations with the support of the 
Ecuadorian government. Extensive 
information was gathered on the country's 
debt, participating groups then carried out 
an assessment of which parts of the debt 
were legitimate. The process was carefully 
documented and made publicly available 
(CADTM, 2011). 
                                                        
23 http://www.savelewishamhospital.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Lewisham-Commission-
reportb.pdf 
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Quasi-
institutional 
monitoring 
projects 
The Police 
Monitoring Unit, 
Manchester City 
Council 
✓ Members of the public were invited to 
report experiences of police misconduct 
to the Unit. Articles in the weekly Police 
Watch magazine documented incidents 
of police racism, violence, and lack of 
follow up on gender-based violence, 
which were reported by members of the 
public. These experiences went largely 
unreported in the mainstream media.  
Popular 
referenda 
Catalan 
Independence 
Referenda 
X Independence referenda took place across 
Catalonia in 2009.  
Radical Cause 
referendum on 
President Pérez 
X  
 
Unofficial 
embassy (not 
recognised by 
other states) 
The Aboriginal 
Tent Embassy 
X Organisers can be understood to have 
created a space in which arguments not 
heard in mainstream debates or media were 
articulated. In many instances these will 
have included particular historical and 
other facts, intended to support organisers' 
claims. However, there was no large scale 
nor systematic effort to gather information, 
and present it to the public or some 
purportedly impartial third party 'jury' or 
panel. 
Free States Keele Free State X Like the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 
organisers used the space that they had 
created to articulate marginal and counter-
hegemonic ideas and critiques of the 
Thatcher government. But no systematic 
efforts at information gathering, 
organisation and presentation took place.  
 
411 
 
 
Appendix E 
 
Advice to neighbourhood associations and other civil society groups who 
wanted to participate in the referendum, published in the press in the fortnight 
before the referendum was due to take place 
 
Participants were advised to;  
 “1. determine the place and time in which the referendum will be carried out, and notify the Radical 
Cause office at the Supreme Electoral Comission. 
 2. Set up a ballot box, which can be made out of a cardboard box.  
 3. The Referendum ballot paper should contain the following question:  
 'Are you in agreement that President Carlos Andrés Pérez continue governing? Yes/ No' 
 4. When the voting period has been finished, come to the public count of the results, and specify 
how many 'yes', how many 'No' and how many null votes were deposited.  
 5. Draw up the certificate of the results, and send it to the Radical Cause Office in the Supreme 
Electoral Comission. Centro Simón Bolívar, Mezzanina, Caracas, and communicate them via 
telephone to the numbers 42-11-04 and 483-32-02.  
 6. The national results will be made known to the public via the national press.  
7. Any additional information please communicate via the numbers listed above” 
 
(The Radical Cause, Ultimás Noticias, June 1st 1992, p. 9) 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
The Honduran National Front of Popular Resistance for a Constituent Assembly 
 
The profound cultural and social significance of the National Front of Popular Resistance and 
the struggle for a constituent assembly are explained by Rafael Murillo Selva, a well-known 
Honduran playright:  
 “the eruption of the National Front of Popular Resistance is the most relevant cultural 
event of our supposed republican life, only comparable to Francisco Morazán’s struggle to 
keep Central America united (in the 19th Century)…The emergence and formation of the 
Resistance Front in all corners of Honduras is like a high intensity earthquake that leaves no 
structure standing. This earthquake has broken the ideological apparatus that has shaped our 
values, belief systems, and customs. Our codes are changing. In this sense, resisting is change, 
and change involves transforming ourselves deep inside…We have acquired a new sense of 
everything, of doing politics, practising religion, education, work, family, sex, love, art, 
science, sports, communication…We are building nothing less but a counterhegemonic 
culture! Bertha Caceres, a leader of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations 
(COPINH) sums it up in a sentence. She says: ‘the coup created the Resistance Front and the 
Resistance Front has changed our way of life... the coup has allowed Hondurans for the first 
time to feel a sense of belonging and enabled us to draw our own path (to the future). We 
have rationally and emotionally become aware of our historical being and are now more able 
to connect to other processes occurring in the region. Appropriating our history gives us a 
sense of a higher purpose in life that goes beyond our personal lives. This explains why the 
murders of hundreds of resistance members have not caused fear, instead they have served 
to reenergize and keep the struggle going.” (Cited in Mendoza 2012). 
 
 
 
